Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully assaulted, pepper-sprayed, detained in an unlawful mass arrest, and ultimately incarcerated. He sued the City of St. Louis and multiple police officers for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights, and supplemental state law claims. One officer moved to dismiss the 1983 claims, arguing plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state a claim and he is entitled to qualified immunity. The only allegations relating to the defendant’s involvement are that he was working on September 17 and took custody of the plaintiff’s bicycle lying in the street at the time of his arrest. These allegations do not establish a causal link between the plaintiff and the specific wrongs the defendants as a whole allegedly committed. Further, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the amended complaint did not contain specific and plausible allegations linking the defendant to overt acts alleged as part of the conspiracy of all the defendants. The assertion that he agreed to participate in those acts does not state a plausible claim.Finally, the circuit court held that the district court erred in denying the other defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not clearly established. View "Michael Faulk v. Gerald Leyshock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was seriously injured when a pledge of the defendant fraternity snuck into her room and slit her throat after a night of drinking. The plaintiff filed tort claims against the fraternity and related parties (“the fraternity”). Plaintiff claimed primary and vicarious liability.Applying Nebraska law, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s primary liability claims, finding that the attack was not a foreseeable result of the fraternity’s forced hazing. The attacker’s criminal conduct was an intervening cause, severing the chain of causation. As to the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that any supposed agents of the fraternity were negligent under Nebraska law.The Eighth Circuit also held that social host liability does not apply. Nebraska’s Minor Alcoholic Liquor Liability Act provides a cause of action related to the “negligence of an intoxicated minor.” Here, the attacker was convicted of second-degree assault, which requires a finding that he acted knowingly or intentionally. This precludes a finding that the attacker acted negligently. View "Teresa Spagna v. Collin Gill" on Justia Law

Based upon its belief that Walmart has failed to comply with the terms of an injunction, Cuker sought to initiate contempt proceedings against Walmart, requesting supplemental damages for Walmart's post-verdict use of its trade secrets.The Eighth Circuit affirmed and concluded that the district court did not err in denying the request to commence contempt proceedings because Cukor had failed to make a prima facie case showing a violation of, or refusal to follow, a court order. In this case, Cuker's claim that the district court did not consider its arguments or evidence is belied by the record. Upon review of the record and Cuker's arguments, the court stated that Cuker's challenges to the district court's order go to the weight the court gave its evidence, not a failure to consider the evidence. View "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cuker Interactive, LLC" on Justia Law

Robinson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit six years and one day after police officers arrested and allegedly beat him. The day before he sued was Veterans Day, so federal courthouses were closed. The defendants argued that his claims were untimely. The district court asked whether some of the claims were really timely filed because the limitations period, which ordinarily would have ended on a “legal holiday,” actually “continue[d] to run until the end of the next day.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Despite the hint, Robinson never made that argument himself, so the court dismissed the claims.The Eighth Circuit reversed in part. Robinson’s privacy, excessive force, and false-arrest claims were timely. Robinson’s failure to argue the federal-holiday rule was forfeiture, not waiver, as it involved inaction rather than acquiescence. Once the district court raised the federal-holiday rule, Robinson’s counsel thought there was little point in pressing the issue. Forfeiture is excusable in limited, well-defined circumstances, including when “the proper resolution is beyond any doubt,” for “purely legal issue[s]” that do not require “additional evidence or argument.” Here, how the federal-holiday rule works is clear, none of the relevant dates are in dispute, and everyone agrees that a six-year statute of limitations applies; this “purely legal issue” that is “beyond doubt.” Robinson’s malicious-prosecution claim, however, does not state” a constitutional claim and was properly dismissed. View "Robinson v. Norling" on Justia Law

A judgment creditor’s attorney, Rodenburg, mailed the consumer debtor, Ojogwu a copy of the garnishment summons Rodenburg had served on garnishee US Bank, knowing that Ojogwu had retained counsel after the default judgment was entered and that he disputed the debt. The district court held that Minn. Stat. 571.72(4), which requires that copies of papers served on a third-party garnishee “be served by mail at the last known mailing address of the debtor not later than five days after the service is made upon the garnishee” was inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: “Without the prior consent of the consumer . . . or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with collection of any debt . . . if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt.” 15 U.S.C. 1692c(a)(2).The Eighth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the case. Under recent Supreme Court precedent, Ojogwu lacks Article III standing to pursue this claim in federal court because he failed to allege and the record does not show that he suffered concrete injury-in-fact from Rodenburg’s alleged violation of section 1692c(a)(2). View "Ojogwu v. Rodenburg Law Firm" on Justia Law

Alissa's Flowers filed suit against State Farm, alleging that it had overpaid its premiums to State Farm in light of its significantly lower exposure rate due to COVID-19. State Farm moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Missouri law required that Alissa's Flowers bring its claims before the director of the Missouri Department of Insurance.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the administrative review process set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 379.348 applies in the commercial insurance context and to plaintiff's claims in this case. The court explained that the district court properly determined that Alissa's Flowers was required to exhaust administrative remedies because the claims, in essence, constitute a challenge to State Farm's rates, rating plan, rating system and underwriting rules. Finally, the complaint should not have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but rather for lack of authority to grant relief. View "Alissa's Flowers, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The Stewarts purchased an RV in 2013 from Spitler, who financed their purchase through a bank loan. The RV was equipped with a refrigerator manufactured by Norcold. In 2016, the RV was destroyed in a fire that the Stewarts alleged was caused by the Norcold refrigerator. The Stewarts brought product liability claims against Norcold seeking damages including the market value of the RV, emergency expenses, the value of the lost personal property, and the payoff of the loan balance on the RV.During a summary judgment motion hearing, the Stewarts affirmed that the amount of the loan constituted “the alleged damages that are the subject of this lawsuit,” stating, “we are not seeking recovery of the damage to the RV.” The district court’s order granting Norcold summary judgment stated that “the only claim that remains … is for the loan payoff amount of $43,201.85.”On appeal, the Stewarts asserted that they “retained a damage claim against [Norcold]” for $106,885, which includes damages for the market value of the RV, emergency expenses, and the value of their personal property. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Stewarts waived any challenge to the district court’s determination that the loan payoff amount was the only damage claim at issue. View "Stewart v. Norcold, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Bank of the West in state court, seeking to set aside the trustee's sale of his property. After the claim was dismissed, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding U.S. Bank as a defendant. The case was removed to federal district court where it was ultimately dismissed.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal orders, concluding that the federal law violations as alleged in the second amended complaint all occurred prior to the institution and maintenance of any foreclosure activity. Therefore, they were not defects in the trustee's sale under Nebraska law. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint where the motion was procedurally defaulted and granting leave would be futile. View "Anderson v. Bank of the West" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' action alleging that nuclear waste materials from various St. Louis sites leaked into Coldwater Creek and its 100-year floodplain in St. Louis County, damaging their health and property. Following Cotter's removal to federal court on the basis of the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), the district court concluded that the PAA did not apply and remanded to state court. After plaintiffs amended their complaint in state court, Cotter filed a third party action for contribution against seven defendants, including Mallinckrodt, which then removed the entire lawsuit under the PAA and other bases. The district court granted the motion and Cotter appealed.After determining that the court has jurisdiction over the appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the PAA does not apply to plaintiffs' claims against Cotter because Cotter lacked an applicable license or indemnity agreement. Contrary to the district court's ruling, the court concluded that the PAA provides federal question jurisdiction over all "nuclear incidents," regardless of whether the defendant had an applicable license or indemnity agreement. The court explained that the PAA's text and history support its conclusion. In this case, the PAA Act provides original federal question jurisdiction for all nuclear incidents regardless of whether the defendant had an applicable indemnity agreement. View "In Re: Cotter Corporation" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit dismissed, based on lack of jurisdiction, plaintiffs' appeal of a district court order staying a federal action for trademark infringement and unfair competition pending resolution of common trademark license issues in a long-pending state court litigation between the parties. The court concluded that the stay order is neither a final order under 28 U.S.C. 1291 nor a collateral interlocutory order that may be appealed. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that if the Lomax Parties prevail on their broad allegations in state court, then the state proceedings will fully dispose of the claims in federal court. View "Window World International v. O'Toole" on Justia Law