Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Coloplast Corporation and Coloplast Manufacturing US, LLC (collectively, Coloplast) manufacture and market Restorelle L, a surgical mesh device. Plaintiff sued Coloplast for injuries allegedly caused by the implantation of Restorelle L mesh. After excluding portions of Plaintiff’s expert opinions and testimony, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Coloplast. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in excluding her expert’s opinion on specific causation and in granting summary judgment on her negligent design claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the expert’s supplemental declaration was untimely because it was submitted after the deadlines for disclosure of expert reports and completion of all discovery. The court reasoned that Rule 26(e)(2) requires that an expert’s supplement “be disclosed by the time the party’s pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) are due.” Rule 26(a)(3)(B), in turn, states that “Unless the court orders otherwise, these disclosures must be made at least 30 days before trial.” Plaintiff maintains that she, therefore, had until thirty days before trial to disclose the expert’s supplemental declaration. However, the court explained that she ignored the caveat that Rule 26’s default timing provision applies only if the court does not order otherwise. Here, the court set deadlines in its scheduling order, those deadlines superseded the default rules, and Plaintiff failed to meet those deadlines. Further, the court wrote that the district court also did not abuse its discretion when it decided to exclude the expert’s report and declaration without considering lesser sanctions. View "Angela Cantrell v. Coloplast Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that led West Memphis Police Department (WMPD) officers on a dangerous chase. He was shot and killed when officers tried to stop the car, and his estate sued them under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for excessive force and state-created danger. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that Plaintiff had his hands up. And the court has no doubt that shooting into the car posed a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to him. But the driver had just led police on a reckless, high-speed chase, which involved swerving into oncoming traffic, hitting a police car, and resisting efforts to stop the car by other means. By the time officers started shooting, the car had run over one officer’s legs and was headed toward others. Here, the court wrote that all things considered, officers acted reasonably in using deadly force, and the district court didn’t err in granting summary judgment. View "Estate of De'Angelo Brown v. E.C. West" on Justia Law

Entergy Arkansas, LLC, sells electricity to Arkansans. The Arkansas Public Service Commission sets the retail rates that Entergy can charge. Arkansas Electric Energy Consumers, Inc. (“AEEC”) is a trade association comprised of large industrial and agricultural Entergy customers. Entergy asked the Commission for permission to raise its retail rates.  AEEC intervened, urging the Commission to deny Entergy’s request. The Commission ultimately did so. Entergy then sued the Commission in September 2020, alleging that the denial violated federal and state law. The Commission promptly moved to dismiss, but the district court denied its motion. Entergy moved for summary judgment. A week later—about twenty-two months after the suit commenced—AEEC moved to intervene as of right or, alternatively, to intervene permissively. AEEC appealed only the denial of its motion for the intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial. The court explained that the Commission’s trial presentation does not evince the sort of “misfeasance or nonfeasance in protecting the public” necessary to overcome the presumption of adequacy. The court explained that the Commission has maintained throughout this litigation that the lawfulness of its denial must be evaluated solely on the basis of the evidence presented in the administrative proceeding (in which AEEC participated) and that additional evidence before the district court is, therefore, unnecessary. AEEC, therefore, has not shown that the Commission inadequately represents its interest in this litigation, as required by Rule 24(a)(2). View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. Arkansas Electric Energy Consumers, Inc." on Justia Law

A Missouri physician prescribed ivermectin and hydroxychloroquine to Minnesota residents (Plaintiffs) to treat their severe COVID-19 infections. Pharmacists at Walmart and Hy-Vee stores in Albert Lea, Minnesota, refused to fill the prescriptions. the district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal of their claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to plausibly plead that the pharmacists’ alleged actions amounted to “extreme and outrageous” conduct.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The allegation that the Hy-Vee pharmacist said he was following “corporate policy” is neither extreme nor outrageous in these stressful circumstances. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege experiencing physical or specific psychological consequences after the pharmacists refused to fill their prescriptions, nor that they sought medical or mental health treatment for their distress. To the contrary, they allege both fully recovered from COVID-19 two weeks after self-treating with horse paste. View "William Salier v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Prospect Funding Holdings (NY), LLC, won arbitration awards against Ronald Palagi and his law firm, Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., LLC. Palagi and his firm filed an application to vacate the awards in federal court, which the district court granted.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that applicants seeking to vacate or confirm awards under Section 9 and Section 10 must identify an “independent jurisdictional basis” for their actions. The court wrote that the dispute between Prospect and Palagi and his firm does not contain a federal question, so diversity of citizenship between the parties must exist. Here, the application to vacate the 2021 awards does not identify any jurisdictional basis whatsoever. Crucially, Palagi and his firm failed to plead the parties’ citizenship in the application. Palagi’s individual citizenship has never been pleaded before the court. Diversity of citizenship has not been established so the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case. View "Prospect Funding Holdings (NY) v. Ronald J. Palagi, P.C., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for deliberate indifference after she was assaulted by a fellow inmate and co-defendant. She appealed the district court’s dismissal of one prison staff member, the grant of summary judgment to other staff members, and the denial of her motion to alter or amend the judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Nebraska law, Plaintiff had four years to sue after her cause of action accrued. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims started to accrue when she was assaulted in September 2016, the moment she could “sue and obtain relief.”. When Plaintiff sought to sue Defendant in December 2020, more than four years later, her claims were time-barred. The court explained that it is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, so the district court did not err. Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiff’s motion, considering she had notice of what she needed to do to comply with the local rules and neglected to do so. View "Christine Bordeaux v. Cheryl Bicknase" on Justia Law

Four employee benefit funds and their Boards of Trustees, as well as two labor unions (collectively, “Boards”), sued B.F.W. Contracting, LLC and B.F.W. Contractors, LLC (collectively, “Contractors”) to compel an audit and recover money damages pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) signed onto by Contractors. The district court granted summary judgment for the Boards and found damages in the amount of $48,568.76.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the Boards argued that the Contractors forfeited the argument about supplemental dues because they failed to raise it before the district court. The court concluded that the Boards are incorrect. The Contractors made this argument in their Response to the Statement of Material Facts by Plaintiff, as well as in their Supplemental Reply Memorandum. The court found that this was enough to avoid forfeiture and allowed the court to consider the issue on appeal.   Additionally, the Boards argue that failure to pay the supplemental dues resulted in a breach of the CBA provision, which authorized the dues under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 186(c)(2). However, as the plain language of the CBA makes clear, there is no violation of that provision if the Contractors never received the employee authorization cards as required by both the CBA and 29 -6- U.S.C. Section 186(c)(4). Without a breach of this subsection of the CBA, these statutory provisions are inapplicable. View "Greater St. Louis Const. Laborers Welfare Fund v. B.F.W. Contracting, LLC" on Justia Law

Farmer William Topp raises crops and livestock in Monroe County, Iowa. After several rough years, he filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy—intended for “family farmers.” Farm Credit Services of America had financed part of Topp’s farm operation and filed a $595,000 claim as a secured creditor. The claim arose from five loans of various durations, with interest rates ranging from 3.5% to 7.6%. Together, the loans were secured by $1.45 million of Topp’s real estate. This bankruptcy appeal arises from a dispute between the farmer and his creditor over their proposed repayment plan. The two could not agree on the appropriate discount rate that should apply to the farmer’s deferred payments so as to satisfy the creditor’s present claim. The bankruptcy court sided with the farmer.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the bankruptcy court studied the Till/Doud relationship and the prevalence of postTill decisions using the prime rate. The court considered the length of the proposed maturity period, the fact that Farm Credit’s claim was substantially over-secured, and the overall risk of nonpayment. In the end, the court approved a 4% rate—the treasury rate plus 2% for risk. By focusing on the starting rate rather than the ultimate rate, Farm Credit has failed to show that the bankruptcy court clearly erred in its determination that a 4% rate was sufficient to ensure full payment on “the value, as of the effective date of the plan,” of the secured claim. View "Farm Credit Services of America v. William Topp" on Justia Law

A former BNSF Railway Company employee died from lung cancer in 2018. Plaintiff, on behalf of her late husband’s estate, brought this wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that her husband’s cancer was caused by his exposure to toxins at work. The district court excluded Plaintiff’s expert witness testimony and granted summary judgment to BNSF.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that there is no direct evidence that Plaintiff’s husband was exposed to asbestos or diesel combustion fumes. Even if a jury could infer that Plaintiff’s husband had been exposed, there is no evidence of the level of exposure. The court explained that while a quantifiable amount of exposure is not required to find causation between toxic exposure and injury, there must be, at a minimum, “evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of that agent that are known to cause the kind of harm that the plaintiff claims to have suffered,” There is no such evidence here. Moreover, the court explained that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion by determining that the expert’s opinion lacked a sufficient foundation and that, in turn, his methodology for proving causation was unreliable. View "Rebecca Lancaster v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

Lake Elmo Bank fired Plaintiff after receiving a report that she sexually harassed another employee. Plaintiff sued the Bank, claiming her termination was based on sex in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. Sections 363A.08, subd. 2(2) and (3). She also sued the Bank and the reporting employee for defamation. On both claims, the district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. First, the court explained that even assuming the complainant was not credible about some details, the Bank had sufficient information to reasonably believe that Plaintiff violated the harassment policy. The details at issue here are not significant enough to convince a jury that the Bank’s explanation was an attempt to cover up a discriminatory motive for Plaintiff’s termination.   Further, the court explained that here, unlike the employee in Bahr, the complainant’s complaint focused on only the conduct related to the harassment. There is also no evidence that the complainant, unlike the employee in Bahr, made any knowingly false statements or expressed an improper motive for making the complaint. In her interview, the complainant said that as a remedy, she sought to be moved off the teller line, away from Plaintiff, or switched to a different location. There is no evidence to show that the complainant made her statements causelessly and wantonly to injure Plaintiff’s employment. View "Heidi Nelson v. Lake Elmo Bank" on Justia Law