Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) creates “navigators,” to assist consumers in purchasing health insurance from exchanges, 42 U.S.C. 18031(i), and authorizes the Department of Health and Human Services to establish standards for navigators and exchanges. HHS regulations recognize: federal navigators, certified application counselors (CACs), and non-navigator assistance personnel. They conduct many of the same activities, but federal navigators have more extensive duties. Plaintiffs, federally-certified counselor designated organizations, employ CACs. The federal government established a Missouri Federally Facilitated Exchange. The Health Insurance Marketplace Innovation Act (HIMIA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 376.2000, regulates “person[s] that, for compensation, provide[] information or services in connection with eligibility, enrollment, or program specifications of any health benefit exchange.” Regulatory provisions dictate what state navigators and cannot do. Plaintiffs challenged: the definition of state navigators; three substantive provisions; and penalty provisions. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the ACA preempted HIMIA. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, finding likelihood of success in challenges to HIMIA requirements that: state navigators refrain from providing information about health insurance plans not offered by the exchange; that in some circumstances, the navigator must advise consultation with a licensed insurance producer regarding private coverage; and that CACs provide information about different health insurance plans and clarify the distinctions. The court vacated the preliminary injunction, holding that ACA does not entirely preempt HIMIA. View "St. Louis Effort For AIDS v. Huff" on Justia Law

Debtor filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition. Debtor had a program under which independent contractor drivers could lease and acquire ownership of trucks. Trucks were financed or leased from creditors, including Daimler. At the time of filing, Daimler was the lessor of 14 trucks and held security interests in 99 others and in driver lease payments and other proceeds generated by the use of such trucks. Daimler sought sequestration to prevent unauthorized use of that money. The parties submitted an agreed order, providing that Daimler would sell 21 trucks and credit the net proceeds. Debtor would retain 80 trucks subject to Daimler’s security interest and would make adequate protection payments. The order was silent about Daimler’s security interest in proceeds from the use of the trucks. The bankruptcy court confirmed a plan. The debtor appealed with respect to application of excess adequate protection payments, claiming it overpaid for erosion in the value of the trucks and argued that the court erred when it supplemented the secured portion of Daimler’s claim with an award of $51,909.40 as proceeds from the use of Daimler’s trucks. The Eighth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The orders were interlocutory. The debtor now possesses no trucks; no meaningful relief could be granted. Debtor did not propose a plan that was denied, so it is not an aggrieved party, and does not have standing. View "O&S Trucking, Inc. v. Mercedes Benz Fin. Servs., USA" on Justia Law

Prisoners on death row filed suit, challenging Missouri's execution protocol as violating the federal Controlled Substances Act and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and based on Eighth Amendment due process, ex post facto, and other claims. The district court sealed certain documents or docket entries, making them inaccessible to the public. There was no indication in the record why the entries were sealed, nor any explanation of what types of documents were sealed. Publisher Larry Flynt filed motions to intervene in both cases, under Federal Rule 24(b), and moved to unseal the records and entries. No party opposed Flynt's motions to intervene. One case had already been dismissed. In his motions, Flynt stated he had an interest in the sealed records as a publisher and as an advocate against the death penalty. Flynt claimed a heightened interest because Franklin, who had confessed to shooting Flynt, was a Missouri death row inmate and a plaintiff in both cases. Franklin was executed in November 2013; on that same day the district court denied Flynt's motion to intervene in one case as moot, and in the other, stating that "generalized interest" does not justify intervention. The Eighth Circuit reversed; for reasons of judicial efficiency, Rule 24(b) intervention is often preferable to filing a separate action. View "Flynt v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

In 2005 E3’s predecessor began construction of an ethanol plant, to be powered, in part, by methane, and contracted with Biothane for a boiler system. Biothane, an expert in systems integration but not in boilers specifically, subcontracted with PEI to install and integrate the boilers. Biothane retained overall responsibility. Both are engineering companies. In 2007, PEI’s engineer repeatedly tried and failed to light the main flame of one of the boilers. The repeated attempts caused gas to build up and explode. E3 claims that the boiler never worked properly afterward and that the plant failed as a result. The plant’s owners eventually reorganized in bankruptcy. In 2011 (3 years and 364 days after the explosion) E3 sued, alleging torts against both companies and breach of contract against Biothane. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding all of E3’s claims time-barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-222, Nebraska’s two-year limitations period for actions based on professional negligence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the chain of events ultimately led to the breach of a contract, E3 still sued Biothane “for an action performed in a professional capacity.” View "E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane, LLC" on Justia Law

In March, 2004, Harris closed on a home with a mortgage loan from MPI. To be licensed in Missouri, MPI, as obligor and principal, bought two “Missouri Residential Mortgage Brokers Bonds” from Hartford, its surety, RSMo 443.849. The surety bonds stated that the two parties were “jointly and severally” bound for payment to any person “who may have a claim against” MPI. Harris sued MPI for violating the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, sections 407.010-.1500. Harris obtained a judgment for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Hartford had notice of the suit against MPI, but chose not to intervene. As surety, Hartford failed to pay the judgment amount due on the bonds. In 2012, Harris sued Hartford for breach of contract, vexatious refusal to pay, and equitable garnishment. The district court granted Hartford summary judgment, rejecting the 10-year statute of limitations in RSMo 516.110(1) in favor of the three-year statute in section 516.130(2). The Eighth Circuit reversed. Harris’s claim against Hartford sought the amount due on the bonds, not a penalty. View "Harris v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Debtors filed a petition for relief under chapter 11 in 1999. Debtors proposed several plans of reorganization, but none were confirmed. On the Trustee's motion, the bankruptcy court dismissed Debtors' case in 2004. Debtors did not appeal and the case was closed on the bankruptcy clerk's docket in 2005. In 2014, Debtors moved to reopen their case "to pursue Confirmation of their current Plan[.]" The Trustee and Agrifinance objected, and, without first holding a hearing, the bankruptcy court entered a text order denying Debtors' motion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. There is no requirement in 11 U.S.C. 350 that the court provide a hearing on a motion to reopen and nothing would have been gained by holding a hearing. View "Bowman v. Casamatta" on Justia Law

Smith, labeled as a “snitch,” was attacked by other inmates in the Varner Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction. He was removed from the Unit and placed in protective custody. Smith alleges that correctional officer Johnson later returned him to the general population in the Varner Unit, without Smith’s consent and in violation of departmental policies. According to Smith, the next day another inmate severely beat him with his fist and a lock, causing scarring, a lost tooth, migraines, blurred vision, sensory losses, dizzy spells, and psychological symptoms. After the attack, Smith claims that Johnson and other officers punished him using “major disciplinary policies.” Smith unsuccessfully pursued grievances and filed a pro se claim with the State Claims Commission. The Commission dismissed Smith’s claim for failure to prove any negligence by the Department of Correction. Smith next filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging “deliberate indifference for [his] safety” and cruel and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed, ruling if the Claims Commission had jurisdiction over Smith’s constitutional claim, the action was barred by claim preclusion; if the Commission did not have jurisdiction over that claim, issue preclusion barred Smith’s claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that neither doctrine barred the suit. View "Smith v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Alleging illegal tip pooling Conners filed a collective action against her former employer (a restaurant) under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The employer then implemented a new arbitration policy that requires all employment-related disputes between current employees and the employer to be resolved though individual arbitration. The policy purports to bind all current employees who did not opt out; each employee received an opt-out form. Citing public policy, the district court declared the policy unenforceable insofar as it could prevent current employees from joining this collective action. On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated, holding that former employees like Conners lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to challenge the arbitration agreement, which applied only to current employees. View "Conners v. Gusano's Chicago Style Pizzeria" on Justia Law

As part of a redevelopment project partially financed by Sioux City, Iowa, Civic borrowed from Northwest Bank to build a movie theater complex. Main Street leased the space in 2004. Main Street did not fully pay its rent and Civic did not fully make its loan payments. After mediation, Civic and Main Street agreed on an amended lease that substantially lowered the rent. Eventually, Civic filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, arguing that the court should subordinate the interests of Northwest and the city because they had defrauded Civic into accepting the amended lease. The bankruptcy court issued orders deciding that the amended lease applied. Civic appealed the lease orders; the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ruled that Civic’s appeal was improperly interlocutory and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Civic filed a second plan, which restated the fraud argument. The bankruptcy court denied confirmation and rejected the fraud argument, but did not dismiss the bankruptcy petition. Civic appealed the new order and, again, the three earlier orders. The BAP again dismissed. Civic appealed all four orders. The Eighth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; a determination of the BAP is not final unless the underlying order of the bankruptcy court is final. View "Civic Partners Sioux City, LLC v. Main Street Theaters, Inc." on Justia Law

Union Pacific filed suit against Progress Rail, alleging that Progress Rail negligently reconditioned certain railcar axles, causing the axles to fail and two trains to derail. A jury returned a verdict for Progress Rail and Union Pacific appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Union Pacific's metallurgical engineer's opinion and in admitting the opinion of Progress Rail's expert. Progress Rail filed a conditional cross-appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the engineer's opinion that the axle failures were caused by corrosion pits that Progress Rail failed to remove when it reconditioned the axles because the engineer could not say when the corrosion pits formed and could not trace the fatigue cracks that caused the axles to fail to specific corrosion pits. In this case, the district court properly exercised its gatekeeping function in excluding the engineer's ultimate opinion as unreliable. The court also concluded that Progress Rail laid an adequate foundation for Progress Rail's expert's opinions and the district court acted within its discretion when it overruled Union Pacific's objections. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Progress Rail Serv. Corp." on Justia Law