Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Davis was arrested for driving while intoxicated and was transported to the crowded Ferguson jail. Officers escorted Davis to a cell, which Davis refused to enter. Three officers responded as backup. White pushed Davis into the cell and a short, bloody fight ensued. Later, White was treated at a hospital and required surgery for a broken nose that had bled profusely. Davis was taken to the emergency room; scalp bleeding was noted but he refused treatment. After his release, Davis went to another hospital where he was diagnosed with a concussion and a scalp laceration. There was testimony that three officers each beat or kicked Davis after he was handcuffed and subdued on the cell floor. Davis was charged with “Property Damage” for transferring blood onto four uniforms and eventually pleaded guilty to careless driving, speeding, non-moving violations, and two counts of Destruction of City Property. Davis filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force, municipal liability, substantive due process violations by filing false complaints, and assault and battery against the officers individually under Missouri law. White filed an assault and battery counterclaim. The district court rejected all claims. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment on the excessive force and assault and battery claims, vacated the dismissal of White’s counterclaim, and remanded. View "Davis v. White" on Justia Law

The Robbinses provide towing and wrecker services along the I-44 corridor in eastern Missouri. State Highway Patrol (MSHP) Troops C and I, pursuant to MSHP policy, used a “rotation list” of approved towing and wrecking companies to determine which company to call to the scene of a disabled vehicle if the vehicle owner had no preference. The Robbinses were on both lists until they were removed, reportedly because Robbins had been charged with shooting at a competitor’s truck in 1999. The Robbinses alleged the criminal charge resulted from a “sham investigation” and that their competitor used a friendship with an MSHP officer, with whom Robbins had had a confrontation, to harm the Robbinses’ business. A jury acquitted Robbins, but they were never reinstated to either list. In 2005, the Robbinses sued the MSHP. The state court determined the MSHP lacked statutory authority to create a rotation list. In 2010, the Robbinses sued officers in their individual capacities, alleging due process and equal protection violations and conspiracy to violate those rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, claiming that the officers conspired to deny them work and disparaged their business. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. View "Robbins v. Becker," on Justia Law

After graduating from the FAA Academy, Huynh became a trainee air traffic controller. Huynh, the only Asian American in his training class, reported problems with his instructors. He was assigned a different team. The new team reported that Huynh was performing poorly. Huynh was granted 42 additional training hours above the180 target hours. After he completed those hours, Huynh moved on to the second of 12 required certifications. He was again reported as performing poorly. Huynh's team provided many opportunities to improve, beyond the 180t hours. Superiors reported that Huynh did not have command of basic air traffic terminology and geography and was defensive when trainers noted mistakes. Huynh was the only member of his class suspended for poor performance on a skill check. Huynh applied for reassignment, but no other facilities offered to hire him. A review board concluded that Huynh had been given comprehensive training, but had failed to progress. A manager nonetheless continued Huynh's training. Huynh received additional instruction and several weeks to refresh his learning. Shortly after Huynh returned to training, he reported problems with his supervisors and classmates. He declined reassignment. Problems continued; Huynh was terminated. The court granted the FAA summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, finding that the stated reasons for termination were not pretextual. View "Huynh v. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Mead, committed to Iowa's Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleging that defendants deprived him of "extensive dental care that he is unable to afford" and were "deliberately indifferent to [his] need for dental care." He alleged that he had many teeth pulled while in custody, was unable to chew food properly, suffered from acid reflux, and had become diabetic. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that Mead had sufficient funds to pay for a partial denture plate and failed to demonstrate a serious medical need because he had not requested and did not want a soft diet, had not lost weight, had complained of discomfort but not pain, had stated that he was satisfied with his medical care, and no dentist had concluded that Mead had a serious medical need for dentures. The defendants argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity, not personally responsible for Mead's alleged damages, and immune from money damages. The district court denied summary judgment, concluding that Mead had established genuine issues of material fact. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding the defendants entitled to qualified immunity from damages on Mead's claim regarding the denial of partial dentures View "Mead v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Initially hired in 1987, Schaffhauser worked as a Plant Engineering Manager from 2007-2012. He received training on UPS’s anti-harassment, anti-discrimination, and ADA policies. The company prohibits unprofessional and discourteous actions, even if those actions do not constitute unlawful harassment. In 2012, Schaffhauser was at work chatting with Sharkey, Goodwin, and Williams (all African-Americans). Goodwin said, “I wish Rodney Barefield would take a swing at me and I would knock that motherf**r out.” Schaffhauser commented, “If he ever hit me, I would hit him back so hard it’d knock the black off him.” He admits making the comment, that it could be racist, and that it was a mistake, but claims he was just joking and did not intend it to be racist. In his report to human resources, Schaffhauser claimed that his medical condition was a “contributing factor in [his] poor choice of words.” Schaffhauser was demoted from manager to supervisor. Schaffhauser sued UPS, alleging reverse race discrimination and failure to accommodate a disability (he had received a steroid shot). The district court granted summary judgment to UPS. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Schaffhauser did not request accommodation or inform UPS of the relevant details of his disability. UPS had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action View "Schaffhauser v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Deputy Russeth stopped Wall for a traffic violation. Exiting her vehicle, Wall smelled of alcohol, exhibited poor balance, failed field sobriety tests, and in a preliminary breath test, produced a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of .109—beyond the .08 legal threshold. Russeth arrested Wall. At headquarters, Russeth sought Wall’s consent to conduct a urine or blood test to determine BAC. In compliance with Minn. Stat. 169A.51, Russeth read aloud the “implied consent advisory,” informing Wall that “[r]efusal to take a test [wa]s a crime,” and before making a decision about testing, she had the right to consult an attorney. Affirming her understanding of her rights and disclaiming her right to an attorney, Wall agreed to urinalysis. After 45 minutes, Wall had not produced a urine sample. Russeth transported Wall to a medical center where Wall agreed to blood analysis. A registered nurse took a blood sample. Wall pled guilty to a petty misdemeanor traffic violation; her DWI charge was dismissed. Wall sued, alleging the county had a policy or custom of conducting warrantless, nonconsensual blood-alcohol tests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Following the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the court agreed that Wall’s consent made the blood draw constitutional. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Wall’s dilemma, alone, does not satisfy her burden of nullifying her otherwise uninhibited consent. View "Wall v. Stanek" on Justia Law

Stephens visited the Oaklawn Club for gambling. After winning, playing slot machines, Stephens cashed out and left the casino. He returned later that evening and purchased another ticket for use in the slot machines. He was approached by uniformed security personnel and Jessup, a uniformed Hot Springs police officer. They accused Stephens of stealing the cashed-out ticket and detained Stephens while employees reviewed surveillance footage. Stephens alleges that Jessup threatened to “take him to jail immediately” if he did not return the money. Jessup recited Miranda warnings, escorted Stephens to his vehicle, and retrieved the money. An Arkansas state court granted Oaklawn summary judgment. Neither Jessup nor Amtote was a party to that action. Stephens then filed a federal suit against Jessup and Amtote, alleging the same causes of action against these new defendants. The court dismissed, citing issue preclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part, finding that Stephens did not perfect an appeal with respect to Amtote. The court expressed no view on the merits of the Jessup claims, stating that the record is not clear that Stephens is trying to relitigate an issue that was previously decided or that Jessup and Oaklawn represent the same legal right. View "Stephens v. Jessup" on Justia Law

Witthar pleaded guilty to conspiracy against rights, obstruction of justice, and interference with fair housing rights, 18 U.S.C. 241, 1512(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. 3631 waiving her right to appeal or collaterally attack a finding of guilt and her sentence on any ground except: ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum, or an illegal sentence. The prosecution advocated for a sentence at the bottom of her advisory guidelines range, dismissed four other counts, and agreed to not bring additional charges related to her crimes. The district court sentenced Witthar to 63 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of her advisory guidelines range. No appeal followed. Eleven months later, Witthar filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that her attorney failed to file a requested notice of appeal. The government submitted an affidavit from Witthar’s attorney stating that Witthar had not asked him to file an appeal. The district court denied Witthar’s claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing, finding that Witthar’s “bare, conclusory allegations” did not entitle her to relief. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Because Witthar’s allegations, if true, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, there was a factual dispute on a critical issue View "Witthar v. United States" on Justia Law

A 2006 indictment charged Weaver, England, Key, and others, with crack-cocaine conspiracy and possession crimes. England and Key pled guilty. Only Weaver proceeded to trial. He was convicted. After a motion for a new trial was denied, Weaver’s trial counsel, Primmer, moved to withdraw. The court granted the motion and appointed Dornan to represent Weaver for sentencing. Although neither England nor Key, Weaver’s cousin, testified at Weaver’s trial, both testified at his sentencing hearing that Weaver was not involved in the charged conspiracy and distribution conduct. The court sentenced Weaver to 300 months imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. After unsuccessful direct appeal, Weaver moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court heard argument concerning Dornan’s failure to file a motion for a new trial at or before sentencing based on his knowledge that England and Key were then willing to testify. The court concluded Dornan provided ineffective assistance, vacating Weaver’s conviction. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Considering the totality of the circumstances, sentencing counsel Dornan reasonably relied upon the general rule that belated exculpatory testimony by a codefendant who did not testify at trial is not newly discovered evidence. View "Weaver v. United States" on Justia Law

St. Francis hired Shirrell, who is Jewish, as a nurse in 1995. Shirrell resigned in 2000. In 2001, St. Francis re-hired Shirrell. In early 2012, Miller, who is not Jewish, commented to a co-worker that she was going to try to “Jew down” a seller to a lower price. Shirrell informed her supervisor, who talked to Miller, posted a copy of the harassment policy, and sent an email reminding nurses to be careful with their words and actions. Six weeks later, Shirrell informed her supervisor that her work environment had become hostile, alleging that co-workers gave her the cold shoulder and that Miller accused Shirrell of trying to get Miller in trouble. St. Francis later promoted Miller, who brought two patient complaints concerning Shirrell to the attention of her supervisor. By late May 2012, Shirrell had accumulated five unscheduled absences within a 12-month period. Subsequent incidents were described as reluctance, disinterest, or neglect in carrying out responsibilities. Based on Shirrell’s accumulate disciplinary points, her employment was terminated. She filed suit, alleging religious discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant; St. Francis terminated Shirrell pursuant to policy for accumulation of disciplinary points. View "Shirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr." on Justia Law