Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, filed suit against Arkansas, patrolman in his individual capacity.  Plaintiffs pleaded claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the patrolman had violated their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs also sued the Wynne police chief, and the mayor, in their individual capacities, for failing to supervise the patrolman.   Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless their actions violated a constitutional right that was clearly established. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not set forth evidence showing that the patrolman is responsible for the alleged Fourth Amendment violations.   Further, Plaintiffs allege that the Police Chief and Mayor are liable for the patrolman’s alleged unconstitutional acts because they had received notice of his behavior and failed to stop it. A supervising officer may be liable for the actions of his subordinates when “he (1) had ‘notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates’; (2) was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized those acts; and (3) failed to take ‘sufficient remedial action’; (4) proximately causing injury to” the plaintiffs. Here, no evidence in the record supports a finding that either the Chief or Mayor subjectively knew of and deliberately disregarded a substantial risk of unconstitutional harms posed by the patrolman. View "Dana Harrison v. Brodie Faughn" on Justia Law

Kansas City Officer (“Officer”) shot and killed the victim during a foot chase. Family members of the victim filed suit and the district court concluded that the Officer was entitled to both qualified and official immunity. In addition to contesting the grant of summary judgment on appeal, Plaintiffs argued they should receive a trial on their claims against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and the other municipal officials named in their complaint.   In evaluating the family’s excessive-force claim against the Officer, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court explained that the key issue requires answering whether the officer’s actions violated a constitutional right and then whether the right was clearly established. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has explained that “the focus” of the clearly-established-right inquiry “is on whether the officer had fair notice that [his] conduct was unlawful.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018). Here, “judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct,” a reasonable officer would not have had “fair notice” that shooting the victim under these circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.     Additionally, to prevail in this case under Kisela, the family would need to establish “the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Here, the family failed to show that the Officer acted in bad faith or with malice. Finally, there is not enough evidence to find that the municipal defendants liable under a deliberate indifference theory. View "N.S. v. Kansas City Board of Police" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer, the University of Minnesota, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), for discrimination based on her disability, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the University.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court first addressed whether Plaintiff met her burden to show that the University failed to provide a reasonable accommodation; specifically, whether Plaintiff qualified for any alternative positions. The court held that Plaintiff did not meet her burden, reasoning that she did not submit the job posting, the job title, or any evidence of the duties or requirements of any position.Further, the court addressed whether the University failed to engage in the interactive process. The court concluded that there is no genuine dispute of material fact about whether the University acted in good faith to make reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff. The University offered to help Plaintiff find a new job many times and considered adopting technologies to help Plaintiff perform her job duties. Once the University realized Plaintiff could not be accommodated in her current position, an employee from the job center reached out to Plaintiff to schedule a meeting about vacant positions. But Plaintiff cancelled it, and the rescheduled meeting could not take place because Plaintiff went on full-time medical leave. Moreover, even if the University did not use good-faith efforts, Plaintiff needed to show that she “could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.” View "Jessica Ehlers v. University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

Defendants, Des Moines Police Department officers, lacking probable cause, took relatives of a stabbing victim to the station and held them for over three hours during which time the victim died. The district court denied qualified immunity, ruling for the family on their claims of illegal seizure and false arrest.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The court held both the duration and the nature of the seizure at issue exceeded the bounds of the Constitution.   The court reasoned that officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, establishes a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation, such that a reasonable official would have known that his actions were unlawful.  Here, the officers seized the family against their will and without probable cause. There was no “reasonable ground” for the officers’ action.   The court concluded that there was no minimally-intrusive Terry stop and the detention was the most intrusive means of questioning survivors after a violent crime. Further, officers of the Des Moines Police Department were on notice that they could not detain someone for questioning against their will, even in a homicide investigation, absent probable cause.  The same evidence establishes the officers’ violation of sec. 1983 and the Fourth Amendment establishes a violation of the Iowa Constitution. View "Crysteal Davis v. Trevor Spear" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claims his former employer, the Transit Authority of the City of Omaha (“Metro”), discriminated against him based on his disability and retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity. Metro appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not disclose the witness as an expert and it only learned the witness was a LIMHP at her trial deposition. The court reasoned that under Rule 26, non-retained experts are subject to less stringent disclosure requirements than retained experts. Further, the contents of the witness’ testimony were disclosed at the beginning of the case. Plaintiff provided what he thought was accurate information at the time of initial disclosures. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the witness’s testimony because she testified as a treating practitioner only.The court affirmed the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on both the ADA and ADEA claims. Taken together, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that Plaintiff’s disability was a motivating factor in Metro terminating him. Finally, under the plain language of the ADA, the district court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees. View "John Gruttemeyer v. Transit Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff arrived at Becker County Jail in Minnesota with a number of physical ailments, two weeks later he was taken to the hospital and subsequently diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia. Plaintiff filed an action against Becker County Jail (“BCJ”) and its personnel, claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs, failure to provide adequate training to corrections officers, and negligence. The district court held that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and claims under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).On appeal, the court reasoned that qualified immunity “shields government officials from liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The court found no violation of the Eighth or the Fourteenth Amendments because the undisputed facts do not provide sufficient proof that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs nor do they show intentional denial or delay in access to medical care. The court reasoned that Plaintiff gave mixed signals as to the severity of his pain. Because medical professionals failed to grasp the seriousness of his condition, prison staff without medical training could not have been expected to do so. Further, because the individual Defendants are entitled to official immunity, Becker County is entitled to the same immunity. View "Kyle Rusness v. Becker County, Minnesota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges that while he was detained at a detention center, officers subjected him to severe racial harassment, including the use of racial epithets, multiple times per day. He filed several internal grievances, but each was rejected. Plaintiff alleges the grievances were rejected because of his race. Plaintiff challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants. He also argues that the court should have construed his pleadings to include claims for retaliation and violations of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.Plaintiff argues that his summary judgment evidence and other evidence available in the record was sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Plaintiff identifies three “buckets” of relevant evidence: (1) his counter-affidavits; (2) the internal grievance forms filed with the adult detention center; and (3) other non-summary judgment evidence available in the record.The court found that the evidence does not raise a genuine dispute that either officer was personally involved in racial harassment or discrimination at the detention center. Plaintiff's statement fails to identify any direct or circumstantial evidence that would demonstrate the denial was racially motivated. Further, Plaintiff failed to obtain sworn testimony or documentary evidence asserting specific facts to help prove his claim. The court held that Plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence is insufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants were personally involved in racial discrimination or harassment. Thus, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that either officer’s conduct violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and both are entitled to qualified immunity View "Wilbert Glover v. Matt Bostrom" on Justia Law

Under Michigan abortion law, a minor may bypass the parental-consent requirement by obtaining a court order granting the right to self-consent (for mature minors) or judicial consent (for “best interests” minors). When the plaintiff sought to apply for judicial bypass, the defendant hadn’t heard of the process and told the plaintiff to come back later. Plaintiff sued the defendant in her individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendant’s refusal to allow her to apply for a judicial bypass without parental notification violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion when the defendant moved for summary judgment, invoking quasi-judicial and qualified immunity.Before the Eighth Circuit, the defendant claimed she acted at the direction of the Associate Circuit Judge (“Judge”). The Judge testified that he did not recall telling the defendant not to accept the application without parental consent. The circuit court concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Judge’s practice of giving pre-filing directions. Further, the is a clearly established right to apply for a judicial bypass. Thus the circuit court declined to address the defendant’s other arguments regarding qualified immunity. View "Jane Doe v. Michelle Chapman" on Justia Law

Minnesota Governor Walz (“Walz”) signed an executive order mandating a statewide residential eviction moratorium. Heights Apartments, LLC (“Heights”), a property owner of residential units, challenged the executive orders, raising First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims under Section 1983.The court found that the plaintiffs met the two-prong test to determine whether a state has impermissibly interfered with a contract. However, the court held that Heights has failed to allege a cognizable Petition Clause claim because the only potential remedy is damages; Heights has not pleaded damages that are somehow unique to its Petition Clause claim.Heights alleged it was deprived of its expected return on investment in the form of rental income. These alleged damages are sufficient to plausibly give rise to a Fifth Amendment takings claim. Finally, Heights has alleged violations of various rights that trigger protections under other constitution amendments; however, it has failed to plausibly plead a substantive due process violation. Thus, Heights has plausibly argued constitutional claims under the Contract Clause and Takings Clause. The court reversed the dismissal of those two claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Heights Apartments, LLC v. Tim Walz" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of Metro Transit in an action brought by plaintiff, who is blind and deaf, alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). In this case, plaintiff's claims stemmed from 150 complaints he made regarding bus operators' failure to stop at T-Signs and announce the bus route. The court concluded that the record contains evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Metro Transit provided meaningful access to disabled bus riders. The court stated that, at trial, the DOT regulations cited by plaintiff are admissible as evidence that the jury may consider and weigh when determining whether he has met his burden of demonstrating that he was denied meaningful access to Metro Transit's services. View "Segal v. Metropolitan Council" on Justia Law