Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After police officers interrogated L.G. at her high school, she filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the school resource officer had unconstitutionally seized her by escorting her to the office for questioning. Once L.G. was in the office, defendant left her alone with the officers and closed the door.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order rejecting defendant's request for qualified immunity and remanded with directions to dismiss the section 1983 claim against defendants. The court respectfully disagreed with the district court that it was clearly established that the school setting makes no difference for Fourth Amendment purposes when the seizure occurs at the behest of police. In this case, defendant's involvement in the alleged seizure was minimal and ministerial. Furthermore, the incident occurred in a public school setting where it would not necessarily be clear at what point a student has been unreasonably seized for constitutional purposes. Therefore, the court did not think existing circuit precedent, such as Stoner v. Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2013), and Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987), would have alerted every reasonable officer in defendant's position that she was violating L.G.'s constitutional rights. The court also concluded that L.G. has not successfully demonstrated a robust consensus of persuasive authority that created a clearly established right, and this is not the rare case where a general constitutional rule applies with "obvious clarity." View "L.G. v. Edwards" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants from enforcing the City of Davenport's Special Events Policy against him. In this case, plaintiff seeks to protect his right to share his religious messages in public spaces within Davenport. The district court found that the Street Fest was a traditional public forum and that law enforcement's decision to move plaintiff to an adjacent location was likely a content-neutral limitation on the time, place, and manner of his speech.The court concluded that the district court did not err in determining the Special Events Policy was a content-neutral permitting scheme. Furthermore, even if it the court assumed for purposes of this appeal, without deciding, that plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, the court found that plaintiff's inability to demonstrate a threat of irreparable harm heavily weighs against granting preliminary injunctive relief. View "Sessler v. City of Davenport" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, alleging that the County's right-of-way dedication ordinance violates their procedural due process rights. The court concluded that plaintiffs' due process and unconstitutional conditions claims are an impermissible attempt to recast a Takings claim. In this case, plaintiffs claim that the County's dedication rules could result in an exaction, which would require consideration of nexus and proportionality. However, the court concluded that this conflates takings and due process law. The court explained that plaintiffs claim a redundant remedy under the due process clause.The court concluded that the ordinance here promotes the government's interest in providing public roads and was not truly irrational. Furthermore, because plaintiffs received individualized notice and an opportunity to be heard on their variance applications, the County provided sufficient notice and opportunity for a hearing about their proposed uses. View "Pietsch v. Ward County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the City, alleging that the Rental Property Registration and Inspection Ordinance violated their constitutional rights, breached their consent decree with the City, and violated the Fair Housing Act. The Ordinance implemented uniform residential rental property registration, and a regular inspection program that is phased in accordance with the history of code violations on each property, requiring all rental properties in the City to register with the Permits and Inspections Division before leasing to tenants. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed plaintiffs' claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Ordinance does not violate Metro Omaha's constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Applying the Nebraska Supreme Court's rules of construction, the court concluded that the plain text of the Ordinance does not authorize warrantless inspections of properties if consent is withheld. Furthermore, pre-compliance review before inspections does not apply here where inspections are permitted only if there is consent, a warrant, or court order. Finally, by withholding consent, property owners are not subject to criminal liability or prohibited from renting their property.The court also concluded that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The court explained that the Ordinance provides adequate notice of the proscribed conduct and does not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement. The court further concluded that Metro Omaha fails to plausibly plead a breach of the consent decree, and that the Ordinance does not violate the Fair Housing Act. View "Metropolitan Omaha Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Omaha, Nebraska" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of defendants in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in its credibility findings. In this case, plaintiff sustained a chemical burn to his left toe while power-washing the prison laundry area; the district court found credible defendant's testimony that she did not order plaintiff to clean up the chemical spill; and defendant's at-the-infirmary comment to plaintiff that he should have changed his shoes is not internally inconsistent or implausible because it is reasonable to suggest an inmate change wet shoes. View "Zahn v. Nygaard" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint challenging Missouri's form to claim a religious exemption from mandatory immunizations for school children, as violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs, children enrolled or seeking to reenroll in Missouri public schools, have sincere religious objections to immunization. After plaintiffs refused to fill out Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services Form 11, plaintiffs were disenrolled from school until they filed the form. Plaintiffs claimed that the form and the text of the form regarding "vaccine education" violated their rights to free speech, free religious exercise, and equal protection.The court held that Form II does not compel speech, restrict speech, or incidentally burden speech, and thus does not violate plaintiffs' free speech rights; does not require plaintiffs to engage in conduct against their religious beliefs; and does not make plaintiffs morally complicit in the production or use of vaccinations. Rather, Form 11 communicates neutrally to anyone considering opting out on religious grounds that the government discourages it, but the ultimate decision belongs to the parents. The panel explained that the form states the government's neutral and generally applicable position that immunization prevents childhood diseases, and thus should be required for school attendance. The court also held that plaintiffs failed to plead specific facts about forced immunization education, and that Form 11 does not target religious believers or violate their right to equal protection. Finally, the court held that plaintiffs have not stated a hybrid rights claim that requires strict scrutiny. View "B.W.C. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellants, a class of sex offenders civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) pursuant to the Minnesota Civil Commitment and Treatment Act: Sexually Dangerous Persons and Sexual Psychopathic Personalities, codified at Minnesota Statute 253D (MCTA), filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against various MSOP managers and officials as well as the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services.On appeal for a second time, the Eighth Circuit clarified the legal standard applicable to the conditions of confinement claims brought by these civilly committed individuals. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Count 3 of appellants' Third Amended Complaint after applying the "shocks the conscience" standard. However, the district court erred as a matter of law when it applied the "shocks the conscience" standard to Counts 5, 6, and 7, which appellants allege that they were subjected to punitive conditions of confinement. The court instructed the district court, on remand, to consider the claim of inadequate medical care under the deliberate indifference standard outlined in Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2006), and to consider the remaining claims under the standard for punitive conditions of confinement outlined in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). View "Karsjens v. Lourey" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Golden China on plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he has Article III standing to bring his ADA claim. In this case, plaintiff unequivocally acknowledged in his deposition that his intent in visiting Red Wing was not to patronize Golden China but rather to test various establishments for ADA violations. He had never been to Golden China and his amorphous level of intention to return to the restaurant is, at most, aspirational, which is insufficient to establish an injury in fact. Even if the court were to accept plaintiff's post hoc attempt to establish an injury in fact, the court would still find that his declaration asserts nothing more than an uncertain intention to some day return to Golden China. View "Smith v. Golden China of Red Wing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota alleging retaliation and sex discrimination under Title IX. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the University violated Title IX by (1) retaliating against her for supporting a former coach in a sexual harassment investigation by not allowing her to redshirt; and (2) discriminating against her on the basis of sex.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the University's motion to dismiss because plaintiff did not have an actionable claim for retaliation under Title IX and she failed to show that she was treated differently because of her sex. In this case, plaintiff failed to allege that she engaged in a protected activity, and no part of Title IX designates participation in a sexual harassment investigation on the side of the accused as protected activity. In regard to plaintiff's claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex when she was denied the right to redshirt, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a claim of sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. View "Du Bois v. The Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on her claims against the County, her former employer, alleging that it retaliated against her for participating in protected activity in violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Title VII suspension-based claim, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. In this case, plaintiff failed to show that she engaged in statutorily protected activity because she did not communicate or report any sexual harassment before her suspension. In regard to the termination-based claim, the court applied the burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas framework and concluded that, assuming plaintiff made a prima facie case, the County articulated several legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for her discharge. Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown that the County's reasons are sufficiently intertwined or fishy that rebutting only some of the reasons discredits them all. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the termination-based claim under Title VII. However, given the relatively novel questions of state law, the court dismissed the MWA claims without prejudice so that they can be taken up by the Minnesota state courts. View "Kempf v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law