Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Debtors filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. CP Medical’s collection agent timely filed a proof of claim. The Chapter 13 plan, proposing monthly payments of $124.00 over 36 months and pro rata distribution to unsecured creditors, was confirmed. Debtors fell behind on payments and converted to a Chapter 7. After confirmation, but during the Chapter 13 case, Debtors filed an adversary proceeding against CP, seeking damages For violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The complaint indicated that CP's proof of claim was for medical services provided in February 2011, that the bankruptcy and proof of claim filings were beyond Arkansas’ two-year statute of limitations for medical debt collection, and that by filing a claim on a debt that is time-barred, CP engaged in a “false, deceptive, misleading, unfair and unconscionable” debt collection practice. The bankruptcy court granted CP summary judgment, holding that no FDCPA violation occurs when a debt collector attempts to collect a potentially time-barred debt that is otherwise valid unless there is actual litigation or the threat of litigation. The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate panel affirmed. CP's proof of claim was a simple attempt to share in any distribution made to listed creditors in bankruptcy, not actual or threatened litigation. View "Gatewood v. CP Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

Alpine repairs automotive glass and, under Minnesota law, receives from insured vehicle owners the right to seek payment from insurance companies for repairs performed. Alpine and several insurers had disputes regarding the amounts paid for 482 separate claims. Minnesota law mandates arbitration of these disputes. The district court determined many claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations included in some of the insurance policies; 248 claims either were not governed by the two-year statute of limitations or were timely. The court consolidated these claims for one arbitration and ordered arbitration. Alpine appealed the consolidation order. The Eighth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the consolidation order was not an appealable final judgment. The parties pursued arbitration of one claim in which Alpine sought reimbursement for an alleged underpayment of $398.77. Arbitration resulted in a ruling in favor of the insurance company. ​The district court confirmed the award. The Eighth Circuit again dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction View "Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Meyers signed a revolving credit note and agreement and later signed term notes and loan agreements with U.S. Bank, to finance their swine production business. In 2006, the Meyers transferred all their business assets to a revocable trust, naming themselves as grantors and trustees. The revolving credit loan went into default in 2008. U.S. Bank agreed not to exercise its default rights. The lending relationship continued until the Meyers withheld proceeds from the sale of collateral (hogs). U.S. Bank filed suit; the Meyers sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 2010. In 2011 the Meyers, individually, sued U.S. Bank, alleging breach of contract, fraud, violations of the Nebraska Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and unjust enrichment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal. The Trust then commenced another suit, alleging that U.S. Bank tortiously interfered with the Trust’s contractual relations with a feed supplier. The district court granted summary judgment and imposed a $5,000 sanction against the Trust and its attorneys. The Trust appealed. U.S. Bank sought additional sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, arguing that appeal was frivolous. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the rulings, held that appeal was not frivolous but was frivolously argued, and granted double costs as a Rule 38 sanction. View "David M. Meyer & Nancy R. Meyer Trust v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Eighteen years after Nissan and Wayzata entered into an agreement which established Wayzata as an authorized Nissan dealer, Nissan informed Wayzata that it intended to establish a new dealership in Eden Prairie, eight miles from Wayzata. Nissan sought a declaratory judgment that the Eden Prairie dealership neither violated their dealer agreement nor infringed Wayzata's "relevant market area" under Minn. Stat. 80E.14. One month later, Wayzata sued Nissan in Minnesota state court, alleging the new dealership violated its dealer agreement and the statute, and moved to dismiss the federal action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to dismiss after concluding that the parties were not diverse under 28 U.S.C. 1332. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. A district court may dismiss or stay a declaratory judgment action when it determines that the question in controversy would be better handled in state court. It would be duplicative and uneconomical for a federal court to decide a case substantially similar to one which has been pending for over a year in state court. View "Nissan N. Am., Inc. v. Wayzata Nissan, LLC" on Justia Law

Taylor was charged with conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiring to launder money. The government offered to dismiss the drug conspiracy count and recommend a two-year sentence if Taylor pled guilty to money laundering. Taylor did not accept the plea. After trial, the court granted judgment of acquittal on the money laundering count. The jury found Taylor guilty on the drug count. Taylor received the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. His conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2255’s limitation period in January 2012. Taylor filed a timely motion to vacate, arguing his attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to communicate his decision to accept the plea; failing to request a “cautionary tail” instruction; and failing to request a lesser included offense instruction. After a hearing, Taylor moved to amend to add a claim that his attorneys were ineffective for presenting a defense theory that essentially conceded guilt. The court allowed amendment and granted the motion to vacate on Taylor’s amended claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed with instructions to reimpose the sentence, finding that Taylor’s amended claim did not relate back to any original claim. View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law

Manuel’s home burned down while he and his family were vacationing in Las Vegas. Manuel had insured his home through MDOW with a policy providing $150,000 for the house, $75,000 for personal property, and $45,000 for added costs. Manuel filed a claim for the fire, but MDOW denied it. MDOW told Manuel that it believed he or someone acting on his behalf had intentionally set the fire and that Manuel’s claim form contained fraudulent information. Manuel sued. A jury found that MDOW proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Manuel “either burned his home or caused it to be burned.” The jury did not decide whether Manuel had intentionally misrepresented information during the fire investigation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing even under an “implied bias” test of juror impartiality, there was insufficient potential bias alleged to warrant a new trial. The court rejected an argument that the court erred by allowing the testimony of MDOW’s expert witness, who disagreed with parts of the National Fire Protection Association 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations. View "Manuel v. MDOW Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Franklin claimed that Young, an assistant caseworker at the facility where Franklin was incarcerated, violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from sexual assault by another inmate by being deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that he would be sexually assaulted by inmate Mosley. The district court denied Young’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, holding that factual disputes prevented the court from determining whether Young violated Franklin’s rights. The Eighth Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal. A district court's summary judgment order denying qualified immunity may not be appealed “insofar as [it] determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Essentially, Young argued that the district court erred in finding a genuine dispute of material fact over whether he violated Franklin’s Eighth Amendment rights. By challenging the district court's finding on sufficiency of the evidence, Young was asking the court to engage in “the time-consuming task of reviewing a factual controversy about intent.” View "Franklin v. Young" on Justia Law

Officer Williams allegedly searched and seized Banks without probable cause, took $1,100 from him without including it in department records, and filed false reports, leading to a criminal prosecution against Banks for unlawful use of a weapon, a charge on which he was acquitted. Plaintiffs sued, in state court, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. An amended complaint against Williams, in his individual and official capacities, alleged that Williams’s actions were part of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct about which the St. Louis Police Board was deliberately indifferent. Williams and the Board were served. Williams and an attorney for the Board were notified of the potential default and a scheduled hearing. Only plaintiffs appeared. A$900,000 default judgment entered against Williams "in his personal and official capacities, jointly and severally." Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to enforce the judgment against city officials in state court. The federal district court declined to enter a declaratory judgment, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Refusal to honor the default judgment against Williams in his official capacity, not the state court denial of mandamus, was the source of the injury from which plaintiffs seek relief. Plaintiffs did not ask a federal court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment. Younger abstention is also inappropriate. View "Banks v. Slay" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs obtained second mortgage loans on their homes through Bann-Cor. After Bann-Cor executed their loan agreements, it sold or assigned the loans and the accompanying mortgage liens to the defendants. The borrowers alleged that the defendants, either directly or indirectly, charged, contracted for, or received fees that were impermissible under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act. About 15 years ago, the borrowers first filed suit in Missouri state court against Bann-Cor. The borrowers periodically sought leave to amend the complaint and add additional defendants. After two removals to federal court and two remands, the borrowers filed their sixth amended complaint in 2010, which for the first time added Wells Fargo as a party. Wells Fargo removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, and the district court denied the borrowers’ motion to remand. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the subsequent dismissal on grounds that the borrowers lacked standing to pursue their claims against defendants who did not personally service their loans and that a three-year statute of limitations barred the action against remaining defendants. View "Wong v. Bann-Cor Mortgage" on Justia Law

An estimated 1,600 Missouri homeowners obtained second mortgage loans from FirstPlus, a now-defunct California company. After issuing the loans, FirstPlus sold and assigned the loans and second mortgages to the defendants. In a putative class action, the borrowers alleged that FirstPlus and the defendants violated the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA) by collecting impermissible fees which were rolled into and financed as part of the borrowers’ principal loan amount. The district court dismissed, concluding the claims were barred by a three-year statute of limitations and the action is not saved under class action tolling principles. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In 2000, a different set of named borrowers had started a Missouri state court action based on the same MSMLA claims against FirstPlus. The state court granted summary judgment to the defendants in that action, concluding that there was no cause of action under MSMLA. The court rejected borrowers’ argument that they were members of that putative class and that their claims in this action should be tolled from the filing of that action in 2000 until its dismissal in 2004. View "Thomas v. US Bank NA ND" on Justia Law