Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Deputy Brian Williams responded to a domestic-violence call at Tina Hight’s residence, where two dogs ran out toward him as Hight opened her door. Williams shouted warnings and fired a shot that caused the dogs to retreat. As Hight attempted to bring her dogs inside, a small Pomeranian mix ran toward Williams, prompting him to fire again in the dog’s direction. The shot missed the dog but ricocheted and struck Hight, leaving a bullet fragment in her leg.Hight filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to Deputy Williams on the basis of qualified immunity, concluding that Williams did not violate Hight’s constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, making all reasonable inferences in favor of Hight. The appellate court considered whether Deputy Williams’s actions constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure of Hight. Applying the requirement that a seizure by force must involve an officer’s objectively manifested intent to restrain the person affected, the court found no evidence that Williams intended to restrain Hight; his actions and statements were aimed at stopping the dog. The court held that accidental force, or force directed at another target, does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s seizure standard as articulated in Torres v. Madrid and related precedents.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Deputy Williams did not seize Hight within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus did not violate her constitutional rights. The court declined to address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. View "Hight v. Williams" on Justia Law

Several senior financial advisors resigned from a national investment advisory firm’s Des Moines branch to join a competitor that was opening a new local office. After their departure, nearly all remaining advisors at the branch also resigned en masse and joined the competitor, which offered substantial incentives. The resignations occurred despite restrictive covenants in the former advisors’ employment contracts, which limited their ability to solicit clients, disclose confidential information, and recruit other employees. The competitor and the departing advisors soon began servicing many of their former clients, resulting in a substantial loss of business for their previous employer.Following these events, the original firm filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, alleging breach of contract, tortious interference, and theft of trade secrets. The district court initially denied a temporary restraining order but later granted a broad preliminary injunction. This injunction prohibited the former advisors from servicing or soliciting covered clients, using confidential information, or recruiting employees, and it barred the competitor from using confidential information or interfering with employment agreements. The defendants sought a stay but were denied by both the district court and the appellate court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the preliminary injunction. The appellate court determined that the record did not show a likelihood of irreparable harm that could not be compensated by money damages, as required for preliminary injunctive relief. The court found that the alleged financial harms were calculable and that the claimed destruction of the Des Moines branch had already occurred, rendering injunctive relief ineffective for preventing future harm. The Eighth Circuit therefore vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Choreo, LLC v. Lors" on Justia Law

Abrahim Fofana, a Liberian national, attempted to enter the United States with fraudulent documents in 2001. After disclosing his fundraising activities for the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and claiming fear of persecution due to his affiliation, he was granted asylum by an immigration judge. In 2002, Fofana applied to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident. In 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his application, determining he was inadmissible because he had solicited funds for ULIMO, which was classified as a Tier III terrorist organization under federal law.Fofana challenged the denial in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, arguing that USCIS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that collateral estoppel precluded his inadmissibility finding. The district court initially ruled in his favor on collateral estoppel grounds, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to Fofana, rejecting the government’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction, and finding that Fofana was not inadmissible for engaging in terrorist activity. The court also concluded that USCIS’s determination regarding ULIMO was arbitrary and capricious and that the record did not support the finding that Fofana knew or should have known of ULIMO’s terrorist activities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s decision on adjustment of status, finding that federal law precludes judicial review of both discretionary and non-discretionary determinations made by the Secretary regarding such applications. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fofana v. Noem" on Justia Law

On December 25, 2019, a patrol sergeant noticed a van idling in a driveway, twice encountered it, and approached the vehicle. The driver, Raymond Kelley, identified himself and his residence. The sergeant observed signs of alcohol and learned Kelley had a prior DUI and an active warrant. Kelley exited, was patted down, and sat on a wall; after asking to call his wife and being denied, Kelley ran up the driveway. The sergeant pursued and tackled Kelley, gaining control of his wrist. A deputy arrived after Kelley was tackled and assisted with handcuffing. Kelley complained of an arm injury, received medical attention, and was cited for public intoxication and resisting law enforcement before being released. Disputed facts center on the degree of Kelley’s resistance and the force used during handcuffing.Kelley sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful arrest and excessive force against the officers in both their official and individual capacities. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the officers on the false arrest claim and on all claims against them in their official capacities. However, the court denied qualified immunity to both officers on the excessive force claim in their individual capacities, finding that disputed facts about Kelley’s conduct and the techniques used precluded summary judgment and should be resolved by a jury.Reviewing this interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that the district court erred by failing to construe disputed facts in the light most favorable to Kelley and by not completing the required two-prong qualified immunity analysis. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying qualified immunity and remanded the case for a more detailed assessment, instructing the district court to consider both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis after properly construing the facts. View "Kelley v. Pruett" on Justia Law

A group of patients civilly committed under Minnesota law challenged the state's sex offender treatment program, alleging inadequate treatment and unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The lawsuit was brought as a class action, initially filed pro se and later supported by counsel through the Minnesota Federal Bar Association’s Pro Se Project. During the litigation, the patients, citing indigence and the need for expert testimony, requested court-appointed experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 706. Both parties jointly nominated experts, and in 2013, they recommended a 50/50 split of expert costs. However, the court initially allocated all costs to the defendants, reserving the option to adjust later.After more than a decade of litigation, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled in favor of the state officials on all claims. The officials then sought to recover litigation costs, including expert fees, as prevailing parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). The district court declined to award any costs to the officials, citing the plaintiffs' indigence, good faith, public importance of the issues, vigorous litigation, difficulty and closeness of the issues, and potential chilling effect on future litigants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court failed to consider the plaintiffs’ 2013 recommendation to share expert costs and did not adequately weigh their acknowledged ability to pay half at that time. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s cost judgment and remanded with instructions to award half of the expert costs to the prevailing defendants, to be assessed jointly and severally against the named plaintiffs. View "Karsjens v. Gandhi" on Justia Law

A man named Jordan was incarcerated in the Madison County Jail in Iowa, where he exhibited signs of acute mental health distress, including a recent history of suicide attempts, hearing voices, and expressing thoughts of self-harm. His parents and girlfriend raised concerns about his mental state to jail staff. In response, Scott Thomas, a Jail Diversion Case Manager employed by Eyerly-Ball Community Mental Health Services, met with Jordan, who disclosed his mental health struggles and suicidal thoughts. Thomas reported to jail staff only that Jordan said he would not harm himself while in custody, omitting other serious statements. Ten minutes after being returned to his cell, Jordan died by suicide.The Paynes, Jordan’s parents, sued Thomas and Eyerly-Ball for negligence in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The district court dismissed the federal claims and retained jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Later, the court granted summary judgment to Thomas and Eyerly-Ball on the negligence claims, holding that they owed no legal duty to Jordan under Iowa law and relevant sections of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Thomas and Eyerly-Ball undertook a duty to assess and communicate Jordan’s suicide risk and whether their actions increased the risk of harm or caused jail staff to rely on their assessment. The court held that, under Iowa law, summary judgment was inappropriate on the question of duty based on an undertaking. However, it agreed that no duty arose from a custodial relationship, as Thomas and Eyerly-Ball did not have custody of Jordan. The appellate court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Payne v. Eyerly-Ball" on Justia Law

Aguilar-Hernandez, a citizen of Guatemala, began a relationship with Arreaga Soto at age fifteen. After the birth of their child, Jose, she experienced repeated sexual and physical abuse from Arreaga Soto, who threatened her life and verbally abused her. Despite multiple attempts to leave, she reconciled with him each time, but the abuse continued. In 2016, Aguilar-Hernandez and her son left Guatemala and were apprehended at the U.S. border. She applied for asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, with her son seeking derivative relief.An Immigration Judge denied all applications, finding that Aguilar-Hernandez failed to establish a nexus between the alleged persecution and her membership in the proposed social groups. The judge concluded that the abuse stemmed from a personal relationship and not from her membership in a particular social group. The judge also found no evidence that the Guatemalan government acquiesced in torture. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed all findings and denials.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the Board’s decision, applying de novo review to legal questions and substantial evidence review to factual findings. The Eighth Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that Aguilar-Hernandez’s membership in the proposed social groups was incidental or tangential to the motive for abuse, and that she did not show persecution “on account of” such membership. The court further found that she failed to meet the higher standard required for withholding of removal and did not provide particularized evidence that she would more likely than not be tortured with government acquiescence upon return. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit denied both petitions for review. View "Aguilar-Hernandez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Darrick Ferguson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of federal law. At the time of sentencing, Ferguson had three prior felony convictions, one of which was under Arkansas law for delivery of a controlled substance—specifically, cocaine. The district court determined that all three prior convictions, including the Arkansas drug conviction, qualified as predicate offenses for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum sentence for individuals with three or more prior convictions for “serious drug offenses.” Ferguson was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas found that Ferguson’s Arkansas conviction qualified as a serious drug offense under the ACCA. Ferguson appealed, contending that the Arkansas statute under which he was convicted criminalizes a broader range of cocaine isomers than are covered by the federal Controlled Substances Act, and therefore, his conviction should not count as a predicate offense for ACCA purposes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Ferguson’s Arkansas conviction qualified as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Applying the categorical approach, the court held that the Arkansas statute criminalizes all cocaine isomers, while the federal law only covers specific ones. Because the Arkansas statute is broader and punishes conduct not included in the federal definition, Ferguson’s conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit vacated Ferguson’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the ACCA enhancement. The court did not address Ferguson’s argument regarding his burglary conviction since the drug conviction was dispositive. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Two individuals were charged with multiple criminal offenses following an encounter with law enforcement. The initial police contact arose when an officer observed their vehicle driving at night without a functioning license plate light. After the officer followed the vehicle, one passenger exited and ran away, prompting further investigation. The officer questioned the driver, who admitted to having a suspended license and denied ownership of the car. Other officers arrived, and both individuals were eventually detained and handcuffed. A search of the vehicle revealed marijuana, methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and identification for the passenger. Subsequent criminal charges against both individuals were dismissed after a state court granted their motions to suppress the evidence.After the dismissal of the state charges, the two individuals filed a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. They brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, and asserted additional claims under state law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants—local officers and government entities—concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some state law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the federal claims against two officers. The Eighth Circuit held that the officers had, at minimum, arguable reasonable suspicion to justify the initial detention, that the warrantless search of the vehicle was permissible under the plain view doctrine, and that the arrests were supported by probable cause or, at least, arguable probable cause. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Valdivia v. Porsch" on Justia Law

Robbie Dean Fetters was convicted by a jury in 2011 of several serious offenses, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine, and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Following his conviction, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa imposed a downward-variant sentence of 320 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Fetters later developed multiple significant medical conditions, such as cirrhosis, diabetes, and complications with a feeding tube, and is classified by the Bureau of Prisons as a Level Three chronic care inmate.In 2020, Fetters sought compassionate release from the district court, arguing that his health issues warranted a reduction in his sentence. The district court denied the motion, finding that he did not establish that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) supported release. In 2024, Fetters renewed his motion for compassionate release, emphasizing the progression and severity of his medical conditions. Again, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied the request, concluding that his medical needs, while serious, did not amount to “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release and that the Bureau of Prisons could provide adequate care.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court properly exercised its broad discretion, considered both the guideline and BOP definitions of “terminal illness,” and thoroughly evaluated Fetters’s health and criminal history. The court further found that the district court appropriately weighed the § 3553(a) factors and did not err in denying compassionate release. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Fetters" on Justia Law