Articles Posted in Banking

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The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Specialized Loan Servicing, in an action alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and the Minnesota Mortgage Originator and Servicer Licensing Act. The court held that plaintiff failed to prove actual damages under RESPA and therefore he failed to establish an essential element of his federal claim. In this case, the bank records that plaintiff obtained for 2012 and 2013 were irrelevant to the dispute whether his loan payments were past due before June 2011. In the alternative, plaintiff did not produce evidence to support a finding of "pattern or practice" here, and there was no evidence that Specialized failed to investigate and respond reasonably to qualified written requests from other borrowers. Consequently, the court reversed as to the state law claim as well. The court remanded with directions to enter summary judgment for Specialized on the RESPA claim and for further proceedings on the claim under the Minnesota Act. View "Wirtz v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on remand in favor of defendants in an action filed by mortgage loan borrowers alleging violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Specifically, borrowers alleged that the lender did not provide the required number of copies of the required notice and material disclosures, and thus borrowers could rescind their loan on a date just shy of the three-year anniversary of loan execution. The court held that the district court did not err in determining that the signed acknowledgement borrowers had executed created a rebuttable presumption that they received the required number of copies and that borrowers' evidence was insufficient to overcome that rebuttable presumption. View "Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on remand in favor of defendants in an action filed by mortgage loan borrowers alleging violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Specifically, borrowers alleged that the lender did not provide the required number of copies of the required notice and material disclosures, and thus borrowers could rescind their loan on a date just shy of the three-year anniversary of loan execution. The court held that the district court did not err in determining that the signed acknowledgement borrowers had executed created a rebuttable presumption that they received the required number of copies and that borrowers' evidence was insufficient to overcome that rebuttable presumption. View "Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

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Bank of America filed suit against the Hanna Parties for breach of contract after they failed to pay a loan. The jury found that the Hanna Parties did not breach the contract and the district court entered judgment for them. On remand, the Hanna Parties advanced defenses of fraudulent inducement and fraudulent failure to disclose. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion for summary judgment on those defenses because JB Hanna could not have reasonably relied on the Bank's allegedly fraudulent representations. In this case, the district court correctly rejected the defenses of fraudulent inducement and fraudulent failure to disclose as a matter of law. Furthermore, because there was insufficient evidence to support the fraud defenses, the setoff defense also failed. View "Bank of America v. JB Hanna, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Banking, Contracts

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Plaintiffs filed suit against several financial entities for foreclosing on a mortgage loan. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. At issue were plaintiffs' claims under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.020. The court affirmed and held that the foreclosure was justified because defendants had a right to foreclose on the house and thus the MMPA claim failed as a matter of law because the loss was not caused by any misconduct on behalf of defendants. Likewise, plaintiffs' tortious interference claim failed because the foreclosure was legal. View "Wheatley v. JP Morgan Chase Bank" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit alleging that GCF violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., by failing to clearly and conspicuously disclose the annual percentage rate (APR) and finance charge in his Retail Installment and Security Contract. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law where the Summary of Understanding was not completely integrated; the district court thus did not err in admitting parol evidence; and there was sufficient evidence to support GCF's affirmative defense of waiver. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial where there was no record of what objections plaintiff would have raised had the district court turned on "white noise" during the initial portion of the trial, nor was he prejudiced; even if the district court erred by not sustaining plaintiff's objection to GCF's counsel's statement during closing argument, the statement was not such a magnitude that a new trial was warranted; the court rejected plaintiff's claims of error as to the discretionary evidentiary rulings; and there was no error in the district court's response to a jury question. View "Smiley v. Gary Crossley Ford, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Banking, Consumer Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601-1667f, seeking to rescind their 2006 mortgage. Plaintiffs alleged that they did not receive sufficient copies of disclosures required by TILA at the December 2006 closing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the bank, holding that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether they received only one notice. The court explained that a borrower's own conclusory denial of receipt of TILA disclosures, unaccompanied by details or other evidence supporting the denial, was insufficient to rebut the presumption of delivery created by section 1635(c). Therefore, plaintiffs' three-day rescission window of section 1635(a) barred their request for rescission. The court also held that plaintiffs did not raise any specific objections to the accuracy of the disclosure statement during the first summary judgment proceedings. Therefore, the district court's finding was the law of the case and plaintiffs' allegations were waived. Even if the argument were not waived, plaintiffs cannot prevail because the alleged error was not a violation of TILA. View "Keiran v. Home Capital" on Justia Law

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Bayer filed an interpleader action to determine its obligations with regards to a settlement reached with Texana that came about as a result of lawsuits that arose when Bayer introduced genetically modified rice into the United States commercial long-grain rice supply. Stearns Bank and Amegy are both bank creditors of Texana. The district court found for Amegy Bank. The court held that the district court erred in determining that Stearns Bank’s foreclosure extinguished its rights to pursue the proceeds of its original collateral; while Stearns Bank does not have an interest in the Settlement Payment as an after-acquired general intangible because that payment arose as proceeds of a commercial tort claim, it does have an interest in the Settlement Payment to the extent the payment is for damage to the original collateral; and the district court will have to determine on remand what part of the sum held in the registry of the court constitutes proceeds of Stearns Bank’s original collateral and what part does not constitute such proceeds. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Stearns Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Amegy Bank Nat'l Assoc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Banking

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The Government filed suit to determine whether its 2004 tax lien on a foreclosed property had priority over several other competing interests in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for the Government. US Bank held an interest via a 2006 deed of trust, and appealed the district court's judgment. In chronological order, the 2004 deed of trust was recorded (March 29, 2004), the date the Government’s tax lien for unpaid 2004 taxes was assessed (November 21, 2005), and the date the 2006 deed of trust was recorded (July 11, 2006). The court concluded that the release-first sequencing combines with the lengthy gap in recording to prevent the court from considering the release of the 2004 deed of trust and recordation of the 2006 deed of trust to have occurred sufficiently contemporaneously to be part of the same transaction. Allowing U.S. Bank to stretch the notion of “same transaction” to include a more-than-two-month gap between release of an old deed of trust and recordation of a new one would undermine the integrity of the recording statute. The court concluded that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to the Government because no genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the 2006 deed of trust retained the priority of the released 2004 deed of trust. View "United States v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff requested payment for the one year remaining on his employment contract, but the FDIC advised that the payment was a prohibited “golden parachute,” under 12 U.S.C. 1828(k) and 12 C.F.R. 359.1, which the bank could not make without prior agency approval. Plaintiff, a former executive at Reliance Bank, filed suit against the bank and the FDIC, alleging a breach of contract under Missouri law and sought a declaration that federal law does not prohibit the payment. The district court upheld the FDIC determination and granted summary judgment to the bank. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the agency determination is not worthy of deference because it is inconsistent with FDIC positions taken elsewhere. Rather, the court concluded that Chevron and Auer deference is irrelevant because the agency treats the word "contingent" as unambiguous and relies on its dictionary meaning. The court concluded that one could reasonably characterize the payment obligation as contingent on either plaintiff’s termination or his continued employment. In this case, plaintiff alleged the bank came to owe the payment because of his termination, not because of services he rendered. Therefore, the agency determined the payment was contingent on termination, and the court found this finding was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court concluded that the bank’s obligation to pay plaintiff was rendered impossible when the FDIC determined the payment was a golden parachute. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Rohr v. Reliance Bank" on Justia Law