Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Martin Brauner transmitted HPV to M.O. through sexual activity in Brauner’s GEICO-insured automobile. M.O. threatened to sue Brauner for negligence and demanded $1,000,000 from GEICO, which denied the claim and sought a federal court declaration that the policy did not cover M.O.’s injuries. Brauner and M.O. settled the threatened lawsuit, agreeing that M.O. would collect only from GEICO if an arbitrator found Brauner negligent. The arbitrator awarded M.O. $5,200,000, which M.O. sought to confirm in Missouri state court. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the confirmation and remanded the case to allow GEICO to intervene.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas initially handled the case but transferred it to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri due to lack of personal jurisdiction over M.O. The district court granted GEICO’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policy required bodily injury to arise out of the use of the automobile, and that sexual activity in an automobile did not constitute “use” under Kansas insurance law. Brauner and M.O. appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the insurance policy unambiguously required bodily injury to arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the automobile. The court found that sexual activity in an automobile did not meet this requirement, as the automobile was merely the situs of the injury and not causally connected to the negligent act. Therefore, M.O.’s injuries were not covered under the policy. View "GEICO General Insurance Co. v. M.O." on Justia Law

Daniel Graff purchased a life insurance policy from Brighthouse Life Insurance Company for his father, with Graff as the beneficiary. Over the years, Graff paid more in premiums than the policy's death benefit. He sued Brighthouse, claiming the policy violated Minnesota's Readability of Insurance Policies Act (RIPA) and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and also sought recovery for unjust enrichment. Brighthouse removed the case to federal court, which dismissed Graff's claims for failing to state a claim.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Graff's complaint with prejudice. The court found that the RIPA did not provide a private cause of action, the implied-covenant claim was untimely, and Graff could not recover under unjust enrichment because a valid contract governed the parties' relationship.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the RIPA does not create a private cause of action, as enforcement authority is vested exclusively in the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce. The court also determined that Graff's implied-covenant claim could not proceed because it was based on a statute that does not provide a private remedy. Lastly, the court upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, noting that equitable remedies are unavailable when a valid contract governs the parties' rights, and Brighthouse was entitled to the premiums under the policy. View "Daniel Graff v. Brighthouse Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The case involves over 1,420 Peruvian citizens alleging environmental harm due to exposure to toxic substances from the La Oroya Metallurgical Complex (LOMC) in Peru. The plaintiffs claim that Doe Run Resources Corporation and related entities, which purchased LOMC in 1997, failed to reduce lead emissions, resulting in unsafe lead levels and subsequent health issues. The plaintiffs argue that Doe Run's decision-making in the United States led to their injuries.Initially, the plaintiffs filed common law tort lawsuits in Missouri state court, which were removed to federal court and consolidated. The district court dismissed several claims and defendants but allowed the substantive negligence-based claims to proceed under Missouri law. Doe Run filed motions to dismiss based on international comity and to apply Peruvian law, both of which were denied by the district court. The court also denied summary judgment on the safe harbor defense and certified its choice-of-law and comity rulings for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying dismissal under the doctrine of international comity, as the harm occurred in Peru but the alleged conduct occurred in Missouri. The court also found that the Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) between the United States and Peru did not require dismissal, as the plaintiffs' claims were not explicitly addressed by the TPA. Additionally, the court determined that traditional comity factors did not necessitate dismissal, as neither the State Department nor the government of Peru had asserted their positions, and there was no adequate alternative forum in Peru. Lastly, the court concluded that extraterritoriality principles did not warrant abstention, as the plaintiffs' claims were based on conduct within the United States.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Reid v. Doe Run Resources Corp." on Justia Law

Cybercriminals hacked into T-Mobile's computer systems, stealing personal information of approximately 76.6 million customers. Several customers filed class action lawsuits against T-Mobile, which were centralized in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The parties reached a settlement, with T-Mobile agreeing to create a $350 million fund for affected customers and to spend an additional $150 million on data security improvements. Class counsel requested $78.75 million in attorneys' fees, which two class members, Cassie Hampe and Connie Pentz, objected to as excessive.The district court struck Hampe's and Pentz's objections and overruled them on the merits. The court found Hampe's objection to be in bad faith, influenced by her attorneys' history as serial objectors, and struck it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Pentz's objection was struck as a discovery sanction after she refused to cooperate with class counsel's discovery efforts. Both objectors appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in striking Hampe's objection, as Rule 12(f) does not apply to objections and there was no evidence of bad faith in this case. The court also found that the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees, determining that the fee award was unreasonable given the relatively short duration and limited discovery of the case. The court affirmed the decision to strike Pentz's objection but reversed the decision to strike Hampe's objection and the award of attorneys' fees, remanding for further proceedings. View "Daruwalla v. Hampe" on Justia Law

The case involves a pass-through billing scheme orchestrated by Beau Gertz, Mark Blake, SeroDynamics, and LabMed Services (collectively, the Sero Defendants). They made it appear that blood tests conducted at their Colorado lab were performed at a small hospital in Unionville, Missouri, resulting in a $26.3 million profit. The scheme involved billing Blue Cross using the hospital's provider numbers, despite the tests not being conducted there. Blue Cross paid the hospital $18,053,015 for these tests. The Sero Defendants were found liable for fraud, tortious interference with contract, civil conspiracy, and money had and received.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri oversaw the trial. After five days of evidence, the jury found the Sero Defendants liable and awarded Blue Cross $18,053,015 in compensatory damages and $1.9 million in punitive damages against each of the four Sero Defendants. The Sero Defendants appealed, raising multiple claims of error, including the exclusion of their lead counsel from delivering closing arguments and the admission of certain evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgments, finding no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of lead counsel from closing arguments due to repeated misconduct. The court also upheld the admission of a portion of an audit report, finding it relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of fraud and tortious interference, noting that the Sero Defendants had actual knowledge of the contract between Putnam and Blue Cross and intentionally interfered with it. The court also upheld the jury's award of damages and punitive damages, finding no miscarriage of justice.In conclusion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgments, rejecting all of the Sero Defendants' claims of error. View "RightCHOICE Managed Care v. Labmed Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Joshua Francisco, an inmate at Farmington Correctional Center (FCC), suffered from mental illness and was placed on suicide watch multiple times during his incarceration. Despite receiving treatment and being evaluated by mental health professionals, Francisco was found hanging in his cell on October 22, 2014, after his cellmate reported he was suicidal. Francisco had denied being suicidal to correctional officers and mental health staff earlier that day.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the correctional officers and the warden, finding no deliberate indifference to Francisco's medical needs. The court determined that the officers' actions did not rise to the level of criminal recklessness required to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the correctional officers and the warden were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers had conducted reasonable investigations and searches based on the information available to them and that Francisco's repeated denials of suicidal intent, along with the absence of a noose, did not indicate a strong likelihood of self-harm. The court also concluded that the warden was not personally involved in any unconstitutional custom or practice and that the claim of an unconstitutional policy requiring inmates to explicitly state they were suicidal was not supported by the evidence. View "Francisco v. Villmer" on Justia Law

S.A.A. filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Samantha Geisler, alleging Fourth Amendment violations during her arrest. The initial complaint, filed on September 20, 2021, claimed false arrest and excessive force but did not specify the capacity in which Geisler was sued. S.A.A. admitted she had not alleged official capacity claims. She amended her complaint twice before the deadline in May 2022 and sought to amend it a third time after the deadline, which the magistrate judge allowed with a warning. Geisler moved for summary judgment, arguing that S.A.A. failed to plead personal capacity claims as required by the Eighth Circuit’s clear statement rule. S.A.A. then moved to amend her complaint a fourth time, which the magistrate judge denied.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted Geisler’s motion for summary judgment, overruled S.A.A.’s objection to the magistrate judge’s denial of her motion to amend, and denied her fourth motion to amend. The court found that S.A.A. failed to plead personal capacity claims against Geisler, adhering to the Eighth Circuit’s clear statement rule, which interprets complaints silent on the capacity in which the defendant is sued as including only official capacity claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that S.A.A. did not explicitly plead individual capacity claims and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her fourth motion to amend the complaint. The court emphasized that S.A.A. failed to demonstrate diligence in meeting the scheduling order’s requirements, which is the primary measure of good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. View "S.A.A. v. Geisler" on Justia Law

Following the fatal police shooting of Daunte Wright, protests erupted in Brooklyn Center, Minnesota. Sam Wolk, a protester, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations and civil conspiracy against various law enforcement officials and agencies. Wolk claimed he was injured by tear gas, flashbang grenades, pepper spray, and rubber bullets used by officers during the protests, resulting in chronic knee pain.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denied the defendants' motions to dismiss most of Wolk's claims but dismissed his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The defendants appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources' (DNR) motion to dismiss, citing Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also reversed the denial of qualified immunity for former Brooklyn Center Police Chief Tim Gannon, as he had resigned before Wolk's injuries occurred. Additionally, the court found that the Fourth Amendment claims for excessive force and failure to intervene were not clearly established as constitutional violations at the time of the incident, granting qualified immunity to the supervisory defendants on these claims.However, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for the First Amendment retaliation claims against the supervisory defendants, except for Gannon. The court found that more facts were needed to determine whether the officers' actions were driven by retaliatory animus. The court also reversed the district court's denial of the supervisory defendants' motion to dismiss the civil conspiracy claims, finding the allegations insufficient to show a meeting of the minds.The court reversed the district court's denial of the municipal defendants' motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment and conspiracy claims but lacked jurisdiction over the First Amendment retaliation claim against the municipal defendants. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Wolk v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Nycoca Hairston, an employee at the United States Army’s Pine Bluff Arsenal, alleged that her immediate supervisor sexually harassed her and that she was unlawfully terminated in retaliation for her complaints. Hairston sued the Secretary of the Army under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After a jury trial on her retaliation claim, the Army prevailed. Hairston appealed the district court’s denial of her post-trial motions and its decision to limit the testimony of one of her witnesses.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas initially granted summary judgment in favor of the Army on both Hairston’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims. Hairston appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim but reversed it on the retaliation claim, remanding it for trial. After the jury ruled in favor of the Army, Hairston filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, which the district court denied. Hairston then filed an appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Hairston’s post-trial motions because she failed to file an amended notice of appeal after the district court ruled on those motions. However, the court did have jurisdiction to address Hairston’s challenge to the district court’s decision to limit the testimony of one of her witnesses. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony, as it was deemed irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hairston v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

Teddy and Melanie Scott filed a lawsuit against Dyno Nobel, Inc., alleging that Teddy suffered serious injuries from exposure to a toxic gas cloud negligently emitted from Dyno’s nitric acid plant in Louisiana, Missouri. The incident occurred on March 20, 2015, when an equipment failure during a startup led to the release of nitrogen oxide gas, which enveloped Teddy while he was working at a nearby plant. Teddy experienced immediate physical symptoms and has since suffered from ongoing health issues, including irritable larynx syndrome, headaches, and back pain. Melanie claimed loss of consortium due to Teddy’s injuries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri initially granted summary judgment in favor of Dyno, concluding that Dyno owed no duty of care to Teddy. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed this decision, finding that the issue of foreseeability, which determines duty, should be decided by a jury. On remand, a jury trial resulted in a verdict for the Scotts, awarding Teddy $13,750,000 in compensatory damages and $30 million in punitive damages, and Melanie $3 million in compensatory damages. Dyno’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment in part. The appellate court found that the jury had sufficient evidence to determine that Dyno’s actions created a foreseeable risk of harm and that Dyno breached its duty of care. However, the court reversed the award of punitive damages, concluding that the Scotts did not provide clear and convincing evidence that Dyno acted with a culpable mental state necessary for punitive damages under Missouri law. The case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment omitting the punitive damages award. View "Scott v. Dyno Nobel, Inc." on Justia Law