Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose after the City of Redfield and Quam entered into a construction contract and issues arose regarding the subsurface ground conditions. On appeal, Quam challenged the district court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration for contract disputes between Quam and the City. The court concluded that the district court properly found that no agreement to arbitrate was made between the parties and, therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Quam's motion to compel.View "Quam Construction Co., Inc. v. City of Redfield" on Justia Law

The Union appealed from the district court's order vacating an arbitration award. PSC argued that the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and the Standards of Conduct mandate that an employee found guilty of insubordination be discharged. PSC claimed that after the arbitrator found that the employee at issue in this case had been insubordinate, the arbitrator was required to uphold the employee's discharge. The court concluded that whether the employee's discharge was for just cause was a matter of contract interpretation that was within the arbitrator's authority. In this case, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by concluding that PSC did not have just cause to discharge the employee and by reducing the penalty from discharge to suspension, because his award draws its essence from the CBA. The court reversed and remanded with directions that the arbitration award be reinstated.View "PSC Custom, LP v. United Steel, Paper, etc." on Justia Law

Richard L. Brown and Susan Brown-Thill, co-trustees of the EDB Trust, signed an Arbitration Agreement for resolving a broad range of disputes. These consolidated appeals concern two awards following an initial arbitration. The March 14 award authorized distributions from family-owned limited partnerships to family trusts. The December 12 award declared invalid Brown's attempt to resign as co-trustee and name his successor, and removed Brown as co-trustee, applying the Uniform Trust Code's standards for the statutory removal of a trustee as adopted in Missouri, the situs of the controversy, and Florida, the situs of the EDB Trust. The district court denied Brown's attempt to vacate both awards and Brown-Thill's request for a contractual award of attorneys' fees in both suits. The court concluded that the March 14 award cannot be vacated on the ground of procedural irregularities and the arbitrator's procedural errors did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2), (3), and (4). In regards to the December 12 award, the district court did not err in interpreting the EDB Trust Agreement; the arbitrator's interpretation of the Trust Agreement's removal provision is not a ground for vacating the award; the court concluded that Brown-Thill properly submitted the removal issue under the Arbitration Agreement, the arbitrator then had power to construe and apply the Trust Agreement's removal provision and to make findings regarding the statutory standards for removal which Brown-Thill could present in a judicial proceeding, but the arbitrator exceeded his powers by exercising the exclusively judicial function of removing Brown on statutory standards; however, this decision is of no practical importance because of Brown's unconditional resignation as co-trustee; and the court rejected Brown's FAA challenge. Finally, the court concluded that Brown-Thill was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed except with a modification and denied Brown's motion to take judicial notice.View "Brown v. Brown-Thill" on Justia Law

Cargotec appealed the district court's conclusion that Cargotec's contract with NMC did not contain arbitration and indemnification provisions. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that whether the arbitration clause became part of the parties' agreement remains a question "presumptively committed to judicial determination." On the merits, the court concluded that the district court erred in failing to order a trial to resolve material factual disputes concerning whether the parties agreed to arbitration and indemnification. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to hold a non-jury trial, making findings of fact, and apply the appropriate U.C.C. provisions in light of those facts. View "Nebraska Machinery Co. v. Cargotec Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Eckert Wordell appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to FJM, which compelled the parties to submit to an arbitrator the threshold issue of whether FJM may use an arbitration provision in a contract it did not sign to compel Eckert Wordell to arbitrate. The court previously held that the incorporation of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules into a contract requiring arbitration to be clear and unmistakable indicated that the parties intended for the arbitrator to decide the threshold questions of arbitrability. Eckert Wordell's drafting of the architectural services contract here to incorporate the AAA Rules requires the same result. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc, et al. v. FJM Propertiesof Willmar, LLC" on Justia Law

Polar Tank discharged a maintenance technician for failing to safely complete repair of an overhead crane. The Union grieved the discharge and the grievance was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator partially upheld the grievance, reducing the technician's discipline to a thirty-day unpaid suspension. Polar Tank sued to vacate the arbitration award and the Union counterclaimed to enforce it. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment enforcing the award where the award at issue drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The arbitrator considered the technician's poor performance and concluded that it constituted negligence but not the type of insubordination for which Article 29 mandated discharge; the court rejected Polar Tank's claim that the arbitrator was wrong to disregard the Standards of Conduct; and the arbitrator did not err in disregarding the Management Rights clause. View "PSC Custom, LP v. United Steel, etc." on Justia Law

AECI filed suit against the Union seeking to vacate the arbitrator's award and the Union counterclaimed for enforcement. Relying on the court's decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, the district court ruled that the last chance agreement (LCA) superseded the collective bargaining agreement and therefore, when the arbitrator ignored the clear and unambiguous terms of the LCA, he imposed his personal standards of industrial justice. The court concluded that the district court read the Coca-Cola bottling decision too broadly. Where a CBA requires "just cause" to discipline or discharge an employee but fails to define the term, the arbitrator's broad authority to interpret the contract, to which the court must defer, includes defining and applying that term of the contract. Viewed from this perspective, the arbitrator's decision to sustain the Union's grievance must be enforced. Because the arbitrator specifically invoked and applied the just cause provision of the CBA, the contract between AECI and the Union that defined his authority, his decision "draws its essence" from the CBA. Accordingly, the arbitrator's decision sustaining the Union's grievance must be enforced. The court declined to enforce the portion of the award granting the employee back pay from the day he was suspended until the day he was discharged. The court reversed and remanded. View "Associated Electric Coop. v. IBEW" on Justia Law

The Union sought to set aside an arbitration award that ruled in favor of the MADA and several member car dealerships. At issue was the transition between the 2006 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and the 2010 CBA and its impact on above-scale time allowances for hybrid car warranty and recall work. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court agreed with the district court and found that the arbitrator was "warranted" in determining the CBA's plain language to be "silent or ambiguous with respect to the disputed issue - how the above-scale time allowances could be legitimately terminated." With MADA's attorney's unrebutted testimony and the letters documenting other dealerships' similar conduct to help the parties' past practice with respect to the ambiguous CBA language at issue, the court concluded that the arbitration award drew its essence from the CBA. Therefore, the court found no basis to vacate the arbitration award. The court affirmed the district court's order granting MADA's motion to dismiss with prejudice. View "Garage Maintenance, etc. v. Greater Metropolitan, etc., et al." on Justia Law

After BIVI discharged an employee for falsifying work records, the Union grieved the discharge. BIVI and the Union submitted the dispute to arbitration, the arbitrator ordered that the employee be reinstated without back pay, and BIVI commenced this action to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment to the Union and BIVI appealed. The court concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) where BIVI's Article VIII, Section 3(d) argument was waived and where the arbitrator conducted a straightforward balancing of the management rights and just cause provisions. The court also concluded that BIVI has not made the factual and legal showing that would be required for the court to invoke the narrow public policy exemption and vacate an arbitration award that fully acknowledged the employee's misconduct, denied her back pay as a result of that misconduct, but reinstated her to her former position. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica v. UFCW" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute involving certain equipment Dakota purchased from the Kloster division of Tromley. On appeal, Tromley appealed the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. Because the arbitration provision was not readily available and because Dakota did not have a reasonable opportunity to reject it, Tromley could not establish the necessary consent to bind Dakota to that provision. Further, the emails exchanged between Dakota and Tromley in June and July 2010 did not constitute an addendum to their agreement which successfully incorporated the arbitration agreement where the court could not say that the parties mutually assented to modify their agreement to include the provision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Dakota Foundry, Inc. v. Tromley Industrial Holding" on Justia Law