Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff argued with a police officer during a protest in downtown St. Louis. Defendant- Lieutenant saw the confrontation and, fearing for the other officer’s safety, pepper-sprayed him. Plaintiff alleged that the force used was both excessive and retaliatory the district court granted qualified immunity. Plaintiff brought excessive force and First Amendment retaliation claims against the Lieutenant and a municipal liability claim against the City of St. Louis.   The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims at summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what remained. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s arguments are just general complaints about the Lieutenant’s “true motivations, intentions, and testimonial fabrications.” None of these arguments make any difference because “evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force.” Further, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, causation is missing. As Plaintiff acknowledged, the Lieutenant “was not even in the area” when he criticized the Bicycle Response Team. Nor did Plaintiff “have any interaction with him” during the mere seconds between the beginning of the incident and the use of pepper spray. Accordingly, the court’s conclusion that the Lieutenant did not violate Plaintiff’s First or Fourth Amendment rights also forecloses his constitutional claims against the City of St. Louis. View "Derek Laney v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant both work for the State of Iowa. Plaintiff is a urologist at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics; Defendant is a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law. After Defendant criticized Plaintiff’s expert testimony in a case unrelated to this one, Plaintiff sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant retaliated against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on multiple grounds, including that Plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that Linder’s conduct was under color of state law.  Plaintiff argues that his complaint contains ample facts that together plausibly allege that Defendant acted under color of state law. These include that Defendant (1) identified himself as a state employee when he criticized Plaintiff in the newspaper articles, (2) relied on “the prestige of his official position with [UI] to gain credibility with his audience,” and (3) “used the instrumentalities and resources of the State of Iowa to facilitate his retaliatory conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to plead adequately that Defendant’s retaliatory actions were under color of state law. Contrary to Plaintiff’s insistence, our case law is clear that a state employee, merely by publicly identifying himself as such, does not act under color of state law. Further, even assuming that a public university professor acts in his official capacity or within the scope of his employment when he comments on public affairs, it would not necessarily follow that he acts under color of state law. View "James Brown v. Marc Linder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, sued the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, associated government officials, and lawyers and other private defendants alleging, among other claims, they violated his constitutional rights by pursuing an ethics complaint against him. The district court granted the state defendants' motion to dismiss under Younger v. Harris and found that Plaintiff waived his abuse-of-process claim against the private defendants. The court also held that Plaintiff lacked standing to seek sanctions based on the private defendants' alleged violations of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of its determinations, the Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Herbert Igbanugo v. Minnesota OLPR" on Justia Law

Defendant stopped Plaintiff for speeding. Plaintiff sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging, among other things, that Defendant pulled him over without probable cause. The district court denied Defendant’s summary judgment and qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s unlawful stop claim. On appeal, Defendant argued that he is entitled to qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal, holding that it lacks jurisdiction to review the court’s factual assumptions. The court explained that Defendant’s claim that Plaintiff’s speed is immaterial for qualified immunity purposes assumes that Defendant used radar, clocked Plaintiff’s van, and clocked Plaintiff over the speed limit. But the district court did not assume these facts, which are material to whether Defendant reasonably believed Plaintiff broke the law Defendant’s jurisdictional arguments are “based on facts not assumed by the district court.” The court explained that because the factual record, as assumed by the district court, is unsettled and disputed, it lacks jurisdiction to go further. View "Sheck Mulbah v. Cody Jansen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer, Marsden Building Maintenance, L.L.C., alleging wage discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Marsden. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her wage discrimination claim. Plaintiff also argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Marsden on her sex discrimination claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that on the record, Marsden has met its burden to prove the pay differential between Plaintiff and her male counterparts was based on a factor other than sex. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff offered no evidence to support her sex discrimination allegation. Plaintiff took issue with how Marsden’s operations manager conducted himself in the role of operations manager. But none of the evidence she presented supports a reasonable inference that his decision to fire her is “more likely than not” explained by an intent to discriminate against her on the basis of her sex. View "Maria Mayorga v. Marsden Building Maintenance" on Justia Law

Police Lieutenant deployed pepper spray into Plaintiff’s face, during a protest in St. Louis, Missouri. Plaintiff sued the police lieutenant and the City of St. Louis, alleging, federal claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for retaliatory use of force in violation of the First Amendment, as well as tort claims under Missouri law. The district court denied the lieutenant’s motion for summary judgment based on his defenses of qualified and official immunity and reserved ruling on whether the City is entitled to sovereign immunity on the state tort claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to the lieutenant, vacated, in part, the denial of summary judgment to the City, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court explained that the lieutenant contended that at the time he pepper-sprayed Plaintiff, it was “not clearly established that a use of force that does not violate the Fourth Amendment violates the First Amendment.” The lieutenant forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the district court. In any event, the argument does not undermine the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s right to be free from a retaliatory use of force was clearly established at the time of the incident.  However, the court vacated the denial of summary judgment on the state tort claims and instruct the district court on remand to reach the merits of the sovereign immunity issue. View "Alison Dreith v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of Drake University (Drake), brought this action against Drake and her former supervisor, (collectively, Appellees), after her 2019 termination. Plaintiff alleged disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under both the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), as well as retaliation and discrimination based on the exercise of her rights under the Family Medical Leave  Act (FMLA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on all of Plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her retaliation claims under the FMLA, ICRA, and ADA, as well as her discrimination claim under the FMLA.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Appellees have established a robust, well-documented set of legitimate reasons for Plaintiff’s termination—and Plaintiff does not dispute them. These reasons include a plethora of performance deficiencies, such as failing to pay staff members the appropriate amounts and missing deadlines, as well as non-FMLA tardiness and attendance problems. Here, the only evidence of pretext Plaintiff provides is: (1) a tenuous temporal connection between her harassment complaints and negative performance reviews; (2) a one-month temporal connection between her filing an NLRB complaint and her termination; and (3) Drake’s failure to follow its harassment-complaint policies. Therefore, the court held that Plaintiff’s FMLA claims fail as a matter of law because she has presented insufficient evidence of pretext. View "Margaret Corkrean v. Drake University" on Justia Law

The Religious Sisters of Mercy, Sacred Heart Mercy Health Care Center, SMP Health System, and the University of Mary (collectively, “RSM plaintiffs”) filed suit, alleging that the Department of Health and Human Services (‘HHS’) had violated, among other things, the APA, the First Amendment, and the RFRA. Additionally, the Catholic Benefits Association (CBA); Diocese of Fargo (Diocese); Catholic Charities North Dakota (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the RFRA against HHS’s and the EEOC’s interpretation and enforcement of the relevant statutes to the extent they required the CBA plaintiffs to “provide, perform, pay for, cover, or facilitate access to health services for gender transition.”   The district court held that the RFRA entitles Plaintiffs to permanent injunctive relief. On appeal, HHS and the EEOC (collectively, “the government”) challenge the district court’s grant of declaratory and permanent injunctive relief to Plaintiffs.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first held that the CBA lacks associational standing to sue on behalf of unnamed members. However, the court held that Plaintiffs have satisfied the elements necessary to establish standing to challenge the government’s interpretation of Section 1557. Moreover, the court wrote that contrary to the government’s position, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that the CBA plaintiffs face a “credible threat” of enforcement from the EEOC. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court correctly held that “intrusion upon the Catholic Plaintiffs’ exercise of religion is sufficient to show irreparable harm.” View "The Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued various officials of the State of Arkansas, alleging that these officials (collectively, “ADHS defendants”) violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the ADHS Defendants argued that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by individuals brought against a state or its agencies or departments, regardless of the relief sought.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs’ ARChoices benefits must be reassessed each year and, according to Plaintiffs’ allegations, “ADHS has no plans to switch to a different assessment tool, allocation methodology, or notice of action than those now used.” The very harm alleged remains likely to recur barring a change in the state’s operation of the program or judicial intervention. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that sovereign immunity does not bar this suit.   Further, the court concluded that beneficiaries have a clearly established right to be provided adequate notice of reduction, loss, or termination of benefits. No fundamental difference exists between this case and Jacobs: in both cases, beneficiaries suffered a loss of benefits under ARChoices. Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that ADHS violated their right to notice. Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs have also alleged involvement by each ADHS defendant in creating, applying, or interpreting this policy. Thus, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged facts to survive a dismissal motion raising the defense. View "Ginger Elder v. Cindy Gillespie" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a security officer at the Center for Behavioral Medicine (CBM). Plaintiff sued CBM, alleging a racially hostile environment, disparate treatment based on race, retaliation, and constructive discharge in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment to CBM.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff argued that his retaliation claims are like or related to the substance of his EEOC charge, he doesn’t address how they are related, thus the court considered the argument waived. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff’s argument fails on the merits too. Plaintiff testified to three occasions he considered retaliation by HR, all of which occurred in mid-to-late 2019. But the charge’s only references to HR’s actions were about the finding that Plaintiff’s August 2018 grievance was unsubstantiated and HR’s failure to provide a grievance or complaint form when Plaintiff asked for one. Plaintiff never claimed that either action was retaliatory.   Further, the court found that Plaintiff has not exhausted his constructive discharge claim either. Here, Plaintiff’s charge gave no indication that he was about to be constructively discharged, and Plaintiff did not resign from CBM until approximately five months after he filed his charge. View "Anthony Slayden v. Center for Behavioral Medicine" on Justia Law