Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking lot of a Walgreen Co. d/b/a Walgreens store in Republic, Missouri. The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreens.  The court concluded that Plaintiff did not establish the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the “lip” formed at the junction of the parking lot’s pavement and the brick sidewalk was a dangerous condition. Consequently, Plainitff failed to establish an element of premises liability under Missouri law. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by granting summary judgment because the record shows that there was a genuine fact dispute regarding the dangerousness of the sidewalk.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff is correct that he was not required to produce expert testimony and that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient. But the circumstantial evidence presented fails to provide a sufficient basis for a jury to infer the presence of a dangerous condition created by Walgreens. Thus, the court held that Plaintiff did not present any evidence, direct or circumstantial, permitting the reasonable inference that a dangerous condition caused his accident. The district court, therefore, did not err by granting summary judgment to Walgreens. View "Gerry Hodge v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Missouri inmate currently in custody at the Northeast Correctional Center (“NECC”), filed a pro se Section 1983 action against multiple defendants, claiming deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and retaliation for filing grievances. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on his individual capacity claims against Defendant, an employee of the Missouri Department of Corrections serving as food service manager at NECC during the time in question. After discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint. As noted, Defendant argued that summary judgment was warranted because undisputed facts show that Defendant was not responsible for discontinuing Plaintiff’s Renal Diet.   The Eighth Circuit vacated a portion of the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The court explained that Defendant asserted exhaustion as an affirmative defense in his separate answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. In granting summary judgment, the district court did not consider exhaustion because it did not address Plaintiff’s 2015-2018 interference and retaliation claims. Thus, that issue remains open on remand. View "Kenneth Charron v. Larry Allen" on Justia Law

The United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) adopted a rule eliminating processing-line-speed limits in pork plants. Unions representing pork-processing-plant workers sued to vacate the rule as arbitrary and capricious. The district court granted summary judgment for the unions and vacated the rule. Two months later, Appellants—pork-processing companies affected by the rule and vacatur—moved to intervene. The district court denied the motion as untimely, noting that Appellants had participated in the summary judgment briefing eight months earlier. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained to assess the timeliness of a motion to intervene courts consider four factors: “(1) the extent the litigation has progressed at the time of the motion to intervene; (2) the prospective intervenor’s knowledge of the litigation; (3) the reason for the delay in seeking intervention; and (4) whether the delay in seeking intervention may prejudice the existing parties.”Here, Appellants sought to intervene over a month after the court entered summary judgment and the full vacatur the unions had sought. Next, Appellants had knowledge of the case and proposed relief well before the court entered summary judgment. Appellants’ reason for delay is unpersuasive. Their proffered reason—that USDA’s interests in defending NSIS aligned with theirs—fails because USDA’s interests did not align. Appellants’ core concern is having the district court return them to the HIMP waiver system. But neither the unions nor the USDA ever pursued this. Appellants suffered little prejudice because all four of their relevant plants received line-speed permits. This factor also weighed against intervention. View "United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Quality Pork Processors, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, garbage haulers and processors, sued Goodhue County, Minnesota. (“County”) and state-owned plant in Red Wing, Minnesota (the “City Plant”). Plaintiffs argued that an ordinance requiring all garbage to be deposited at the City Plant violated the Commerce Clause by benefitting an in-state company (Xcel) at the expense of out-of-state haulers and processors. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling affirming summary judgment holding that the ordinance did not implicate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court explained that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. Const. Art. I, Section 8, cl. 3. “The dormant Commerce Clause is the negative implication of the Commerce Clause: states may not enact laws that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce.”  The Commerce Clause was “never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country.”  Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that they are able to convert the garbage into refuse-derived fuel, nor do they allege that they have the ability to burn refuse-derived fuel to create electricity. Thus, the Defendants, therefore, are not competitors with either the City Plant or Xcel. View "Paul's Industrial Garage, Inc. v. Goodhue County" on Justia Law

Defendants Kim Reynolds, Governor of Iowa, and Ann Lebo, Director of the Iowa Department of Education, appealed the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction completely barring enforcement of Iowa’s facial covering statute, Code Section 280.31. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s entry of preliminary injunction completely barring enforcement of Iowa Code Section 280.31 as moot.   The court reasoned that the issue surrounding the preliminary injunction is moot because the current conditions differ vastly from those prevailing when the district court addressed it. The court reasoned that COVID-19 vaccines are now available to children and adolescents over the age of four, greatly decreasing Plaintiffs’ children’s risk of serious bodily injury or death from contracting COVID-19 at school. Further, when Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, delta was the dominant variant, producing high transmission rates and caseloads throughout the country. Now, omicron has become dominant and subsided, leaving markedly lower transmission rates and caseloads throughout Iowa and the country. The court noted that to the extent that the case continues, the Court emphasized that the parties and district court should pay particular attention to Section 280.31’s exception for “any other provision of law.” Iowa Code Section 280.31. This exception unambiguously states that Section 280.31 does not apply where “any other provision of law” requires masks. The word "any” makes the term “provision of law” a broad category that does not distinguish between state or federal law. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Kimberly Reynolds" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s father died when a driver collided with a BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) train. Plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit in state court against BNSF, the train operator, and the driver. The driver’s widow filed a wrongful death suit against the City of Hayti (“City”) and the train operator in state court. Plaintiff and his sister filed a wrongful death suit against the City in state court, and a motion to consolidate that action with the driver's. Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss this case without prejudice. BNSF opposed the motion, arguing improper forum shopping and prejudice to the defendants.   The state court granted Plaintiff’s motion to consolidate and the district court granted the motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The district court concluded that a single action in state court “will best allow for efficient use of judicial resources that this Court cannot ignore.” BNSF appealed, arguing (i) the court erred when it “failed to address Plaintiff’s purpose in seeking to voluntarily dismiss, and (ii) abused its discretion in dismissing without prejudice.   The Eighth Circuit found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court’s ruling.  The court reasoned that Plaintiff’s memorandum supporting his motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice set forth the proper standard; explained that two actions arising out of the same crash were pending in state court and were not removable; and argued that judicial economy and the interests of justice would be served by dismissing the case without prejudice so it can be consolidated with the state court cases. View "Ricky Tillman, Jr. v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

Sleep Number partnered with Defendants and through their partnership, Defendants’ inventions were adapted to create SleepIQ technology. After two years as employees, Defendants informed Sleep Number that they wished to pursue their own venture. The parties entered into a consulting agreement requiring Defendants to disclose and assign to Sleep Number the rights to inventions within a defined Product Development Scope (“PDS”).Sleep Number sued Defendants., asserting ownership of the inventions claimed in certain patent applications filed by UDP with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). The district court granted Sleep Number’s motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from further prosecuting or amending the patent applications.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court did not err in determining that Sleep Number had a fair chance of success on the merits of its claims; nor did the court err in concluding that Sleep Number has demonstrated a threat of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; further the remaining factors of the balance of the harms and public interest both weighed in favor of Sleep Number. The court reasoned that the plain meaning of the language in the consulting agreements clearly and unambiguously places the inventions described in the patent applications within the PDS. Finally, absent an injunction, Sleep Number faces a threat of harm if it cannot participate in the patent-prosecution process for the patent applications. View "Sleep Number Corporation v. Steven Young" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants claiming they violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act. The district court entered an order granting summary judgment to Defendants. After the court entered its order, but before the clerk had entered a separate judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff filed a notice stating that he had accepted an offer of judgment that Defendants had extended in which they agreed to pay him four thousand dollars plus costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.   Plaintiff maintained that, under Rule 68(a), he could accept the offer anytime up to fourteen days after Defendants had served him with it, and therefore it had survived the court's grant of summary judgment. The clerk nevertheless entered judgment consistent with the summary-judgment order. Plaintiff moved the court to amend the judgment to reflect the terms in the offer of judgment. The district court, relying on Perkins, granted Plaintiff’s motion, and the clerk entered a new judgment. Defendants appealed, maintaining that the judgment should have reflected the court's summary judgment ruling rather than the offer of judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and denied Defendants' requested relief and affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and from the court’s order granting Plaintiff only one dollar in attorneys' fees. The court reasoned that only its’ en banc court may overrule a prior panel's decision. Further, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only one dollar in fees. View "Stetson Skender v. Eden Isle Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs did not purchase flood insurance for their house after the sellers told them that the property was not in a FEMA flood zone. Within weeks the area flooded, the home was destroyed and Plaintiffs sued the property sellers, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and private contractors.   Plaintiffs alleged that either FEMA or the Strategic Alliance for Risk Reduction (“STARR”) made the 2010 Change to the 100-year flood-line estimate and SFHA designation. They alleged that STARR is a joint venture by Defendants Stantec Consulting Services, Inc., Dewberry Engineers, Inc., and Atkins North America, Inc., but do not name STARR itself as a defendant. Atkins and Stantec filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), extending the federal-contractor defense. The district court granted the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court held that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because their complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to show they are entitled to relief from Defendants. The court reasoned that Plaintiff’s complaint does not state how Atkins, Stantec and Dewberry work within STARR or which entity was responsible for any acts through STARR. Further, the complaint fails to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation against Atkins, Dewberry, and Stantec because the Plaintiffs provide “only naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” for three elements. Finally, the complaint similarly failed to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation because it does not plead which defendant made what representation. View "Derek Christopherson v. Robert Bushner" on Justia Law

Defendant was found incompetent to stand trial for the criminal charges against him. Defendant filed seventeen pro se motions seeking either release, a competency evaluation, or an order compelling his counsel to file a Sec. 4247(h) motion for a hearing to determine discharge. The court addressed whether the court had jurisdiction over Defendant’s direct appeal from a magistrate judge’s order. The parties argue the magistrate judge’s order was a “final order” authorized by the district court’s order of reference and Western District of Missouri Local Rule 72.1(c).The court reasoned that it has jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district courts of the United States”, thus without a “decision of a district court” it lacks jurisdiction to proceed any further. Defendant argues the parties implicitly consented to have the magistrate judge decide the motions at hand. But the parties’ consent does not save the appeal. Parties may consent to have a magistrate judge conduct any civil proceeding when the magistrate judge is “specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court”. Here, the district court did not specially designate the magistrate judge to exercise such jurisdiction. Thus, the court dismissed the Defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Timothy O'Laughlin" on Justia Law