Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gibson, an African-American male, was hired by the IRS on January 1, 2008, as a full-time seasonal tax examiner, subject to completion of a one-year probationary period. Gibson's work leader was an African-American female. Gibson's first-level supervisor was Butler, an African-American female; Gibson's second-level supervisor was Hunter, an African-American female. Gibson's third-level supervisor was Vermillion, a Caucasian female. In his unit, there were 32 employees; 18 were probationary. Of the 18, four were African-Americans, 12 were Caucasian, and two were Hispanic. Six were female and 12 were male. Gibson was the only African-American male. During his probation, Gibson was observed to not be editing entire bundles of returns, mislabeling bundles, recording working hours he was not present, and improperly altering a government document. Butler prohibited Gibson from working overtime. Gibson claimed he was being unfairly targeted by Butler. Gibson's work product, subject to 100% review, revealed an unacceptable error rate. In April, Gibson delivered a letter to Jones, titled "Sexual Harassment, Retaliation, Harassment, and Creating a Hostile Environment, by Manager Ms. Felecia Butler." Hunter reported that the letter’s allegations were unfounded. Vermillion terminated Gibson based on Gibson's failure to attain successful performance during his probation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the IRS, rejecting race and sex discrimination and retaliatory termination claims. View "Gibson v. Geithner" on Justia Law

During a fight in 2007, Delonais stabbed Addai's friend. Addai stabbed Delonais, who died as a result of his injuries. Addai was convicted of class AA felony murder, ND Code 12.1-16-01(1)(a). At trial, Addai's attorney called as a witness the attorney of another individual who had been involved in the stabbing investigation, to testify regarding alleged tampering with evidence and obstruction of the Delonais murder investigation. Before testifying, Lange explained that he was uncomfortable testifying because there could be topics that were protected by attorney-client privilege or not public knowledge. Asked to testify about his client's criminal file, he objected and advised the court that the file was sealed. The trial court closed the courtroom. Addai's counsel stated he did not "have a problem with this" and the court allowed Addai's attorney to question the witness further regarding the restricted information. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Addai sought habeas relief, arguing that courtroom closure during his state court trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel consented to the closure. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court properly denied Addai's petition. View "Addai v. Schmalenberger" on Justia Law

In 1990, Magee was hired as a professor at Hamline University School of Law. She became tenured in 1994. In 2009, Magee was charged with felony state tax violations. While her case was pending, Hamline placed her on a leave of absence and relieved her of teaching responsibilities. In 2011, a jury found Magee guilty of four misdemeanor counts of failure to file state tax returns. The convictions were upheld on appeal. After the dean initiated her termination, a faculty committee voted in favor of discharge. Magee was terminated on July 21, 2011. Magee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In 2013, Magee served a second lawsuit, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, which “offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship,” The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that because Magee’s section 1983 claim in Magee I and the section 1981 claim “arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions,” the section 1981 claim should have been raised in Magee I and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.. View "Magee v. Hamline Univ." on Justia Law

After series of problems arising between Dr. Fatemi and other program residents and coworkers at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS), including reported failure to comply with regulatory standards that require a complete history and physical evaluation in the medical record prior to surgery or within 24 hours of admission, the UAMS program terminated Fatemi, a female second-year neurosurgery resident. Fatemi sued UAMS and several of its employees, asserting, among other things, gender discrimination. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Fatemi's arguments concerning pretext. While there was an atmosphere of contentiousness and discord between Fatemi and her coworkers during her residency, there was no evidence that the discord was the product of intentional gender discrimination. A reasonable jury could come to only one conclusion on gender discrimination after considering all the undisputed material facts, and considering the few disputed facts in Fatemi's favor. She lost her place at UAMS because of her many professional shortcomings as a resident, not because she is a woman. View "Fatemi v. White" on Justia Law

In 2007 Pedersen began working for BMA dialysis clinics. She became a registered nurse. On April 17, 2012, clinic manager Ince talked to Pedersen about Pedersen’s aggression and patient care performance issues; Pedersen was to be transferred to another clinic with more experienced staff. Pedersen yelled at Ince. Later that day, the two met with nephrologists to discuss patient care planning. Pedersen informed the nephrologists about mispackaging of blood samples a week earlier. Ince discussed how the incident had been handled. Following the meeting, Pedersen contacted regional manager Kienzle and others to report the mispackaging. Kienzle informed them that the incident had been investigated and no samples were affected. On April 19, a patient reported that Pedersen had slapped her arms; others complained that Pedersen had impersonated a manager and had inappropriately documented patient treatment. BMA investigated. Pedersen went on medical leave. BMA determined Pedersen could return under a corrective plan. Pedersen did not return. BMA offered Pedersen employment as a technician due to Pedersen’s long absence and new policies; she could be retrained as an RN. Pedersen refused to return unless BMA met her conditions. After several months, BMA terminated Pedersen’s employment, characterizing her failure to return as voluntary resignation. Pedersen sued, alleging retaliation and violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. The district court granted BMA summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of Minn." on Justia Law

Colbert alleges that in traffic court deputy Chapman beckoned him to a group of officers and loudly said, “Don’t be eyeballing my officers”; when Colbert said he was not, an officer grabbed Colbert and said “shut up”; when Colbert told that officer to let go, officers handcuffed him, threw him against a wall (causing his nose to bleed), threw him to the floor, tased him twice, “hog tied” him, and dragged him out. A state court found Colbert guilty of disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to arrest. Colbert sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unreasonable seizure and excessive force. The district court dismissed. Colbert appealed dismissal of his excessive-force claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed. When a state prisoner seeks damages under section 1983, the court must consider whether judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. If the court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should proceed. A finding of excessive force would not necessarily invalidate Colbert’s convictions. View "Colbert v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Desloge has a population of 5,054; 97.4% are white. The Ku Klux Klan regularly distributes leaflets on streets and sidewalks, wearing robes and hoods. Imperial Wizard Ancona contacted city officials about plans to distribute leaflets in 2012 and learned that an ordinance prohibited "solicitation activities" on public streets. The district court issued an injunction, concluding that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. In 2013 Ancona and the Klan returned to distribute leaflets concerning gun rights. They stood along a sidewalk at a four way stop, holding up leaflets. If a vehicle’s occupant signaled for a leaflet, a Klan member would step into the street to supply one. A police officer told them about a 2013 traffic ordinance , which prohibited "stand[ing] in or enter[ing] upon a roadway for the purpose of soliciting rides, employment, business or charitable contributions from, or distribut[ing] anything to, the occupant of any vehicle." The Klan left. While litigation was pending, the city amended the ordinance, adding a preamble and defining terms to explain that it sought to address "public safety concerns," distracted drivers, and resulting collisions. "Roadway" was defined as the entire road, from one curb or pavement edge to another, including parking lanes. The district court granted an injunction, concluding that some provisions were not narrowly tailored. The Eighth Circuit reversed. There was no evidence that the ordinance was created to curtail the Klan's message or its speech in Desloge; it is not impermissibly underinclusive. View "Traditionalist Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Desloge" on Justia Law

DeCoteau was convicted of gross sexual imposition in 1996. His 2012 habeas petition had six claims. The district court dismissed, finding four claims time-barred, one procedurally barred, and the other without merit, but granted a certificate of appealability as to whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act limitations period applies on a claim-by-claim basis. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. AEDPA’s one-year limitations period applies to “an application” for habeas corpus, running from the latest of: the date on which judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time for seeking review; the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed; the date on which a newly-recognized constitutional right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or the date on which the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The court rejected DeCoteau’s argument that the word “application” focuses on the date of the latest claim within the entire application, allowing review of all claims if one is timely. View "DeCoteau v. Schweitzer" on Justia Law

EEOC sued CRST in its own name, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging that CRST subjected Starke and 270 similarly situated female employees to a hostile work environment, in its Driver Training Program. For two years, EEOC failed to identify the women comprising the putative class; the court ordered EEOC to make all class members available for deposition or risk a discovery sanction. EEOC filed updated lists of allegedly aggrieved individuals, but failed to make all of them available for deposition before the deadline. The court barred EEOC from pursuing relief for any individual not made available for deposition before the deadline. EEOC then listed 155 individuals for whom it was still pursuing relief and 99 individuals, allegedly sexually harassed, but for whom EEOC was not pursuing relief based on the order. Following remand, the court dismissed, but for one claim, which settled for $50,000, and awarded CRST $92,842.21 in costs, $4,004,371.65 in attorneys' fees, and $463,071.25 in out-of-pocket expenses. The Eighth Circuit held that CRST is not entitled to attorneys' fees for claims dismissed based on EEOC's failure to satisfy pre-suit obligations and a purported pattern-or-practice claim. On remand, the court must individually assess each claim for which it granted summary judgment on the merits and explain why it deems each to be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

After Hopkins was arrested for driving while impaired for the third time in 10 years, officers impounded her vehicle under Minnesota Statute 169A.631(e)(1), She received a notice of seizure and intent to forfeit her vehicle. Hopkins filed a challenge and requested immediate return of her vehicle. The court administrator did not schedule a hearing on the demand because that “judicial determination . . . must not precede adjudication in the criminal prosecution of the designated offense without the consent of the prosecuting authority.” Hopkins neither requested a decision on her demand prior to resolution of her underlying criminal case nor utilized procedures that allow an owner to give security or post bond in exchange for the vehicle. Hopkins voluntarily withdrew her demand. The resolution of her criminal case was delayed by continuances pending the outcome of litigation relating to the breathalyzer. Hopkins pled guilty, then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the vehicle forfeiture statute violated the federal and state constitutions by depriving Hopkins of procedural due process and by unreasonably seizing her vehicle. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Hopkins voluntarily ceased pursuing available state administrative remedies, so she waived her post-deprivation procedural due process claim. View "Hopkins v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law