Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers on allegations by a Minnesota-based health insurer that several related pharmaceutical companies carried out an unlawful scheme involving the distribution and sale of repackaged and adulterated oncology drugs. The scheme allegedly involved breaking sterile seals on medication vials, pooling overfill amounts—which were not intended for patient use—and creating pre-filled syringes that were then sold to healthcare providers. These syringes were ultimately administered to cancer patients, including many insured under programs operated by the plaintiff. The defendants did not themselves submit claims for reimbursement, but the plaintiff asserts it paid for treatments using these adulterated drugs, unaware of their compromised quality.Prior to this lawsuit, the scheme was the subject of other civil actions and federal investigations, including qui tam actions and a federal criminal prosecution. The defendants disclosed these investigations in annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the events received media attention beginning in 2012. In 2017, a related company pleaded guilty to federal charges, admitting to the repackaging scheme, and paid significant fines and settlements. The plaintiff filed suit in 2023, asserting claims for common-law fraud, unjust enrichment, and violations of several Minnesota consumer protection statutes. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the complaint, finding the claims were barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations, and that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently plead fraudulent concealment to toll the limitations period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. It concluded that publicly available disclosures and the plaintiff’s own allegations established that the plaintiff should have discovered its causes of action no later than 2016. Because the plaintiff did not file suit until 2023, its claims were untimely. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that all claims were barred by the statute of limitations. View "United HealthCare Services, Inc. v. AmerisourceBergen Corporation" on Justia Law

Shelly Ketcher was employed as a bookkeeper for South Delta Aviation (SDA) and also managed the personal affairs of the owner, D.R. Over a five-year period, she embezzled about $2.7 million from SDA and D.R. by forging more than a thousand checks, making them payable to herself, family, and friends. Ketcher concealed her extensive criminal history of prior fraud and embezzlement convictions when she was hired. The embezzlement was discovered after D.R. found he was delinquent on property taxes and confronted Ketcher, who attempted to cover up her actions with forged documents.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas handled Ketcher’s guilty plea to one count of money laundering and one count of filing a false federal income tax return. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated an advisory guidelines range of 92 to 115 months. At sentencing, after hearing victim impact statements and arguments from both sides, the court imposed an upward variance, sentencing Ketcher to a total of 156 months in prison—120 months for money laundering and a consecutive 36 months for the tax offense. The court cited the egregiousness of the offense and Ketcher’s repeated similar crimes as aggravating factors, outweighing her mitigating circumstances.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Ketcher argued that her sentence was substantively unreasonable, asserting that the district court gave insufficient weight to mitigating factors, imposed a harsher sentence than similarly situated defendants, and was motivated by personal animosity. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the upward variance, found the court’s reasoning and weighing of factors appropriate, and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Ketcher" on Justia Law

Empirical Prime, LLC defaulted on a loan issued by Enterprise Bank, violating the loan agreement by obtaining additional loans from other banks. Officers of Empirical allegedly submitted inaccurate financial statements and manipulated documents to secure these loans, as well as commingled and misappropriated funds. After the default, Enterprise Bank sought the appointment of a receiver, resulting in Brent King being appointed as receiver for Empirical. King, acting as receiver, sent letters to Texas Insurance Company (TIC) asserting that Empirical was owed coverage under a Directors and Officers Liability Policy, citing losses from the officers’ alleged misconduct.The case was initiated in Missouri state court by King, alleging breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay under Missouri law. TIC removed the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri and moved to dismiss, arguing King lacked standing and that his claims failed to meet the policy’s requirements for coverage. The district court found that King had standing but concluded he failed to sufficiently allege either a “Claim” or a “Loss” as defined by the policy, because his letters to TIC were not demands against Empirical and there was no allegation of a legal obligation to pay resulting from a claim. The court granted TIC’s motion to dismiss and denied King’s motions to alter the judgment and to file an amended complaint, finding amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that King’s complaint did not plausibly allege a “Claim” or “Loss” triggering coverage under the policy, and that the district court did not err in denying leave to amend because the proposed amendments would not cure these deficiencies. Thus, the dismissal and denial of leave to amend were upheld. View "King v. Texas Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a lead engineer employed by JanCo FS3, LLC (doing business as Velociti Services), worked at UMB Bank's Technology Operations Center in Kansas City and later at the 1010 Grand Building. He had a permanent disabled parking placard due to an ankle replacement, which affected his mobility. After his building assignment changed, he requested to park in a handicap spot at 1010 Grand, rather than his assigned spot at the Tech Center. Velociti requested updated medical documentation to support his accommodation request, but the plaintiff only provided his handicap placard renewal paperwork, which did not explain his disability or limitations. Despite repeated requests and deadline extensions from Velociti, he did not submit the required medical certification. He continued to park in the unassigned garage, received disciplinary warnings, and was ultimately fired for insubordination.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient medical documentation to support his accommodation request and did not demonstrate that the defendants’ actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. The court held that the employer’s enforcement of its parking policy and subsequent termination of the plaintiff for insubordination constituted legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that any breakdown in the interactive process was due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide necessary medical information, not the employer’s refusal to accommodate. The court also held that the plaintiff did not present direct or indirect evidence of disability discrimination or retaliation, and that the employer’s stated reason for termination was not pretextual. The judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Hibbert v. MC Realty Group, LLC" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on mineral rights to a property in McKenzie County, North Dakota. In 1938, the county acquired the property from Ellen Stole through foreclosure. In 1948, the county leased mineral rights—the “County Lease”—to Thomas Dorough, granting extraction rights in exchange for royalties. Hans Stole, Ellen’s son, redeemed the property in 1951, terminating the county’s ownership, and in 1954 ratified the County Lease as it pertained to his interest. There has been continuous mineral production since 1957. The Rolfsruds acquired the property in 2002 and entered new leases in 2007 and 2019—the latter (“Rolfsrud Lease”) granting higher royalties and naming Davis Exploration as lessee. Continental Resources operated under both leases, ultimately paying royalties at the lower County Lease rate. The Rolfsruds, joined by Davis Exploration, sued Continental and Petro-Hunt, asserting the Rolfsrud Lease controlled the property and raising several claims, including breach, quiet title, and declaratory relief.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court relied on Ulrich v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation and Holbeck v. Hull from the North Dakota Supreme Court, finding the County Lease had priority. The court determined the Rolfsrud Lease was a “top lease” and quieted title in favor of Petro-Hunt’s interest under the County Lease.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. It held the County Lease became voidable—not void—upon redemption, and Hans’s ratification was valid as to the property he owned. The court further held continuous production under the County Lease sustained its force, despite no Pugh clause or lack of production on the specific property. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding the County Lease controls the subject property and the Rolfsrud Lease is a top lease. View "Rolfsrud v. Continental Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

A senior citizen, Jerry Freid, became the insured under a $4 million life insurance policy in 2008, with the policy owned by a trust naming his daughter as beneficiary. The transaction was orchestrated by Michael Binday, whose business solicited seniors to take out life insurance policies for third-party investors through premium financing schemes. These arrangements typically ensured that neither the insured nor their estate bore financial risk, and the policies were ultimately acquired by investors after a contestability period. In Freid’s case, all premiums were financed and the trust sold the policy to an investor after two years. Evidence established that Freid lacked both the means and legitimate reason to seek such a large policy, and that the representations made in the policy application regarding his finances and intent were false.After Freid’s death in 2020, Ameritas Life Insurance Corp., successor to the original issuer, refused to pay policy benefits to Vida Longevity Fund, which had purchased the policy and was represented by Wells Fargo as securities intermediary. Wells Fargo sued in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. The district court granted summary judgment for Ameritas, finding New Jersey law applied and that the policy was void as a stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) policy, contrary to state law. The court concluded that because the policy was void ab initio, Ameritas owed no benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that New Jersey law governed the policy under Nebraska’s choice of law rules, and that the policy was void under New Jersey law as a STOLI transaction. The court determined that no genuine dispute of material fact existed and that summary judgment for Ameritas was proper. View "Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Ameritas Life Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

In 2024, Iowa enacted legislation (HF 2677) prohibiting the manufacture and sale of electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) that had not received marketing authorization from the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The law required manufacturers to certify their compliance with federal premarket approval requirements or demonstrate that their products were pending FDA review. Several manufacturers, retailers, and consumers challenged the law, contending it was preempted by federal law, specifically the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, and that it violated constitutional equal protection guarantees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted a preliminary injunction, halting enforcement of the law. The district court found that at least one plaintiff had standing, was likely to succeed on the merits of the preemption claim, and was not required to post a security bond. It dismissed claims against the Iowa Department of Revenue based on Eleventh Amendment immunity but allowed the case to proceed against the Director in her official capacity. The Department voluntarily stayed enforcement while the litigation continued.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The Eighth Circuit held that at least one retailer plaintiff had Article III standing, as they plausibly alleged injury from the credible threat of enforcement. However, the appellate court concluded the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their preemption claim. The court determined that HF 2677 was not preempted by federal law, as it fell within the scope of the Tobacco Control Act’s savings clause, which permits state requirements relating to the sale and distribution of tobacco products. The Eighth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Iowans for Alternatives v. Mosiman" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was originally charged with felony murder and arson after a fatal fire in a cabin in Mandaree, North Dakota, which resulted in the death of one individual. The incident occurred after a bonfire gathering attended by the defendant, his wife, and two others. There was evidence of a dispute between the defendant and his wife, who hid in a vehicle to avoid him. The cabin burned down shortly thereafter. Forensic evidence linked gasoline to the fire, and reports included statements from the defendant’s wife that he had accused her of infidelity and intended to harm her. After an initial mistrial due to an evidentiary dispute, the defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter as part of a plea agreement; the more severe charges were dismissed.Following the guilty plea, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota conducted sentencing. The court declined to grant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines, finding that the defendant had not genuinely accepted responsibility, as evidenced by his statements to the probation office denying involvement in the offense. The court adopted the advisory guideline range but determined it was inadequate, and imposed an upward variance to the statutory maximum sentence of fifteen years.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sentence. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in denying the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, nor did it abuse its discretion in considering reliable evidence outside the guilty plea for sentencing purposes. The Eighth Circuit further found no plain error or constitutional violation by the district court in basing the upward variance on facts not admitted in the plea, nor was the sentence substantively unreasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Owl" on Justia Law

Five individuals obtained over $1.8 million in workplace sexual harassment judgments against various related business entities and individuals. When these judgments went unpaid, they brought a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against fifteen defendants, alleging a scheme to evade collection of the judgments. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants orchestrated fraudulent asset transfers and used a sham consignment scheme involving false customs forms to prevent the plaintiffs from seizing assets to satisfy their judgments.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the plaintiffs’ RICO claims based on predicate acts of bankruptcy crimes, money laundering, and obstruction of justice, as well as their claim for declaratory relief regarding alter ego liability. However, the court allowed the RICO claims predicated on wire fraud related to the consignment scheme to proceed. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show proximate causation between the alleged wire fraud and their inability to collect on their judgments, and that they were not entitled to adverse inference sanctions for alleged discovery misconduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the consignment scheme was a but-for cause of their injury, as they did not show that any assets subject to seizure belonged to the judgment debtors. The court further concluded that claims based on other predicate offenses failed due to insufficient evidence and lack of particularity. The appellate court also found no error in the district court’s refusal to draw adverse inferences or to allow amendment of the complaints at this stage. The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants on all claims. View "Rennenger v. Aquawood, LLC" on Justia Law

Victor Dominquez was indicted on multiple charges, including aggravated sexual abuse of a minor in Indian country. The indictment specifically alleged that, between March 2006 and March 2012, Dominquez knowingly engaged in acts involving the penetration of the genital opening of a child under twelve years old, with an intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. At trial, the minor victim, M.D., testified that Dominquez, while bathing her as a child, used his fingers to clean her vagina, describing sensations and experiences that the jury found credible and sufficient for conviction.Following the jury’s guilty verdict on all counts, the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted Dominquez’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated sexual abuse charge. The district court reasoned that, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, M.D.’s testimony was too ambiguous and nonspecific to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dominquez penetrated her genital opening, as required by statute. The court noted that clarifying questions might have elicited more explicit testimony but concluded it could not sustain a conviction based on suspicion or possibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order de novo. The appellate court held that a rational jury could infer that M.D. used the ordinary anatomical meaning of “vagina” in her testimony, and that Dominquez’s actions described by M.D. necessarily involved penetration of the vaginal orifice. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficiently specific to support the verdict. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting judgment of acquittal, reinstating the jury’s finding of guilt. View "United States v. Dominquez" on Justia Law