Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants appealed the district court's dismissal of all of their appeals concerning the purchase agreements to jointly-owned property and the underlying bankruptcy court orders. The property was owned by Sears Cattle and AFY, a debtor in bankruptcy. The court concluded that 11 U.S.C. 363(m) mooted the Tract 1 appeal. Appellants' failure to preserve their appeal of the district court's holding that Sears Cattle did not object to the motion to pay funds precluded the court from addressing Sears Cattle's appeal of the order to pay funds to the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Sears Cattle could not appeal the order. Because the Sears could not assert a direct interest in the litigation, they lacked appellate standing for bankruptcy purposes under the shareholder standing rule. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding the Sears lacked standing to appeal the order to pay funds. Because AFY was not a debtor-in-possession, the trustee had standing to move to convert. The court rejected the Sears' remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sears, et al. v. Badami" on Justia Law

Appellees made claims on AFY's bankruptcy estate in connection with the sale of appellees' former interests of AFY. Appellants claimed to be the only present shareholders of AFY. On appeal, appellants challenged the bankruptcy court's denial of their objections to the claims. The court dismissed the appeal because appellants lacked standing to appeal the bankruptcy court's order where AFY was the only party directly and adversely affected by the order and any effect on appellants was indirect, based on their status as shareholders of AFY. View "Sears, et al. v. Sears, et al." on Justia Law

Buffets filed suit against U.S. Bank and BMO Harris Bank alleging, among other things, violations of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act (UFA), Minn. Stat. 520.01 et seq. The district court asserted jurisdiction on the ground that the action was related to a Title 11 bankruptcy proceeding, 28 U.S.C. 1334(b), and that abstention in favor of state-court litigation was not required under 28 U.S.C. 1334(c)(2). The court concluded that, although the question of "related to bankruptcy" jurisdiction was difficult and close, the answer ultimately did not affect the court's jurisdiction. Even if the district court lacked "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction - because the banks could not pursue indemnification claims against LGI - the court had jurisdiction over the appeal under the rationale of Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis. On the merits, the court concluded that Buffets has not established a genuine dispute as to whether either bank was indifferent to LGI's suspicious activity, such that its actions amounted to bad faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the the district court's grant of summary judgment to the banks. View "Buffets, Inc., et al. v. BMO Harris Bank, et al." on Justia Law

Debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and her case was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. On appeal, debtor challenged the bankruptcy court's order denying her motion to reopen her case to pursue an alleged violation of the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court where the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that debtor's allegations were without merit and, therefore, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen her bankruptcy case. View "Pennington-Thurman v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On appeal, debtor challenged the bankruptcy court's order sustaining the Bank's objection to her claimed exemption in her 2000 Hyundai Tiburon, and ruling that debtor could avoid the Bank's lien under section 522(f) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) agreed with the bankruptcy court that debtor could not claim an exemption under IOWA Code 627.6 where debtor had no equity and had no interest in the vehicle to exempt, and that the Bankruptcy Code provided for no such avoidance. Accordingly, the BAP affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court. View "Goben v. Corydon State Bank" on Justia Law

Debtor appealed from the order of the bankruptcy court finding his debt to Bank of America nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2) for fraud and section 523(a)(4) for embezzlement. Under section 523(a)(4), Southwest Bank established that debtor was not lawfully entitled to use the insurance proceeds at issue for the purposes for which he used them and debtor produced nothing to the contrary. Accordingly, the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding under section 523(a)(4). Because the BAP concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding the debt to be nondischargeable under 523(a)(4) for embezzlement, the court limited its analysis to that basis for nondischargeability and did not reach the section 523(a)(2) fraud issue. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

The Government appealed the bankruptcy court's order denying its motion to approve its superpriority administrative expense claim under section 507(b) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; its motion for evidentiary hearing; and its motion to alter or amend the bankruptcy court's denial of its motion for a section 507(b) administrative expense claim. The bankruptcy appellate panel concluded that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion when it denied the Government the opportunity to conduct discovery and produce evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the bankruptcy court to determine the amount, if any, of the Government's section 507(b) claim. View "United States v. Lange, et al." on Justia Law

After defendants, Wendell O. Maness and Carolyn H. Maness, filed for bankruptcy, Legendary Stone sought a determination from the bankruptcy court that the indebtedness due from Top Shop, the company defendants owned, was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A), and that defendants were liable for such amounts under Missouri's lien fraud statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. 429.014. Two days before defendants filed for bankruptcy, Legendary Stone filed a criminal complaint against Wendell. Wendell was charged with theft under the lien fraud statute and subsequently was arrested, booked, and released on signature bond. The prosecutor eventually dismissed the charges against Wendell. Defendants then filed a counterclaim against Legendary Stone in the adversary proceeding asserting that Legendary Stone's actions in regards to the criminal complaint were attempts to collect a debt and willful violations of the automatic stay. The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of defendants' counterclaim where Legendary Stone met its burden of presenting detailed evidence that its representatives were not attempting to use the criminal prosecution to collect a debt and where defendants failed to prove otherwise. View "Legendary Stone Arts, LLC v. Maness, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, the parties disagreed about the nature of their dissolution agreement after one of them experienced a change in circumstances. Patriot Coal and Heritage Coal sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 57, and requested a declaration that Peabody Holding's obligations with respect to the healthcare benefits owed to the Assumed Retirees would not be affected by modification of the benefits of retirees of Heritage or Eastern Associated under 11 U.S.C. 1114. The bankruptcy court denied relief and Patriot and Heritage appealed. While Heritage's rejection of its collective bargaining agreement relieved it of its contractual obligation to pay benefits, it still has a statutory obligation to pay those same benefits, at least until all of the steps of section 1114 are complied with. Therefore, the bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) held that upon rejection of the "me too" agreement under section 1113, absent modification under section 1114, Heritage was still required to comply with the terms of the individual employer plan and provide its retirees those plan defined benefits; neither Heritage or United Mine Workers of America requested a modification; Peabody Holding's obligation under the liabilities assumption agreement remains undisturbed upon grant of the sections 1113 and 1114 motion; and Peabody Holding's remaining arguments lacked merit. Accordingly, the BAP reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court. View "Patriot Coal Corp., et al. v. Peabody Holding Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the bankruptcy court's finding that her student loan obligations to NCT and its loan servicer were nondischargeable. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) concluded that the record revealed that plaintiff's past, present, and reasonably reliable future resources were not sufficient to meet all of the monthly payment obligations to NCT while maintaining a minimum standard of living. Accordingly, the BAP concluded on de novo review that excepting all of the obligations to NCT from discharge would be an undue hardship on plaintiff and, therefore, the BAP reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Conway v. National Collegiate Trust, et al." on Justia Law