Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Schoettle, an insulin-dependent diabetic, was driving when he became lightheaded. He parked on the shoulder, took glucose tablets, and fell asleep or became unconscious. Deputy Hudson approached, knocked on the window, and attempted to identify himself. Schoettle mumbled that he was recovering from low blood sugar. Believing Schoettle to be intoxicated, Hudson radioed for a DWI enforcement officer. Peifer arrived. Schoettle told him to “leave me the fuck alone.” Peifer twice requested that Schoettle exit his vehicle. Schoettle refused. The officers grabbed Schoettle’s legs and pulled him out, causing him to hit the ground. Schoettle attempted to return to the truck. The officers forced him to the ground. While they attempted to handcuff him, Schoettle stated he had a gun in his waistband. Peifer removed the gun and threw it. Schoettle became more agitated because the gun could have discharged, and asked the officers if they were stupid, continuing to struggle. The officers pepper-sprayed and struck Schoettle, trying to subdue him. An ambulance arrived. EMS personnel noted that Schoettle was “very uncooperative.” After treatment for a nosebleed and hypoglycemia, he became calm. Tests on his blood alcohol content were negative. He had a broken rib. Schoettle sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that even if the officers were aware that Schoettle was suffering a hypoglycemic episode, they were still confronted with a belligerent and impaired man who was refusing to comply with orders. View "Schoettle v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Before 2010, no disciplinary issues were recorded in the employment history of former BNSF Railway claims representative Ludlow. In 2009, Ludlow discovered his forged signature on documents submitted to the Department of Veterans Affairs certifying that coworker Fernandes was eligible to receive VA training benefits. Ludlow reported the forgery to his supervisor, Wunker, opining that Fernandes may have been responsible. Wunker did not investigate or report to his superiors, contrary to what Ludlow believed BNSF protocol required. In 2010, Ludlow reported the forgery to the BNSF police, notifying Wunker the following day. Wunker expressed concern that the disclosure could cost him his job and began sending complaints regarding Ludlow’s workplace behavior to Human Resources. After his termination, Ludlow sued for wrongful termination in violation of Nebraska public policy and whistleblower retaliation under the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1114(3). A jury found BNSF liable on the NFEPA claim and awarded damages. The court awarded $206,514.13 in attorney’s fees and $22,202.16 in nontaxable costs. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jury instructions that Ludlow need only prove that his protected activity was a “motivating factor” in the termination and to the amount of attorney’s fees and costs. View "Ludlow v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Officers obtained a warrant and searched an Arkansas home where an identifiable internet connection and computer had been used to receive child pornography, but did not find the computer. The home’s wireless network was unsecure and could be accessed from neighboring homes. During the search, officers observed Harper leaving a neighboring home in a truck bearing Oklahoma license plates. Officers knew the computer being sought had been used in the vicinity of Owassa, Oklahoma, to download child pornography. Officers ran the plates and discovered Harper had an outstanding warrant for contempt. Officers approached the home and talked to Harper's girlfriend, who stated she and Harper had recently moved to Arkansas from Owassa. Officers eventually located Harper, arrested him, searched his truck, and discovered a computer and a thumb drive in a backpack in a truck-bed toolbox. Later, at the police station, officers gave Harper a Miranda warning, and he signed a consent form to allow search of the computer and thumb drive. After officers discovered child pornography, Harper admitted he had downloaded the images. Harper moved to suppress the materials found in the truck. The parties dispute whether an officer asked for or obtained consent before searching the truck or toolbox. Harper entered a conditional plea agreement to Receipt of Images of Child Pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2); (b)(1). The Eighth Circuit upheld denial of the motion to suppress and his sentence of 121 months' imprisonment. View "United States v. Harper" on Justia Law

Sergeant Denver of the Benton County Sheriff’s Office arrested New in 2009 for possession of marijuana after two leaves were found during a consensual search of New’s car following a traffic stop. When the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory tested the leaves and reported they did not contain detectible amounts of Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the prosecutor dropped a criminal charge. New filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Denver, alleging he was arrested without probable cause. Denver moved for summary judgment on the merits and based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it could not make “a credibility determination crediting Mr. Denver’s assertions as true in the face of contrary evidence -- a negative lab result and the contrary averments of Mr. New.” The Eighth Circuit reversed: an objectively reasonable police officer with Denver’s training and experience could have reasonably believed that the leaves he found in New’s car were marijuana, giving Denver probable cause to arrest and have the leaves tested for THC. More than evidence of a mistake is required to deny a public official qualified immunity from section 1983 damage liability. View "New v. Denver" on Justia Law

On the first day of his arson trial, Kelley informed the court that Kelley did not want the public defender to represent him. Kelley explained that Kelley had not had a chance to view all the evidence against him and he had communication problems with his attorney. The court denied the request. Kelley then stated, “Since you won’t provide substitution, I would like to move for the court to allow me to represent myself, contingent upon getting a continuance for me to review the evidence and prepare.” The judge replied, “I do not believe that granting a continuance at this point is appropriate or necessary. This case has been set for trial on at least one other occasion. The case is ready to move forward. You have expressed identical, if not very similar concerns with respect to [the public defender] I know for a long period of time now … is it your wish that you proceed pro se and without [the public defender] representing you?” Kelley never answered. The judge then reviewed Kelley’s written submission and denied his requests. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction. “The right to self-representation . . . is not absolute.” Considering the totality of the circumstances, Kelley’s request was neither timely nor unequivocal. View "United States v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Medina police officers arrested Greenman on three separate occasions for, among other things, operating his Segway while under the influence of alcohol (DWI) in violation of Minnesota Statutes Chapter 169A. Greenman filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the officers and city prosecutor violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, his due-process rights, and his First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. He further alleged that the city was liable for not properly training and supervising its police officers. He also filed several state-law claims. The district court dismissed all the federal claims, on the basis that the police officers and city prosecutor were entitled to qualified immunity, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Greenman’s state-law claims. The Eighth Circuit concluded that a request for declaratory relief is moot because there is no longer an actual case or controversy.. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has concluded that operating a Segway while intoxicated does not violate Minnesota’s DWI statute. Following that decision, the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office dismissed the pending DWI charges against Greenman. View "Greenman v. Jessen" on Justia Law

An Iowa court entered an order requiring no contact between Peters and her boyfriend. Sioux City police stopped a speeding car being driven by the boyfriend, found that Peters was a passenger, arrested her for violating the no-contact order, and transported her for booking. A security video showed officers attempting to obtain information from Peters, who became agitated, began shouting at the officers, and refused to answer questions, including questions designed to determine whether she presented a risk of harm to herself. The officers escorted Peters to a holding cell, where Peters again refused to respond, yelling “[w]hy the fuck would I want to hurt myself?” Peters was wearing a bathing suit under a shirt and sweat pants. Officers told Peters to remove her clothing, concerned that Peters could harm herself with the swimsuit strings. Peters persisted in refusing to comply and shouting; an officer grabbed and turned Peters’s hand, causing Peters to fall face down onto the bunk. Peters continued to resist. The officers applied pressure to control her, then placed a paper jumpsuit over Peters and removed Peters’s clothing. In her suit under 42 U.S.C 1983, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the officers. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting her claim of unreasonable "strip search." View "Peters v. Risdal" on Justia Law

Rebouche began working for Deere as a technician in 1977. She claims she was passed over for promotions and asked to train male supervisors. In 1998 she and three others filed a complaint with human resources. As a result a supervisor was sent to sensitivity training. In 2002-2004 Deere engaged a consulting firm and redefined job titles. Rebouche alleges that none of the women in her department received pay grade increases, while men were elevated. Rebouche file a complaint with the EEOC. She was subsequently promoted. The district court granted summary judgment, rejecting her claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) and Iowa law. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that allegations concerning events in 1998-2001 were time barred; that Rebouche failed to establish that similarly-situated males were treated differently during the remapping of jobs; and that there was no evidence of retaliation for the EEOC filing. View "Rebouche v. Deere & Co." on Justia Law

Rey was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), and 846. The jury found that the conspiracy involved between five and 50 grams of cocaine base. The district court determined that the conspiracy involved between 50 and 150 grams of cocaine base and sentenced Rey to 240 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In 2009, Rey filed a preprinted form entitled “Motion Under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence.” The court rejected his claims that he did not receive a fair trial, his trial counsel was ineffective, and the court sentenced him based on a greater drug weight than found by the jury. Later, Rey filed a letter stating that he did not intend to file a motion, but was merely seeking assistance of counsel to help him file a motion. The court responded that it would “await any further filing ... to determine whether it constitutes a second or successive 2255 petition.” In 2014, with assistance of counsel, Rey filed a 2255 motion, arguing that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 Alleyne decision. The district court dismissed it as an uncertified second or successive petition and found that the motion was untimely because the Supreme Court has not declared Alleyne to be retroactively applicable. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Rey v. United States" on Justia Law

On December 28, Hudson did not attend work as a Tyson supervisor due to illness. Hudson’s girlfriend (a Tyson employee) told Hudson’s supervisor, Beganovic, that Hudson would be late or absent that day. Hudson claims he texted Beganovic before his shift that he was having health issues and would be out a few days. Tyson’s attendance policy requires managers “to personally call their direct supervisor to report an unplanned absence.” Hudson claims that he often texted with Beganovic, and at least once before (acceptably) notified Beganovic of an absence by text. Hudson missed three work days, saw a doctor, and was diagnosed with back pain and depression. On January 3, Hudson went to Tyson with a doctor’s note and requested leave from December 28 until January 7. He intended to apply for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA ) leave. He signed an application, on which the non-FMLA box was checked. He claims someone else checked it after he signed. On January 4, Tyson granted Hudson non-FMLA leave. Hudson returned to Tyson on January 9 and was terminated for failure to comply with notification policy. Hudson sued under the FMLA. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Tyson, noting disputes as to whether Tyson enforced its call-in policy. View "Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc." on Justia Law