Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dr. Tara Gustilo, an Asian American obstetrician-gynecologist of Filipino descent, was demoted from her position as Chair of the OBGYN Department at Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc. (HHS) in April 2021. Following her demotion, she filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently sued HHS, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), as well as a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment in favor of HHS, finding no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the race discrimination, retaliation, and First Amendment claims. The court concluded that Dr. Gustilo failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination and that there was no evidence she opposed an unlawful employment practice. Additionally, the court found no material fact dispute regarding whether the HHS Board considered her Facebook posts in its decision to demote her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, finding that there was a material fact dispute regarding whether the HHS Board ratified the MEC's decision and the basis for it, which included consideration of Dr. Gustilo's Facebook posts. The court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the posts were protected speech and to apply the Pickering balancing test.The court declined to review the district court's summary judgment rulings on the Title VII and MHRA claims at this time, as they are now interlocutory. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Gustilo v. Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc." on Justia Law

Wayne Lozier, Jr., a licensed bounty hunter in Louisiana, traveled to Missouri to detain a fugitive, R.C., who had failed to appear for her court date in Louisiana. Lozier entered a residence in Missouri, handcuffed R.C., and transported her towards Mississippi. During this time, the residence owner alerted law enforcement, leading to an investigation by Officer Jeffrey Atkins. Lozier was found to have violated Missouri laws by not being licensed in Missouri and failing to notify local law enforcement before apprehending R.C.A federal grand jury indicted Lozier for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap. Lozier moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing his actions were lawful as an agent of a bail bondsman. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied these motions, stating Lozier's arguments were factual challenges. At trial, Lozier admitted to the Missouri law violations but contended his actions were standard fugitive apprehension. He objected to a jury instruction that he claimed deprived the jury of deciding whether his actions were unlawful. The jury found Lozier guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to 120 months on each count, to run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the jury instruction (Instruction 16) created a conclusive presumption that Lozier acted unlawfully by violating Missouri law, thus removing the jury's ability to consider justification or excuse. This violated Lozier's due process rights. The court held that this error was not harmless and vacated Lozier's convictions, remanding the case for a new trial. View "United States v. Lozier" on Justia Law

After the death of George Floyd, large-scale protests occurred in Kansas City, Missouri. On May 30, 2020, the Kansas City Police Department requested assistance from the Missouri State Highway Patrol to manage the protests, which turned violent. Law enforcement used tear gas and other munitions to disperse the crowd. Sergeant Jeffrey Spire deployed various crowd control measures, including smoke grenades and projectiles. Around 11:47 p.m., Spire fired projectiles indiscriminately into the crowd, one of which allegedly struck Sean Stearns, causing him to lose vision in his left eye.Stearns sued Sergeant Spire under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation and excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also brought claims under Missouri law and a Monell claim against the Board of Police Commissioners. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that Spire was entitled to qualified immunity and that Stearns could not establish a Monell claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Spire was entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliation claim because Stearns failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his injury and retaliatory animus. The court also found that Stearns waived his Fourth Amendment claim by not providing a meaningful argument. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court concluded that Spire's actions did not shock the conscience and thus did not constitute a substantive due process violation. Consequently, the Monell claim failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice, finding no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Stearns v. Dean" on Justia Law

Derrick A. Davis sued the City of Little Rock, the chief of police, and three detectives for Fourth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after a no-knock warrant was executed on his residence. The warrant was based on an email about drug activity, a controlled buy using a confidential informant (CI), and Detective Bell's affidavit. The SWAT team executed the warrant, finding marijuana inside Davis's home.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Davis appealed, arguing that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the detectives' responsibility for the SWAT team's actions, the veracity of statements in the warrant affidavit, and the existence of a conspiracy to violate his Fourth Amendment rights. He also challenged the district court's handling of evidence and the imposition of sanctions for his failure to attend a deposition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Detectives Bell and Ison were entitled to qualified immunity because the right in question was not clearly established at the time of the warrant's execution. The court also found no Franks violation, as Davis failed to show that any false statements in the affidavit were made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. Additionally, the court ruled that Davis's § 1983 conspiracy claim failed because the underlying Fourth Amendment claims were properly dismissed.The court also determined that the district court did not err in considering Detective Bell's affidavit or in disregarding Davis's expert opinions. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the sanctions award because the district court had not yet fixed the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "Davis v. City of Little Rock" on Justia Law

Anthony Lemicy was convicted by a jury on four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e). The district court sentenced him to consecutive 30-year terms for each count, totaling 120 years. Lemicy appealed, raising several claims including improper waiver of his right to counsel, violation of his right to a fair trial due to appearing in an orange jumpsuit and restraints, improper jury instructions, insufficient evidence, incorrect calculation of criminal history points, and an unreasonable sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri initially appointed a federal public defender for Lemicy, but after conflicts, he chose to represent himself with standby counsel. The court repeatedly informed him of the risks and limitations of self-representation, which he acknowledged. During the trial, Lemicy appeared in jail-issued clothing by choice, despite the court offering him the opportunity to change. The jury was instructed to disregard his appearance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It found that Lemicy knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and the district court did not err in its handling of standby counsel. The court also determined that Lemicy was not compelled to wear the orange jumpsuit and any error was invited by him. The jury instructions were deemed appropriate, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court upheld the calculation of criminal history points and found the sentence reasonable, given the severity of the offenses and the involvement of multiple victims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that there were no violations of Lemicy’s constitutional rights and that the sentence imposed was within the court’s discretion. View "United States v. Lemicy" on Justia Law

Robert J. Hall, an inmate in the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), filed a lawsuit against MDOC and Corrections Officer Paul Woodruff, in his individual capacity, for injuries he sustained from an attack by a fellow inmate, Ahmad Townsend. Hall had previously submitted an "Enemy Listing/Protective Custody Declaration" form indicating he felt threatened by Townsend. Despite this, Woodruff placed Townsend in Hall's cell while Hall was asleep, leading to the attack and resulting in mental and physical injuries.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Woodruff’s motion to dismiss based on official immunity. Woodruff appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, accepting all factual allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Hall. The court examined whether Woodruff was entitled to official immunity under Missouri state law, which protects public officials from liability for discretionary acts performed during their official duties. The court found that the MDOC policies cited by Hall did not create a ministerial duty because they allowed for discretion in how and when enemy declarations were checked and safeguards implemented.The Eighth Circuit concluded that Woodruff's actions were discretionary, not ministerial, and thus he was entitled to official immunity. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hall v. Woodruff" on Justia Law

Tremonti Perry, while incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center, experienced a severe medical emergency that resulted in him being placed in a medically induced coma for a month. Several years after recovering, Perry filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison's warden, the Missouri Department of Corrections Director, and two medical-care contractors, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Perry admitted he did not use the prison’s administrative remedy, which required filing a complaint within fifteen days of the incident, but argued that his coma made it impossible to meet this requirement.The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Perry had not exhausted his available remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). They acknowledged that the grievance process was unavailable to Perry during his coma and a reasonable period afterward but contended that Perry should have made a diligent effort to exhaust his claims once he recovered. The district court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the complaint, concluding that Perry could have filed a grievance after his medical conditions resolved.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court determined that the prison’s administrative grievance process was unavailable to Perry due to his physical incapacity during the coma and the prison’s rules not allowing late filings. The court rejected the Defendants' arguments that Perry could have filed an untimely grievance or that the grievance deadline was perpetually renewed due to ongoing medical issues. The court also denied the Defendants' motion to supplement the record with new evidence. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Perry’s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Perry v. Precythe" on Justia Law

Fred Watson filed a lawsuit against Officer Eddie Boyd III and the City of Ferguson, Missouri, alleging violations of his civil rights following a police interaction at a park. Watson claimed unlawful search and seizure, unlawful retaliation, and malicious prosecution against Officer Boyd, and a municipal liability claim against the City. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts, leading Watson to appeal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri initially denied qualified immunity to Officer Boyd on several claims but granted it on the malicious prosecution claim. The court also denied the City’s motion for summary judgment on most Monell claims but granted it on the inadequate training claim. On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further analysis. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on Watson’s Fourth Amendment claims, finding that Officer Boyd had at least arguable probable cause for the traffic-related offenses and that the search of Watson’s vehicle was lawful as a search incident to arrest. However, the court found that the district court erred in not addressing Watson’s First Amendment retaliatory use-of-force claim. The Eighth Circuit held that Watson presented sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on this claim, noting that Officer Boyd’s actions could be seen as retaliatory for Watson’s request for his name and badge number.The court also reversed the district court’s summary judgment on Watson’s Monell claim against the City, as a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Officer Boyd’s retaliatory use of force. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the First Amendment retaliatory use-of-force claim. View "Watson v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Estella Morris, an employee of the Central Arkansas Veterans Healthcare System (CAVHS), filed civil-rights claims against her employer, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. Morris, who is black, claimed she was denied a promotion to Chief of Social Work Service in favor of a white colleague, Anne Wright, despite having veteran preference. Morris also alleged that her pay upgrade request was sabotaged by her supervisor, Michael Ballard, in retaliation for her previous discrimination complaints.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of CAVHS. The court found that Morris had established a prima facie case of race discrimination but concluded that CAVHS had provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for promoting Wright—her more favorable references. The court held that Morris failed to show that this reason was a pretext for racial discrimination. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court found no evidence that Ballard's actions were causally linked to Morris's protected activities or that the person who denied the pay upgrade was aware of her discrimination complaints.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Morris did not demonstrate a causal connection between her race and the promotion decision. The court also found that Morris failed to show that Ballard's alleged sabotage of her pay upgrade request was linked to her protected activities. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that CAVHS's actions were motivated by racial discrimination or retaliation. View "Morris v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Officer Blayne Newton of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department shot and killed Donnie Sanders during a traffic stop. Sanders’s children, Latetia Nunley and Zahleyiah Fielder, filed a lawsuit against Officer Newton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of Sanders’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Officer Newton sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court denied, citing genuine issues of material fact. Officer Newton appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Officer Newton’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there were disputed facts essential to the analysis of the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the threats made by Sanders and his level of compliance with commands. The court highlighted discrepancies between Officer Newton’s testimony and the forensic evidence from the autopsy, which suggested that Sanders was shot in a manner inconsistent with Newton’s account of Sanders pointing something at him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Officer Newton argued that the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity and that the excessive-force claim was barred under the Eleventh Amendment. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that it could not resolve genuine disputes of material fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment. The court emphasized that the factual record was unsettled and disputed, preventing it from determining whether Newton’s actions were objectively reasonable or whether they violated clearly established law. The court concluded that the district court’s finding of a material factual dispute precluded it from granting qualified immunity at this stage. View "Nunley v. Newton" on Justia Law