Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two administrative hearing panels (Panels) concluded that the school district failed to provide plaintiffs' twin sons with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in 2005, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., but did provide one in 2006. The district court upheld these decisions and later awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs and the school district cross appealed. The court held that the school district offered the twins a FAPE in 2005 and therefore, reversed the award of a reduced attorney's fee. The court affirmed, however, the district court's ruling that plaintiffs waived or abandoned their appeal of the Panels' 2006 FAPE decision.

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her action against a former employer alleging race, sex, and age discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court concluded that plaintiff had not filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of her termination, as required to exhaust her claim, and therefore dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court held that because the district court rested its factual conclusions on matters outside the pleadings, it erred by failing to convert the employer's motion into one for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. This error did not prejudice plaintiff with regard to her claims of age discrimination and retaliation, so the court affirmed the district court's dismissal in this respect. The court held that because the error was prejudicial with respect to the remaining claims of race and sex discrimination, however, the court reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued her employer under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. 363A.01-43, and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-54, and asserted other state common law claims including breach of employment contract. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the dismissal of her breach of contract claim with prejudice, the denials of her motions for leave to amend her complaint, the denial of her motion for consideration, and the adverse grant of her MHRA and FMLA claims by the district court. The court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's arguments because any error with respect to the dismissal of the breach of employment contract claim was harmless where plaintiff resigned from her employment with the county and failed to generate a genuine issue of fact as to constructive discharge in the context of her MHRA reprisal claim. The court also held that because plaintiff failed to generate an issue of fact as to whether she suffered a materially adverse employment action, summary judgment was appropriate as to her MHRA retaliation claim. The court further held that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiff's FMLA interference claim where plaintiff did not contest the district court's finding that she received the full twelve weeks of FMLA leave to which she was entitled each year she requested it. The court finally held that summary judgment was properly granted on plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim where she failed to generate an issue of fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment action.

Planned Parenthood brought this equitable action against the Governor and Attorney General of South Dakota in their official capacities, seeking to enjoin enforcement of revisions enacted in 2005 to the South Dakota law on informed consent to abortion. The court held that because Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds upheld the human being advisory against a facial challenge, the district court did not err in doing the same in this case. The court also held that the district court erred in holding the relationship advisories unconstitutional where they could be constitutionally applied to a "large fraction" of the women to whom they were relevant. The court further held that the district court did not err in granting Planned Parenthood summary judgment as to the suicide advisory where it violated due process and doctors' First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech that was untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant. The court finally held that the district court did not err in upholding the risk advisory where Planned Parenthood had not shown that the risk advisory would cause confusion in any case, let alone the quantum of cases required to sustain a facial challenge.

A grand jury indicted defendant, an African-American, for conspiracy to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base, which then carried a 10-year mandatory minimum. The grand jury also indicted defendant's former husband, who is white, for conspiracy to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base, which then carried a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss the indictment for selective prosecution and denial of an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss where defendant offered no credible evidence that race or gender played a role in the government's charging decision. The court also held that defendant offered no credible evidence of discriminatory purpose. The court further held that defendant had not shown any credible evidence of purposeful discrimination and the district court properly denied an evidentiary hearing.

Appellee applied for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1382. The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration subsequently appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the ALJ permissibly discounted appellee's testimony and that the district court substituted its own judgment for that of the ALJ in concluding otherwise. In the alternative, the Commissioner asserted that even if the ALJ erred, the district court should have remanded for additional proceedings and erred in directing the entry of an award of benefits. The court held that valid reasons supported the ALJ's adverse credibility determination and that substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ's determination that appellee could perform sedentary work as long as he had the option of alternating between sitting and standing. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded for the district court to affirm the decision of the Commissioner.

Plaintiff, an inmate in the South Dakota State Penitentiary (SDSP), alleged that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, defendants violated the First Amendment when defendants received notice that a magazine plaintiff had ordered was rejected from the mailroom because it was too violent. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint where his allegations were sufficient to plausibly state a claim under section 1983 and, at this extremely early stage of the litigation, there was a reasonable inference that SDSP's policy was unconstitutionally applied to the censored publication. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Appellant appealed the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Lake Lotawana, and its mayor, and the subsequent dismissal of her wrongful termination and retaliation claims. On appeal, appellant contended that the city breached her employment contract and that she established triable issues of fact as to her retaliation claims. The court held that the city was entitled to summary judgment on appellant's wrongful termination claim where she did not have an enforceable contract or viable tort claim. The court also held that appellant was terminated because of her inappropriate activities and therefore, the dismissal of appellant's retaliation claims was affirmed because nothing in the record indicated that her opposition to unlawful discrimination was a contributing factor to her termination. The court further held, for the same reasons, that appellant could not succeed under the more stringent standard applied in the Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court.

Appellant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer in a wrongful-termination suit brought pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) 38 U.S.C. 4316. The court held that appellant failed to raise a genuine factual dispute about whether the employer's conduct was reasonable and whether the employer had notice that such conduct would be a ground for discharge because the employer's decision to terminate appellant was reasonable where appellant violated a clear written policy by failing to personally report his absences.

Plaintiff sued his former music teacher, the Logan-Rogersville R-VII School District, and the school principal, asserting nine different claims stemming from the teacher's alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims and denying his motion to amend his complaint. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Counts 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 were time-barred where plaintiff's complaint established that his cause of action accrued in 1992 when he was 15 years old, the statute of limitations was tolled until his 21st birthday, and he had five years, until November 22, 2003, to file his complaint. The court also held that plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title IX were also time-barred where both claims relied on the state's statute of limitations governing personal-injury claims and Missouri imposed a five-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.120.4. For the same reasons, plaintiff's state-law claims were time barred by section 516.120.4. The court further held that the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's childhood sexual abuse claim was affirmed where Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.046 required him to commence his action within five years of his 18th birthday. The court finally held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's sexual abuse claim against the school district and principal and the district court did not err in denying as futile plaintiff's motion to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.