Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, a jury found Thompson guilty of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of first-degree murder while committing aggravated robbery. Thompson was 17 when he committed the crimes. Pursuant to Minnesota law, he received two consecutive mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Thompson’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court (Miller decision) held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Thompson sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed with prejudice, finding that Miller’s rule was not retroactively applicable. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Miller did not announce a new substantive rule because it neither categorically barred a punishment nor placed a group of persons beyond the state’s power to punish. After Miller, as before, a court retains the power to impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole. That the sentence now must be discretionary does not alter its substance. View "Thompson v. Roy" on Justia Law

Lee and Kehoe, members of a white supremacist group, killed a gun dealer, his wife, and their eight-year- old daughter during a 1996 robbery. Lee was sentenced to death. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Lee sought post-conviction relief, 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that counsel provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by not adequately objecting to Dr. Ryan’s testimony regarding the Hare Psychopathy Checklist, which indicated Lee was a “psychopath” and a future danger if sentenced to life imprisonment. Lee's petition referenced Dr. Ryan’s sworn declaration, repudiating his reliance on the checklist, but neither that declaration nor supporting exhibits were attached. The court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Lee moved for reconsideration (Rule 59(e)), attaching affidavits purporting to show that the checklist was scientifically invalid and including Ryan’s sworn declaration that he should not have relied on the checklist and that the basis for a challenge was available before Lee's trial. The judge denied the motion, stating that had counsel timely presented these affidavits, it “might have determined that an evidentiary hearing was required.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed both denials. Lee moved for relief from the section 2255 judgment (Rule 59(e)), citing 2012-2013 Supreme Court decisions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the successive section 2255 motion filed without appellate authorization. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

After the Fire District suspended Anzaldua, a paramedic and firefighter, for failing to respond to a directive issued by Chief Farwell, Anzaldua emailed a newspaper reporter expressing concerns about the District and about Farwell. The email “shocked” and “angered” his co-workers. Battalion chiefs noted it “fostered division between Anzaldua and his co-workers," and between firefighters and Farwell. The District terminated Anzaldua, who sued, alleging that the District and the individuals involved in his termination violated his First Amendment rights by retaliation and that Farwell and Anzaldua’s ex-girlfriend violated federal and state computer privacy laws by accessing his email account and obtaining his emails. The district court allowed some First Amendment claims to proceed but dismissed all other claims and denied leave to amend the computer privacy law claims. The court granted defendants summary judgment on Anzaldua’s First Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Anzaldua’s First Amendment claims and denial of leave to amend federal computer privacy law claims, but reversed denial of leave to amend state computer privacy law claims. View "Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire" on Justia Law

Fischer worked for Minneapolis Public Schools as a Janitor Engineer, 2008-2010, and performed satisfactorily. After being laid off for fiscal reasons, he was told that he was eligible for reinstatement, conditioned on his possession of a boilers license and his completion of a strength test created by Cost Reduction Technology that measured the “maximum force-producing capability of muscles.” Fisher did not pass the test. Fischer alleged that District employees told him that he was not reinstated because of his back, that he was “incapable of pulling, carrying, pushing, or lifting a heavy load,” and that his employment would “create[] a substantial risk of injury in the work place.” The District denied his request for a retest. Fischer sued, claiming violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act by refusing to reinstate him. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the district. The District’s belief that Fischer was capable of performing the physical labor of a medium strength worker is not equivalent to a belief that Fischer suffered a physical impairment such as a physiological disorder, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or disease as defined by the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12102(1). View "Fischer v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs" on Justia Law

In 1992, Gabaree began living with a woman who had two daughters; the two later had two children together. In 1996, three children told a social services employee that Gabaree was abusing them. A physician found marks that had been inflicted intentionally. The girls, ages five and six, made inconsistent statements concerning sexual abuse; no physical evidence was found. Gabaree was convicted of statutory sodomy, first-degree child molestation, and child abuse. A court granted post-conviction relief because Gabaree’s attorney had failed to impeach the girls. At a 2003 retrial, one girl testified that Gabaree had sex with her and that she saw Gabaree having sex with her sister, who testified that Gabaree had “touched her ‘private part’ with his hands.” The court admitted the statement of an unavailable witness that the girls had previously recanted their allegations. A doctor’s testimony about Gabaree’s “propensity” was not challenged. Gabaree again was convicted of all counts. The state court denied Gabaree’s post-conviction petition, concluding that counsel’s stated possible reasons for not objecting to the doctors’ testimony were not necessarily unreasonable. Gabaree sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted Gabaree’s petition with respect to his convictions for sodomy and child molestation and denied his petition with respect to child abuse. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. By not challenging the testimony of the doctor concerning sexual abuse, counsel failed to make the adversarial testing process work. View "Gabaree v. Steele" on Justia Law

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)(1)(A) provides that, following arrest, the arresting officer “must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge.” Under the judicial McNabb-Mallory rule “confessions made during periods of detention that violate [Rule 5(a)’s] prompt presentment requirement” are “generally render[ed] inadmissible,” but 18 U.S.C. 3501(c), enacted in 1968, limits that rule, providing that a confession “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing [the defendant] before a magistrate judge” if the confession was voluntary and was made “within six hours immediately following” arrest or detention. If the confession occurred before presentment and beyond six hours, the court must decide whether delaying that long was unreasonable or unnecessary. “[D]elay for the purpose of interrogation is the epitome of ‘unnecessary delay.’” Casillas, charged with conspiracy to distribute and nine counts of distributing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846, argued that his confession should be suppressed because it was made more than six hours after his arrest and that presentment to a magistrate 36 hours after his arrest was “unreasonable and untimely.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress and the 188-month sentence, finding that the confession occurred within six hours of arrest. View "United States v. Casillas" on Justia Law

First National sought a successor for Senior Vice President of Operations Downing. Cox, a woman, began at First National in 2008 as Vice President of Loan Operations, reporting to Downing. She had 21 years of experience, plus a graduate degree. Her 2009 and 2011 performance appraisals rated her “Meets Expectations.” Doyle, a man, began at First National in 2000 and became Vice President of Payment Operations, reporting to Downing. He had more than 10 years’ previous experience. He was rated “Meets Expectations” in 2011 and “Exceeds Expectations” in 2009. Anticipating retirement, Downing created a matrix, rating potential candidates. Doyle rated higher in: “Leadership,” “Peer Respect,” and “Managerial Acceptance.” President O’Neill made the decision. O’Neill did not interview the candidates, did not review their resumes or appraisals, but studied Downing’s matrix. One of 15 executive officers was female, one member of the 12-member Board of Directors, and one of 18 employees reporting directly to O’Neill. O’Neill promoted Doyle. Cox remained in the same position; O’Neill gave her a raise and increased responsibility. Cox sued for gender discrimination. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. Taken as a whole, Cox did not raise a genuine dispute of material fact that O’Neill’s reasons for promoting Doyle are “unworthy of credence.” Only the lack of female executives supported pretext. View "Cox v. First Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Sellers, a Deere employee for more than 30 years, sued Deere and his supervisor, alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act; disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act), 42 U.S.C. 12101; retaliation under the ADEA, ICRA, and ADA; and harassment because of his age and disability. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Sellers did not suffer an adverse employment action when his title and duties changed during a company-wide personnel reorganization. Incidents identified by Sellers may have been “rude or unpleasant,” but they were not “severe enough to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of his employment.” View "Sellers v. Deere & Co." on Justia Law

Burciaga began working at Ravago in 2007. Howe, a customer service manager, was her supervisor. Burciaga utilized Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, leave in 2008 and 2010-2011, for the births of her children. Burciaga received raises after each leave. After Burciaga returned to work in 2011, she had several performance-related issues. Howe warned that if the errors continued, she could be terminated. Burciaga requested FMLA paperwork in 2012, for intermittent leave to care for her son. Ravago’s human resources department approved her leave. According to Burciaga, Howe provided her time off for appointments when she requested it and was flexible with scheduling so she could attend appointments. Burciaga thereafter took FMLA leave for half a day on August 8, September 5, and September 6. After Burciaga returned from leave on September 6, she committed several shipping errors over the following three weeks. On the 28th, Burciaga’s employment was terminated. Howe indicated the termination was due to Burciaga’s shipping errors. Howe also could not provide Burciaga with the specific monetary amount her errors cost Ravago. Neither Howe nor Kramer referenced Burciaga’s absences. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Ravago on her FMLA claim. View "Burciaga v. Ravago Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

Taylor was charged with conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiring to launder money. The government offered to dismiss the drug conspiracy count and recommend a two-year sentence if Taylor pled guilty to money laundering. Taylor did not accept the plea. After trial, the court granted judgment of acquittal on the money laundering count. The jury found Taylor guilty on the drug count. Taylor received the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. His conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2255’s limitation period in January 2012. Taylor filed a timely motion to vacate, arguing his attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to communicate his decision to accept the plea; failing to request a “cautionary tail” instruction; and failing to request a lesser included offense instruction. After a hearing, Taylor moved to amend to add a claim that his attorneys were ineffective for presenting a defense theory that essentially conceded guilt. The court allowed amendment and granted the motion to vacate on Taylor’s amended claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed with instructions to reimpose the sentence, finding that Taylor’s amended claim did not relate back to any original claim. View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law