Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Riding home from a bar, Partlow talked about suicide. When they reached his apartment, Partlow jumped out of the running car, ran into his apartment, and locked the door. His aunt (Lisa) called 911. Officer Mann arrived and requested backup, stating that there was a weapon involved and that the subject had said, “You don’t want to see this.” Beedy, Stadler and Craig arrived, heard the door crash open, turned, and saw Partlow carrying a shotgun, with Lisa holding his other arm. They yelled, “Drop the gun.” Partlow seemed surprised by their presence. Lisa fell, freeing Partlow’s arm. Officers testified that Partlow chambered a round and aimed at them. They opened fire, hitting Partlow in the eye, forearm, hands, groin, hip, and shin. Beedy secured Partlow’s shotgun and discovered a live round in the chamber. Partlow was convicted of terrorizing, N.D. Code 12.1-17-04. Lisa testified that Partlow putting the gun down when the officers opened fire. Partlow sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It is possible that the officers were mistaken, but their mistake was objectively reasonable in light of known circumstances. View "Partlow v. Stadler" on Justia Law

While an inmate in Federal Correctional Institution - Forrest City, Spencer was assigned a cell for a medical assessment. Correctional Officer t Sheldon entered the cell to assist staff with checking Spencer's restraints. Spencer backed himself into a corner and was verbally abusive. Staff members told Spencer to sit on the bunk, but Spencer was uncooperative and aggressively resisted. While forcibly being placed on the bed, Spencer bit Sheldon's abdomen. Spencer was then placed in "four-point" restraints around 9:10 a.m. and was not removed from those restraints until 3:45 p.m. the following day. After a hearing, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer found that Spencer assaulted Sheldon and disciplined Spencer with losses of privileges. Spencer brought a petition for habeas corpus alleging a Fifth Amendment due process violation for being put in four-point restraints without being afforded a hearing. The district court dismissed without prejudice, finding that conditions-of-confinement claims cannot be raised in the context of habeas petitions. The Eighth Circuit remanded, stating that the court should liberally construe the pro se petition and decide the conditions-of-confinement claims under the principles of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. View "Spencer v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Reeves, an inmate housed in the isolation unit at Ouachita River Unit in Malvern, provided information to correctional officers about a prison nurse who was bringing contraband into the facility. While Lieutenant King and another officer made security rounds in the unit, Reeves attempted to initiate a conversation with them. King responded by commenting, “Go ahead and snitch to the major like you did to him on the nurse and he’ll get back with you later.” King made this comment in the presence of several inmates, and Reeves suffered emotional distress and fear of retaliation. The next day, Arkansas Department of Corrections transferred Reeves, who then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that King violated his Eighth Amendment rights by calling him a snitch. King sought summary judgment. The magistrate determined King was not entitled to qualified immunity because Eighth Circuit precedent provides a detention officer violates his duty to protect an inmate by labeling that inmate as a snitch. The district court adopted the recommendations and denied the motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable correctional officer in King’s position would have known that labeling Reeves a snitch would violate his constitutional right to protection. View "Reeves v. King" on Justia Law

Sellner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846. Judgment was entered on March 8, 2013. Her attorney did not file notice of appeal. In July 2013, Sellner filed a pro se motion to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, including counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal as requested. Sellner’s attorney submitted an affidavit, stating that when Sellner asked him about filing an appeal, he told her that he would file an appeal if she insisted, but that Sellner decided to forgo an appeal after counsel explained to Sellner that she had waived her right to appeal. In November 2013, Sellner filed another pro se 2255 motion, alleging a violation under Alleyne v. United States. The district court dismissed the July motion on the merits without an evidentiary hearing and the November motion as barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) as “second or successive.” The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded after the government conceded that the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the claim of failure to file a notice of appeal. View "United States v. Sellner" on Justia Law

Goodwin, scheduled to be executed on December 10, 2014 based on his conviction for first-degree murder, sought a certificate of appealability with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim of intellectual disability or, in the alternative, authorization to file a successive habeas application. Goodwin claims that he is intellectually disabled and that,in his case, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued a decision that was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Hall v. Florida. The Eighth Circuit denied relief, noting state court findings that “Goodwin has eight independent intelligence tests spread over twenty years that indicated that Goodwin is not retarded” and that Goodwin’s single IQ score within the five-point margin of error for the Wechsler scale of sub-average intellectual functioning was “inadequate to raise a triable issue of fact.” Jurists of reason would not find debatable the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that Goodwin’s claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1); Goodwin conceded that he raised the claim that he is mentally retarded and ineligible for execution in his initial habeas application. View "Goodwin v. Steele" on Justia Law

Williams was an Alexander police officer under chief Walters. There was animosity between them, stemming from Williams’s support of the mayor. Walters stated that he had Williams “in his cross hairs” and relieved Walters of duty. The city reinstated Walters. The city’s bookkeeper later discovered that Williams had cashed two payroll checks covering the same period without realizing that a check he found was the check that he had reported lost and had had replaced. The mayor found that it was unintentional error; the city council agreed. Williams returned the money. Williams borrowed police lights from a county deputy that were the deputy’s personal property and were marked with his name. Williams informed Walters that he had borrowed the lights. At Walters’s instruction, another officer retrieved the lights from Williams and installed them on Walters’s patrol car. A magistrate issued a warrant for Williams’s arrest, based on Walters’s affidavit, based on those incidents. Williams was arrested for theft and spent a day in jail. The prosecutor dismissed the charges. Williams sued Walters and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed claims against the city, but denied summary judgment and qualified immunity for Walters. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Williams v. Walters" on Justia Law

Musolf was a J.C. Penney loss prevention specialist. Store manager Child had concerns Musolf did not display respect for her team. Child conducted sessions with Musolf to improve teamwork. In 2010, Musolf alleged sexual harassment by her co-worker, Pekarna. Child met with Pekarna. Pekarna never touched Musolf again. Musolf acknowledges that Child repeatedly stated that the situation was resolved. In March 2010, Musolf received a certificate commending her outstanding performance. In May, she earned a merit raise. By August, Child had received complaints about Musolf from several employees, including Pekarna. Child met with Musolf three times. Musolf admits she refused to fully answer questions. Child believed Musolf had downloaded documents in violation of her confidentiality agreement and had involved another employee in an attempt to sneak into Child's office. Child recommended terminating Musolf. Musolf communicated to the district manager that she believed Pekarna had not been properly disciplined. J.C. Penney terminated Musolf for failure to cooperate in the investigation, taking confidential information, and attempting to involve another in a plan to sneak into the manager's office and take documents. The district court rejected her claims of sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Musolf v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Noel accepted a new position at SBC that involved frequent travel, which aggravated his diabetes. Two years later, Noel was hospitalized after collapsing at an airport, and the next year, SBC gave him a temporary assignment that did not involve travel. After Noel performed poorly in both his new position and the temporary assignment, SBC put him on a performance-improvement plan. Two weeks later, Noel was hospitalized again, after suffering a breakdown. He never returned to SBC. After six months of disability leave, Noel resigned. The district court rejected his claims that SBC violated the Missouri Human Rights Act by constructively discharging him because of his diabetes, a disability. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. SBC expected Noel only to continue his job as it had been; his work was made intolerable not by SBC but by his own worsening health. View "Noel v. AT&T Corp." on Justia Law

An Iowa jury convicted Paulson of sexually abusing his five-year-old daughter, M. Paulson’s defense argued that there was no direct, credible evidence. A clinical psychologist testified that the method of questioning M. was coercive. M’s pediatrician and others, including M’s teacher, testified that they observed no physical or emotional signs of sexual abuse. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed. Paulson sought post-conviction relief, arguing 18 grounds of ineffective assistance by trial and appellate counsel. Following remand for an evidentiary hearing, the Iowa trial court found that the attorneys’ performance was not deficient and did not result in prejudice, considering failure to object to the testimony of Paulson’s ex-wife that could imply he was sexually violent. The Iowa Court of Appeals agreed, stating that Paulson could not demonstrate that exclusion of that testimony would have resulted in a different outcome. The federal district court denied Paulson’s habeas corpus petition. On remand the court determined that the Iowa decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, considered de novo whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, and determined, in light of the significant evidence against him, that Paulson had failed to show prejudice. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Paulson v. Newton Corr. Facility" on Justia Law

Sanders assisted another inmate by writing a letter to officials outside the Arkansas Department of Correction, asserting that Officer Page accepted a pair of ostrich-skin shoes made by the inmate. Sanders claimed that Page gave him favorable treatment to convince Sanders to dismiss the complaint. Sanders withdrew the complaint, but filed ADC grievances alleging Page improperly coerced him to withdraw his complaint and discussed with another inmate the "grave fabrication" that Sanders possessed a cell phone. Days later, officers, including Page, searched the barracks for contraband. They uncovered a cell phone in another inmate’s bunk. Sanders claimed that another officer warned Sanders that Page was going to file a disciplinary charge unless he withdrew his grievances. Days later, Page charged Sanders with use of a cell phone. A hearing officer found Sanders guilty. Sanders lost privileges and spent 30 days in isolation. The decision was upheld on ADC review. After a trial on his retaliatory-discipline claims (42 U.S.C. 1983), the jury awarded Sanders $1. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss. Sanders received adequate notice, did not identify any witnesses or evidence he was not allowed to present, and received a copy of the decision. View "Sanders v. Page" on Justia Law