Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bliv, Inc. owned a commercial building insured by Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company against hail damage, but not against damage caused by wear and tear. After a storm on July 9, 2021, Bliv claimed that water intrusion had damaged both the exterior and interior of the building, asserting that hail was the cause. Charter Oak’s expert, Isaac Gaetz, inspected the property and found hail damage to vents and air conditioner fins, but no damage to the roof’s membrane. Gaetz concluded that the water intrusion was due to long-term wear and tear, not hail. Bliv disputed this and retained its own expert, Brian Johnson, who opined that hail caused the loss, relying on reports and satellite images rather than direct testing or inspection of the interior.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri reviewed the case. Charter Oak moved to exclude Johnson’s expert opinion, arguing it lacked sufficient factual support and was not based on reliable methods. The district court found Johnson qualified but excluded his opinion due to deficiencies in his investigation, such as failing to review key reports, not inspecting the interior, and not conducting independent testing. Without Johnson’s opinion, Bliv could not rebut Charter Oak’s causation evidence, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Charter Oak.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of Johnson’s opinion under the abuse of discretion standard. The appellate court found that, despite some inconsistencies in the district court’s reasoning, there was a sufficient basis for exclusion because Johnson’s opinion relied on incomplete information and failed to address critical evidence. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Charter Oak. View "Bliv, Inc. v. The Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Federal agents traced downloads of prepubescent child pornography to an IP address at Benjamin Tyler Gentry’s residence in Boone, Iowa. During a search of the home, officers seized electronic devices and firearms. Forensic analysis of a Samsung tablet revealed 181 deleted images of child pornography, stored locally between January 2020 and just before the device was seized. Applications on the tablet were linked to Gentry’s email, and search history included terms related to child pornography. Gentry admitted to downloading pornography involving minors as young as 14.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa indicted Gentry on three counts related to receipt and possession of child pornography, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Gentry pleaded guilty to the firearm charge, and the child pornography charges proceeded to a jury trial. After the government’s case, Gentry moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence of his knowledge regarding the images. The district court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Gentry on all child pornography counts. Post-trial, Gentry again moved for acquittal and a new trial, challenging the sufficiency of evidence for knowing receipt; both motions were denied. The court dismissed two possession convictions as lesser included offenses and sentenced Gentry to 168 months.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Gentry argued for the first time that the government failed to prove venue for the receipt offense in the Southern District of Iowa. The Eighth Circuit held that Gentry affirmatively waived any objection to venue by not raising it at trial or in post-trial motions. The court declined to review the venue issue and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The main holding is that a defendant who fails to raise a venue objection at trial waives the issue, precluding appellate review. View "United States v. Gentry" on Justia Law

A company that manufactures emergency-use auto-injectors terminated a senior technician after she certified that a probationary employee completed five on-the-job training (OJT) tasks in a single day. The company alleged that this certification was fraudulent and did not comply with its training policies, as the forms lacked supporting documentation and the employee did not demonstrate proficiency. The technician, a qualified trainer, filed a grievance through her union, arguing that it was common practice on her shift to conduct and certify multiple OJTs in one day and that supervisors were aware of these practices.An arbitrator reviewed the grievance under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the company and the union. The arbitrator found that the company failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the technician’s actions were intentionally fraudulent or falsified. The arbitrator also noted that the company’s staffing shortages and established practices contributed to the situation and drew an adverse inference against the company for not calling key supervisors as witnesses. The arbitrator ordered the technician’s reinstatement with back pay and benefits. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the union, affirming the arbitrator’s award.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo for legal conclusions and for clear error on factual findings. The Eighth Circuit held that the arbitrator acted within his authority in interpreting ambiguous terms in the CBA, such as “dishonesty,” and in considering past practices. The court also found that the arbitrator’s adverse inference and allocation of the burden of proof were permissible. Finally, the court concluded that reinstating the technician did not violate any well-defined and dominant public policy. The judgment affirming the arbitrator’s award was affirmed. View "Meridian Medical Technologies, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 688" on Justia Law

The plaintiff purchased products from a company’s “Sustainability Collection,” which were advertised as sustainable and environmentally friendly. She alleged that these representations were false because the products were made with virgin synthetic and non-organic materials that are harmful to the environment. The plaintiff claimed that she would not have bought the products, or would have paid less, had she known the truth. She brought a putative class action under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, asserting that the company’s advertising was misleading.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri first considered and dismissed the plaintiff’s initial complaint for failure to state a claim, after which she filed an amended complaint. The company again moved to dismiss, arguing that the amended complaint lacked sufficient factual support and did not plausibly allege that a reasonable consumer would be misled. The district court agreed, finding that the amended complaint failed to provide facts making the plaintiff’s claims plausible and did not meet the required pleading standards. The court dismissed the case without specifying whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. The plaintiff then filed a post-judgment motion for reconsideration and for leave to amend, which the district court denied, citing her failure to properly request leave to amend before judgment and her delay in doing so.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed only whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit held that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits (i.e., with prejudice) unless the order states otherwise. The court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Ellis v. Nike USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a black woman, worked as a Supervisory Medical Support Assistant at the Kansas City Veterans Administration (KCVA). After her supervisor, Angela Frey, was hired, the plaintiff alleged that Frey harassed her from the outset. The plaintiff was eventually assigned to a different position outside her original office and retired from the KCVA over a year later. She claimed that Frey discriminated against her based on race, retaliated against her for complaining about racial discrimination, created a racially hostile work environment, and constructively discharged her.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the KCVA. The district court found that the plaintiff’s allegations regarding denial of training, a negative performance review leading to reassignment, and interference with a job application in Florida were either too vague, unsupported by evidence, or based on inadmissible hearsay. The court also determined that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of discriminatory intent or a causal link between any protected activity and adverse employment actions. Additionally, the court concluded that the incidents described did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment or constructive discharge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support her claims of racial discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, or constructive discharge under Title VII. The court emphasized that speculation and conclusory statements were insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial and that the conduct alleged did not meet the legal threshold for actionable discrimination or harassment. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Sherman v. Collins" on Justia Law

An employee at a Home Depot store in New Brighton, Minnesota, wrote “BLM” (Black Lives Matter) on their required work apron as a symbol of solidarity against prejudice and racism. This occurred in the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder, which had sparked significant civil unrest in the Minneapolis area, including near the store. The store had experienced incidents of racial tension among employees, complaints about discriminatory conduct, and vandalism of a Black History Month display. Management directed the employee to remove the “BLM” message, citing company policy prohibiting political messages unrelated to workplace matters on uniforms. The employee refused, insisting the message was necessary to support coworkers of color, and subsequently resigned.After resigning, the employee filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that Home Depot violated Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by prohibiting the display of “BLM” on aprons. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the complaint, finding that the display was not concerted activity protected by Section 7, as it was not coordinated among employees and had only an indirect relationship to workplace issues. The NLRB reversed the ALJ, holding that the refusal to remove the “BLM” message was protected concerted activity, and that Home Depot’s enforcement of its dress code and constructive discharge of the employee violated Section 8(a)(1). The Board ordered Home Depot to reinstate the employee with back pay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Home Depot had established “special circumstances” justifying its enforcement of the dress code policy at this location and time, given the heightened tensions and safety concerns following local unrest. The court vacated the NLRB’s order and remanded for further proceedings, declining to address other issues. View "Home Depot U.S.A. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

An attorney with over two decades of experience brought suit against an insurance company and its agent after his life insurance policy lapsed due to a missed payment. He claimed to have cured the lapse by paying the overdue premium and submitting required information, and alleged that the insurer confirmed reinstatement before later refunding his payment and rescinding the reinstatement. The insurer denied ever reinstating the policy and asserted it had expired by its own terms. The attorney filed suit in state court, alleging breach of contract and other claims. After removal to federal court, the parties mediated and signed a settlement memorandum outlining five essential terms, including a $10,000 payment to the plaintiff and mutual releases. The memorandum stated that final settlement language would use standard contractual terms.After mediation, the plaintiff refused to sign the draft settlement agreement, objecting to a non-reliance clause he claimed was not discussed during mediation. He also began raising new questions about the status of his insurance policy. He moved to vacate the settlement and sought further discovery, while the defendants moved to enforce the settlement. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held an evidentiary hearing, which the plaintiff missed, and then granted the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement and denied the plaintiff’s motions. The plaintiff’s motion for rehearing was also denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the settlement memorandum contained all essential terms and that the non-reliance clause in the draft agreement was standard language, not a material new term. The court found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings and no abuse of discretion in denying a new hearing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment enforcing the settlement. View "Schlecht v. Goldman" on Justia Law

Deepali Tukaye, an Indian cardiologist, was employed by Jack Stephens Heart Institute, which contracted with Conway Regional Medical Center to provide cardiologists. While working at Conway Regional, Tukaye raised concerns about the quality of care provided by a white cardiologist. Following her complaint, the CEO of Conway Regional, Matt Troup, threatened to terminate Jack Stephens’s contract unless Tukaye was reassigned. Jack Stephens did not reassign her, and Tukaye subsequently gave notice to leave her employment. After her notice, Conway Regional renewed its contract with Jack Stephens.Tukaye filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central Division against Troup, the City of Conway, the Health Facilities Board, and John Doe #1, alleging tortious interference with contract, due process violations, and employment discrimination. The district court dismissed her amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and denied her motion to alter or amend the judgment and to file a second amended complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo and the denial of the Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. The appellate court limited its review to Tukaye’s tortious interference claim against Troup, as she did not challenge the dismissal of other claims or defendants. The court held that Tukaye’s own action of providing notice to leave constituted a resignation, which was a superseding cause of her harm and defeated the proximate cause element required for tortious interference under Arkansas law. The court also found no manifest error or newly discovered evidence to justify post-judgment relief. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Tukaye v. Troup" on Justia Law

A security services company and its sole shareholder, who is also its president and CEO, provided security services to two Iowa cities under separate contracts. After the shareholder published a letter criticizing media coverage of law enforcement responses to protests, a local newspaper published articles highlighting his critical comments about protestors and the Black Lives Matter movement. Subsequently, a city council member expressed concerns about the shareholder’s views, and the city council voted unanimously to terminate the company’s contract. The council member also pressured officials in the other city to end their contract with the company. Facing negative publicity, the company voluntarily terminated its second contract to avoid harm to a pending business transaction.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against the city, the council member, and other council members, alleging First Amendment retaliation, tortious interference with business contracts, and defamation. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). It found that the shareholder lacked standing to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim for injuries to the corporation, and that the corporation failed to state a retaliation claim because only the shareholder engaged in protected speech. The court dismissed the tortious interference claim for lack of sufficient factual allegations and because the contract was terminated voluntarily. The defamation claim was dismissed for failure to identify any actionable statements by the defendants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the shareholder’s First Amendment retaliation and defamation claims, but directed that these dismissals be without prejudice. The court reversed the dismissal of the corporation’s First Amendment retaliation and tortious interference claims, finding that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, and remanded those claims for further proceedings. View "Conley v. City of West Des Moines" on Justia Law

In the aftermath of protests in St. Louis following the acquittal of a police officer, two individuals attended a demonstration as legal observers. They remained off the interstate highway while protesters marched onto and blocked Interstate 64. After the protesters exited the highway, the observers and the group proceeded together onto Jefferson Avenue. Police, acting on orders to arrest those who had trespassed on the interstate, encircled and arrested the entire group, including the observers, despite their protests that they had not been on the highway. The observers were processed but never charged with any crime.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed claims against one officer for lack of timely notice and later granted summary judgment to the remaining officers and the City. The court found the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim, reasoning that it was not clearly established that arresting the observers under these circumstances violated the Constitution. The court also granted qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims, finding the officers had at least arguable probable cause and that the plaintiffs had not shown retaliatory motive. The court rejected the municipal liability claims as well. The plaintiffs appealed only the grant of summary judgment to the officers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. It held that, under precedent, officers had arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs as part of a group that had trespassed, given the practical difficulties of distinguishing individuals in a mass protest. The court also held that the existence of arguable probable cause defeated the First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. The court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Kampas v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law