Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the University dismissed plaintiff from its medical residency program, plaintiff filed suit for wrongful termination and alleged that the University discriminated against her based on age and disability, as well as retaliated against her.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the University, concluding that the University established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. In this case, assuming that plaintiff made a prima facie case for age discrimination, the University produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff by explaining that she made an egregious error affecting patient safety despite supervisor and attending efforts. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to show evidence of pretext. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act because there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the University regarded her as disabled at the time before her termination. View "Canning v. Creighton University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Ford under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), claiming that Ford terminated him twice and took other adverse employment action against him based on his asthma and scoliosis. The district court dismissed the FMLA claim as time-barred, and dismissed his ADA and MHRA claims on the ground that he exhausted his administrative remedies.The Eighth Circuit concluded that FMLA claims were sufficient to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion. The court also concluded that plaintiff has cleared the exhaustion hurdle on his MHRA claim but has pulled up short on his three ADA claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Weatherly v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to a deputy sheriff in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the deputy sheriff failed to safeguard plaintiff's health and safety and had thereby inflicted injuries upon him. In this case, the deputy sheriff was transporting plaintiff from a medical appointment to the Lee County Correctional Center when city police dispatch advised of an armed robbery nearby. The deputy sheriff drove to the bank with the intent of observing the crime in progress, saw the robbery suspect flee on foot through a vacant lot, and drove his cruiser at approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour through the lot to follow the fleeing suspect. During the pursuit, the suspect shot at the cruiser and the deputy sheriff turned sharply to the right and drove away from the scene. Plaintiff, who was shackled and "thrown around" in the back of the cruiser without a seatbelt during these events, alleged that the deputy sheriff subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The court could not say that the deputy sheriff's actions in this quickly evolving emergency situation were anything more than negligent and thus were clearly insufficient to constitute deliberate indifference. In the absence of a showing that he acted with deliberate indifference, plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of an Eighth Amendment violation. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to enter an appropriate order. View "Stark v. Lee County" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that investigating officers had violated his constitutional rights. After spending more than 10 years in prison, plaintiff was released when new evidence suggested that he was not the driver of a vehicle that caused a fatal accident.In regard to plaintiff's reckless-investigation claims, the court concluded that, even if the trooper could have conducted a more thorough investigation, there is no evidence that he recklessly or purposefully ignored eyewitnesses. Furthermore, failing to locate an unavailable witness does not qualify as recklessly or purposefully ignoring evidence. Nor did the trooper's failure to ask additional questions at the scene shock the conscience. The court also concluded that the officers' decision to leave the vehicle at a local impound lot also did not rise to the level of reckless or purposeful misconduct. Finally, because plaintiff failed to establish a constitutional violation, his remaining claims also fail. View "Engesser v. Fox" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action brought by DeJuan Bison's family after DeJuan committed suicide by hanging himself in a cell after being transferred from the St. Louis City Justice Center to the City of Jennings Detention Center. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant was an officer who failed to notify detainee intake personnel with the City that Brison was suicidal when St. Louis transferred Brison into the City's custody.The court concluded that defendant did not violate any clearly established right where she was not required to second-guess a mental health professional's judgment as to the substantiality of a suicide risk. The court explained that a mental health professional had determined that DeJuan was not suicidal and his classification as under Close Observation was, in an of itself, indicative of the absence of suicide risk. View "Perry v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the college, alleging that it mishandled the sexual misconduct disciplinary process and committed other acts of deliberate indifference in the wake of the first of two assaults. Plaintiff seeks relief under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Minnesota common law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the college on all of plaintiff's claims. In regard to the Title IX claim, the court concluded that, on the record, it cannot say that a reasonable jury would conclude that the college's response to the sexual assault by Student One amounted to deliberate indifference. Although the court noted that the college could have been more inclusive during the sexual assault complaint and more attentive to plaintiff in the aftermath, the court agreed with the district court that permitting a meeting between plaintiff and Student One to take place, after the sexual assault proceedings had concluded, was not an act of deliberate indifference. Even if it was, it is far from clear that requiring plaintiff to attend the meeting would have violated Title IX. The court also concluded that, even assuming that track posters of Student One on campus qualify as sexual harassment for purposes of Title IX liability, the record evidence fails to support a finding that not removing the posters amounted to deliberate indifference. Finally, the evidence does not show that the college's conduct in the wake of plaintiff's complaint concerning Student Two was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. In regard to the ADA and Section 504 claims, the court concluded that nothing in the record suggests that the college denied plaintiff reasonable accommodations as she endeavored to finish her degree while struggling with challenges to her mental health brought on by the sexual assaults. View "Shank v. Carleton College" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a deputy sheriff, alleging an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and state-law torts of battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's action arose from an incident where he was asked to leave an automobile auction because the deputy sheriff believed that he was trespassing in a restricted area. When the deputy grabbed plaintiff's arm to escort him out of the building, plaintiff shoved the deputy. The deputy eventually deployed pepper spray against a defiant plaintiff. Plaintiff then seized the pepper spray cannister from the deputy and a further altercation ensued.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the deputy based on qualified immunity, concluding that, even if the deputy was mistaken about trespassing, plaintiff's physical resistance gave the deputy probable cause to believe that plaintiff committed another offense by unlawfully resisting arrest or detention. The court explained that plaintiff's use of force gave the deputy reasonable grounds to believe that additional force was justified to remove plaintiff from the premises. The court also concluded that, under these circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed that it was reasonable to strike the resisting plaintiff in the head and take him to the ground for handcuffing. Furthermore, plaintiff cites no authority in comparable circumstances that clearly establishes a right to be free from the deputy's use of force. Therefore, the deputy is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly applied official immunity to dismiss the state-law claims. View "Jacobsen v. Klinefelter" on Justia Law

Tofurky and the Institute filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of Missouri Revised Statutes 265.494(7), which criminalizes "misrepresenting a product as meat that is not derived from harvested production livestock or poultry."The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the statute. After determining that Tofurky and the Institution have standing to bring this pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge, the court concluded that Tofurky and the Institution were unlikely to prevail on the merits. The court explained that Tofurky and the Institution's intended speech was not likely to be seen as "misrepresenting a product as meat" and thus did not fall within the scope of the statute. Therefore, the district court did not apply the wrong legal standard. Furthermore, the district court acted within its discretion in reading the statute as not prohibiting their commercial speech. The court similarly concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Tofurkey and the Institution failed to show irreparable harm. The court declined to reach the remaining Dataphase factors for a preliminary injunction. View "Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Business Leaders in Christ filed suit against the University and others, alleging that the University defendants violated its First Amendment rights through the application of the University's Policy on Human Rights. This action arose from the University's investigation of Business Leaders' refusal to allow a gay member to become an officer in the religious organization. The district court held that the University defendants violated Business Leaders' First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion; granted Business Leaders permanent injunctive relief and thus prohibited the University defendants from enforcing the Policy against Business Leaders under certain conditions; but granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' money damages claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' free-speech and expressive-association claims. In this case, the law was clearly established at the time the individual defendants acted that the University's recognition of registered student organizations constituted a limited public forum, that the university may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in a limited public forum, and that Business Leaders had a right not to be subjected to viewpoint discrimination while speaking in the University's limited public forum. However, the district court correctly granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' free-exercise claim, because the law was not clearly established at the time that the individual defendants' violated Business Leaders' free-exercise rights. View "Business Leaders In Christ v. The University of Iowa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an officer in the Minneapolis Police Department, filed suit against more than forty local government entities and employees for, among other things, violating the Driver's Protection Privacy Act (DPPA).The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err by denying the City's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the 72 vicarious-liability claims against it. In this case, the dismissals of the 72 underlying claims against the officers were not "judgments on the merits" under the meaning of section 217B(2) and that section does not prohibit the City from being held vicariously liable for them. The court also concluded that defendants are entitled to a new trial on the basis that the admitted evidence of 850 accesses that were not committed by the 58 MPD officers whose alleged DPPA violations were at issue; the admitted evidence of harassment, retaliation, and failure to investigate by the City; and the instructions to the jury that the City would indemnify Officers Young and Olson. The court vacated the judgment, reversed, and remanded for a new trial due to the erroneous admission of evidence and faulty jury instruction that affected defendants' substantial rights. View "Krekelberg v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law