Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Animal / Dog Law
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The case revolves around Erin Bulfin, who sued St. Louis County and several employees of St. Louis County Animal Care & Control (ACC) after her pet dog, Daisy, was euthanized at ACC. Bulfin's dog had bitten her daughter, requiring hospitalization. Following the incident, Bulfin's husband, Edward Nea, took Daisy to ACC. The details of the conversation between Nea and ACC employees are disputed, but it is undisputed that Nea signed a form authorizing the euthanasia of Daisy. The next day, Bulfin went to ACC to pick up Daisy for home quarantine and was informed that Daisy had been euthanized.The district court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants, concluding that Bulfin's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the defendants reasonably relied on the apparent consent of Bulfin's husband to euthanize Daisy. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the County on Bulfin's federal municipal liability claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bulfin's state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that when ACC accepted custody of Daisy, that was not a seizure because it is undisputed Bulfin approved of Daisy being quarantined in ACC custody after biting her daughter. The court also held that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity unless the evidence established a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights that was clearly established at the time of the violation. The court concluded that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred and that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established authority holding that government officials violate the Fourth Amendment by seizing and destroying an effect with the consent of a person who reasonably has actual or apparent authority. View "Bulfin v. Rainwater" on Justia Law

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The case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit involved Allen Thomas Bloodworth, II, a business owner who operated two towing businesses in Kansas City. Bloodworth alleged that the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and fourteen officers of the Kansas City Police Department conspired to stop him from running his businesses and shut down his ability to conduct business in Kansas City. He brought 17 state and federal claims, including defamation, tortious interference with contract and business expectancy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, training, supervision, or retention. He also alleged Fourth Amendment violations for an unlawful warrant search and seizure of his residence and business, the shooting of his dog during the search, and the seizure of business records.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling. The appellate court concluded that Bloodworth failed to link the specific conduct of individual defendants to the alleged constitutional violations, and his claims were based on general assertions mostly. It also ruled that Bloodworth failed to establish that the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous to support his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court further found that Bloodworth failed to establish a constitutional violation resulting from the official policy, unlawful practice, custom, or failure to properly train, retain, supervise, or discipline the police officers. Therefore, there was no basis for municipal liability against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners. View "Bloodworth v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners" on Justia Law

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Several dog owners sued the City of Council Bluffs challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance prohibiting “pit bulls" under 42 Sec. 1983. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, finding that the ordinance had the "required rational relationship to the health, safety, and public welfare interests of the city to survive rational basis review." The dog owners appealed the trial court's ruling pertaining to their equal protection and substantive due process claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first noted that the parties agreed that rational-basis review was appropriate. However, the dog owners claimed that their evidence "negates every conceivable basis for the Ordinance’s rational relationship," presenting expert testimony that showed, among other things, pitbulls were not any more dangerous than other breeds of dogs that were permitted under the ordinance. ultimately, the court concluded that the City had a conceivable basis to believe banning pit bulls would promote the health and safety of Council Bluff citizens. View "Rachael Danker v. The City of Council Bluffs" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that defendants deceived plaintiffs into believing their products were approved by the FDA. After the district court remanded the case back to state court, the Eighth Circuit granted defendants' petition for review under 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1), limiting review to the issue of federal question jurisdiction.The court held that federal question jurisdiction exists in this case, because plaintiffs rely explicitly on federal law throughout their pleadings and their prayer for relief invokes federal jurisdiction where it seeks injunctive and declaratory relief that necessarily requires the interpretation and application of federal law, including the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. Therefore, based on the allegations in the complaint and relief sought, the court found that a federal issue surrounding the state law claims is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wullschleger v. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that each individual defendant violated his constitutional right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when the local animal shelter, after a five-day holding period, put a stray dog up for adoption and spayed the dog before delivering it to the adopting family. Defendants did not know that the stray dog was plaintiff's young German Shepherd, which boasts world champion lineage and had escaped from plaintiff's back yard two weeks earlier.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court failed to devote sufficient attention to whether plaintiff had a protected procedural due process property interest and if so, the nature and extent of that interest. The court agreed with the Supreme Court of Arkansas that affirmative pre-deprivation notice is not constitutionally required in this situation, when an animal shelter holds a stray dog for more than five days and then adopts out and spays the dog after the owner fails to file a claim. The court also held that plaintiff failed to prove that each individual defendant's conduct violated his right to procedural due process. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order insofar as it denied summary judgment to the individual defendants acting in their individual capacities, remanding with directions. View "Lunon v. Botsford" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims challenging the city's ordinance based on lack of standing. The challenged ordinance made it unlawful for any person to own, possess, keep, exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport or sell within the City of Sioux City, Iowa, any pit bull. In this case, plaintiff admitted that she does not currently own a dog because she and her fiance work full time and do not have the time to own a dog, but she intended to adopt a dog in the near future.The court held that, to the extent plaintiff sought prospective relief against future conduct, she failed to show that she owns a dog and does not live in the city. Furthermore, her intention to adopt a dog in the near future was uncertain and insufficient to confer standing. The court also held that plaintiff's past injuries did not grant her standing because she failed to demonstrate how her proposed relief redressed them. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to its sua sponte dismissal of plaintiff's claim. View "Myers v. Sioux City" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., seeking to enjoin defendants' mistreatment of endangered species. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order that the endangered species be transferred to another facility and denied plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and costs. Determining that plaintiffs had standing, the court held that the district court did not err in finding defendants had harassed the lemurs by keeping them in social isolation; by not developing, documenting, and following an appropriate plan for environmental enhancement; and by not providing clean water and sanitary conditions. The district court also did not err by ruling that defendants had injured, and thereby harmed, the tigers by failing to provide timely and appropriate veterinary care. Furthermore, the decision to imposed upon defendants the responsibility of finding an appropriate, licensed facility for the lemurs and tigers was well within the district court's broad equitable powers. The court held that the circumstances of this case justified the denial of attorney fees and costs. The court rejected the remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Kuehl v. Sellner" on Justia Law

Posted in: Animal / Dog Law
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The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity against a trooper who shot and killed plaintiff's dog when the dog ran onto a highway and obstructed traffic. The court held that the issue was not whether the trooper had the authority to seize the dog, but whether the degree of force he employed was reasonable to accomplish the necessary seizure. In this case, the trooper's actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and he was entitled to qualified immunity. Even assuming a constitutional violation, the trooper was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not violate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right. Plaintiff has not cited, and the court has not found, any case concluding that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he shot and killed an unrestrained, unsupervised dog creating a serious risk to public safety and avoiding numerous attempts to control him without force. View "Hansen v. Black" on Justia Law

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Defendant, a corporal in the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (AGFC), appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss claims related to the search of a residence. The district court determined that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would have known that a warrant should not have issued based on the information he provided to the issuing court. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that it was not entirely unreasonable for defendant to believe that his affidavit established sufficient indicia of probable cause for the search and seizure of the items listed in the warrant. In this case, the affidavit provided probable cause to seize a deer, based on an anonymous tip and a recorded jailhouse call. Furthermore, the items described in the warrant were relevant to the criminal offense under investigation, as they directly related to the existence, capture, and maintaining of a pet deer. View "Kiesling v. Spurlock" on Justia Law

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Hughes guides hunting parties, charging $1,600 to $2,600 per person for accommodations, meals, hunting stands, field dressing, and carcass-cleaning facilities. To hunt buck in Iowa, a hunter must have a “tag.” Non-residents must enter a lottery. Hughes gave his non-resident clients tags belonging to others. After they killed a buck, Hughes falsely reported to the Iowa DNR that the tag owner had killed the buck. The bucks were transported out of state. Hughes was indicted under the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. 3371, which prohibits selling in interstate commerce any wildlife taken in violation of state law. The value of the wildlife determines whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor. The court instructed the jury: you may, but are not required to, consider, the price the wildlife would bring if sold on the open market between a willing buyer and seller; the price a hunter would pay for the opportunity to participate in a hunt for the wildlife; or Iowa’s valuation of the wildlife in state prosecutions where such wildlife is unlawfully taken. The jury found that the market value of the wildlife exceeded $350. The district court sentenced Hughes to three years’ probation, $7,000 in fines, and $1,802.50 in restitution. The Eighth Circuit reversed; the jury was not properly instructed as to the meaning of “market value.” View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law