Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1997, after his third DWI arrest, Scheffler’s driving privileges were cancelled. Scheffler successfully completed a one-year abstinence-only program, and in 1998, was issued a driver’s license with the restriction that he abstain from use of alcohol. After a 1999 cancellation of his license, Scheffler was completed a three-year rehabilitation program and received a restricted license in 2002. In 2010, Scheffler was arrested for DWI and, to obtain a new restricted license, had to either complete a six-year rehabilitation program or submit to an Ignition Interlock Program. Scheffler sued, claiming Americans with Disability Act violations based on perceived alcoholism. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. ADA defines a disabled person as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, having a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment, 42 U.S.C. 12102(1). Alcoholism may qualify when it limits a major life activity. Scheffler did not claim to actually be an alcoholic or that alcoholism limits a major life activity. DWI does not, alone, establish that he is an alcoholic. There was no allegation that Scheffler has ever been diagnosed as an alcoholic or that Scheffler suffers from a substantial limitation to a major life activity. View "Scheffler v. Dohman" on Justia Law

n 2007, Minneapolis Police Department Lieutenant Keefe was made commander of the Violent Offenders Task Force, involving the FBI, ATF, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The task force conducted a wiretap investigation of a gang. Keefe learned that gang members had threatened to kill police officers. Keefe told a local police chief that the U.S. Attorney’s Office would brief the chief’s department about an ongoing investigation. ATF officials believed that this disclosure was inappropriate because the investigation involved a wiretap and notified Keefe that he was “prohibited from entering ATF office space.” In an unrelated investigation, a suspected gang leader identified six MPD officers as corrupt, triggering a corruption investigation. Keefe doubted the claims and confronted the informant. The FBI told his chief that Keefe was harming the investigation. Keefe was removed from the investigation and, after others voice concerns, was removed from the task force only months after his appointment. Keefe lodged a misconduct complaint (later designated unfounded) against an MPD Sergeant who was involved in his reassignment and made an anonymous telephone call to the chief’s wife. Keefe was disciplined for false allegations and demoted. The Eighth Circuit affirmed rejection of Keefe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. View "Keefe v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Ziesmer was driving when Travis threw a cigarette out the window. It flew back in and landed on the back floor. Ziesmer pulled over to retrieve the cigarette. Trooper Hagen approached. Hagen claims and Travis denies that Travis “bent over as if” reaching for something. Hagen claims he saw a hammer. Ziesmer claims the hammer was under the seat, not visible. Hagen reported smelling marijuana. The occupants disagree. Hagen ran their names. No relevant information appeared. Hagen subsequently searched all three occupants and the car. The occupants claim that Hagen began screaming, pulled Ziesmer out of the car, and injured him. Ziesmer claims that he attempted to call 911, but Hagen “hung up my phone and threw it.” St. Paul Police have a record of the call. Hagen denied injuring Ziesmer and claimed that, searching Ziesmer, he found a small amount of marijuana. Ziesmer was cited for possession and released. Charges were later dropped. At home, he took pictures of his bruised face. Five days later, Ziesmer went had x-rays of his spine, head, and neck. Three months later he underwent an MRI and was diagnosed with “minimal disc bulging” and neck and upper-back pain. Almost three years later, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Hagen, finding material issues of unreasonable seizure and that injuries like those claimed are “within the range of common experience,” so the lack of a medical expert was not fatal to Zeismer’s claim. View "Ziesmer v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Grider and his family were at a Taco Bell. An argument occurred between Grider and another patron. Police were called. The Griders crossed the street to eat in their vehicle. Officer Bowling, the first to arrive, approached Grider, who was wearing a knife on his hip, and asked Grider to exit his vehicle. Grider declined. Bowling forcibly removed Grider, placed Grider on the ground with his knee on Grider's back, and handcuffed Grider. Officer Reece arrived, ran toward the two and kicked Grider in the head. Bowling and Reece did not communicate before the kick; Bowling did not act to prevent the kick. Grider had open whiskey in his vehicle, which the officers poured out. Grider suffered contusions and abrasions on his face; the kick caused neck pain and restriction of movement that persisted at least two years. Mrs. Grider suffered emotional distress and problems with her pregnancy. The Griders filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that Bowling was not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Grider had no evidence that Bowling was aware of the kick before it occurred or had the opportunity "to take action to deescalate." Bowling cannot be liable for nonfeasance under these circumstances. View "Grider v. Bowling" on Justia Law

Johnson was a guard at the South Dakota State Penitentiary. Inmates Berget and Robert attempted to escape and intentionally murdered Johnson. Berget entered the penitentiary at age 15 after escaping repeatedly from State Training School. Berget amassed convictions for grand theft, burglary, escape, and attempt to escape. He spent most of his life in prison. His last escape attempt occurred in 1987. He did not have a history of institutional violence. Berget was transferred to segregation at times; Johnson’s estate alleges at least some transfers back to general population were negotiated to end hunger strikes. Robert had no criminal history when he arrived at the penitentiary in 2006 to serve an 80-year sentence for kidnapping. In 2007 Robert was discovered preparing for an escape attempt; he threatened a correctional officer. The estate alleges that Robert’s transfer from maximum security was to end his hunger strike. There was some forewarning of the escape attempt. The district court rejected the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Although the paperwork was not always completed for the discretionary housing decisions, it was within the warden’s power to move the inmates; the Department’s policies on warden discretion do not shock the conscience and the warden did not act with deliberate indifference. View "Estate of Johnson v. Weber" on Justia Law

The district court denied Ragland’s petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255 for relief from his conviction and sentence for distribution of heroin resulting in death (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C)), which has a mandatory sentence of 20 years to life. On remand, the government conceded it could not prove but-for causation and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Burrage applied retroactively, but argued the district court lacked authority to grant relief because the enhanced sentence Ragland received did not exceed the maximum statutory sentence without application of the enhancement. The district court concluded that Ragland’s claim was not cognizable under section 2255, denied relief, and denied a Certificate of Appealability. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to enter judgment on the lesser included offense of distribution of heroin and resentence Ragland. Ragland’s claim under Burrage was a challenge to the validity of his conviction for distribution of heroin resulting in death, and therefore was cognizable under section 2255. View "Ragland v. United States" on Justia Law

Turner, a Missouri inmate, suffered from a neurological disorder but was able to ambulate, stand, and sit by using leg braces and crutches. Although Turner received medical care several times, no physician ordered a wheelchair or transport by wheelchair-accessible van. The facility had a wheelchair-accessible van with a "lift," but restricted its use to wheelchair users. Signage on the van advised that only wheelchairs were allowed on the lift and that standing on it was forbidden to avoid falls. For transport to a medical appointment, Turner arrived with neither a wheelchair nor a physician's order to use a wheelchair-accessible van. Turner alleges that he had to enter the van by crawling; that urine and vomit were on its floor, so that he was unable to eat while traveling; and that, during his return trip the driver stopped near a bridge and stated that the guards could drown Turner and claim that Turner tried to escape., Turner filed an Inmate Resolution Request; according to Turner, prison staff "ransacked" his cell and were verbally abusive in retaliation and that when he was moved to another prison, he was transported in a non-wheelchair-accessible van for part of the trip. The Eighth Circuit affirmed rejection of Turner’s claims of violations the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Americans with Disabilities Act,, 42 U.S.C. 12131; and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. View "Turner v. Mull" on Justia Law

In 1991, Nunley pled guilty in Missouri state court to the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Nunley waived his right to jury sentencing, the state court sentenced him to death. He sought to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his sentencing judge had been drinking before the sentencing proceeding. Nunley's motion to withdraw his plea was denied. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed rejection of that motion. He filed an action under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging that the state denied his constitutionally protected liberty interest in the right to capital jury sentencing as articulated in by the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona (2002), and later applied retroactively under Missouri law. The district court denied Nunley's petition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Nunley unequivocally waived his right to jury sentencing when he pled guilty. Nunley acknowledged the court’s warnings and waived his rights. He has since admitted that he made a strategic choice to waive jury sentencing because he believed a court was less likely to be inflamed by the details of his crime than a jury. View "Nunley v. Bowersox" on Justia Law

Convent filed suit in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, seeking to appeal a resolution that the North Little Rock City Council passed declaring Convent's property a nuisance and condemning the property. In the same complaint, Convent asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code 16-123-101, and a common law claim of trespass. The defendants removed the case to federal district court based on the federal claims and then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court did not grant the motion, but found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Convent's claims based on Convent's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies; the court remanded the case to state court. Convent sought costs, fees, and expenses incurred due to “improper removal." The district court rejected the motion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal of this action to federal court. View "Convent Corp. v. City of North Little Rock" on Justia Law

Linares was held at the Hardin County Correctional Center at the direction of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). She alleges that another inmate made derogatory and “threatening statements,” which “alarmed” her; that she reported them to a sergeant and an ICE Agent; and that did not act on her concerns. Within a week, the inmate threw a lightweight, plastic chair at her. Linares said the “assault caused a significant injury on my face,” and “a great deal of head pain” for “at least two days,” and residual “pain in my right cheek for about three weeks.” She took one pain pill. A contemporaneous photo shows an injury consistent with observation of “a little red mark on her right cheek. There was no swelling or puffiness and no bleeding.” Officers did not complete an incident report “because the scratch was so minor, and because [she] was not upset, in pain, [and did not ask] for medical treatment.” Linares brought claims of failure-to-protect; failure-to-train; substantive-due-process violations; and, failure-to-have-a-custody-policy. The court dismissed the federal defendants and granted summary judgment to the county defendants. The court also granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Chavero-Linares v. Smith" on Justia Law