Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against BNSF, claiming that BNSF refused to hire him on account of his obesity and thereby discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA), Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-1101-1126. The district court granted summary judgment for BNSF and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on his claims. The court concluded that, taken as a whole, the relevant statutory and regulatory language makes it clear that for obesity to qualify as a physical impairment - and thus a disability - under the ADA, it must result from an underlying physiological disorder or condition. This remains the standard even after enactment of the ADAAA, which did not affect the definition of physical impairment. Because plaintiff failed to produce evidence that his obesity was the result of an underlying physiological disorder or condition, the district court properly concluded that plaintiff did not have a physical impairment under the ADA. Finally, the district court properly rejected plaintiff's argument that BNSF perceived him as having a physical impairment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morriss v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed as a juvenile detention officer, filed suit against the County, alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 12 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that the County retaliated against her in violation of the ADA, Section 504, Arkansas law , and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The County terminated plaintiff's employment because she could not meet the job requirement of lifting 40 pounds. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 because plaintiff was not a qualified individual where she could not perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation. Even if the court were to find that extending plaintiff's FMLA leave was a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing that she could perform the essential functions of her job with that accommodation. Likewise, the court agreed with the district court that the County was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim. The court further held that plaintiff failed to present a submissible case of retaliation under the ADA where plaintiff's request for additional time to obtain a new FMLA certification was not a reasonable accommodation, and therefore it was not protected activity. And because plaintiff still was unable to perform an essential function of her job at the end of her FMLA leave period, the County did not violate FMLA by terminating her after her FMLA expired. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Scruggs v. Pulaski County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wal-Mart, alleging disability discrimination, failure to continue to accommodate, retaliation, and harassment. After being diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, plaintiff was transferred to a new position at Wal-Mart. The district court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart on all claims. Plaintiff has conceded that the new overnight cashier position is less physically strenuous than stocking, and her acceptance of that position was accompanied by a $.20/hour raise. The court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to show she suffered an underlying adverse employment action, she has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination, and she cannot prove her claim that Wal-Mart failed to accommodate her disability; with temporal proximity alone to support her argument for pretext, plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue for trial on her retaliation claim; in regard to her workplace harassment claim, plaintiff failed to identify any discriminatory statements made to her or any evidence sufficiently severe to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment; and plaintiff failed to successfully establish that she faced a hostile work environment where plaintiff offers no examples or evidence of an increased workload beyond stating that she had four pallets to stock one night. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kelleher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Matt Holten and Jeff Ellis under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants, law enforcement officers, used excessive force while taking plaintiff into custody. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of appeal, and he eventually filed a brief challenging only the district court’s dismissal of the claim against Holten. The notice of appeal, however, specified that plaintiff was appealing only a different order in the case. Where an appellant specifies one order of the district court in his notice of appeal, but fails to identify another, the notice is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction to review the unmentioned order. Where a district court dismisses one claim at an early stage of the case, and later enters an order and judgment dismissing a second claim, a notice of appeal that cites only the later order and judgment does not confer appellate jurisdiction to review the earlier order. In this case, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order not mentioned in plaintiff's notice of appeal. Because plaintiff failed to raise any arguments in regard to the order he did mention, the court determined that plaintiff has abandoned any challenge to that order. View "Rosillo v. Holten" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, CSL, alleging violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Rev. 213.055, 213.070. The district court granted CSL's motion for summary judgment. In regard to the sex discrimination claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of his written warnings, and plaintiff's version of the events immediately preceding his firing fails to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of CSL’s stated basis for terminating his employment. Because plaintiff admitted that he failed to comply with CSL’s policies, no genuine issue of material fact remained with respect to the credibility of CSL’s assertion that plaintiff’s failure was the basis for the termination of his employment. Because plaintiff failed to show how he and a female employee engaged in similar conduct, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether CSL treated plaintiff less favorably than similarly situated female employees. Further, no genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether CSL treated plaintiff unfavorably relative to similarly situated employees; without facts connecting the comment at issue, made by one of Denn’s peers, to CSL’s decision to fire Denn, the statement does not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding Denn’s discrimination claim; and the fact that other male employees were disciplined was insufficient to render summary judgment improper. In regard to the retaliation claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to point to any evidence showing that his discrimination complaint was a “contributing factor” to any adverse action taken by CSL. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Denn v. CSL Plasma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant John Daugherty was sufficiently involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff to qualify as a decision maker, given that the evidence showed that he participated in the investigation leading up to her termination, and that he was the one who ultimately told her she was terminated; there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Daugherty had earlier told plaintiff that she should step down because she was “a female” and “a single mom,” that it was “a man’s world,” and that she needed to “man up;" and because the court construed such comments, if made by a decisionmaker, as direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the court concluded, under a mixed-motive analysis, plaintiff may be entitled to some of the remedies she sought in her complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Morrow v. Zale Corp." on Justia Law

The ACLU filed suit against the director of the Missouri Department of Corrections, in his official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Mo. Rev. Stat. 546.720 is unconstitutional as applied to department records the ACLU obtained under the Missouri Sunshine Law, Mo. Rev. Stat. 610.010 et seq., and then posted on its website. Section 546.720 prohibits the disclosure of the identities of individuals who participate in executions. On appeal, the director challenged the district court's order denying immunity. The court concluded that the ACLU has alleged an injury in fact because it has shown an objectively reasonable fear of legal action that chills its speech. The court concluded, however, that the ACLU’s injury is not fairly traceable to the director because he does not possess any statutory authority to enforce section 546.720, and the ACLU's injury is fairly traceable only to the private civil litigants who may seek damages under the statute and thereby enforce the statute. Therefore, the court concluded that the ACLU lacks standing. The court also concluded that the director is also immune from suit because he lacks authority to enforce the challenged statute. In this case, the director’s authority to define the members of the execution team is not an enforcement action within the meaning of Ex Parte Young and its progeny. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment. View "Balogh v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an independent lease truck driver for FMC Transport, filed suit against FMC Transport, alleging racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FMC Transport. FMC Transport's accident review board had concluded that plaintiff's accident was preventable and the company later terminated him. Although plaintiff is a member of a protected class and he did suffer an adverse employment action, and even if he did meet FMC Transport's legitimate expectations, the court concluded that he failed to present evidence that supports an inference of discrimination. Further, plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, because he has not shown that the circumstances of his termination gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Macklin v. FMC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the Westboro Baptist Church, filed suit in 2006 against Missouri state and state officials after the Missouri General Assembly enacted statewide restrictions on pickets and protests near funerals and funeral processions. In 2014, Missouri appealed the statute at issue while plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion remained pending in district court. In this appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's adverse judgments on her due process claim as well as the court's award of attorneys' fees. The court vacated the district court's judgment on the due process claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss her claim as moot. In regard to the attorneys' fees, the court concluded that the district court's 2/14th calculation was an abuse of discretion because its arithmetically simplistic fee calculation did not accurately reflect her degree of success of her interrelated claims. Moreover, even if the court accepted the district court's basic mathematical approach, its 2/14th calculation is inaccurate because it did not address whether it counted consent judgments, mooted claims, and dismissed claims as prevailing, neutral, or unsuccessful claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's award of attorneys' fees. View "Phelps-Roper v. Koster" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a government investigation of Mountain Pure's bottling facility. Mountain Pure and its employees filed suit against defendants, government agents, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that the district court did not err in granting Defendants Roberts and Spradlin summary judgment on Mountain Pure's excessive force claim, nor did the district court err in granting the agents summary judgment on Mountain Pure's claim alleging unlawful seizure of its property. In regard to the individual employees' arguments that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against them on their claims alleging unlawful detention, unlawful seizure of their property, and excessive force, the court concluded that: the detention of the employees during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable where detaining the employees prevented them from fleeing in the event that incriminating evidence was found and ensured that they would be present to assist with the completion of the search such as by opening locked file cabinets to avoid the use of force, and detention of the employees in the break room was not particularly intrusive; the length of the detentions here was reasonable given that the search took nearly twelve hours and the government had a legitimate interest in detaining the employees during the search; the employees' argument that qualified immunity should not apply in Roberts' and Spradlin's case is rejected where there is no evidence showing that the interrogations at issue prolonged the employees' detentions beyond a reasonable time; Roberts and Spradlin did not act unreasonably in detaining them incommunicado by denying them access to telephones; the district court did not err in concluding that qualified immunity barred the employees' claims alleging an unlawful seizure of their property; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Roberts and Spradlin on Bush, Morgan, and Stacks' excessive force claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mountain Pure v. Roberts" on Justia Law