Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit consolidated appeals from district court decisions granting defendants summary judgment in cases under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against law enforcement officials and municipalities. The claims related to the seizure of firearms, which were kept by the police for up to two years, and the arrests and prosecutions of plaintiffs, as to whom charges were ultimately dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that there was a reasonable basis for retention of the firearms in both cases and that officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in connection with the arrests and searches. View "Rodgers v. Knight" on Justia Law

In 2007, while on probation for 2005 theft offenses, Clark illegally used a credit account. North Dakota revoked Clark's probation, and he received a sentence of five years for the 2005 offenses. Clark entered into a plea agreement on the new offense, to avoid being sentenced as a habitual offender. He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, consecutive to his other sentence. Clark signed a judgment for the 2007 offense, stating that he entered a plea of guilty, but never actually entered a plea of guilty. Clark unsuccessfully appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court arguing that he was sentenced without actually entering a plea in the trial court. A federal court granted habeas relief. Clark was then convicted on the 2007 charge. With an enhancement for being a habitual offender, he was sentenced to eight years (consecutive to his other sentence). The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected Clark's appeal. In federal habeas proceedings, the court dismissed claims that had been raised only in Clark's pro se state court brief as procedurally defaulted. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. A federal habeas court cannot reach an otherwise unpreserved and procedurally defaulted claim merely because a reviewing state court analyzed that claim for plain error. View "Clark v. Bertsch" on Justia Law

Smith, labeled as a “snitch,” was attacked by other inmates in the Varner Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction. He was removed from the Unit and placed in protective custody. Smith alleges that correctional officer Johnson later returned him to the general population in the Varner Unit, without Smith’s consent and in violation of departmental policies. According to Smith, the next day another inmate severely beat him with his fist and a lock, causing scarring, a lost tooth, migraines, blurred vision, sensory losses, dizzy spells, and psychological symptoms. After the attack, Smith claims that Johnson and other officers punished him using “major disciplinary policies.” Smith unsuccessfully pursued grievances and filed a pro se claim with the State Claims Commission. The Commission dismissed Smith’s claim for failure to prove any negligence by the Department of Correction. Smith next filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging “deliberate indifference for [his] safety” and cruel and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed, ruling if the Claims Commission had jurisdiction over Smith’s constitutional claim, the action was barred by claim preclusion; if the Commission did not have jurisdiction over that claim, issue preclusion barred Smith’s claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that neither doctrine barred the suit. View "Smith v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Patterson's mother called police after an argument. Officers approached Patterson, who sat on the porch, and told him, repeatedly, to leave. Patterson became agitated when they suggested that he go to a homeless shelter. They stated that he was under arrest and would be physically removed. The officers attempted to lift him. Patterson resisted. Patterson and an officer fell against a barbeque grill "with considerable force." Officer Hasiak punched Patterson in the stomach. That failing, Officer Hiatt used her taser; its probes did not connect. Hasiak thrust his knee into Patterson's thigh. Hasiak attempted to kick Patterson's leg, missed, and contacted Patterson's torso. Patterson stopped resisting. The officers put Patterson in their police cruiser and took him to the hospital. Medical staff diagnosed fractured ribs but believed that they would heal without further treatment. Patterson pleaded guilty to failing to leave his mother's property and was released. He collapsed outside of the jail and was returned to the hospital. Doctors discovered a torn intestine. He underwent surgery and was released a week later. Patterson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury found excessive force, yet only awarded $1. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed. A jury may reasonably conclude that compensatory damages are inappropriate despite finding that excessive force was used if it finds that both justifiable and unjustifiable force might have been used and the injury may have resulted from justifiable force. View "Patterson v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Minnihan worked for Mediacom for 30 years. As an Ames, Iowa technical operations supervisor (TOS), His duties included observing service calls, being on call 24/7 to respond to outages; accident investigations; unannounced safety checks; and delivering equipment to the field. Mediacom provided a vehicle. At least half of his working hours were spent outside of the office. In 2009, Minnihan had a seizure and was prohibited, by Iowa law, from driving for six months. Mediacom reallocated his driving responsibilities. After another seizure, Mediacom asked Minnihan to apply for positions that did not require driving. Minnihan inquired about Family Medical Leave or having his position restructured. Mediacom accommodated him until October 2010, when Minnihan resumed his regular duties. In April, 2011, Minnihan had a third seizure. Mediacom transferred him to the Des Moines office in a non-driving position with the same pay and benefits as a TOS. Minnihan did not report to the position, although Mediacom provided transportation options, including another employee with whom Minnihan could ride to Des Moines. Mediacom terminated Minnihan's employment. After receiving right-to-sue letters from the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Minnihan sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, finding that Minnihan was not a qualified individual under disability law because he could not perform the essential functions of his job. View "Minnihan v. Mediacom Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Walz worked for Ameriprise, 1996-2012 and received mostly positive reviews. Walz suffers from bipolar affective disorder, which, beginning in 2012, caused her to interrupt meetings, disturb her coworkers, and disrespect her supervisor, Radel. Radel approached Walz several times to discuss her behavioral problems and to offer help, before issuing a formal warning. Walz applied for Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, which was granted by a third-party administrator. Walz never disclosed the reason for her FMLA leave to Ameriprise. Upon returning from leave, Walz gave Radel a doctor’s note, clearing her to return to work and stating, “[s]he has been stabilizing on her medication.” Walz signed an Individual Treatment Policy, which explained Ameriprise’s policy against disability discrimination and the process for requesting accommodations. Months after returning to work, Walz’s erratic and disruptive behavior returned. Radel warned Walz, but Walz repeated her erratic and intimidating behavior in meetings. Ameriprise fired Walz because of her repeated misconduct. Walz never informed Ameriprise that she suffered from bipolar disorder or requested any accommodation. Walz sued, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, noting that Walz failed to establish that her termination was based on her disability and never requested an accommodation. View "Walz v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc." on Justia Law

Previously, Missouri’s lethal-injection protocol involved Sodium thiopental to anesthetize the prisoner and render him unconscious, pancuronium bromide to paralyze him and stop his breathing, and potassium chloride to stop the prisoner’s heart. In 2012, after sodium thiopental became unavailable, the state revised its protocol to use a single drug—propofol—as the lethal agent. While a challenge was pending, the state revised its protocol to use pentobarbital as the lethal agent. An amended complaint alleged that use of compounded pentobarbital constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, that the defendants are deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ medical need for their executions not to inflict gratuitous pain, that use of compounded pentobarbital creates a significant risk of increased punishment over previous methods and amounts to ex post facto punishment, that the defendants deprived them of due process by not providing notice of the lethal injection methods, that the defendants deprived them of equal protection by deviating from execution protocol in certain instances, that the defendants violated their First Amendment rights by refusing to disclose the identities of the pharmacy that compounds the pentobarbital and its suppliers, and that the defendants violated federal laws by soliciting and using the compounded pentobarbital in executions. The court dismissed all claims except for that alleging “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment and its state equivalent. The prisoners’ concession that “other methods of lethal injection . . . would be constitutional” did not suffice to state a claim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Zink v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

Bucklew was convicted in state court of murder, kidnapping, and rape and sentenced to death. After Missouri courts denied post-conviction relief, the Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Bucklew’s petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of Missouri set Bucklew’s execution date as May 21, 2014. Bucklew was a plaintiff in a pending 42 U.S.C. 1983 action (Zink) that challenged Missouri’s method of execution. The district court tentatively dismissed that action on May 2. Bucklew filed another Section 1983 action on May 9, asserting that the method of lethal injection would violate his Eighth Amendment rights because of the unique risk that his serious medical condition (cavernous hemangioma) will result in excruciating pain. On May 16, the district court finally dismissed the Zink complaint. On May 19, the court denied a stay of execution and dismissed Bucklew’s Eighth Amendment claim. On May 21, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending appeal. The Eighth Circuit then reversed the dismissal: it was not “patently obvious” that Bucklew could not prevail. His as-applied challenge is distinguishable from Zink’s facial challenge. Bucklew’s allegations of a substantial risk of serious and imminent harm were far more specific than those allegations. There was also support for Bucklew’s allegations that the state unreasonably refused to change its regular method of execution to a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative that -would “significantly reduce” the substantial risk of pain. View "Bucklew v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

In 2011, after about two weeks of reporting symptoms and being treated for constipation and gas, Allard, a prisoner at the Clarinda Correctional Facility of the Iowa Department of Corrections , suffered a bowel obstruction and perforation. Allard had emergency surgery where a colostomy bag was installed and his bowel was repaired. Allard filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison staff. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that material questions of fact existed regarding the appropriateness of the care Allard received. Although Allard demonstrated that CCF medical staff failed to properly diagnose his bowel obstruction, and demonstrated that failure to treat the bowel obstruction led to a bowel perforation, Allard failed to put forward evidence to support a finding of deliberate indifference. View "Allard v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

CVS hired Jain, a woman of East Asian descent, as a pharmacist in 2006. She claims that coworkers and supervisors discriminated against her, calling her the "little Indian lady," and her Indian clothing “unprofessional.” Referring to her "bossy" attitude, the manager remarked that "she was from India but might as well be from Germany." Jain became "pharmacist-in-charge" (PIC) at another store, with permission to work a three day schedule. Supervisor Deaner later learned that the store was struggling in numerous performance metrics; that Jain had not been following company policies; and that multiple complaints had been filed. Deaner issued a performance action plan and began holding weekly meetings to help Jain. Problems continued. Jain was issued another warning. After inspections revealed additional problems, Jain was terminated. Jain sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 213.055, 213.070. Jain opposed a summary judgment motion with a declaration from her husband, stating that an "arithmetic comparison" of scores showed that the pharmacy had improved in every performance metric after Jain became PIC. The court struck the declaration because Mr. Jain "never worked for [CVS] and did not claim to have industry experience” and granted CVS summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Jain v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc." on Justia Law