Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For more than 30 years, Wagner worked at the Merrick County sheriff’s office, as chief dispatcher and office manager. Campbell was appointed as sheriff in 2011 and told Wagner he wanted her to train another employee to perform her duties in her absence.” Campbell later expressed concerns that the training was taking too long and informed Wagner that he had received a complaint from a judge about delays in depositing bond money with the court. Campbell wanted to change policy to have bond money taken directly to court, rather than deposited in the sheriff’s office account. Wagner disagreed. Campbell gave Wagner a reprimand, stating that she failed to follow directives. Wagner refused to sign the reprimand, claiming it contained false information, told Campbell she was leaving, and walked home. Wagner never returned to work; she filed a grievance, which the Board of Supervisors denied. Wagner sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-148, alleging she suffered an adverse employment action in retaliation for protected speech on a matter of public concern. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Campbell. When a reprimand does not affect the terms and conditions of employment, a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Wagner v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Hughes, Arkansas school district hired Ray Nassar as superintendent in 2008. Nassar hired Gena Smith as a business manager. Both are white. The school district renewed Nassar’s contract until June 30, 2013. After the racial composition of the school board shifted to an African-American majority, Nassar’s already-poor relationship with two African-American board members deteriorated. One member, Jackson, referred to Smith as Nassar’s “girlfriend,” at a public meeting (both are married to others) and to Nassar’s “lie[s].” A profanity-laced exchange followed; soon after, the district fired Nassar without a hearing. Months later, the school district fired Smith, without a hearing. Nassar and Smith sued, alleging violations of due process, unlawful racial discrimination, breach of contract, and defamation. A jury found for Nassar and Smith on all claims, awarded Nassar $340,000 on his due-process claim (more than he would have earned through the end of his contract), $1.00 on his discrimination claim, and $1.00 on his contract claim. The court granted Nassar and Smith attorney’s fees at a rate of $375 per hour. The Eighth Circuit vacated the due process award and remanded with instructions to offer remittitur. View "Nassar v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Long, the elected head prosecutor for the first judicial district of Arkansas, supervises deputy prosecutors in six counties. In 2006, Long hired Austin, an African-American, as a deputy prosecutor for Phillips County. The prosecutor previously hired for that position was African-American, as was the prosecutor hired to replace Austin. Austin failed to follow the instructions of Murray, the senior deputy prosecutor, conerning allocation of county funds. Long asserts that Murray and other court personnel had trouble contacting Austin during business hours, that Austin deviated from policy on felony bond reduction orders and expungement orders and incurred extraordinary expenses without approval. A judge reportedly contacted Long to ask why Austin had failed to appear in court. Austin contends that Long never provided him with a formal evaluation and never explained why he was fired. Austin filed an employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, claiming that Long treated him more harshly than similarly situated white prosecutors, who had been convicted of driving while intoxicated and sanctioned for an ethical violation. The district court denied Long's motion asserting qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the record gave rise to disputes of material fact over whether Long's stated reasons for firing Austin were a pretext for racial discrimination. View "Austin v. Long" on Justia Law

Villanueva was the contact to the police department for her neighborhood watch group, communicating with Officer Moreno. She told Moreno that her ex-husband (Alvaro) had assaulted her. Moreno did not file a report or take official action, but spoke with Alvaro about the incident. Moreno began spending time alone with Villanueva, touching her, and sending sexually explicit messages. The relationship became sexual. Villanueva ended the relationship and began experiencing what she believed was harassment. She saw unknown cars parked outside her house and received anonymous threatening phone calls referencing private conversations between Villanueva and Moreno. Villanueva believed Moreno orchestrated the harassment. Villanueva reported to the Scottsbluff police. Officers were dispatched after many calls, but they generated only two reports and took no official action. Villanueva, diagnosed with PTSD, filed suit, citing the Equal Protection Clause and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court construed Villanueva’s complaint to allege substantive due process violations of her rights to bodily integrity and to be free from state-created danger, granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the constitutional claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence did not suggest Moreno coerced Villanueva into sexual relations through an abuse of authority so egregious and outrageous that it shocked the conscience. View "Villanueva v. City of Scottsbluff" on Justia Law

Johnson shot his ex-girlfriend in the head, causing serious permanent injuries. A South Dakota jury convicted him of first-degree attempted murder and aggravated assault. The trial judge imposed consecutive sentences of 25 and 15 years for the two offenses. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota rejected Johnson’s claim that imposing consecutive sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault based on the same act violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. After exhausting state post-conviction remedies, Johnson sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the double jeopardy claim as no “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). View "Johnson v. Young" on Justia Law

Chief of Police Lillis announced his retirement. Lieutenant Hilde, on the force for 29 years, was the second-ranking officer, and had served as acting Chief. A commission that controls hiring had previously promoted internally. They selected finalists, including Hilde and external candidate, Koivunen. Hilde had an Associate’s degree in law enforcement. Detective Koivunen had served another city for 18 years. He had a Bachelor’s degree in criminal law. The hiring protocol involved: weighted years of service, training and employment, and an interview. Hilde had a service score of 65, the highest of the finalists. He received 9 out of 20 on training-and-employment, the lowest of the finalists. The commissioners could not explain that score. Koivunen received a service score of 28 and 15 out of 20 for his training-and-employment, the highest of the finalists. Each commissioner gave Koivunen an unprecedented perfect 100 score for his interview. Hilde’s interview sheets also reported identical scores: 69 points. Hilde and Koivunen each had 143 points after the interview. Two commissioners claimed not to remember changing Hilde’s scores, although the sheets were altered. When Hilde applied, he was 51 years old. Koivunen was 43. An officer is retirement-eligible at 50. Commissioner England said that retirement eligibility “might have” been a factor. Hilde sued, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), 631(a), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. View "Hilde v. City of Eveleth" on Justia Law

Defendant and others were charged with conspiring to distribute and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a). He originally was appointed counsel, but later retained new counsel. Unsatisfied, defendant retained a third attorney, Rozan. Represented by Rozan, defendant pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate levels. Defendant argued that Rozan did not disclose that in 2004 and 2005, Rozan was privately reprimanded by the State Bar of Texas; in 2007, he was publicly reprimanded; and in 2009, while representing defendant on appeal, he was suspended from practice in Texas for five years, effective January 1, 2010. The Texas Supreme Court ordered Rozan to provide written notice of his suspension to every client and to every court officer in every court in which Rozan practiced. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. It was defendant’s responsibility to investigate the disciplinary past of his attorney; the required notification occurred after defendant’s sentencing, and defendant did not show how he was prejudiced by Rozan’s silence. View "Ghost Bear v. United States" on Justia Law

Officers were informed that a “couple of black females” had stolen merchandise from Urban Outfitters, and that an employee from the nearby Heartbreaker store had called to report suspected shoplifters. The Heartbreaker manager said that an unidentified customer had pointed out African American females (Parker and her friends) inside the store that had run out of Victoria’s Secret. A Victoria’s Secret employee confirmed that a “group of black females” had “very recently” run out of the store, but could not confirm whether anything was stolen. The manager did not suspect the women of stealing from Heartbreaker. The officers noted no suspicious activity, but followed the group, pulled their squad car in front of Parker’s car and turned on the emergency lights. The women stated that they had not been to Victoria’s Secret. Parker consented to a search of her shopping bags; nothing appeared stolen. After running Parker’s license and speaking to her father on her cell phone, the officers told the women they could leave. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The Eight Circuit reversed. It was not clearly established that the officers, having corroborated the running incident, and knowing shoplifting recently occurred, could not reasonably suspect Parker of shoplifting. View "Parker v. Chard" on Justia Law

Brooks, a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, is incarcerated for Minnesota convictions of first-degree DWI and assaulting an officer. The Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) requires a chemical-dependency assessment. Brooks was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions. Brooks began treatment in 2011, but, in 2012, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996; and the Minnesota Constitution. He claimed that his required chemical-dependency program deprived him of his right to the free exercise of his religion. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all others. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, because, based on the complaint, the court and the defendants could not discern what beliefs he has or what faith he professes. View "Brooks v. Roy" on Justia Law

In 2008, Camacho pleaded guilty to capital murder in Arkansas state court. He did not file a direct appeal. After state post-conviction relief was denied, Camacho filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The state responded that, although the limitations period was tolled while Camacho’s state post-conviction proceedings were pending, the petition was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). The magistrate judge recommended denying relief, reasoning that because Arkansas law generally does not permit an appeal from a guilty plea, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period began to run when the judgment of conviction was entered, not 30 days later when the time for filing a direct appeal from that judgment expired. The district court dismissed the petition as being filed 18 days past the deadline. The Eighth Circuit reversed. For state prisoners, the AEDPA limitations period runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” The critical date for finality of the state-court conviction is the expiration of the state’s filing deadline, regardless of whether the petitioner could file an appeal. View "Camacho v. Hobbs" on Justia Law