Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brothers and Sisters in Christ, LLC (BASIC) allege that Zazzle, Inc. sold a t-shirt that infringed on BASIC’s federal trademark. The district court granted Zazzle’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that BASIC bears the burden of establishing a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Further, where the applicable federal statute, here the Lanham Act, does not authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction the existence of personal jurisdiction depends on the long-arm statute of the forum state and the federal Due Process Clause.   Here, the court looked to Zazzle’s contacts with Missouri related to BASIC’s claims. Aside from the single t-shirt sale, BASIC fails to allege a connection between Zazzle’s other contacts with Missouri and the underlying suit. BASIC does not allege that Zazzle’s other activities in Missouri involved trademark infringement or that Zazzle sold additional trademark-infringing goods into the state. Further, BASIC has not alleged that Zazzle took such purposeful, targeted action toward Missouri or Missouri consumers. Although Missouri has an interest in this litigation because the allegedly injured plaintiff is a Missouri company, the convenience of the parties is neutral, as Zazzle would be inconvenienced by litigation in Missouri and BASIC would likely be inconvenienced in an alternate forum. In sum, BASIC has failed to allege that Zazzle could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Missouri. View "Brothers and Sisters in Christ v. Zazzle, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff shattered her heel bone participating in the Rugged Maniac Twin Cities 5k obstacle race at the Wild Mountain Recreation Area (“Wild Mountain”). Plaintiff sued Rugged Races LLC (“Rugged Races”), the race promoter and the owner of Wild Mountain, alleging that Defendants were “grossly negligent” in failing to perform their duties to protect race participants from unreasonable risks of harm.   Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of both Defendants. On appeal, Plaintiff argues (i) the exculpatory clause is unenforceable; (ii) if enforceable, it does not waive claims based on Defendants’ alleged greater-than-ordinary negligence; and (iii) the summary judgment record includes evidence from which a reasonable jury could find greater-than-ordinary negligence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Minnesota law, as in most States, “ordinary negligence” is the “failure to exercise such care as persons of ordinary prudence usually exercise under such circumstances.” The court wrote that it agrees with the district court that “[t]he fact that thousands of participants -- many of whom undoubtedly outweighed Plaintiff-- jumped into the landing pit without incident is compelling evidence that the water level was not unreasonably low.” Further, the court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff offered “little more than speculation” supporting her contentions that the rock was present before the pit was filled and would have been discovered had the construction crew not acted with greater-than-ordinary negligence. As such, Plaintiff’s negligence claims were waived by the valid and enforceable exculpatory clause in the Race Participant Agreement. View "Jeanne Anderson v. Rugged Races, LLC" on Justia Law

Mount Rushmore played host to Fourth of July fireworks shows. Unfortunately, visitor safety and fire-danger concerns put the practice on hold. The Park Service later changed course and granted a permit that said it was for the “year 2020 and [did] not mean an automatic renewal of the event in the future.” South Dakota tried again. This time, the Park Service denied the request, citing COVID-19 risks, concerns about tribal relationships, effects on other Mount Rushmore visitors, a then-in-progress construction project, and ongoing monitoring of water-contamination and wildfire risks. The denial led South Dakota to sue the agency on two grounds. South Dakota asked the court to convert its order denying a preliminary injunction into a final judgment. Despite having doubts about whether the continuing dispute over the permit denial was still live (given that the Fourth of July had already passed), the court went ahead and granted the request because the non-delegation issue presented a “non-moot appealable issue.   On appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and dismissed the appeal. The court explained that it cannot change what happened last year, and South Dakota has not demonstrated that deciding this otherwise moot case will impact any future permitting decision. The court explained that the problem for South Dakota is redressability. The declaration it seeks is that “the statutes granting [the Park Service] permitting authority are unconstitutional for want of an intelligible principle.” But it cannot identify how the “requested relief will redress [its] alleged injury,” which is not being able to hold a Fourth of July fireworks show at Mount Rushmore. View "Kristi Noem v. Deb Haaland" on Justia Law

Defendant, a neurosurgeon, chose to use implants distributed by DS Medical, a company wholly owned by his fiancée. Physicians in other practices grew suspicious and filed various claims under the False Claims Act. The jury returned a verdict for the government on two of the three claims. The district court then awarded treble damages and statutory penalties in the amount of $5,495,931.22. Following the verdict, the government moved to dismiss its two remaining claims without prejudice, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), on the ground that any recovery would be “smaller and duplicative of what the [c]ourt ha[d] already awarded.”   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court explained that are several ways to prove that a claim is “false or fraudulent” under the False Claims Act. One of them is to show that it “includes items or services resulting from a violation” of the anti-kickback statute. This case required the court to determine what the words “resulting from” mean. The court concluded that it creates a but-for causal requirement between an anti-kickback violation and the “items or services” included in the claim. Thus, the court reversed and remanded because district court did not instruct the jury along these lines. View "United States v. Midwest Neurosurgeons, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Appellants are four Minnesota state employees who sued unions that represented their local bargaining units. The employees sought monetary relief based on the amount of so-called “fair-share” fees that were deducted from employee paychecks for the benefit of the unions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the unions.  On appeal, the employees argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the unions on each of the claims for retrospective relief.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the unions’ reliance on Section 179A.06 was objectively reasonable. It is an open question whether subjective intent is relevant to the defense, but the employees did not present a submissible case that the unions collected fair-share fees in subjective bad faith in any event. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the unions on these claims.   The unions prevailed on motions for summary judgment. The rules of civil procedure provide those costs “should be allowed to the prevailing party,” unless the court or a federal statute or rule directs otherwise. Further, the employees point to no authority that requires a district court to reduce an award of costs because a defendant opted to forgo a motion to dismiss and to file a dispositive motion only after developing a factual record. A defendant may choose how best to defend a lawsuit, and if the case is resolved in favor of the defense on a motion for summary judgment, then the defendant is presumptively entitled to costs. View "Linda Hoekman v. Education Minnesota" on Justia Law

Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP (Wagstaff) filed a declaratory-judgment action against the Defendant-Attorney, seeking a declaration that Wagstaff owed nothing to Defendant for any work on a wrongful death lawsuit or, in the alternative, a determination of the amount it owed to Defendant.   Defendant filed counterclaims against Wagstaff, including a counterclaim under the theory of quantum meruit. The district court entered judgment in Wagstaff’s favor. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in (1) denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (2) denying his motion for leave to dismiss counterclaims without prejudice and motions for leave to file his second amended answer (3) denying his motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action without prejudice under the abstention doctrine and motion to reconsider the denial of that dismissal motion and (4) denying, in part, his motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, relief from judgment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in Plaintiff’s favor. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, relief from judgment. The court held that the district court reasonably interpreted Defendant’s response to Wagstaff’s third summary judgment motion as an abandonment of his quantum meruit claim. In addition, Defendant had not sustained his burden of proving that Wagstaff has engaged in misconduct that prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case. View "Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP v. Neal Lewis" on Justia Law

Missouri challenged the Secretary of the Treasury’s implementation of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA), Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4. Missouri argues that the Secretary’s “erroneously broad interpretation” of a provision in ARPA—the “Offset Restriction”—is unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Missouri lacked standing and that Missouri’s claims were not ripe for adjudication.   On appeal, Missouri identifies five specific ways it has been injured: (1) the broad interpretation of the Offset Restriction punishes Missouri for exercising its constitutional right to set taxes; (2) the Secretary’s “embrace of the broad interpretation” has harmed Missouri’s interest in the offer Congress provided to the State; (3) Treasury’s regulations make ARPA’s requirement more onerous, leading to greater compliance costs; (4) under the broad interpretation, there is an increased chance Missouri will lose ARPA funds; and (5) under the pre-enforcement test, Missouri has alleged an intention to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute, with a credible threat of enforcement hanging over it.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Missouri has not alleged an injury in fact. The court explained that Missouri has only alleged a “conjectural or hypothetical” injury, not one that is actual or imminent. It has also not alleged a future injury that is “certainly impending” or even likely to occur. Instead, Missouri asked the court to declare, in the abstract, what a statute does not mean. It asked the court to enjoin a hypothetical interpretation of the Offset Restriction that the Secretary has explicitly disclaimed, without alleging any concrete, imminent injury from the Secretary’s actual interpretation. View "State of Missouri v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law

Defendant is an inmate serving a sentence in federal custody after he was convicted in 2007 for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. After a hearing, the district court ordered Defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment of a mental disease or defect at the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on his own without counsel, and the clerk of this court appointed the federal public defender to represent Defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw from representing Defendant and a separate motion to file counsel’s motion to withdraw under seal.   The Eighth Circuit denied the motion to file under seal as overbroad. The court explained that a proper motion to seal should be narrowly drawn and accompanied by a proposed redacted filing for the public docket. Here, counsel’s present motion seeks to seal the entire motion to withdraw without any proffered justification. Further, counsel failed to state any cited authority or developed an argument as to why a court’s decision to commit a person against his will for mental health treatment should be made and reviewed in secret.   However, the court granted the the motion to withdraw and will not require a brief of the sort described in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The court wrote that on review of the motion and the record, the court is satisfied that counsel’s ethical obligation to refrain from prosecuting a frivolous appeal justifies his motion to withdraw. View "United States v. David Garner" on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy sexually abused J.T.H.’s 15-year-old son. J.T.H., who also worked in law enforcement, threatened to sue for the abuse. Before long, Spring Cook, a child-welfare investigator, showed up at his door after someone had apparently called the child-abuse hotline and accused J.T.H. (and his wife) of neglect. The parents asked for the case to be reassigned to an investigator from another county, but Cook kept it for herself. Cook ultimately issued a preliminary written finding of neglect. Unsatisfied with the outcome, the parents requested a formal administrative review. Cook was the circuit manager, so she reviewed and upheld her own finding. The second step required Cook, the parents, and their attorney to appear before Missouri’s Child Abuse and Neglect Review Board. Following that meeting, the Board concluded that Cook’s findings of “neglect were unsubstantiated.” The parents sued Cook for allegedly retaliating against them for exercising their First Amendment rights. The magistrate judge, acting by consent of the parties, concluded that neither absolute nor qualified immunity applied. The Eighth Circuit reversed: "the availability of absolute immunity depends on 'the nature of the function performed,' not the type of claim brought. ... So even if there is a general right to be free of retaliation, the law is not clearly established enough to cover the 'specific context of the case': retaliatory investigation. Cook is entitled to qualified immunity for both investigative acts." View "J.T.H. v. Cook" on Justia Law

Ila Reid appealed a district court’s summary judgment dismissal of her breach of contract claim against Primerica Life Insurance Company (“Primerica”). Reid brought her claim after Primerica filed an interpleader action to resolve competing claims to her late husband Garvin Reid’s life insurance beneficiary proceeds. She contended Primerica acted unfairly in multiple ways to create the controversy and thus the district court should not have permitted Primerica to use interpleader as a shield against her breach of contract claim. Finding no reversible error, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s summary judgment order in favor of Primerica. View "Primerica Life Insurance Co. v. Reid" on Justia Law