Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Missouri resident, filed suit in state court against her former employer, Ferrellgas, a propane supplier, as well as James Ferrell and Pamela Brueckmann, Kansas residents and employees and officers of Ferrellgas. Plaintiff alleged gender discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act against Ferrellgas (Counts I and II), and tort claims against all defendants (Counts IIIVI). After removal to the district court, the district court granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration in part.The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in concluding that no language in plaintiff's employment agreement suggested that she consented to arbitrate tort claims arising from actions which predated her employment. The court explained that, though plaintiff's claims are based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions made before and at the time she accepted employment, they are subject to arbitration because they arise out of and relate to the resulting employee agreement and employee relationship. The court also concluded that Ferrell and Brueckmann, officers and agents of Ferrellgas who were not parties to the Employee Agreement, may enforce the arbitration clause. The court concluded that a signatory plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration when she treated signatory and non-signatory defendants as a single unit. In this case, each of plaintiff's tort claims against defendants is a single one that should be referred in its entirety to arbitration. View "Morgan v. Ferrell" on Justia Law

After New Adesta initiated an arbitration against the guarantors of certain indemnification obligations, three of the guarantors, brought an action in Nebraska state court seeking a declaration that New Adesta's arbitral claims were released and discharged in a settlement agreement. New Adesta removed to federal court and moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss guarantors' case. The district court granted New Adesta's motion in its entirety.The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Settlement Agreement neither abrogated, modified, nor terminated the arbitration clauses set forth in the Purchase Agreement. In this case, the underlying issue, indemnification for the NYSTA work, is not a matter that was addressed in the Settlement Agreement, the Nebraska action, or the Illinois action. The court explained that, while the Federal Arbitration Act generally requires a federal district court to stay an action pending an arbitration, rather than to dismiss it, district courts may, in their discretion, dismiss an action rather than stay it where it is clear the entire controversy between the parties will be resolved by arbitration. In this case, the court concluded that the parties have a valid agreement to arbitrate the claims at issue, which fall within the scope of the arbitration clauses. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sommerfeld v. Adesta, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Sachse, Ameriprise, and individual Ameriprise officers, alleging violations of federal securities law. Plaintiff also sought to represent other Sachse and Ameriprise clients in a class action. Defendants filed motions to strike plaintiff's class action allegations and to compel arbitration, which the district court denied.The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of an order striking plaintiff's class action allegations and compelling arbitration. The court concluded that it has appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of defendants' motions to strike class action allegations because this denial was contained in an order reviewable under 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(1)(B). The court also concluded that defendants have not waived their right to arbitrate by moving to strike plaintiff's class action allegations at the same time they moved to compel arbitration where the action was not inconsistent with their right to arbitrate and did not substantially invoke the litigation machinery. On the merits, the court concluded that a valid arbitration clause exists and that it encompasses the dispute between the parties. In this case, the court agreed with defendants that the arbitration clause was valid because it was supported by mutual assent, was supported by consideration, and was not unconscionable. View "Donelson v. Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying Sundance's motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff filed suit against Sundance for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), alleging that Sundance failed to pay her, and other similarly situated employees, for overtime. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining Sundance waived its right to arbitrate because Sundance's conduct, even if inconsistent with its right to arbitration, did not materially prejudice plaintiff.In this case, Sundance does not dispute its knowledge of an existing right to arbitration because the employment agreement included the arbitration clause; Sundance acted inconsistently with its right to arbitration where it substantially invoked the litigation machinery primarily by waiting eight months to assert its right to arbitrate this dispute, and failed to mention the arbitration clause in its answer or motion to dismiss; but plaintiff was not prejudiced by Sundance's litigation strategy where discovery was not conducted and the record lacks any evidence that plaintiff would have to duplicate her efforts during arbitration. View "Morgan v. Sundance, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit previously affirmed an interlocutory ruling that several counterclaims were non-arbitrable. See Meierhenry Sargent LLP v. Williams, 915 F.3d 507, 510–12 (8th Cir. 2019).The primary issue on appeal here is whether the district court "improperly rewrote" its original order by enjoining defendants from seeking damages in arbitration in excess of fees owed. Although the court could review the district court's decision, the court declined to overturn it, explaining that all the district court did was clarify its original order, which it had the authority to do. In this case, the original order stated that the counterclaims were arbitrable to the extent they reduced the amount defendants owed to the firm, and the district court clarified on remand that this restriction applied to the breach-of-contract claim too. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the remaining claims. View "Meierhenry Sargent LLP v. Williams" on Justia Law

Ohio law allows nonsignatory agents to compel arbitration under general principles of contract and agency law. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Navient's motion to compel arbitration against plaintiff. The court disagreed with the district court's finding that the relevant arbitration clause does not include Navient as a party and so Navient cannot compel arbitration. Rather, the court held that Ohio law permits plaintiff to compel arbitration as a nonsignatory agent of the holder of the loan. The court also held that Ohio's rule of alternate estoppel prevents plaintiff from disavowing the arbitration clause because his claim arises out of the same contract. Therefore, plaintiff is estopped from avoiding the arbitration clause because his claims are integrally intertwined with the contract containing the agreement to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Neal v. Navient Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the union's claims against Trane concerning an arbitration award. In this case, the June Award indicated that the arbitrator did not intend for it to be final because he explicitly retained jurisdiction "until the terms of the award are met." When a dispute did arise regarding damages, the arbitrator resolved that dispute in the September Award and then expressly stated that he was "no longer retaining jurisdiction in this matter." Therefore, the express relinquishment of jurisdiction in the September Award indicated that the arbitrator intended the September Award to be final and did not contemplate further disputes regarding the award.The court held that the union is not time-barred from seeking to vacate the arbitration award because the text of the June Award indicates that it was not the final award. The court stated that the September Award is the final award and the union filed its claim to vacate within 90 days of it. Therefore, the union's claim was timely and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "International Union v. Trane U.S. Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) dispute between the parties where an arbitrator resolved the dispute in favor of the union. The Eighth Circuit held that because the arbitrator was arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, there is no basis for vacating the arbitrator's finding that Exide violated the CBA.The court also held that the district court correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction over Exide's claim that the arbitrator's decision that unilaterally changing Family Medical Leave Act leave administrators was a material, substantial and significant change in the employees' terms and conditions of employment in violation of Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. Rather, Congress has empowered the NLRB to resolve unfair-labor-practice claims in the first instance. Furthermore, the cases cited by the parties do not expand the court's original jurisdiction. View "Exide Technologies v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers" on Justia Law

Morgan Stanley filed suit under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to confirm an arbitration award against defendant. After defendant did not respond, the district court entered judgment in favor of Morgan Stanley. Then the district court entered an order granting in part Morgan Stanley's motions to appoint a receiver under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 66 and to enter a charging order under Rule 69(a) and Minn. Stat. 322C.0503. Defendant appealed.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a receiver under Federal Rule 66 to exercise extraordinary investigative powers to determine whether Morgan Stanley's substantial judgment can be paid within a reasonable time. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a general receiver over his interests in the LLCs. In this case, Morgan Stanley's motion for a charging order under Minn. Stat. 322C.0503 properly relied on Federal Rule 69(a) and state law, while its motion for a receiver relied on the district court's federal equitable powers under Rule 66. View "Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law

On remand from the district court, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Catamaran's motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to recent Supreme Court precedent in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416-17 (2019), an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary contractual basis to conclude that the parties agreed to class arbitration. Therefore, the court must determine whether there is an affirmative contractual basis to conclude that the parties agreed to class arbitration.The court held that there was no contractual basis to conclude that the parties agreed to class arbitration. In this case, the agreements were not inconsistent with individual arbitration and do not support the conclusion that the parties intended class arbitration and believed that intent was so evident from the terms of the written agreements that it was unnecessary to express that intent within the agreements themselves. View "Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy" on Justia Law