Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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The case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit involved Allen Thomas Bloodworth, II, a business owner who operated two towing businesses in Kansas City. Bloodworth alleged that the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and fourteen officers of the Kansas City Police Department conspired to stop him from running his businesses and shut down his ability to conduct business in Kansas City. He brought 17 state and federal claims, including defamation, tortious interference with contract and business expectancy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, training, supervision, or retention. He also alleged Fourth Amendment violations for an unlawful warrant search and seizure of his residence and business, the shooting of his dog during the search, and the seizure of business records.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling. The appellate court concluded that Bloodworth failed to link the specific conduct of individual defendants to the alleged constitutional violations, and his claims were based on general assertions mostly. It also ruled that Bloodworth failed to establish that the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous to support his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court further found that Bloodworth failed to establish a constitutional violation resulting from the official policy, unlawful practice, custom, or failure to properly train, retain, supervise, or discipline the police officers. Therefore, there was no basis for municipal liability against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners. View "Bloodworth v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa to dismiss the lawsuit of Iowa-based livestock feed seller Hawkeye Gold, LLC against China National Materials Industry Import and Export Corporation, also known as Sinoma, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Hawkeye Gold sued Sinoma to recover an unpaid default judgment it obtained against Sinoma's now-defunct wholly owned United States subsidiary, Non-Metals, Inc., for breach of a contract to purchase livestock feed. After six years of litigation, the District Court dismissed the case because it did not have personal jurisdiction over Sinoma, a decision which Hawkeye Gold appealed. The Appeals Court, after reviewing the evidence, agreed with the District Court's conclusion that Sinoma had insufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to support personal jurisdiction. The Court also rejected Hawkeye Gold's argument that Sinoma was a party to the contract or that Non-Metals was the alter-ego of Sinoma. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the District Court's denial of Hawkeye Gold's request for sanctions against Sinoma for alleged discovery violations. View "Hawkeye Gold, LLC v. China National Materials" on Justia Law

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Breadeaux’s Pisa, LLC (“Breadeaux”) initiated this action against its franchisee, Beckman Bros. Ltd. (“Main Street Pizza”), in federal court seeking a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, and a declaratory judgment. After litigating its preliminary injunction, mediating, and participating in discovery proceedings, Breadeaux filed a demand for arbitration in which it sought to relitigate its preliminary injunction and avoid the court’s adverse discovery rulings. Breadeaux then moved to stay all proceedings pending completion of arbitration. The district court denied Breadeaux’s motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Section 3’s stay provision is mandatory when “the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration” under a valid arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. Section 3. The court wrote that it is unpersuaded by Breadeaux’s assertion that the only reasonable reading of the arbitration provision in the Agreement is that all claims or disputes, besides Breadeaux’s equitable claims, must be arbitrated. Additionally, Breadeaux elected to enforce the Agreement by judicial process, not through mediation and arbitration. Under these circumstances, Breadeaux’s claims are not referable. View "Breadeaux's Pisa, LLC v. Beckman Bros. Ltd." on Justia Law

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Land O’Lakes and Commercial Bag entered into a “Packaging Materials Supply Agreement.” Under the Agreement, Land O’Lakes agreed to “make best reasonable efforts” to buy fifteen to twenty percent of its annual polypropylene bag volume from Commercial Bag. Due to concerns with the new manufacturer, however, Land O’Lakes decided to purchase a portion of its polypropylene bags from a domestic manufacturer instead. Land O’Lakes informed Commercial Bag of this decision, and said that it would “result in a discontinuation of the business relationship between Land O’Lakes and Commercial” for polypropylene bags. Land O’Lakes gave Commercial Bag 90 days’ notice that it was terminating the Agreement. Commercial Bag sued, alleging that Land O’Lakes breached the contract by terminating the Agreement without cause, reducing its purchases of polypropylene bags from Commercial Bag, and refusing to pay Commercial Bag’s invoice for plates and artwork. The district court granted summary judgment for Land O’Lakes.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that the term “Agreement” in Amendment #2 is not ambiguous. Land O’Lakes was permitted under the contract to terminate the agreement without cause. Amendment #1 added the “without cause” termination provision to Section 2 of the Agreement, and Amendment #2 did not remove that provision. So the “Agreement” to which Amendment #2 referred was necessarily the original agreement as amended by Amendment #1. The court concluded that because Commercial Bag produced no evidence that it actually incurred costs for plates and dies, the district court correctly granted judgment for Land O’Lakes on this claim. View "Commercial Bag Company v. Land O'Lakes, Inc." on Justia Law

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In March 2020, Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City, Inc. (Concord Baptist) sustained damage to its facilities in a severe storm. After disagreements with its insurer, Church Mutual Insurance Company (Church Mutual), regarding the amount of loss, Concord Baptist initiated this action, alleging breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Church Mutual, concluding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Concord Baptist failed to comply with a cooperation clause contained in the insurance policy, which precluded coverage. Concord Baptist appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Concord Baptist admits that it materially breached the policy, the court need not address Concord Baptist’s argument regarding whether the failure to submit to an EUO was a material breach. However, the court noted that Missouri courts have found a material breach where an insured failed to submit to an EUO before commencing an action against the insurer. Regarding the second element, whether Church Mutual suffered substantial prejudice from Concord Baptist’s material breach, the court agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts show that it did. Finally, as to the third element, whether Church Mutual exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to procure Concord Baptist’s cooperation, the court again agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts demonstrate Church Mutual’s diligence. View "Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City v. Church Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and his colleague secured provisional patents for a medical device and created a new company, Caisson Interventional, LLC. He sold it to LivaNova USA, Inc. in order to develop and bring it to market. When LivaNova shut down the project, he sued. The district court granted summary judgment for LivaNova. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that LivaNova breached section 4.3 of the UPA. The parties dispute the meaning of LivaNova’s obligation to be “consistent with the efforts and level of care and business decisions [LivaNova] and its affiliates employ generally.” Plaintiff emphasized the obligation to act “consistent with” the (1) efforts, (2) levels of care, and (3) business decisions employed in LivaNova’s other projects. LivaNova stressed the authorization to act as it “generally” does.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that evidence that LivaNova treated similarly situated companies differently than it treated Caisson might carry Plaintiff’s claim past summary judgment. But Plaintiff points to no such evidence in the record—Caisson’s particularities undercut Plaintiff’s premise that a “general approach” to its development can be inferred from LivaNova’s other projects. When Plaintiff argued that Caisson was treated differently than other projects, LivaNova presented evidence that Caisson was different than other projects. With only apples-to-oranges comparisons available on this record, Plaintiff cannot establish a “general” approach to developing the unique Caisson device and thus cannot show inconsistency with the UPA’s requirements. In short, the court held that the device did not work well enough to trigger a contractual obligation. View "Todd Mortier v. LivaNova USA, Inc." on Justia Law

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Ritchie Capital Management, LLC fell victim to a massive Ponzi scheme. Ritchie sought recovery outside the receivership. But settlement agreements and bar orders prevent recovery. The district court approved the receivership’s final accounting and a previous bar order. Claiming abuses of discretion, Ritchie appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court ordered the receiver to prepare and file a final accounting. The district court established the requirements that, in its sound discretion, the receiver satisfied in the final accounting. Ritchie fails to identify a clear abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the final accounting and, regardless, waived its right to do so. Further, the court held that because bankruptcy-standing doctrine independently prevents Ritchie from bringing claims related to the bankruptcy estate, and because Ritchie can still pursue personal claims against JPMorgan, Ritchie cannot identify a protected right that is deprived here. View "United States v. Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff (and IVYR PLLC, doing business as Par Retina) sued Wolfe Clinic, P.C. (and three of its owner-physicians). Plaintiff alleged that the Clinic monopolized or attempted to monopolize the vitreoretinal care market. On the merits, the district court initially dismissed the monopolization, fraudulent inducement, and recission claims while remanding the remaining state law claims. In an amended judgment, the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and affirmed the dismissal of the monopolization claims, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, dismissing all state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. The information in the amended complaint was previously available to Plaintiff and should have been pleaded before the judgment was entered. Plaintiff was on notice of the deficiencies in his complaint when the Clinic filed its motion to dismiss. Despite this, Plaintiff inexcusably delayed filing the Rule 59(e) motion—waiting over five months after the motion to dismiss was filed and almost a month after the district court dismissed the complaint. The court ultimately held that Plaintiff failed to plead a plausible claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization because he did not allege a relevant geographic market. View "George Par v. Wolfe Clinic, P.C." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff invented a medical device. He sold it to LivaNova USA, Inc. in order to develop and bring it to market. When LivaNova shut down the project, he sued. The district court granted summary judgment for LivaNova. Plaintiff argued that LivaNova breached section 4.3 of the UPA by shuttering Caisson.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim because LivaNova did not breach the UPA’s unambiguous requirements. The court explained that Plaintiff argued that LivaNova failed to act consistently with its general approach. However, Plaintiff points to no such evidence in the record—Caisson’s particularities undercut Plaintiff’s premise that a “general approach” to its development can be inferred from LivaNova’s other projects. When Plaintiff argued that Caisson was treated differently than other projects, LivaNova presents evidence that Caisson was different than other projects.   Further, the court found that Plaintiff’s claim that LivaNova shut down Caisson in part to avoid tax liability does not allege that LivaNova “generally” would not shut down projects to avoid tax liability. His claim that LivaNova chose inexperienced Goldman Sachs bankers for the sale does not aver that LivaNova “generally” chose better bankers. And his claim that LivaNova kept Caisson independent from the corporate structure does not establish that LivaNova “generally” integrated projects with independent-minded founders like Caisson’s. Further, applying the principles of contract interpretation outlined above, the court found that the section imposed upon LivaNova, at most, a limited future obligation to maintain enough capital to fulfill its UPA obligations. View "Todd Mortier v. LivaNova USA, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, two brothers, were the sole shareholders of Crown C Corporation. The corporation obtained life insurance on each brother so that if one died, the corporation could use the proceeds to redeem his shares. When one brother died, the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes on his estate, which included his stock interest in the corporation. According to the IRS, the corporation’s fair market value includes the life insurance proceeds intended for the stock redemption. The brother's estate argues otherwise and sued for a tax refund. The district court agreed with the IRS.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here the estate argues that the court should look to the stock-purchase agreement to value of the brother’s shares because it satisfies these criteria. But the estate glosses over an important component missing from the stock purchase agreement: some fixed or determinable price to which we can look when valuing the brother’s shares. Further, the Treasury regulation that clarifies how to value stock subject to a buy-sell agreement refers to the price in such agreements and “the effect, if any, that is given to the . . . price in determining the value of the securities for estate tax purposes.” 26 C.F.R. Section 20.2031-2(h). Here, the stock-purchase agreement fixed no price nor prescribed a formula for arriving at one. Further, the court explained that the proceeds were simply an asset that increased shareholders’ equity. A fair market value of the brother's shares must account for that reality. View "Thomas Connelly v. United States" on Justia Law