Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a case alleging that Abbott's baby formula contained a harmful bacteria that caused permanent brain damage to J.M.K., the jury found in favor of Abbott. The district court then ordered defense counsel Ghezzi to show cause why she should not be sanctioned under FRCP 30(d)(2) for obstructing each deposition in which she had participated. Defense counsel was subsequently ordered to produce a discovery training video dealing with the impropriety of form objections, witness coaching, and excessive interruptions and to distribute the video to most of the attorneys in her national law firm, Jones Day. The Eighth Circuit reversed. While the court had authority to impose Rule 30 sanctions, generally sanctions should be imposed within a time frame that has a nexus to the behavior sought to be deterred and no advance notice was given of the unusual nature of the sanction being considered. The court noted that once information about an unusual sanction appears in public, the damage to the subject's career, reputation, and future professional opportunities can be difficult if not impossible to repair. View "Sec. Nat'l Bank of Sioux City v. Jones Day" on Justia Law

B&B, manufacturer and seller of "Sealtight," sued Hargis, manufacturer of "Sealtite," claiming trademark infringement and unfair competition. Hargis counterclaimed for false advertising and false designation of origin. The jury rejected B&B's claims but found in favor of Hargis on its counterclaims. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court properly refused to apply collateral estoppel to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's (TTAB) decision concerning likelihood of confusion; rejected B&B's argument that the TTAB's factual findings from a trademark registration case were entitled to deference; and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the TTAB's decision from the evidence presented to the jury. On remand from the Supreme Court the Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the ordinary elements of issue preclusion were met, and the usages of the mark adjudicated before TTAB were materially the same as the usages before the district court. On remand, the district court should give preclusive effect to the decision of the TTAB on likelihood of confusion. View "B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Creative, an Iowa corporation, designs and sells beauty products. LF, a Hong Kong corporation, with its principal place of business in Hong Kong, provides services, including product development, shipping oversight, and production planning. LF contacted Unger, President of Creative, in Iowa, seeking to manage Creative’s operations in China and e-mailed a presentation describing proposed services. Unger traveled to Hong Kong to execute the contract. LF managed Creative’s supply chain; the companies communicated extensively electronically and by telephone for two years. As required by the contract, LF shipped pre-production and production samples (made in China by third party factories) to Iowa. LF received payments from Creative’s customers on its behalf, and sent proceeds, less deductions, to Iowa. No LF agents or employees visited Iowa and LF has no connection with Iowa outside of this business relationship. Creative filed suit in Iowa, alleging that LF breached the contract by sending samples that could not be used because they were defective. The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit reversed, stating that a reasonable jury could find that LF had sufficient contacts with Iowa to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "Creative Calling Solutions Inc v. LF Beauty Ltd." on Justia Law

Ash and Jewsome filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, on behalf of themselves and similarly-situated persons, alleging that their employer failed to pay required overtime compensation. The district court dismissed without a hearing for failure to allege that defendants were their employer for purposes of the FLSA, and failure to allege a substantive FLSA cause of action. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion to vacate and request to file an amended complaint. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The complaint alleged only that: “During all relevant times, [defendants] were part of an integrated enterprise and, as such, were plaintiffs’ employer. During all relevant times, and upon information and belief, all of these defendants shared interrelated operations, centralized control of labor relations, common management and common ownership and/or financial control.” The allegation is simply a restatement of the legal test used to determine whether certain entities constitute a joint employer for the purpose of civil rights litigation and does not include any facts describing the “economic reality” of their employment, such as their alleged employers’ right to control the nature and quality of their work. View "Ash v. Anderson Merch., LLC" on Justia Law

Federated, a Minnesota corporation, insured Missouri property owned by Hubbard and leased to the McKees. A fire damaged the property. Both Hubbard and the McKees, who said they exercised an option to purchase the property, made claims. Federated claimed it owed $40,980.95 and that Hubbard and the McKees disputed the distribution. Asserting that Federated owed more, Hubbard counterclaimed for vexatious refusal to pay. The district court authorized Federated to deposit $40,980.95 and dismissed Hubbard’s counterclaim. The parties mediated. In an e-mail to Federated’s counsel and the McKees’ counsel, Hubbard’s counsel wrote that the McKee claim was resolved by payment of $10,879.39. The email stated: As the sum owed to the McKee defendants is less than $11,000.00, there is no possible way that the McKee defendants should have to proceed further as Federated has asserted it owes no less than $40,980.95. Seven months later, Hubbard sued Federated and the McKees in state court. Federated removed the case; Hubbard moved to remand. Concluding that Hubbard fraudulently joined the McKees, the court dismissed them, denied remand, and applied res judicata and collateral estoppel to Hubbard’s claim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that in the original case, the district court has distributed the interpleaded funds and dismissed with prejudice. View "Hubbard v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Shortly before Pettaway was to be released from federal prison, the government sought his commitment under 18 U.S.C. 4246 on grounds that he was mentally ill and dangerous. After a hearing, the district court committed Pettaway for hospitalization and treatment, finding by clear and convincing evidence that commitment was appropriate. The Eighth Circuit vacated, expressing no opinion as to the appropriateness of Pettaway’s commitment, but stating that the commitment order must do more than recite Pettaway’s mental diagnosis and the opinions of mental health professionals that Pettaway’s unconditional release would create the relevant risk of dangerousness. The court heard contrary evidence in the form of testimony from Pettaway and must give some indication as to what information in the record it relied upon– such as Pettaway’s behavioral or psychological history; results of formalized assessments; recent observations, treatment notes, or interview impressions of mental health professionals; or its impressions of Pettaway’s own testimony – in reaching its conclusion. View "United States v. Pettaway" on Justia Law

Four days before the statute of limitations expired, the Barners filed a complaint in Arkansas state court against T/C Inc. and T/C LLC, based on injuries allegedly sustained on October 15, 2010. T/C Inc. had merged into T/C LLC before the Barners filed suit. Under Arkansas law, they had 120 days to serve the defendants with the complaint and summons. Their attorney sent to CT Corporation, the registered agent for Inc., the complaint and summons for each party. CT returned two receipts, showing that service had been completed for both defendants on January 24, 2014; however, CT was not the registered agent for LLC. On February 14, after the 120-day period had expired, the defendants filed notice of removal. On April 8, the Barners served the complaint and summons for LLC on its registered agent. The court found that the claims against LLC would have been dismissed with prejudice had the case remained in state court, so the Barners could not complete service post-removal, and that Inc. was no longer a legal entity capable of being sued. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Inc., but reversed dismissal against LLC. Had the case remained in state court, it would have been dismissed, but without prejudice; the Barners would have had a year to refile under the savings statute. View "Barner v. Thompson/Center Arms Co." on Justia Law

Hughes guides hunting parties, charging $1,600 to $2,600 per person for accommodations, meals, hunting stands, field dressing, and carcass-cleaning facilities. To hunt buck in Iowa, a hunter must have a “tag.” Non-residents must enter a lottery. Hughes gave his non-resident clients tags belonging to others. After they killed a buck, Hughes falsely reported to the Iowa DNR that the tag owner had killed the buck. The bucks were transported out of state. Hughes was indicted under the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. 3371, which prohibits selling in interstate commerce any wildlife taken in violation of state law. The value of the wildlife determines whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor. The court instructed the jury: you may, but are not required to, consider, the price the wildlife would bring if sold on the open market between a willing buyer and seller; the price a hunter would pay for the opportunity to participate in a hunt for the wildlife; or Iowa’s valuation of the wildlife in state prosecutions where such wildlife is unlawfully taken. The jury found that the market value of the wildlife exceeded $350. The district court sentenced Hughes to three years’ probation, $7,000 in fines, and $1,802.50 in restitution. The Eighth Circuit reversed; the jury was not properly instructed as to the meaning of “market value.” View "United States v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Taylor was injured while attempting to secure a vehicle on a Cottrell car-hauling trailer. Dr. Odor operated on Taylor to complete a two-level cervical fusion. More than two years later, Taylor was again injured when he fell approximately 10 feet from a Cottrell trailer. He was taken to the emergency room and was discharged home with pain medication. The same month, Taylor reported to Dr. Odor with neck and back pain. After testing, Dr. Odor observed several disc protrusions and a disc desiccation. These injuries led to another complex spinal surgery with Dr. Odor, the cost of which exceeded $450,000. Two weeks before trial Cottrell claimed it had uncovered copies of agreements between Taylor's counsel and Dr. Odor which evidenced an impermissible contingent-fee agreement. The court found there was a contingency agreement and excluded Odor’s testimony as an expert witness, dismissed claims for Taylor's neck and back injuries, and stayed claims related to shoulder injuries. The Eighth Circuit reversed; the district court failed to articulate the precise interest Odor had in the outcome of the litigation and failed to explain why any such interest overcomes the general rule that Odor's bias and credibility should be resolved by the jury. View "Taylor v. Cottrell, Inc." on Justia Law

After his car was hit by a car driven negligently by Sheffer, Behlmann was billed $89,884.79 for medical treatment. Behlmann settled with Sheffer for $50,000, the limit of Sheffer’s policy. Behlmann sued his insurer, Century, for underinsured motorist benefits. Century argued that Behlmann’s medical treatment cost less than $50,000 and resulted from pre-existing conditions. The jury found for Century. Behlmann unsuccessfully requested a new trial, challenging the admission of evidence on the value of his medical treatment and the strike of the only African-American venire person. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting Missouri law: “Parties may introduce evidence of the value of the medical treatment rendered to a party that was reasonable, necessary, and a proximate result of the negligence of any party.” Behlmann did not establish that Century’s reasons for the strike were pretextual. Juror 4 was a long-time autoworker; he failed to disclose he was an autoworker despite relevant questioning; and he failed to disclose involvement in prior litigation. View "Behlmann v. Century Sur. Co." on Justia Law