Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Needler filed a petition for Chapter 11 relief on behalf of “Miller Chrysler Dodge.” Because Needler is not admitted to practice in the Western District of Missouri, he moved to appear pro hac vice and to be employed as debtor’s attorney. The bankruptcy court agreed, stating that his fees and activities would be closely scrutinized. The Trustee discovered that the named entity did not legally exist and, when the error was not timely corrected, moved to dismiss. Needler filed an amended petition under the proper name. Needler subsequently received several orders to show cause for failure to comply with local filing requirements. Needler was unsuccessful in obtaining authority for the debtor to use cash collateral and to retain a broker to sell the business. Relief from the automatic stay was obtained by the primary creditors. Ultimately, the case was dismissed on the debtor’s motion. The court closed the file. Six months later, the Trustee moved to reopen under 11 U.S.C. 350(b), asserting that she had received a complaint from the debtor: that Needler failed to communicate accurate information, made potentially false and misleading representations, and may have filed documents and taken actions that were not authorized. Needler had filed a state court action for attorney fees of $49,000.00 and sought $63,000.00 more in fees and $3,600.00 in expenses. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed denial of the fee application and the order of disgorgement. Since Needler was a repeat offender, in many jurisdictions, the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion in imposing the sanction of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and revocation of electronic filing privileges. View "Needler v. Casamatta" on Justia Law

Falco sold insurance for Farmers, under a 1990 Agent Agreement, which provided that Falco would be paid Contract Value upon termination of the Agreement. As a Farmers agent, Falco was entitled to borrow money from the Credit Union. In 2006, Falco obtained a $28,578.00 business loan and assigned his interest in his Agreement receivables—including Contract Value—as security. The loan document gave the Credit Union authority to demand payments that Farmers owed Falco; it could tender Falco’s resignation to levy on Falco’s Contract Value. Falco failed to make payments and filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listing the loan on his schedules. Falco received a discharge in February 2011, covering his liability under his Credit Union loan. In April 2011, the Credit Union notified Farmers that Falco had defaulted and exercised the power of attorney to terminate his Agent Agreement. Farmers notified Falco that the resignation had been accepted, calculated Contract Value as $104,323.30, paid the Credit Union $29,180.92, and paid the balance to Falco. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the Credit Union’s secured interest survived bankruptcy; it did not tortuously interfere with Falco’s Agreement because it had a legal right to terminate the Agreement; and Falco failed to show an underlying wrongful act or intentional tort as required under civil conspiracy. View "Falco v. Farmers Ins. Grp." on Justia Law

Robb filed a Chapter 7 petition. Harder, the trustee, discovered a defect in the deed of trust securing the debt on Robb’s home. Robb converted her case to Chapter 13. Harder filed proof of claim ($450), describing an unsecured priority claim for “time spent by trustee in examining documents regarding avoidance of lien, preparing objection to homestead exemption, and filing objection to conversion to Chapter 13 case, and tracking debtors’ [sic] conversion to chapter 13.” Robb objected, arguing that trustee compensation is subject to 11 U.S.C. 326 and, because Harder did not disburse any moneys before conversion, she was not entitled to payment. The bankruptcy court allowed the claim, holding that section 326(a) is not the only method of trustee compensation and that allowing the claim when no money was distributed encourages trustees to be diligent in looking for assets and discourages debtors from concealing assets. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed for lack standing. Robb did not plead any facts establishing that the order diminished her property, increased her burdens, or impaired her rights. If she had shown that all creditors would be paid in full and the length of the plan could have been shortened, it is possible that she would have been an aggrieved party. View "Robb v. Harder" on Justia Law

The Debtors sought Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief. On their schedules, they listed the IRS as an unsecured creditor holding a claim in the amount of $249,085. They received a discharge in October 2009. Following the close of their Chapter 7 case, several IRS employees issued IRS levies and filed Notices of Federal Tax Liens with respect to the Debtors’ federal tax debt. The Debtors filed an adversary proceeding, naming each IRS employee as a defendant, alleging that the IRS employees violated 26 U.S.C. 7433 by issuing levies and filing the Notices of Federal Tax Liens, and seeking actual and punitive damages. The Bankruptcy Court entered an order substituting the United States as the sole defendant, denying the Debtors’ request for default judgment, and dismissing the Debtors’ complaint. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Debtors did not file an administrative claim for damages with the IRS and, therefore, may not bring an action for damages under section 7433. If the Debtors wish to sue the government for violations of the bankruptcy discharge under 11 U.S.C. 524, they must first exhaust their administrative remedies. View "Broos v. United States" on Justia Law

Debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. CP Medical’s collection agent timely filed a proof of claim. The Chapter 13 plan, proposing monthly payments of $124.00 over 36 months and pro rata distribution to unsecured creditors, was confirmed. Debtors fell behind on payments and converted to a Chapter 7. After confirmation, but during the Chapter 13 case, Debtors filed an adversary proceeding against CP, seeking damages For violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The complaint indicated that CP's proof of claim was for medical services provided in February 2011, that the bankruptcy and proof of claim filings were beyond Arkansas’ two-year statute of limitations for medical debt collection, and that by filing a claim on a debt that is time-barred, CP engaged in a “false, deceptive, misleading, unfair and unconscionable” debt collection practice. The bankruptcy court granted CP summary judgment, holding that no FDCPA violation occurs when a debt collector attempts to collect a potentially time-barred debt that is otherwise valid unless there is actual litigation or the threat of litigation. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate panel affirmed. CP's proof of claim was a simple attempt to share in any distribution made to listed creditors in bankruptcy, not actual or threatened litigation. View "Gatewood v. CP Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

Debtors, limited liability companies, own pools of commercial and industrial real estate, subject to mortgages held by the Trust. The promissory notes for the loans provided that upon default, the interest rate on the remaining principal would be 5% in addition to the non-default rate of 5.04%. Debtors defaulted and later filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief. The Trust filed proof of claim for $1,516,739.80 in default interest. The assigned asset manager for the loans testified about expenses associated with default and said that the 5% rate was consistent with the rate for similar loans. According to the Debtors’ chief manager, the additional interest duplicated costs associated with default that Debtors were already paying, including attorneys’ fees, late fees, and costs of administration and enforcement. The bankruptcy court allowed the claim, finding that Debtors failed to rebut the Minnesota law presumption that the default-interest provision was a valid liquidated-damages provision. The district court and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the bankruptcy court misapplied Minnesota law because it did not require the Trust to prove actual damages; that actual damages for breach of a promissory note are always ascertainable; and that many of the costs the default rate purportedly covers are otherwise covered. View "Bowles Sub Parcel A, LLC v. CW Capital Asset Mgmt. LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed they were lured into making investments from which their money was “appropriated” and sued Nathan and Vertical Group. The district court entered an order of default against Vertical, but did not award damages at that time. Nathan filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The district court closed the matter during the bankruptcy. Nathan proposed a Chapter 11 plan. The plaintiffs objected and brought an adversary proceeding, restating their allegations and asserting that their claims were non-dischargeable. The bankruptcy court agreed, rejected Nathan’s plan, awarded actual and punitive damages, and determined that Nathan’s bankruptcy estate acquired his interest in the Kathleen Trust, into which Nathan and his wife had transferred assets before his bankruptcy, but did not identify a specific value of Nathan’s interest. The court converted Nathan’s bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The trustee tried to reach Trust assets. The court concluded that Nathan’s powers as a co-trustee were property of his bankruptcy estate, but Nathan lacked authority to act as trustee without Kathleen’s consent and only Kathleen could revoke the trust. Plaintiffs reopened the original action to determine damages and to collect the Vertical judgment from Trust assets. The district court referred the matter to the bankruptcy court, which recommended awarding actual damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees in the amount awarded in the bankruptcy adversary proceeding. The district court adopted the findings and entered a default judgment against Vertical. The Eighth Circuit dismissed Nathan’s appeal for lack of standing and affirmed as to Kathleen. View "Cutcliff v. Reuter" on Justia Law

Lariat and Tenant entered into a 10-year lease for operation of a restaurant. Debtor personally guaranteed Tenant's performance. Tenant was evicted in 2010 and obtained a judgment of $2,224,237.00, plus interest and attorney fees. In 2011, Lariat filed an involuntary chapter 7 petition against Debtor, which was dismissed by agreement. The same creditors filed suit against Debtor's wife. After the involuntary petition was dismissed, they added Debtor as a codefendant. The court held Debtor and his wife liable for fraudulent transfers ($795,098.00) and awarded interest and costs. In 2013, Debtor sued Lariat; the court dismissed, based on collateral estoppel. Appeal is pending. In 2014 Tenant filed a chapter 11 petition and an adversary proceeding against Lariat. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding. On the Trustee's motion, Tenant’s chapter 11 case was dismissed. Debtor filed his own chapter 11 petition. Lariat filed a proof of claim for $1,734,539.00. Debtor objected on grounds that the amount sought based on Debtor's personal guaranty under the lease exceeded the amount allowable under 11 U.S.C. 502(b)(6) and the amount sought based on fraudulent transfers was duplicative of, and subject to the same limitation as, sought based on thatl guaranty. Lariat filed an amended proof of claim for $1,610,787.00. The court capped Lariat's claim at $445,272.93. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel remanded for recalculation of damages under the lease and of fees and expenses, but agreed that damages for fraudulent transfers were duplicative. View "Lariat Co., Inc. v. Wigley" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Code provides preferential treatment to domestic support obligations. Young filed for bankruptcy shortly after he and his wife, Stephens, divorced. The divorce decree required Young to pay alimony. Young did not pay. Stephens filed contempt proceedings in state court and Young was jailed. Young responded by filing an adversary proceeding against Stephens in the bankruptcy court, alleging a violation of the stay. In the bankruptcy, including the adversary proceeding, attorney Cruz represented Young. She repeatedly mischaracterized past-due post-petition alimony obligations as past-due prepetition obligations and falsely asserted Young was current on his alimony payments, representing that Young would "continue" to make alimony payments. In reliance on these representations, the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan. After discovering Cruz's false statements, the court entered a show-cause order and concluded that Cruz had no basis in law or fact for her assertions. Citing Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, the court imposed, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Eighth Circuit affirmed, sanctions; suspending Cruz from practice in the Arkansas bankruptcy courts for six months, fining her $1,000, and directing her to attend CLE. Rule 9011 required Cruz to "make a reasonable inquiry into whether . . . a factual and legal basis" supported her assertions. View "In re: Cruz" on Justia Law

Hardy filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief. On her Schedule B, Hardy stated that she would be receiving a 2012 tax refund. On her Schedule C, Hardy claimed the majority of the refund as exempt. She noted that $2,000 of the refund was attributable to federal Child Tax Credit (CTC), 26 U.S.C. 24(d). She claimed that the CTC was a "public assistance benefit" that would be exempt from the bankruptcy estate under Missouri law. The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee’s objection, finding that the CTC was not a public assistance benefit because the purpose of the credit was to "reduce the tax burden on working parents and to promote family values" and because the full credit was available to head-of-household filers with Modified Adjusted Gross Incomes (MAGI) of up to $75,000 and joint-married filers with MAGIs of up to $110,000. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, stating Hardy did not present evidence that only lower income families were eligible for the refundable portion of the credit. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress demonstrated intent to help low-income families through amendments to the Additional Child Tax Credit statute, sp the credit at issue qualifies as a public assistance benefit. View "Hardy v. Fink" on Justia Law