Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz declared a state of “peacetime emergency” and began issuing executive orders (EOs) intended to combat the spread of the virus. The EOs limited which types of businesses could continue operations and, later, specified the capacities at which those businesses could operate. Plaintiffs, three Minnesota businesses and their respective owners, suffered financial losses during the COVID-19 pandemic while these EOs were in effect. Plaintiffs brought an Equal Protection Clause claim against Governor Walz and Minnesota’s Attorney General, in their official capacities and a Takings Clause claim against Governor Walz in his individual capacity, which the district court dismissed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court found that in 2020, the law was not clearly established such that Governor Walz would have understood that his issuance of the challenged EOs violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to just compensation for a government taking. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not offered anything that supports their hypothesis that Governor Walz will, first, declare a second peacetime emergency and, then, will issue additional EOs—specifically, EOs like 20-74 that, in their view, treat them differently than other, similarly situated businesses and impede them from conducting their businesses as they wish. The court further wrote that it need not parse through whether or not a taking occurred, however, because even assuming that a taking did occur, whatever its type, Plaintiffs have offered nothing to support their contention that, in 2020, the law was clearly established such that Governor Walz would have understood that his EOs constituted a taking. View "Glow In One Mini Golf, LLC v. Tim Walz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to Iowa Department of Human Service (DHS) employees (collectively, “Defendants”) on Plaintiffs’ claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violation of their right to due process. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to afford them an opportunity to be heard on child abuse allegations prior to issuing a founded child abuse report and placement on the Iowa Child Abuse Registry (Registry).   On appeal, Plaintiffs contended the district court erred in concluding that the right to be informed of child abuse allegations and an opportunity to respond to such allegations prior to issuing a founded child abuse report and placement on the Registry was not clearly established. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. The court held that Plaintiffs have not proven that the law was clearly established such that Defendants should reasonably have been expected to know that the interim finding of founded child abuse pending the interviews of the Plaintiffs violated their right to due process. View "Billie Hovick v. Darci Patterson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a law enforcement officer employed by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE). Martinez claims that Sasse violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment by effecting a seizure through the use of excessive force. Sasse moved for judgment on the pleadings and argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity. denied the motion, reasoning that Martinez’s allegations stated a claim for the violation of a clearly established right.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that Defendant violated a clearly established right, because it was not clearly established as of June 2018 that Defendant’s alleged push was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that although the claim here alleges the use of excessive force, the parties dispute the threshold question of whether Defendant seized Plaintiff at all within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff argues that Defendant effected a seizure when she pushed Plaintiff to the ground before locking the doors to the ICE facility. Defendant maintains, however, that when an officer’s use of force is designed only to repel a person from entering a facility, there is no seizure. On that view, Plaintiff may have a tort claim against Defendant for assault or battery if the officer used unjustified force, but Defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "Andrea Martinez v. Ronnet Sasse" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a former part-time employee of the City of Cedar Falls, brought an action against the City of Cedar Falls and certain city officials after her 2018 termination, alleging interference with and retaliation for the exercise of her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and claims of age discrimination, disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims, and she appealed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it need not consider the substantive elements of the claim because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she sustained any recoverable damages and it is undisputed that she did not seek any form of equitable relief.   Second, as to the retaliation claim, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of retaliation before the burden shifts back to the employer to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Here, Plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence of the kind that would demonstrate pretext. She offered nothing more than disagreement with the statements contained in the disciplinary reports. In the absence of any factual record demonstrating that these documented performance deficiencies were inaccurate, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating pretext. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to show that the final three disciplinary reports were part of the same unlawful employment practice—harassment based on her age and disability. View "Michelle Brandt v. City of Cedar Falls" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Missouri inmate currently in custody at the Northeast Correctional Center (“NECC”), filed a pro se Section 1983 action against multiple defendants, claiming deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and retaliation for filing grievances. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on his individual capacity claims against Defendant, an employee of the Missouri Department of Corrections serving as food service manager at NECC during the time in question. After discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint. As noted, Defendant argued that summary judgment was warranted because undisputed facts show that Defendant was not responsible for discontinuing Plaintiff’s Renal Diet.   The Eighth Circuit vacated a portion of the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The court explained that Defendant asserted exhaustion as an affirmative defense in his separate answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. In granting summary judgment, the district court did not consider exhaustion because it did not address Plaintiff’s 2015-2018 interference and retaliation claims. Thus, that issue remains open on remand. View "Kenneth Charron v. Larry Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five offenses related to trafficking methamphetamine. He filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial, alleging a violation of the court’s trial procedure order and a Brady violation. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to 295 months in prison. He appealed, challenging the denial of his motion and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is nothing in the record reflecting what one of the government’s witnesses learned or whether it affected his testimony, another witness’s testimony, or Defendant’s rights. As a result, Defendant’s argument that he was prejudiced by the still-undefined discussion is baseless, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial.   Next, Defendant argued that the DEA affidavit is favorable evidence because it provides a basis for impeaching Defendant’s cellmate and because it suggests that someone else, was responsible for trafficking drugs. The court held that because the evidence is immaterial to the outcome of the case, the Government’s failure to disclose the DEA affidavit was not a Brady violation. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.   The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s request for a downward variance. The court addressed Defendant’s arguments, considered all relevant factors, and concluded that a downward variance was not justified. View "United States v. Jason Corey" on Justia Law

City Union Mission is a Kansas City, Missouri nonprofit organization located near Margaret Kemp Park that provides food, shelter, employment, and a Christian discipleship program to poor and homeless individuals. A Missouri law prohibits persons convicted of certain sex offenses (Affected Persons) from being present in or loitering within 500 feet of any public park containing playground equipment. After the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office informed City Union Mission that the statute prohibited some of its guests from being present within 500 feet of the park, even when receiving City Union Mission’s charitable services, City Union Mission filed suit, bringing 12 claims against the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office, Jackson County, and the Sheriff in his official capacity (collectively, the County), as well as one claim against the Sheriff in his individual capacity. The State of Missouri (the State) intervened, and the district court dismissed City Union Mission’s 12 claims against the County and granted summary judgment on City Union Mission’s claim against Sheriff Sharp in his individual capacity, finding that Sheriff Sharp was entitled to qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and concluded that City Union Mission’s claims seeking broad injunctive relief prohibiting Sheriff Sharp and Jackson County from “enforcing or threatening to enforce” Section 566.150 against City Union Mission or Affected Persons are moot. Further, City Union Mission did not direct the court to any case that clearly establishes its constitutional right to provide services to Affected Persons within 500 feet of a park with playground equipment. View "City Union Mission, Inc. v. Mike Sharp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, filed suit against Arkansas, patrolman in his individual capacity.  Plaintiffs pleaded claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the patrolman had violated their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs also sued the Wynne police chief, and the mayor, in their individual capacities, for failing to supervise the patrolman.   Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless their actions violated a constitutional right that was clearly established. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not set forth evidence showing that the patrolman is responsible for the alleged Fourth Amendment violations.   Further, Plaintiffs allege that the Police Chief and Mayor are liable for the patrolman’s alleged unconstitutional acts because they had received notice of his behavior and failed to stop it. A supervising officer may be liable for the actions of his subordinates when “he (1) had ‘notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates’; (2) was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized those acts; and (3) failed to take ‘sufficient remedial action’; (4) proximately causing injury to” the plaintiffs. Here, no evidence in the record supports a finding that either the Chief or Mayor subjectively knew of and deliberately disregarded a substantial risk of unconstitutional harms posed by the patrolman. View "Dana Harrison v. Brodie Faughn" on Justia Law

Kansas City Officer (“Officer”) shot and killed the victim during a foot chase. Family members of the victim filed suit and the district court concluded that the Officer was entitled to both qualified and official immunity. In addition to contesting the grant of summary judgment on appeal, Plaintiffs argued they should receive a trial on their claims against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and the other municipal officials named in their complaint.   In evaluating the family’s excessive-force claim against the Officer, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court explained that the key issue requires answering whether the officer’s actions violated a constitutional right and then whether the right was clearly established. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has explained that “the focus” of the clearly-established-right inquiry “is on whether the officer had fair notice that [his] conduct was unlawful.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018). Here, “judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct,” a reasonable officer would not have had “fair notice” that shooting the victim under these circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.     Additionally, to prevail in this case under Kisela, the family would need to establish “the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Here, the family failed to show that the Officer acted in bad faith or with malice. Finally, there is not enough evidence to find that the municipal defendants liable under a deliberate indifference theory. View "N.S. v. Kansas City Board of Police" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer, the University of Minnesota, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), for discrimination based on her disability, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the University.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court first addressed whether Plaintiff met her burden to show that the University failed to provide a reasonable accommodation; specifically, whether Plaintiff qualified for any alternative positions. The court held that Plaintiff did not meet her burden, reasoning that she did not submit the job posting, the job title, or any evidence of the duties or requirements of any position.Further, the court addressed whether the University failed to engage in the interactive process. The court concluded that there is no genuine dispute of material fact about whether the University acted in good faith to make reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff. The University offered to help Plaintiff find a new job many times and considered adopting technologies to help Plaintiff perform her job duties. Once the University realized Plaintiff could not be accommodated in her current position, an employee from the job center reached out to Plaintiff to schedule a meeting about vacant positions. But Plaintiff cancelled it, and the rescheduled meeting could not take place because Plaintiff went on full-time medical leave. Moreover, even if the University did not use good-faith efforts, Plaintiff needed to show that she “could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.” View "Jessica Ehlers v. University of Minnesota" on Justia Law