Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Powell contends that his Christian beliefs compel him to publicly share his faith with others. Powell went to the Iowa State Fairgrounds and positioned himself on a sidewalk outside the paid admission area, close to a heavily-traveled intersection near the fair’s main gate. Uniformed Iowa State Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave the fairgrounds. The next day, Powell returned to the fairgrounds and stood in front of public restrooms outside the paid admission area. Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave. Powell brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 and sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted in part, prohibiting defendants from “arresting or threatening to arrest [Powell] solely for engaging in protected speech on the Fairgrounds in locations where [appellees] have already conceded that he is not impeding or would not be likely to impede the flow of traffic.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Powell’s motion based on his First Amendment claim and remanded the case for consideration of Powell’s request for preliminary injunctive relief based on his due process claim. View "Powell v. Noble" on Justia Law

Heartland employed Thomas as an account liaison from May 2010 until she was terminated in June 2011, at age 53. Thomas claims that Hagen, an administrator for Heartland, had commented “that older people didn’t work as fast or were as productive as younger people,” and about having ‘fresh blood, younger employees.” Hagen referred to Thomas as “the old short blond girl,” and, after Thomas’s discharge,told a Heartland client that “he likes to keep himself surrounded with young people.” A Heartland human resources manager testified that Hagen was “an indirect supervisor” of the account liaison personnel. Duncan, Heartland’s regional manager, had audited three weeks of Thomas’s mileage claims and determined that Thomas had falsified her reimbursement claims. Thomas maintains she responded that she kept records that would explain discrepancies between the claimed mileage and the weekly call plans, but that Hagen dismissed her response by stating that termination “was a decision they had made.” In her suit, alleging violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether age was a contributing factor in Thomas’s discharge by Heartland and Hagen. View "Thomas v. Heartland Employment Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Shortly before Pettaway was to be released from federal prison, the government sought his commitment under 18 U.S.C. 4246 on grounds that he was mentally ill and dangerous. After a hearing, the district court committed Pettaway for hospitalization and treatment, finding by clear and convincing evidence that commitment was appropriate. The Eighth Circuit vacated, expressing no opinion as to the appropriateness of Pettaway’s commitment, but stating that the commitment order must do more than recite Pettaway’s mental diagnosis and the opinions of mental health professionals that Pettaway’s unconditional release would create the relevant risk of dangerousness. The court heard contrary evidence in the form of testimony from Pettaway and must give some indication as to what information in the record it relied upon– such as Pettaway’s behavioral or psychological history; results of formalized assessments; recent observations, treatment notes, or interview impressions of mental health professionals; or its impressions of Pettaway’s own testimony – in reaching its conclusion. View "United States v. Pettaway" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are same-sex couples seeking to marry in Arkansas, South Dakota, or Nebraska or to have their marriage in another state recognized in those states. They also sought state benefits incident to marriage. The district court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment, finding that state laws denying them the right to marry violate the U.S. Constitution’s guarantees of due process and equal protection. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, (2015), abrogating Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning (2006). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The challenged laws are unconstitutional. As Obergefell concluded: [T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. View "Waters v. Ricketts" on Justia Law

King pled guilty in Arkansas state court to 1,577 counts of forgery and theft of property for embezzling more than $700,000 from the school district where she worked. The court sentenced King to 80 years imprisonment, within the guidelines range. King had no criminal history and claims she accepted the plea because of threats that her husband and son would also be charged. Five months later, the court reduced King’s sentence to 20 years imprisonment, under Arkansas Code 16-90-111, which allows a trial court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time” or to “correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within . . . ninety (90) days after the sentence is imposed.” The state appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which reinstated King’s 80-year sentence, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the reduction because the 90-day period for doing so had expired. King sought federal habeas relief. Although the district court was clearly sympathetic, it found no grounds for habeas relief. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that King is not entitled to habeas relief based on her disagreement with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Arkansas law. View "King v. Kelley" on Justia Law

In 2008, Wages began working as a caretaker for StuartCo, a property management firm, responsible for vacuuming, cleaning, mopping, washing windows, dusting, and snow removal. Wages worked 30 hours per week. Her employee record was unblemished. In 2009, Wages learned she was pregnant. The doctor considered her pregnancy to be high risk. Wages experienced abdominal pain in October. Her doctor directed her not to vacuum or mop and provided her a note for her employer. StuartCo redistributed those duties to other employees and contacted the doctor to verify no other job duties were restricted. In November, Wages’s doctor prohibited snow removal. Wages missed three days of work, in November due to abdominal pain. Her doctor limited her to working no more than 20 hours per week. StuartCo terminated her employment, stating that it was “unable to accommodate the work restrictions provided by your physician.” Wages sued, alleging violations of her rights under the FMLA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act (MPLA), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Wages on her FMLA entitlement claim and her FMLA retaliation claim, but reversed and remanded for a jury trial on damages. View "Wages v. Stuart Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

Officers Lesher and McCrillis were working off-duty, patrolling a Little Rock apartment complex. They noticed that Ellison’s apartment door was open. From outside, they could see 67-year-old Ellison sitting on his couch, leaning on his cane. After Lesher and McCrillis started a conversation, Ellison responded that he did not want help or attention. McCrillis thought Ellison was being mouthy and wanted to keep him from shutting the door. The women stepped inside. Ellison got up and approached. A physical altercation ensued. The officers repeatedly struck Ellison and knocked off his glasses. Ellison repeatedly told them to get out of his apartment. McCrillis requested back-up, which arrived after the physical altercation was over. Lesher was still inside the apartment. Officer Lucio reached inside to pull Lesher out. The officers instructed Ellison to lie down. He refused. Lesher told McCrillis that Ellison was getting his cane, and that she was going to shoot Ellison. She fired two shots into the apartment, killing Ellison. In the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Eighth Circuit held that neither officer was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim of illegal entry; that Lesher was not entitled to qualified immunity on a claim of lethal excessive force; but both are entitled to qualified immunity on a claim concerning use of nonlethal force. View "Ellison v. Lesher" on Justia Law

Duit, an Oklahoma highway contractor, contracted with the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD) to reconstruct I-30 between Little Rock and Benton. Duit encountered soil conditions that, it alleges, differed materially from information provided by the ASHTD during bidding. Duit’s claims for compensation were denied by the ASHTD, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, and the General Assembly. Duit sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the “in re Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Duit alleged violations of the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 101, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses and sought to “enjoin Defendants from accepting federal aid … until . . . they fully comply with the federally mandated differing site clause.” The court dismissed the FAHA claim because that statute is enforced exclusively by an executive agency, dismissed the due process claim because Duit’s interest in future highway contracts is not a protected property interest and because the state appeals process for claim denials satisfies procedural due process requirements. The court declined to dismiss the equal protection claim, concluding Duit sufficiently alleged that the Commission treated out-of-state-contractor Duit differently from similarly situated in-state contractors without a rational reason. The Eighth Circuit held that Duit lacks standing to bring its equal protection claim and that the court erred in not dismissing that claim. View "Duit Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Solomon was convicted of violating supervised release and was allowed to voluntarily surrender himself. Solomon absconded after writing a letter, stating his hope that Hendren, then Chief Judge of the Western District of Arkansas, "dies of a slow and painful disease." He sent the letter to Hendren's chambers and a newspaper, which published it. Solomon was apprehended. U.S. Marshal Jones, accompanied by a guard, drove him to Arkansas. According to Solomon's pro se complaint they, "said [he]'d 'pay for writing that type of letter.'" Solomon was transferred to the Benton County Criminal Detention Center (BCCDC). Solomon claimed, while driving him to the BCCDC, the Marshals said that BCCDC "was like going to hell … for their abusive handling practices" and that "they were going to make sure [he] was punished for that letter." Later, Solomon alleged that he was hit by Marshal Cory Thomas; that he "was handcuffed in the middle of the night . . . and a dark cloth was slipped over [his] head and he was . . . carried . . . into another room and given a 'blanket-party' by the deputies." Solomon filed a pro se “Bivens” action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, finding that Jones and Thomas were not entitled to qualified immunity against Solomon's excessive force claim View "Solomon v. Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas" on Justia Law

In 2012, Arkansas inmate Jones filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, challenging the Department of Correction’s (ADC’s) grooming policy. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, relying on an Eighth Circuit decision, Holt. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Holt, and reversed, holding that ADC’s grooming policy substantially burdened the plaintiff inmate’s exercise of religion. The Eighth Circuit granted a motion to supplement the record on appeal with ADC’s new grooming policy, effective 2015. After holding that Jones’s appeal has not been plainly mooted by the new grooming policy, the court declined to reach the merits and remanded to the district court to consider Jones’s complaint in light of the new grooming policy and the Supreme Court’s decision. View "Jones v. Meinzer" on Justia Law