Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Debtor appealed the final judgment of the bankruptcy court awarding plaintiff $350,490 and determining that amount to be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) concluded that the record did not support a finding that the $300,000 loan under the modified oral agreement was made in reliance on a fraudulent representation made concurrently with the creation of the debt. Thus, that portion of plaintiff's claim could not be excepted from discharge and the BAP reversed the bankruptcy court's judgment to that extent. However, the record did support a finding that the Las Vegas deal was between plaintiff and debtor individually and the further finding that plaintiff established each of the requirements of section 523(a)(2)(A) with respect to the $50,490 he loaned debtor pursuant to that agreement. Thus, the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination of nondischargeability to that extent. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Heide v. Juve" on Justia Law

After Bradley Lumber defaulted on a loan, Bradley Timberland sued Webster and Bradley Lumber in state court for fraud and interference with business expectancy, claiming that both parties were liable for Webster's alleged misrepresentations related to the loan. The action was removed to federal court, and Bradley Timberland moved to remand. The court agreed with the district court that Bradley Lumber had been fraudulently joined because there was no reasonable basis for imposing liability on Bradley Lumber for constructive fraud based on Bradley Timberland's pleadings. Accordingly, the district court properly denied remand and dismissed the claim against Bradley Lumber. The court also concluded that Bradley Timberland's claims were time barred under Arkansas's three year statute of limitations for fraud and interference with business expectancy and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bradley Timberland Resources v. Bradley Lumber Co., et al" on Justia Law

Dittmer appealed the district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) of their two lawsuits against a failed bank, the FDIC as the bank's receiver, and the successor representative to the Estate of John Peters. Barkley is a Missouri general partnership with two equal partners, John Peters and Joe Dittmer. In the first of two eventual lawsuits arising out of a 2006 loan transaction to Barkley, Dittmer, representing Joe Dittmer's half interest in Barkley, sued Premier Bank, seeking declaratory judgment that the loan should be declared void as to Dittmer and sought to enjoin the bank from selling encumbered property. The suit was filed in Missouri state court, and the primary basis for Dittmer's complaint was that Peters did not have authority from his partner, Joe Dittmer, to mortgage Barkley property for this transaction. The second suit included the same claims as the first case but included various Dittmer successors as plaintiffs, and both the FDIC and the personal representative were added as defendants. The court found that under 12 U.S.C. 1821(j), the district court correctly dismissed Dittmer's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; given the language of the Missouri Uniform Partnership Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 358.090(1), the amended partnership agreement, and the power of attorney documents, the district court correctly dismissed the claim in the second suit against the FDIC; and the court agreed with the district court that the doctrine of res judicata required dismissal of the second suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dittmer Properties v. FDIC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his declaratory judgment, contract, unjust-enrichment, tort, and shareholder claims. Applying a choice-of-law analysis, the district court dismissed the contract and unjust-enrichment claims as barred by a Delaware statue of limitations and dismissed the tort and declaratory judgment claims as derivative of the contract claims. The district court dismissed the shareholder claims as insufficiently pleaded. The court held that plaintiff's pleadings were minimally sufficient to present plausible shareholder claims. Therefore, the court reversed as to the shareholder claims but affirmed in all other respects. View "Whitney v. The Guys, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

B&B, a supplier of self-sealing fasteners, sued Fastenal for breach of an exclusive supply agreement, tortious interference with business expectancy, and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA) based on Fastenal's purchases of self-sealing fasteners from competing suppliers. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the draft complaint that accompanied B&B's demand letter for the purpose of establishing when the statute of limitations began to run; the four-year statute of limitations applied to B&B's breach of contract claim; the statute-of-limitations barred the breach-of-contract claim; because no reasonable jury could find that B&B was ignorant of the facts surrounding Fastenal's breaching conduct, B&B could not benefit from an equitable exception to the statute of limitations; B&B had no cognizable tortious interference or ADTPA claims; and the attorney's fee award must be affirmed. View "B & B Hardware v. Fastenal Co." on Justia Law

Debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's order denying Debtor's claim of an exemption for limited partnership units that she received from her employer, Kwik Trip, Inc. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court, holding that the Kwik Trip benefit plan was similar to the plans listed in Minn. Stat. 550.37, 24, and the right to payments thereunder were on account of Debtor's length of service at Kwik Trip. Therefore, the Court held Debtor may properly claim her interests in the limited partnership units distributed under the Kwik Trip employee benefit plan as exempt. Remanded to determine whether the amount of Debtor's interest in the partnership and benefit plan over the statutory limit was reasonably necessary for her support. View "Foellmi v. Ries" on Justia Law

Contractor contracted to build a restaurant in Minnesota, promising to pay each subcontractor, upon receipt of payment from the owner, the amount to which the subcontractor was entitled. Appellant became the subcontractor for carpentry and drywall work. Upon completing its work, Appellant was not paid the full amount owed. After Contractor settled a dispute with the restaurant, it offered Appellant a smaller sum, claiming it was Appellant's pro rata share of the settlement proceeds. Appellant rejected the offer and sued Contractor and its Owner in state court. Owner and his wife subsequently filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief, with the debt to Appellant unsatisfied. Appellant commenced this adversary proceeding to have the debt declared nondischargeable. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) determined that neither 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4) nor 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6) barred discharge of the debt. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Owner was not a section 523(a)(4) fiduciary by reason of a Minnesota statute or Owner's Minnesota common law duties, nor did Contractor's use of its own property amount to embezzlement; and (2) the BAP did not err in finding no malicious injury, which resolved the section 523(a)(6) issue. View "Reshetar Sys., Inc. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

This case involved a wire transfer from Plaintiff's bank account to Defendant's wife. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant, a former employee of Plaintiff, initiated the transfer unlawfully. Defendant moved for summary judgment, offering evidence of another explanation for the transfer. Plaintiff did not offer any evidence in response, and the district court entered summary judgment for Defendant. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant made the initial showing required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, thereby shifting the burden to Plaintiff to present affirmative evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact existed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant made the required showing.

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of her petition seeking half the proceeds of the sale of stock that was ordered forfeited in her ex-husband's conviction for mail fraud and money laundering in connection with the Thomas Petters Ponzi scheme. The court concluded that petitioner did not allege a legal interest in the stock proceeds sufficient to confer standing, and that, even if she did, her petition failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Continental sold its food and beverage metal can and can-end technology to Crown via a stock purchase agreement (SPA) in March 1990. The parties disputed the extent of each other's resultant liabilities, as defined by the indemnity provision in the SPA in concurrent binding arbitration and judicial proceedings. Continental subsequently appealed the grant of summary judgment and the district court's denial of its motion to reconsider or alter or amend its judgment. The court found that Continental failed to meet its burden of proving it was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the meaning of the indemnity provision. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Continental was precluded from further litigating the provision's meaning, properly granted summary judgment in favor of Crown, and did not abuse its discretion in denying Continental's motion to reconsider.