Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The St. Louis County Police Department (“SLCPD”) in Missouri utilizes what it calls a “Wanteds System.” This system allows officers to issue electronic notices (“Wanteds”) authorizing any other officer to seize a person and take him into custody for questioning without any review by a neutral magistrate before issuance. The Wanteds may pend for days, months, or, in some cases, indefinitely.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Officers and its dismissal of the municipal liability claim and Count Three. The court reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the Detective. The court explained that the Wanteds System is broad enough to encompass situations that do not violate the Constitution, including those involving an arrest immediately after an officer has entered a wanted. The court wrote that Plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the Wanteds System fails. Further, the court explained that the SLCPD Wanteds System, although fraught with the risk of violating the Constitution in certain circumstances and/or the danger of evidence being suppressed due to an invalid arrest, is not facially unconstitutional. The burden is then on Plaintiffs to show a persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct. The court concluded that the evidence in the record does not show a persistent pattern of unconstitutional arrests so pervasive that it can be said to constitute custom or usage with the force of law. Nor do the proposed classes describe a group of individuals who demonstrate that such a custom or practice exists. The district court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claim. View "Dwayne Furlow v. Jon Belmar" on Justia Law

An officer initiated a traffic stop of Plaintiff. Plaintiff felt the stop was pretextual, and fled. The officer initiated a PIT maneuver to end the pursuit, causing Plaintiff crashed his vehicle into a light pole and was injured. Plaintiff filed various civil rights claims against the police department. The district court granted summary judgment for the police department.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the police department guidelines and policies concerning use of a PIT maneuver did not create rights that give rise to a Section 1983 action, and an officer's knowing violation of the guidelines and policies does not transform his actions into unconstitutional behavior. View "Dean Christiansen v. Christopher Eral" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the Government’s petition for civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. Section 4246. Defendant argued that the Middle District of Tennessee violated the time restrictions in Section 4241(d), depriving the Western District of Missouri of subject matter jurisdiction to civilly commit him under Section 4246 because the timing violation he was no longer lawfully “committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d).”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant did not object to the alleged Section 4241(d) timing violations in the Middle District of Tennessee. Although did he complain to the Middle District of Tennessee in status updates about the delays on the grounds that they violated his rights to a speedy trial and due process. But he never formally requested release, filed an appeal in the Sixth Circuit, or requested a writ of mandamus from the Sixth Circuit. Thus, Defendant waived his right to challenge the alleged Section 4241(d) timing violations. Because the alleged Section 4241(d) timing violations are the basis of Defendant’s Section 4246 challenge, his Section 4246 challenge fails. View "United States v. Andrew Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued police officer under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 after the police officer deployed pepper spray in Plaintiff’s face. The district court concluded that Plaintiff was engaged in protest activity protected by the First Amendment, and that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the police officer used force against Plaintiff because she exercised her constitutional right to freedom of speech. Defendant appealed, and argued that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding that there is no reversible error. The court explained that the district court’s determination that a reasonable jury could find that the police officer acted with retaliatory motive is a matter of evidence sufficiency that is not appealable at this juncture. The court further held that the police officer’s argument based on “arguable probable cause” fails for other reasons as well. Probable cause is a constitutional standard under the Fourth does not argue that this case involves a search or seizure, and he does not explain why the asserted existence of “arguable probable cause” would be dispositive as a matter of law on a claim alleging retaliatory use of force in violation of the First Amendment. View "Essence Welch v. Daniel Dempsey" on Justia Law

Appellants distribute food to homeless people in the City of St. Louis and wish to continue doing so as part of their charitable and religious practice a St. Louis police officer observed Appellants distributing bologna sandwiches and issued each a citation for violating a city ordinance requiring a permit for the distribution of “potentially dangerous food.”Appellants filed this suit, claiming that the City’s enforcement of the ordinance violated their federal and state constitutional rights and Missouri statutes. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the provisions ensure that health inspectors have an opportunity to determine whether the temporary food establishment is complying with the Ordinance. When operating a temporary food establishment, Appellants would also have to ensure: that they take steps to prevent contamination of any ice served to consumers; that tableware provided to consumers is only in single-service and single-use articles; that any equipment is located and installed in a way that avoids food contamination and to facilitate cleaning; that food-contact surfaces are protected from consumer contamination; and that they have water available for cleaning utensils and equipment and to make convenient handwashing facilities available for any employees. Without these provisions regarding the distribution of potentially hazardous food to the public, the City’s goal of preventing foodborne illness would be achieved less effectively. Moreover, the court noted that nothing about the City’s enforcement of the Ordinance against Appellants prevents them from conveying their religious message in other ways. View "Raymond Redlich v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a transgender youth, their parents, and two healthcare professionals, sought to enjoin Arkansas Act 626, which prohibits healthcare professionals from providing gender transition procedures to any individual under the age of 18 or from referring any such individual to any healthcare professional for gender transition procedures. The district court enjoined the Act, and the State appealed.The Eighth Circuit held that because a minor's sex at birth determines whether or not the minor can receive certain types of medical care under the law, Act 626 discriminates on the basis of sex. Thus, to be valid, the Act must be supported by an exceedingly persuasive justification. The Eighth Circuit determined that the Act prohibits medical treatment that conforms with the recognized standard of care for adolescent gender dysphoria and that the purpose of the Act is not to ban a treatment but to ban an outcome the State deems undesirable. Thus, the district court did not err in granting an injunction. View "Dylan Brandt v. Leslie Rutledge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resigned from his employment as a surgeon with Mayo Clinic (“Mayo”) after an internal committee recommended his termination following an investigation into allegations of his misconduct. Plaintiff sued Mayo and his supervisor, alleging discrimination and reprisal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mayo and the supervisor.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Plaintiff argues Mayo’s recommendation to terminate his employment was based on his race, religion, and national origin. Because Said does not offer direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff must create a sufficient inference of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive summary judgment.   Here, Plaintiff claims another similarly situated former employee, who also received complaints, from Mayo received preferential treatment. The court concluded that even if Plaintiff was similarly situated to the other employee, the court concluded that Plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude he received disparate treatment from the other employee. The court further explained that the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that Mayo believed Plaintiff was guilty of making unwelcomed advances toward female coworkers and of other misconduct. Said fails to “create a real issue as to the genuineness of” Mayo’s perceptions. Finally, regarding Mayo’s reporting of Plaintiff’s resignation to the State Board, as already discussed, the record demonstrates Mayo believed it was required to report Plaintiff’s termination to the State Board because Plaintiff resigned during an open investigation into his misconduct. Thus, Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence showing this was a pretext for retaliatory intent. View "Sameh Said v. Mayo Clinic" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued, now retired, police officer, after an encounter that led to Klein’s arrest and a truncated prosecution. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims alleging unlawful seizure, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the seizure and arrest claims were untimely and that the malicious prosecution claim fails on the merits. The court explained that Plaintiff’s false arrest claim accrued when he was bound over for trial on June 20, 2017, and his unlawful seizure claim accrued at the time of the seizure, on June 19, 2017. The action filed on November 6, 2019, was therefore untimely as to these claims as well. The district court properly granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims alleging false arrest and unlawful seizure under both federal law and Iowa law.Moreover, the court concluded that Defendant had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff or possession with intent to deliver more than five grams of methamphetamine, and failure to possess a tax stamp for seven grams of methamphetamine. Plaintiff argues that Defendant lacked probable cause because his search for the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. The existence of probable cause in a civil action, however, is measured based on all evidence known to the arresting officer, whether or not it would have been admissible at trial. View "Michael Klein v. Warren Steinkamp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated action against Experian Information Solutions (“Experian”), alleging a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681 (“FCRA”). The district court found that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a jury question on damages.   Plaintiff contends that a genuine dispute of material fact exists on damages because she provided evidence of financial and emotional harm. The court explained that to maintain a claim for negligent violation of the FCRA, a plaintiff must offer proof of “actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure. Further, Plaintiff argues that she sustained financial injury based on the denial of her application for a Chase Bank credit card after a hard inquiry on her Experian report. However, her deposition testimony refutes this claim. The record bolsters the conclusion that the bankruptcy drove Chase’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s credit card application. Thus, Plaintiff’s assertion of financial harm is insufficient to create a jury question on damages. Finally, the court wrote that like in other decisions where the court has denied damages for emotional distress, the record reveals that Plaintiff “suffered no physical injury, she was not medically treated for any psychological or emotional injury, and no other witness corroborated any outward manifestation of emotional distress. View "Christa Peterson v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

In 2020, Kansas City began restricting participation in its Minority Business Enterprises and Women’s Business Enterprises Program to those entities whose owners satisfied a personal net worth limitation. Mark One Electric Co., a woman-owned business whose owner’s personal net worth exceeds the limit, appeals the dismissal of its lawsuit challenging the Kansas City Program as unconstitutional because of the personal net worth limitation.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to survive strict scrutiny, the government must first articulate a legislative goal that is properly considered a compelling government interest, such as stopping the perpetuation of racial discrimination and remediating the effects of past discrimination in government contracting. Here, Mark One does not dispute that the City has a compelling interest in remedying the effects of race and gender discrimination on City contract opportunities for minority- and women-owned businesses. And Mark One has conceded the 2016 Disparity Study provides a strong basis in evidence for the MBE/WBE Program to further that interest.The City’s program must be narrowly tailored, which requires that “the means chosen to accomplish the government’s asserted purpose are specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Mark One claims that its exclusion from the Program despite its status as a woman-owned business shows that the Program is unlawful Indeed, Mark One has declared that it has suffered past discrimination, as the Program requires for certification. But the City does not have a constitutional obligation to make its Program as broad as may be legally permissible, so long as it directs its resources in a rational manner not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. View "Mark One Electric Company v. City of Kansas City, Missouri" on Justia Law