Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After concluding that police violated plaintiff's constitutional rights in seizing items from his residence, a Missouri state trial court suppressed the evidence. Missouri filed an interlocutory appeal of the suppression order in the Missouri Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. Plaintiff then brought this civil rights lawsuit against his ex-wife, his son, the City of Desloge, a city police officer, and unidentified defendants. Plaintiff alleged a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against all defendants for violations of plaintiff's civil rights, as well as section 1985 and state law claims for civil conspiracy against all defendants. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the dismissal of the city and the police, alleging various errors. The court rejected plaintiff's arguments under State v. Daniels, holding that plaintiff's collateral estoppel argument lacked merit. The court also held that plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated where the arrest warrant was properly admitted and even if the warrant was admitted in error, plaintiff suffered no prejudice. The court further held that plaintiff was unable to show any material prejudice resulting from the late filing of the police's motion to file their brief in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to establish that the police officer violated plaintiff's constitutional rights and could not maintain the action against the other officer or the city. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued defendant, the Secretary of the Navy, for sexual harassment and retaliation, in addition to state law claims. Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of the case based on the failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she first made contact with an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor on February 10, 2004 - 68 days after the sexual harassment ended. The court also held that neither equitable tolling nor equitable estoppel saved her claim.

Appellant appealed the district court's judgment upholding the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of his application for disability insurance and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits, under Title II and XVI of the Social Security Act (SSA), 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq. The court held that substantial evidence on the record supported the ALJ's finding that appellant's depression and anxiety were not severe; that the ALJ did not err in evaluating appellant's credibility; that, while the ALJ did not explicitly address the claims of appellant's girlfriend, the ALJ's error had no bearing on the outcome of appellant's case and did not require remand; and that the vocational expert's answer to a hypothetical question was not improper and constituted substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued the Wild Rose Casino and an agent of the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as state law claims for false arrest and imprisonment where plaintiff was arrested for trespass when she entered the casino after having signed two voluntary exclusion forms at the casino's predecessor establishment. Charges against plaintiff were subsequently dropped. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the agent and the casino. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity where he had an objectively reasonable belief that plaintiff was trespassing. The court also held that the release contained in the 2005 form that plaintiff signed was valid and enforceable and therefore, absolved the casino of any liability from plaintiff's constitutional and state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellant sued his employer alleging race discrimination and retaliation for opposing race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain affidavits and in concluding that discovery concerning the settlement agreement was not warranted. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on both failure-to-promote claims where the employer did in fact promote appellant in 2007. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the hostile work environment based on race claim where the incidents that appellant had alleged were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a hostile work environment.

Appellant sued his former employer claiming under Missouri law that the employer subjected him to malicious prosecution and false arrest for his alleged theft of certain checks. A issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to the employer, concluding, inter alia, that appellant failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to the lack of probable cause for the theft prosecution, an essential element of malicious prosecution and false arrest under Missouri law. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the Missouri court's probable cause determination at appellant's preliminary hearing constituted prima facie evidence of the employer's probable cause which appellant had failed to rebut. Therefore, the court declined to address the district court's alternative holding that the underlying prosecution did not terminate in appellant's favor. The court also held that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in the employer's favor on appellant's claim for false arrest where the arrest was supported by probable cause and was justified per se under Missouri law and could not form the basis of a false arrest claim.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on his claims that defendant committed employment discrimination, in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, et seq. Plaintiff claimed that his military service was a motivating factor in defendant's decision to discharge him and that defendant terminated him without cause. The court held that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that defendant was hostile to his membership in the uniformed services; that the timing of plaintiff's termination failed to support his argument that his membership in the uniform services was a motivating factor in defendant's decision; and that defendant's reason for termination have not varied. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on this claim. The court also held that defendant's decision to discharge plaintiff was not arbitrary and there was no evidence to suggest that defendant tried to evade the statute and that plaintiff had notice that his conduct would constitute cause for discharge. Therefore, the court also affirmed summary judgment on this claim.

A former employee of Schwan's Home Service (Schwan) filed a charge with the EEOC alleging gender discrimination while she was employed at Schwan. Schwan subsequently appealed the district court's order enforcing an administrative subpoena issued by the EEOC while investigating the charges. The court held that because the EEOC's investigation into the former employee's charge of individual gender discrimination revealed potential systematic gender discrimination, the EEOC had the authority to subpoena information relevant to systemic gender discrimination even absent a valid systemic charge by the former employee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order enforcing the administrative subpoena.

Neighborhood Enterprises, Inc., Sanctuary In the Ordinary, and Jim Roos (collectively, Sanctuary) filed suit against, inter alia, the City of St. Louis and St. Louis Board of Adjustment challenging the Board's denial of a sign permit. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the City and the Board, finding, inter alia, that the zoning code's restrictions on signs withstood constitutional scrutiny with respect to the Board's denial of Sanctuary's sign permit. As a preliminary matter, the court held that Sanctuary had Article III standing. The court also held that the zoning code's definition of "sign" was impermissibly content-based and therefore, strict scrutiny applied. The court further held that the City's sign code failed strict scrutiny where the sign code was not narrowly tailored to accomplish the City's asserted interests in aesthetics and traffic safety, nor has the court's case law recognized those interests as compelling. Accordingly, the zoning code's definition of "sign" violated the Free Speech Clause. The court held that because the challenged provisions of Chapter 26.68 of the zoning code were impermissibly content based and failed strict scrutiny, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court finally held that because the district court did not address the issue of whether the provisions were severable from the remainder of the code, the matter was remanded to the district court for it to consider this issue.

The ACLU sued public charter school Tarek ibn Ziyad Academy (TIZA) and other defendants for violations of the Establishment Clause. At issue was whether the parents of students who attended TIZA had standing to intervene on behalf of the children and, in the alternative, whether the motion to intervene was timely. The court held that the parents had Article III standing where the parents have alleged an injury in fact, facts showing that the injury was imminent, the injury was fairly traceable to defendant's conduct, and redressability. The court held, however, that the district court did not make a clear error in finding the motion untimely where it was evident that for fourteen months, the parents were content to remain aloof from the litigation and dependent on TIZA to adequately represent their interests despite their knowledge of the case and its progress. The court further denied the ACLU's motion to supplement the record on appeal because the material proffered would not affect the outcome of the trial and denied the ACLU's motion to seal because it was moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the parents' motion to intervene.