Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

F.B. and M.B. filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and their minor child, L.B., under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that Our Lady of Lourdes Parish and School failed to comply with procedural standards and requirements mandated by the Act's implementing regulations. L.B. had ADHD and reduced vision, and her parents claimed that the school initially provided necessary accommodations but later failed to do so after a change in school administration. This led to L.B. receiving failing grades and eventually being expelled from the school.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the case, holding that Section 504 does not create a private right of action for claims based solely on an alleged failure to comply with procedural standards and requirements of the implementing regulations. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring their claims. The court found that the plaintiffs' alleged injury, L.B.'s expulsion, was not fairly traceable to the school's failure to comply with the procedural regulations of Section 504. Additionally, the court determined that the relief sought by the plaintiffs would not redress their alleged injury. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "F.B. v. Our Lady of Lourdes Parish and School" on Justia Law

Charles James, a home designer, claimed that real estate agents infringed his copyrights by including floorplans of his homes in resale listings. James designed a home with a triangular atrium and stairs, built six homes using the design, and registered copyrights for the designs. In 2010, agent Susan Horak listed one of these homes for resale, creating a floorplan by hand for the listing. In 2017, agent Jackie Bulgin listed another of James's homes, using a similar floorplan. James discovered these listings in 2017 and alleged that the floorplans could be used to build homes, potentially infringing his copyrights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the real estate agents, concluding that their use of the floorplans was fair use. The court also initially ruled in favor of the agents under § 120(a) of the Copyright Act, but this decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which remanded the case for further consideration of the fair use defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the agents. The court held that the agents' use of the floorplans was fair use, considering the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, and the effect on the market for the original work. The court found that the agents' use was transformative, had an informational purpose, and did not harm the market for James's designs. The court also rejected Designworks's request for further discovery on the fair use issue, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The court affirmed the district court's judgments. View "Designworks Homes, Inc. v. Columbia House of Brokers Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Gallagher borrowed money from Santander Consumer USA to purchase a car. After making the final payment via electronic funds transfer, Santander, following its standard practice, waited 15 days before sending the car title. Missouri law requires lienholders to release their lien within five business days after receiving full payment, including electronic funds transfers, or pay liquidated damages. Gallagher filed a lawsuit in Missouri state court on behalf of a potential class of borrowers affected by Santander's 15-day policy.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which granted summary judgment in favor of Santander. Gallagher appealed the decision, seeking to reverse the summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court focused on whether Gallagher had standing to bring the case in federal court, specifically whether he had suffered an injury-in-fact. The court determined that Gallagher had not identified a concrete harm resulting from the delay in receiving the car title. The court noted that a statutory violation alone is insufficient for standing; there must be a concrete harm related to the violation. Gallagher did not demonstrate any monetary harm, such as a failed sale or impaired credit rating, nor did he show any ongoing injury to his property rights.The Eighth Circuit concluded that Gallagher lacked standing because he did not suffer a concrete injury. As a result, the court vacated the district court's judgment and instructed the district court to remand the case to state court. View "Gallagher v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Christopher Meek purchased a universal life insurance policy from Kansas City Life Insurance Company, which combined a standard life insurance policy with a savings account. Meek alleged that Kansas City Life improperly included profits and expenses in the cost of insurance, which was not mentioned in the policy, leading to a lower cash value in his account. Meek filed a federal lawsuit for breach of contract and conversion, and the district court certified a class of about 6,000 Kansans with Meek as the lead plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri found that Meek's lawsuit was timely for payments going back five years under Kansas’s statute of limitations. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Meek on the breach-of-contract claim, interpreting the policy against Kansas City Life. The conversion claim was dismissed. A jury awarded over $5 million in damages, which was reduced to $908,075 due to the statute of limitations. Both parties appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s class certification, finding that common questions of law and fact predominated. The court also upheld the application of Kansas law for both the conversion claim and the statute of limitations. The court agreed with the district court’s interpretation of the insurance policy, concluding that the cost of insurance should not include profits and expenses. The court found that the jury’s damages award was supported by reasonable evidence and did not warrant an increase.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, including the class certification, the application of Kansas law, the partial summary judgment in favor of Meek, and the damages award. View "Meek v. Kansas City Life Ins. Company" on Justia Law

Tad Mayfield, a nonpartisan legislative specialist in the assistant chief clerk’s office of the Missouri House of Representatives, was terminated on August 6, 2020, after sending an email on August 3, 2020, to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tem of the Missouri Senate advocating for mandatory face masks in the state capitol building due to COVID-19 concerns. Mayfield filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging wrongful termination in retaliation for his email, claiming it violated his First Amendment rights.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The jury found in favor of Mayfield, awarding him $15,000 in punitive damages and $14,993.93 in actual damages for lost wages. The district court denied the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law and awarded Mayfield attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Mayfield’s email was protected speech under the First Amendment as it addressed a matter of public concern. The court found that the defendants failed to show that the email had an adverse impact on the efficiency of the House’s operations, which would have necessitated a Pickering balancing test. The court also upheld the jury’s finding that the email was a substantial or motivating factor in Mayfield’s termination and rejected the defendants' claim of qualified immunity, stating that the right to speak on matters of public concern was clearly established.Additionally, the court found sufficient evidence to support the submission of punitive damages to the jury, given the defendants' knowledge that terminating an employee for raising public health concerns could be illegal. The court also upheld the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Mayfield, finding no abuse of discretion. View "Mayfield v. Miller" on Justia Law

Derrick A. Davis sued the City of Little Rock, the chief of police, and three detectives for Fourth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after a no-knock warrant was executed on his residence. The warrant was based on an email about drug activity, a controlled buy using a confidential informant (CI), and Detective Bell's affidavit. The SWAT team executed the warrant, finding marijuana inside Davis's home.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Davis appealed, arguing that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the detectives' responsibility for the SWAT team's actions, the veracity of statements in the warrant affidavit, and the existence of a conspiracy to violate his Fourth Amendment rights. He also challenged the district court's handling of evidence and the imposition of sanctions for his failure to attend a deposition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Detectives Bell and Ison were entitled to qualified immunity because the right in question was not clearly established at the time of the warrant's execution. The court also found no Franks violation, as Davis failed to show that any false statements in the affidavit were made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. Additionally, the court ruled that Davis's § 1983 conspiracy claim failed because the underlying Fourth Amendment claims were properly dismissed.The court also determined that the district court did not err in considering Detective Bell's affidavit or in disregarding Davis's expert opinions. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the sanctions award because the district court had not yet fixed the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "Davis v. City of Little Rock" on Justia Law

Following heavy snowfall in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the roofs of several chicken houses at ten poultry farms collapsed. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which insured the farms, sued Rogers Manufacturing Corporation, the manufacturer of the roof trusses used in the chicken houses, claiming strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranties. Rogers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Norfolk’s claims were barred by the Arkansas statute of repose.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas agreed with Rogers and dismissed the complaint. Norfolk appealed the dismissal, arguing that the statute of repose did not apply to Rogers because the roof trusses were standardized goods, not custom-designed for the farms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Norfolk’s favor. The court found that Norfolk’s complaint plausibly supported an inference that the roof trusses were standardized goods, which would not be covered by the Arkansas statute of repose. The court emphasized that at this early stage, the complaint should not be dismissed if it allows for a reasonable inference of liability.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the facts and legal arguments could be further developed as the case progresses. View "Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Rogers Manufacturing Corporation" on Justia Law

Tremonti Perry, while incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center, experienced a severe medical emergency that resulted in him being placed in a medically induced coma for a month. Several years after recovering, Perry filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison's warden, the Missouri Department of Corrections Director, and two medical-care contractors, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Perry admitted he did not use the prison’s administrative remedy, which required filing a complaint within fifteen days of the incident, but argued that his coma made it impossible to meet this requirement.The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Perry had not exhausted his available remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). They acknowledged that the grievance process was unavailable to Perry during his coma and a reasonable period afterward but contended that Perry should have made a diligent effort to exhaust his claims once he recovered. The district court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Perry could have filed a grievance after his medical conditions resolved.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court determined that the prison’s administrative grievance process was unavailable to Perry due to his physical incapacity during the coma and the prison’s rules not allowing late filings. The court rejected the Defendants' arguments that Perry could have filed an untimely grievance or that the grievance deadline was perpetually renewed due to ongoing medical issues. The court also denied the Defendants' motion to supplement the record with new evidence. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Perry’s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perry v. Precythe" on Justia Law

Major Brands, Inc., a Missouri-licensed liquor distributor, had been the exclusive distributor of Jägermeister in Missouri since the 1970s. In 2018, Mast-Jägermeister US, Inc. (MJUS) terminated this relationship and appointed Southern Glazers Wine and Spirits, LLC (Southern Glazers) as the new distributor. Major Brands sued MJUS and Southern Glazers, alleging wrongful termination under Missouri franchise law, conspiracy to violate Missouri franchise law, and tortious interference with the franchise relationship.The case was initially brought in state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. After dismissing additional defendants, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury awarded Major Brands $11.75 million, finding in its favor on five counts, including violation of Missouri franchise law and tortious interference. The district court denied the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial and awarded attorney’s fees to Major Brands.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on the essential element of a "community of interest" under Missouri franchise law. The appellate court held that the jury instructions failed to require consideration of whether Major Brands made substantial investments that were not recoverable upon termination, which is necessary to establish a community of interest. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, vacated the jury’s verdict and the award of attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Major Brands, Inc. v. Mast-Jagermeister US, Inc." on Justia Law

Strategic Energy Concepts, LLC (Strategic) partnered with Otoka Energy, LLC (Otoka) to develop a biomass power plant in California. The plant faced significant operational and financial issues, accumulating $19 million in debt. State Street Bank & Trust Company (State Street) agreed to invest $25 million to help the project, with Strategic transferring its shares in the plant's holding company to Otoka for a conditional payment of $1.1 million, contingent on the availability of funds from State Street's investment. The plant failed to meet operational deadlines and eventually shut down, leading Strategic to receive no payment.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed some of Strategic's claims and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, including breach of contract, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment. Strategic's motions to reopen discovery and for reconsideration were denied, prompting Otoka to dismiss its counterclaims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court held that the conditions precedent for the $1.1 million payment were not met, as the funds from State Street were allocated to other obligations. Additionally, the court found no evidence of tortious interference by State Street, as it acted within its contractual rights and had justification for its actions. The unjust enrichment claim also failed, as there was no impropriety in State Street's conduct.The court also upheld the district court's denial of Strategic's motions to reopen discovery and for reconsideration, concluding that any new discovery would have been futile and that the summary judgment was based on facts existing at the time of the original decision. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Strategic Energy Concepts, LLC v. Otoka Energy, LLC" on Justia Law