Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board concluded that Petitioner’s prior conviction in Kansas for possession of methamphetamine made him removable from the United States.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that Petitioner is removable and therefore denied the petition for review. Petitioner contends that the approved instruction allows a prosecutor to charge a defendant with possession of multiple drugs in the alternative. But the instruction calls for insertion of a “controlled substance” in the singular, and recommends that “an alternative charge instruction not be given” because “the defendant cannot be convicted of multiplicitous crimes.”   Petitioner further asserted that drug type must be a “means” of committing the offense because Section 21-5706(c)(1) imposes the same punishment for possession of each substance. But while different punishments would conclusively establish that drug type is an element, equivalent punishments do not show that drug type is a means. The legislature may simply have concluded that each separate drug possession offense deserves the same punishment, regardless of whether the offender possessed cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court held that the Board correctly concluded Petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance offense. View "Humberto Barbosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Claimant claimed $34,918 found in his car during a traffic stop. When he failed to fully respond to the government’s special interrogatories, the district court sanctioned him by striking his claim and entering a default judgment forfeiting the money to the government. Claimant appealed, arguing that the district court relied on an incorrect interpretation of Rule G(8).   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that an individual cannot “fail to comply” with an unknowable obligation. A party fails to comply with discovery obligations after a court order defines those obligations. Thus, Rule G(8) authorizes striking a claim for “failing to comply with” Rule G(6) only if the claimant has reason to know of and violates Rule G(6) special interrogatory obligations. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that Claimant knew or should have known that Rule G(6) obligated him to provide more information than he had provided. Claimant articulated a facially reasonable belief that the bank records and check receipts he supplied “firmly established” his relationship to the cash by “showing where the money comes from, [and] where the money was transferred and sent.” He claimed that additional documents requested by the government exceeded the scope of Rule G(6). Nothing in the record indicates that Hester had actual or constructive knowledge of additional obligations—the district court neither found that he should have known he was violating the Rule nor issued an order compelling him to respond to interrogatories. View "United States v. Christopher Hester" on Justia Law

Police officers shot and killed a teenage boy. His parents, Plaintiffs, sued the officers and the City of Benton, Arkansas, under Section 1983 and state law. After the district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, the Eighth Circuit court reversed and remanded in part. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The parents argued that the parties genuinely dispute how their son moved the gun before being shot and that this dispute is material.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that the parents identified a genuine dispute of material fact about whether their son pointed his gun at the officers. A jury could conclude, based on the expert’s testimony, that Plaintiffs’ son “never pointed the gun at the officers” but instead “moved his gun in compliance with commands to drop his gun.” This precludes summary judgment. The district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim is reversed. Because the district court relied on its excessive-force conclusion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell and state-law claims, those decisions are vacated. View "Piper Partridge v. City of Benton, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Ritchie Capital Management, LLC fell victim to a massive Ponzi scheme. Ritchie sought recovery outside the receivership. But settlement agreements and bar orders prevent recovery. The district court approved the receivership’s final accounting and a previous bar order. Claiming abuses of discretion, Ritchie appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court ordered the receiver to prepare and file a final accounting. The district court established the requirements that, in its sound discretion, the receiver satisfied in the final accounting. Ritchie fails to identify a clear abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the final accounting and, regardless, waived its right to do so. Further, the court held that because bankruptcy-standing doctrine independently prevents Ritchie from bringing claims related to the bankruptcy estate, and because Ritchie can still pursue personal claims against JPMorgan, Ritchie cannot identify a protected right that is deprived here. View "United States v. Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Debtor filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Debtor’s recent history of prior bankruptcy filings implicated 11 U.S.C. Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i), which provides that—by operation of law— the automatic stay shall not go into effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy case if a debtor had two or more bankruptcy cases that were pending but dismissed in the previous year. Debtor timely filed a motion to impose the stay in accordance with Section 362(c)(4)(B), which the standing trustee opposed and which the bankruptcy court denied. Debtor timely appealed. While the appeal was pending, Debtor’s bankruptcy case was dismissed.   The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that an appeal is considered constitutionally moot where there is no longer any live case or controversy to be decided. In ordinary parlance, an appeal is considered equitably moot and will be dismissed if implementation of the judgment or order that is the subject of the appeal renders it impossible or inequitable for the appellate court to give effective relief to an appellant. With the dismissal of Debtor’s bankruptcy case, this appeal is constitutionally moot. View "Timothy Davies v. Diana S. Daugherty" on Justia Law

Two individuals were involved in a car accident in St. Louis, Missouri. One of the cars crashed into White Knight Diner, resulting in property damage to the restaurant. At the time, White Knight was insured by Owners Insurance Company (Owners)pursuant to a policy that provided coverage for property damage and loss of business income (the Policy). After the insurers brought several motions to dismiss, the district court dismissed all parties except for Owners and White Knight. White Knight then filed an amended complaint against Owners only, adding new causes of action, including breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Owners filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted Owners’ motion. White Knight appealed, arguing that disputed material facts remain as to whether Owners’ subrogation efforts were conducted in breach of the Policy.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming Owners’ actions were taken pursuant to the Policy, White Knight’s claim still fails because it does not establish that it suffered any damages as a result of Owners’ failure to abide by the contracted-for procedures. White Knight, as an insured party under the Policy, contracted for and paid premiums to receive insurance. And Owners settled White Knight’s claim under the Policy when Owners paid White Knight a total of $66,366.27 for property damage and business income loss. White Knight has not shown that it suffered any damages beyond the compensation it received from Owners. Without evidence of damages, a breach of contract claim fails. View "White Knight Diner, LLC v. Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (and IVYR PLLC, doing business as Par Retina) sued Wolfe Clinic, P.C. (and three of its owner-physicians). Plaintiff alleged that the Clinic monopolized or attempted to monopolize the vitreoretinal care market. On the merits, the district court initially dismissed the monopolization, fraudulent inducement, and recission claims while remanding the remaining state law claims. In an amended judgment, the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and affirmed the dismissal of the monopolization claims, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, dismissing all state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. The information in the amended complaint was previously available to Plaintiff and should have been pleaded before the judgment was entered. Plaintiff was on notice of the deficiencies in his complaint when the Clinic filed its motion to dismiss. Despite this, Plaintiff inexcusably delayed filing the Rule 59(e) motion—waiting over five months after the motion to dismiss was filed and almost a month after the district court dismissed the complaint. The court ultimately held that Plaintiff failed to plead a plausible claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization because he did not allege a relevant geographic market. View "George Par v. Wolfe Clinic, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff has been incarcerated on death row in Arkansas since 1997. After he was denied relief in state court under Arkansas’s postconviction DNA testing statute, Plaintiff filed this federal lawsuit against several Arkansas officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on both standing and immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff does not expressly allege that the Attorney General currently possesses any of the DNA evidence he wants to test, Act 1780 provides the Attorney General an opportunity to play a critical role in the statute’s implementation. And here, the Attorney General responded to Plaintiff’s Act 1780 petition by opposing it in state court. The Attorney General “thereby caused,” in part, Plaintiff’s ongoing injury of being denied access to DNA testing that might prove his innocence. As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact that was caused by Defendants and that would be redressed by the relief he seeks in his Section 1983 action. He has standing to bring his procedural due process challenge to Act 1780. Further, the court found that Defendants here are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because Plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief and has alleged a sufficient connection between the defendants and Act 1780’s enforcement. View "Stacey Johnson v. Tim Griffin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffers from multiple sclerosis. Nearly four years after his diagnosis, he and his wife sued FAG Bearings, LLC, alleging the company caused his condition by improperly disposing of trichloroethylene at a facility near his childhood home in Missouri. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of FAG Bearings after concluding the suit originated in Texas under Missouri’s borrowing statute and was time-barred under Texas law.The Eight Circuit affirmed. The dispute centers on Missouri’s borrowing statute, which provides: “Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state . . . in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts of [Missouri].” Plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that his claim rose in Missouri. The court held that Plaintiff lived in Texas when he learned he may have a claim against the company. And, under Texas law, Plaintiff's claim was subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Thus, the district court did not error in finding Plaintiff's claim was time-barred. View "Spencer Knapp v. FAG Bearings, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 19, 2020. She valued her residence at $130,000 at the time, and the parties stipulated that she claimed a $15,000 homestead exemption under section 513.475 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. The bankruptcy court granted Appellant’s motion to convert from a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case. The parties stipulated that sale of Appellant’s residence would result in more than $62,000 in proceeds after satisfying the mortgage lien and paying the $15,000 homestead exemption and costs of sale. Prompted by indications that the Trustee planned to sell her residence, Goetz filed a Motion to Compel Trustee to Abandon Real Property of Debtor. The bankruptcy court denied the motion.   The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that postpetition preconversion nonexempt equity resulting from market appreciation and payments toward a mortgage lien accrue for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate upon conversion from a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case. Further, the court rejected Appellant’s claim that she benefits from the increase in equity in her residence because her residence was removed from the bankruptcy estate. The court explained the parties stipulated that sale of Appellant’s residence would result in more than $62,000 in proceeds after satisfying the mortgage lien and paying the $15,000 homestead exemption and costs of sale. The bankruptcy court’s determination that this sum is “of more than inconsequential value and benefit to the estate” was not an abuse of discretion. View "Machele L. Goetz v. Victor F. Weber" on Justia Law