Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Taylor was charged with conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiring to launder money. The government offered to dismiss the drug conspiracy count and recommend a two-year sentence if Taylor pled guilty to money laundering. Taylor did not accept the plea. After trial, the court granted judgment of acquittal on the money laundering count. The jury found Taylor guilty on the drug count. Taylor received the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. His conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2255’s limitation period in January 2012. Taylor filed a timely motion to vacate, arguing his attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to communicate his decision to accept the plea; failing to request a “cautionary tail” instruction; and failing to request a lesser included offense instruction. After a hearing, Taylor moved to amend to add a claim that his attorneys were ineffective for presenting a defense theory that essentially conceded guilt. The court allowed amendment and granted the motion to vacate on Taylor’s amended claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed with instructions to reimpose the sentence, finding that Taylor’s amended claim did not relate back to any original claim. View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law

Manuel’s home burned down while he and his family were vacationing in Las Vegas. Manuel had insured his home through MDOW with a policy providing $150,000 for the house, $75,000 for personal property, and $45,000 for added costs. Manuel filed a claim for the fire, but MDOW denied it. MDOW told Manuel that it believed he or someone acting on his behalf had intentionally set the fire and that Manuel’s claim form contained fraudulent information. Manuel sued. A jury found that MDOW proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Manuel “either burned his home or caused it to be burned.” The jury did not decide whether Manuel had intentionally misrepresented information during the fire investigation. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing even under an “implied bias” test of juror impartiality, there was insufficient potential bias alleged to warrant a new trial. The court rejected an argument that the court erred by allowing the testimony of MDOW’s expert witness, who disagreed with parts of the National Fire Protection Association 921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations. View "Manuel v. MDOW Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Franklin claimed that Young, an assistant caseworker at the facility where Franklin was incarcerated, violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from sexual assault by another inmate by being deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that he would be sexually assaulted by inmate Mosley. The district court denied Young’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, holding that factual disputes prevented the court from determining whether Young violated Franklin’s rights. The Eighth Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal. A district court's summary judgment order denying qualified immunity may not be appealed “insofar as [it] determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Essentially, Young argued that the district court erred in finding a genuine dispute of material fact over whether he violated Franklin’s Eighth Amendment rights. By challenging the district court's finding on sufficiency of the evidence, Young was asking the court to engage in “the time-consuming task of reviewing a factual controversy about intent.” View "Franklin v. Young" on Justia Law

Officer Williams allegedly searched and seized Banks without probable cause, took $1,100 from him without including it in department records, and filed false reports, leading to a criminal prosecution against Banks for unlawful use of a weapon, a charge on which he was acquitted. Plaintiffs sued, in state court, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. An amended complaint against Williams, in his individual and official capacities, alleged that Williams’s actions were part of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct about which the St. Louis Police Board was deliberately indifferent. Williams and the Board were served. Williams and an attorney for the Board were notified of the potential default and a scheduled hearing. Only plaintiffs appeared. A$900,000 default judgment entered against Williams "in his personal and official capacities, jointly and severally." Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to enforce the judgment against city officials in state court. The federal district court declined to enter a declaratory judgment, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Refusal to honor the default judgment against Williams in his official capacity, not the state court denial of mandamus, was the source of the injury from which plaintiffs seek relief. Plaintiffs did not ask a federal court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment. Younger abstention is also inappropriate. View "Banks v. Slay" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs obtained second mortgage loans on their homes through Bann-Cor. After Bann-Cor executed their loan agreements, it sold or assigned the loans and the accompanying mortgage liens to the defendants. The borrowers alleged that the defendants, either directly or indirectly, charged, contracted for, or received fees that were impermissible under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act. About 15 years ago, the borrowers first filed suit in Missouri state court against Bann-Cor. The borrowers periodically sought leave to amend the complaint and add additional defendants. After two removals to federal court and two remands, the borrowers filed their sixth amended complaint in 2010, which for the first time added Wells Fargo as a party. Wells Fargo removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, and the district court denied the borrowers’ motion to remand. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the subsequent dismissal on grounds that the borrowers lacked standing to pursue their claims against defendants who did not personally service their loans and that a three-year statute of limitations barred the action against remaining defendants. View "Wong v. Bann-Cor Mortgage" on Justia Law

An estimated 1,600 Missouri homeowners obtained second mortgage loans from FirstPlus, a now-defunct California company. After issuing the loans, FirstPlus sold and assigned the loans and second mortgages to the defendants. In a putative class action, the borrowers alleged that FirstPlus and the defendants violated the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA) by collecting impermissible fees which were rolled into and financed as part of the borrowers’ principal loan amount. The district court dismissed, concluding the claims were barred by a three-year statute of limitations and the action is not saved under class action tolling principles. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In 2000, a different set of named borrowers had started a Missouri state court action based on the same MSMLA claims against FirstPlus. The state court granted summary judgment to the defendants in that action, concluding that there was no cause of action under MSMLA. The court rejected borrowers’ argument that they were members of that putative class and that their claims in this action should be tolled from the filing of that action in 2000 until its dismissal in 2004. View "Thomas v. US Bank NA ND" on Justia Law

Shields and Wilson are Indians with interests on the Bakken Oil Shale Formation in the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota, allotted to them under the Dawes Act of 1887. Such land is held in trust by the government, but may be leased by allottees. Shields and Wilson leased oil and gas mining rights on their allotments to companies and affiliated individuals who won a sealed bid auction conducted by the Board of Indian Affairs in 2007. After the auction, the women agreed to terms with the winning bidders, the BIA approved the leases, and the winning bidders sold them for a large profit. Shields and Wilson filed a putative class action, claiming that the government had breached its fiduciary duty by approving the leases for the oil and gas mining rights, and that the bidders aided, abetted, and induced the government to breach that duty. The district court concluded that the United States was a required party which could not be joined, but without which the action could not proceed in equity and good conscience, and dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The United States enjoys sovereign immunity for the claims and can decide itself when and where it wants to intervene. View "Two Shields v. Wilkinson." on Justia Law

Ideker sued, alleging she developed non-Hodgkins lymphoma from exposure to benzene while working in HD’s paint department. The district court dismissed, predicting that the Missouri Supreme Court would require Ideker to raise her claim before Missouri’s labor and industrial relations commission because it was covered by Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Ideker then filed a workers’ compensation claim, which is pending. The dismissal became final. Less than 30 days later, the Missouri Court of Appeals issued an opinion that cast doubt on that prediction. Although Ideker’s counsel was aware of the decision before time to appeal expired, counsel stated that “there was little incentive for Ideker to seek appellate review requiring a second federal court to predict how Missouri courts would rule.” Ideker filed a complaint in state court, reasserting her occupational disease claim. Harley-Davidson removed the case to federal court. The court dismissed without prejudice on collateral estoppel grounds, concluding that its prior decision was binding because Missouri law precluded Ideker “from relitigating issues finally decided in [an] incorrect order[].” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Any purported “mistake” the court made in predicting Missouri law does not enable Ideker to circumvent the dismissal by refiling the same injury claim based on the same historical facts in a second case. View "Ideker v. Harley-Davidson, Inc." on Justia Law

Billings, Golden Valley, McKenzie, and Slope Counties in North Dakota, and the state, sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, seeking to quiet title to alleged rights-of-way along section lines that run through lands owned by the federal government in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. They alleged that in North Dakota, with a few exceptions, a public easement provides a right-of-way for public travel within 33 feet on either side of the section lines. The federal government does not recognize these rights-of-way. Nonprofit environmental organizations sought to intervene as defendants as of right under FRCP 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They alleged that they possess important aesthetic, recreational, and environmental interests in preserving the Grasslands. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right, finding that they failed to show injury in-fact or a recognized interest in the suit’s subject matter and that the United States adequately represented any legally protectable interest. The court also denied the alternative request for permissive intervention. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the groups did not overcome the presumption of adequate representation and noting that permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary.” View "North Dakota v. Badlands Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

Rogers’s 2005 mortgage on her Minnesota home was executed in favor of Countrywide and it listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee. In 2008, MERS transferred its interest in the mortgage to a securitized mortgage trust by assigning the mortgage to Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificate holders. Bank of New York was party to a Pooling and Servicing Agreement between various entities. According to Rogers, that Agreement governed the mortgage trust and required “that all mortgages to be included in the corpus of the Mortgage Trust were to be transferred into the Mortgage Trust between June 1, 2005 and August 8, 2005.” In 2012, Bank of New York commenced foreclosure proceedings on Rogers’s house, and purchased the house at a sheriff’s sale. Rogers sought a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure was invalid, claiming that the 2008 assignment of her mortgage to the trust violated the Agreement. The district court dismissed, holding Rogers did not have standing to challenge the foreclosure on the ground that the defendants violated an agreement to which Rogers was not party. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Rogers lacked standing. View "Rogers v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law