Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case centers on a defendant who was indicted on two counts: unlawful possession of a firearm by a drug user and making a false statement during the purchase of a firearm. The indictment alleged that, on specific dates in 2022, the defendant, as an unlawful user of marijuana and cocaine, possessed multiple firearms and falsely represented on a federal form that he was not an unlawful user or addict of a controlled substance. The evidence included the defendant’s admissions of regular drug use, his possession of firearms during the same period, and his acknowledgment that he was not prescribed any controlled substances. Additional evidence established that, at the time of a firearm purchase, he smelled of marijuana, and a subsequent search uncovered both a loaded pistol and marijuana in his vehicle. Drug tests confirmed recent use of marijuana and cocaine.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, rejected his claims that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague, and found him guilty on both counts in a bench trial based on stipulated facts. The court concluded that the statutory terms were not vague as applied to the defendant, given his admissions and the explicit warning on the federal form. The court also held that the statute prohibiting firearm possession by drug users was consistent with historical tradition and deferred ruling on the as-applied Second Amendment challenge until trial evidence was complete. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a drug user under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and remanded for the district court to reassess the defendant’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge in light of intervening circuit precedent. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision on all other issues, including the conviction for making a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). View "United States v. Ledvina" on Justia Law

A nonmember landowner sought to install a high-capacity surface water pump on his fee land within the reservation of the White Earth Nation in Minnesota. He obtained a permit from the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources but did not apply for a tribal permit as required by an ordinance enacted by the reservation’s governing body. The tribal Division of Natural Resources sued him in Tribal Court, alleging the pump would negatively affect reservation resources, and obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting installation. The Tribal Court of Appeals remanded the case for a hearing to determine the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction.The landowner then sued the Tribal Court judge and the director of the Division of Natural Resources in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, seeking a declaration that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the tribal sovereignty exception established in Montana v. United States, and moved for a preliminary injunction to halt tribal litigation. The district court denied the injunction and stayed the federal case, requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies—meaning the landowner must litigate jurisdictional issues to completion in the Tribal Court and, if necessary, in the Tribal Court of Appeals. The district court found that tribal jurisdiction was not plainly lacking or frivolous under established law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of the tribal exhaustion doctrine de novo. It held that exhaustion was appropriate because the assertion of tribal jurisdiction was not obviously invalid or frivolous, and the law regarding the tribal sovereignty exception was unsettled in these circumstances. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction and stay of proceedings, requiring completion of tribal adjudication before federal intervention. View "Vipond v. DeGroat" on Justia Law

Benjamin Higgerson was originally sentenced to 78 months in prison and ten years of supervised release after pleading guilty to possession of child pornography. Following his release, he repeatedly violated the terms of his supervised release, including failing to seek approved employment, missing restitution payments, and skipping sex offender treatment sessions. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa revoked his supervised release twice, each time imposing nine months of imprisonment and a new nine-year term of supervised release. Upon beginning his third term, Higgerson failed to report to a designated homeless shelter and did not check in with his probation officer, resulting in further Grade C violations.After these violations, the district court conducted a third revocation hearing. The government requested a sentence above the guideline range due to Higgerson’s repeated noncompliance. Higgerson’s counsel argued for a lower sentence, citing his lack of housing. The district court imposed an 18-month sentence of imprisonment and a subsequent nine-year term of supervised release, with conditions including a residential reentry center placement. Higgerson did not object to the factors considered at sentencing.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Higgerson argued that the district court improperly considered “promoting respect for the law,” a factor excluded from revocation sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The Eighth Circuit applied plain error review, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras v. United States, which prohibits consideration of “respect for the law” in revocation sentences. The Eighth Circuit found no clear or obvious reliance on the excluded factor and concluded that the district court’s reasoning focused on deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Higgerson" on Justia Law

Benjamin Zarn, a Forensic Support Specialist employed at a state-run treatment center, challenged workplace Covid-19 protocols implemented by the Minnesota Department of Human Services (MDHS). In 2021, MDHS adopted policies requiring employees who did not telework to provide proof of Covid-19 vaccination or undergo weekly testing. Additionally, vaccinated employees who tested positive for Covid-19 could receive up to seven days of paid administrative leave if they exhausted their sick leave. Zarn objected to the vaccine and testing requirements on religious and moral grounds, citing his Catholic beliefs and concerns about the use of fetal cells in vaccines. Despite his objections, Zarn complied with the testing policy but claimed he did so under duress, fearing job loss. Although Zarn expressed dissatisfaction with the policies to his supervisor, union president, and administrators, he did not formally request a religious accommodation.Zarn filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging religious discrimination under Title VII and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). After receiving right-to-sue letters, he sued MDHS in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, also alleging violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act and the Minnesota Refusal of Treatment statute. The district court dismissed the state law claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and then granted summary judgment to MDHS on the federal claims, finding that Zarn failed to exhaust administrative remedies for some claims and did not notify MDHS of a religious conflict or suffer an adverse employment action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Zarn failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding the Covid Pay Policy, did not notify MDHS of a religious conflict as required to establish a prima facie Title VII failure-to-accommodate claim, and that the Covid testing requirement did not violate the ADA because it was job-related and consistent with business necessity. View "Zarn v. Minn. Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

Lea and Samantha Johnson obtained a mortgage loan serviced by Freedom Mortgage Corporation and made regular payments. After filing for bankruptcy in March 2020, they reaffirmed the loan, but were required to pay by mail and instructed to include their loan number with each payment. In April 2020, Lea mailed a cashier’s check for their monthly payment, but did not put the loan number on the check itself. Freedom Mortgage received the check but could not identify the correct account to credit, as the check did not match the payment amount and only listed Samantha’s name, a common name among its customers. As a result, the payment was not credited and the Johnsons’ account was marked past due, which was subsequently reported to credit agencies. After realizing the issue, the Johnsons sent a new check with the loan number and the payment was credited, but their credit reports reflected a late payment.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota found there was no material dispute about the accuracy of Freedom Mortgage’s reporting and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The court determined that the payment was in fact late because the first check did not comply with the required instructions, and therefore the information reported to the credit agencies was accurate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The court held that Freedom Mortgage’s investigation into the Johnsons’ credit dispute was reasonable given the conclusory nature of the dispute letters. The court also found that the reported late payment was accurate under both the standard and heightened accuracy tests, and declined to adopt a heightened standard of accuracy. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Freedom Mortgage. View "Johnson v. Freedom Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

The dispute arose from a failed attempt to construct an osteopathic medical school in Gaylord, Minnesota. Philip Keithahn formed Minnesota Medical University, LLC (MMU) and retained Heritage Construction Companies, LLC as the general contractor. MMU planned to finance the project through bond proceeds, with a portion immediately available and the remainder contingent on achieving pre-accreditation. Representatives from Heritage sought confirmation of available funds prior to construction, and Keithahn assured them that the project would be funded and that millions would be available after closing. However, after initial payments, MMU ran out of funds when pre-accreditation was denied, leading Heritage to halt construction and terminate its contract.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota oversaw the case after Heritage and its affiliates faced indemnification claims and filed a third-party complaint against Keithahn and MMU. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied, and the case proceeded to trial on claims including breach of contract, indemnification, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraud by omission. MMU admitted liability for breach of contract and damages. The jury found the defendants liable on all claims except fraudulent misrepresentation. Post-verdict, the district court denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, addressing issues of jury instructions, violations of in limine orders, improper statements, and impeachment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that Keithahn’s representations regarding available financing were actionable as negligent misrepresentations, as they concerned present facts susceptible of knowledge rather than mere future assurances. The court found no error in the jury instructions, no prejudicial violation of evidentiary rulings, and no cumulative error warranting a new trial. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Heritage Const. Companies, LLC v. Keithahn" on Justia Law

A group of individuals with beneficial interests in Indian trust lands on the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota challenged the continued operation of an oil pipeline by Andeavor Logistics and related entities after the expiration of a federally granted right-of-way in 2013. Despite the expiration, Andeavor continued to operate the pipeline while negotiating for renewals with both the tribal government and individual landowners, but was unable to secure agreements with all landowners. The plaintiffs, known as the Allottees, alleged ongoing trespass, breach of the expired easement agreement, and unjust enrichment, seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief, and removal of the pipeline.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota twice dismissed the Allottees’ case, first for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, a decision reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a prior appeal (Chase I), which instructed a stay for further agency action. After further BIA proceedings and related litigation (including the Tesoro case), the district court again dismissed all of the Allottees’ claims with prejudice, finding no individual federal common law cause of action for trespass, breach of contract, or unjust enrichment, and denied their motion to intervene in the Tesoro case, concluding the United States adequately represented their interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Allottees’ claims for trespass, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, holding that individual Indian allottees with only equitable interests in land held in trust by the United States lack standing to bring these claims under federal common law. The court also affirmed denial of intervention in the Tesoro litigation. However, the Eighth Circuit remanded for further consideration of whether consolidation of the two related cases is appropriate under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Chase v. Andeavor Logistics, L.P." on Justia Law

Reinhardt Enterprises, LLC entered into a contract with BNG Holdings, Inc. to market BNG's services, with the contract set to automatically renew each year unless either party provided notice of non-renewal. After several years of automatic renewal, and shortly before BNG’s sale to Kaseya U.S., LLC, the parties amended the contract to include a provision entitling Reinhardt to a buyout fee if the agreement was "terminated" by BNG under certain circumstances. After acquiring BNG, Kaseya continued the contractual relationship for over two years before sending Reinhardt a letter of non-renewal, invoking the contract’s renewal clause, and explicitly refusing to pay the termination buyout fee.The case began after Reinhardt sued Kaseya in state court for breach of contract, alleging entitlement to the buyout fee. Kaseya removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, where it moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that the non-renewal of the contract did not constitute a "termination" as contemplated by the contract, and thus Reinhardt was not entitled to the buyout fee.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s contract interpretation de novo. The appellate court found the term "termination" to be ambiguous in the context of the contract, as it could reasonably refer both to ending the agreement midterm or simply to the end of the contractual relationship, including non-renewal. Because of this ambiguity, the Eighth Circuit held that the parties’ intent regarding the buyout fee must be resolved as a question of fact, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reinhardt Enterprises, LLC v. Kaseya U.S., LLC" on Justia Law

A citizen of the Ivory Coast immigrated to the United States as a child refugee and later became a lawful permanent resident. As an adult, he was convicted in North Dakota of robbery, a Class B felony, for brandishing a gun and menacing others during a theft. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with removability based on two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude and for the robbery conviction, which it classified as an aggravated felony for attempted theft.The Immigration Judge initially found the individual removable for the moral-turpitude convictions but determined he was eligible for cancellation of removal, concluding that the North Dakota robbery statute was overbroad compared to the federal definition of theft. The Department appealed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) disagreed, finding the statute not facially overbroad and instructing the Immigration Judge to apply the “realistic probability” test to determine if the statute was applied to conduct beyond the generic federal definition. On remand, the Immigration Judge found the petitioner failed to show a realistic probability that the statute covered nongeneric conduct and ordered removal. The BIA dismissed the appeal, upholding the order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed only the legal and constitutional claims, as required by statute. It held that North Dakota’s robbery statute is not unambiguously broader than the federal generic definition of attempted theft and that the petitioner had not demonstrated North Dakota actually prosecutes robbery based on conduct beyond that definition. Thus, the court found the robbery conviction to be an aggravated felony, rendering the petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal, and denied the petition for review. View "Banyee v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A seven-year-old child, J.F., died from malnutrition and an infection caused by untreated head lice while living in a house on the Red Lake Indian Reservation in Minnesota. The home was shared by Sharon Rosebear, her husband, their son Derrick’s five children, and, starting in 2021, her son Julius and his five children, including J.F. The house lacked running water, but free showers and medical care were available nearby. Rosebear regularly provided food for Derrick’s children but not for Julius’s, including J.F., who was often kept home from school due to chronic head lice. In the days before J.F.’s death, Julius left his children in Rosebear’s care, and she acknowledged being responsible for them during that time. J.F. ultimately died on December 25, 2022. The autopsy revealed severe malnutrition and a prolonged lice infestation.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota presided over Rosebear’s trial. The jury found her guilty of felony child neglect under the Major Crimes Act, which incorporates applicable Minnesota law. The district court denied Rosebear’s motion for acquittal or a new trial and sentenced her to 15 months in prison and two years of supervised release. Rosebear argued both that the evidence was insufficient to prove she was J.F.’s caretaker and that her sentence exceeded the state’s mandatory maximum under Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines, in violation of the Major Crimes Act and Supreme Court precedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Rosebear was J.F.’s caretaker and had willfully deprived her of food and medical care. The court also held that the Major Crimes Act requires sentencing within the statutory minimum and maximum penalties set by state law, but not adherence to state sentencing guidelines; instead, the federal sentencing guidelines apply, as long as the sentence does not exceed the state statute’s maximum. View "United States v. Rosebear" on Justia Law