Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

CMS collects consumer debts, subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). CMS commences consumer state-court collection actions by filing standard-form complaints that allege, that “more than 90 days have elapsed since the presentation of this claim” to the consumer and seek prejudgment interest and attorney fees “as allowable by law.” When named plaintiffs contested CMS’s complaints, CMS served nearly identical discovery requests seeking disclosure of detailed employment and financial information. Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against CMS and in-house CMS attorneys, claiming that CMS’s standard-form pleadings violate the FDCPA and the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act. In certifying four classes, the district court agreed that the predominant common question was whether the defendants sent each class member standard collection complaints and discovery requests, which violate the FDCPA and NCPA. The four classes consist of persons who received a county court collection complaint or discovery requests seeking to collect a debt “for personal, family, or household purposes,” or had such a collection action pending during the applicable limitations periods. The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the court failed to conduct the “rigorous analysis . . . of what the parties must prove” that FRCP 23 requires. View "Powers v. Credit Mgmt. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

After the 1998 merger of NationsBank and BankAmerica formed Bank of America, shareholders filed class actions alleging violations of securities laws. The cases were resolved when the court approved a $490 million global settlement, overruling an objection by NationsBank class representative Oetting that allocating $333.2 million to those classes was inadequate because their claims had greater merit than the claims of the BankAmerica Classes. After a 2004 distribution and a court-ordered second distribution of $4.75 million to NationsBank claimants in 2009, $2,440,108.53 remained. In 2012, class counsel for the NationsBank Classes moved to terminate the case with respect to those classes, to award class counsel $98,114.34 in attorneys’ fees for work done after the 2004 distribution and to distribute cy pres the remainder of the “surplus settlement funds” to charities suggested by class counsel. The district court granted the motion over Oetting’s objections and ordered “that the balance of the NationsBank Classes settlement fund shall be distributed cy pres to the Legal Services of Eastern Missouri.” The Eighth Circuit vacated and reversed; a further distribution to the classes is feasible, and LSEM is unrelated to the classes or the litigation and is an inappropriate “next best” cy pres recipient. View "Oetting v. Green Jacobson, P.C." on Justia Law

EEOC sued CRST in its own name, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging that CRST subjected Starke and 270 similarly situated female employees to a hostile work environment, in its Driver Training Program. For two years, EEOC failed to identify the women comprising the putative class; the court ordered EEOC to make all class members available for deposition or risk a discovery sanction. EEOC filed updated lists of allegedly aggrieved individuals, but failed to make all of them available for deposition before the deadline. The court barred EEOC from pursuing relief for any individual not made available for deposition before the deadline. EEOC then listed 155 individuals for whom it was still pursuing relief and 99 individuals, allegedly sexually harassed, but for whom EEOC was not pursuing relief based on the order. Following remand, the court dismissed, but for one claim, which settled for $50,000, and awarded CRST $92,842.21 in costs, $4,004,371.65 in attorneys' fees, and $463,071.25 in out-of-pocket expenses. The Eighth Circuit held that CRST is not entitled to attorneys' fees for claims dismissed based on EEOC's failure to satisfy pre-suit obligations and a purported pattern-or-practice claim. On remand, the court must individually assess each claim for which it granted summary judgment on the merits and explain why it deems each to be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Mellon, seeking to represent a class of Arkansas homeowners facing non-judicial foreclosures by Mellon. After plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand to state court and then granted Mellon's motion to dismiss, the district court awarded Mellon costs despite Mellon's failure to file a verified affidavit substantiating the costs. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1)'s one-year removal limitation is inapplicable in this case based on 28 U.S.C. 1453(b). Therefore, Mellon was not required to remove this class action within one year of plaintiff's original complaint. Because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the only named plaintiff was a citizen of Arkansas at the time of commencement and removal, and no defendant is a citizen of Arkansas, this class action falls within the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 1332(a). Plaintiff's challenge to the district court's dismissal of his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) was foreclosed by the court's decision in Rivera v. JPMorgan Chase Bank. Finally, the district court legally erred in awarding costs to Mellon where Mellon provided no affidavit substantiating the costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion to remand and dismiss the case, but reversed the award of costs and remanded with instructions. View "Reece v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purported class action against Charter in Missouri state court, alleging that Charter violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.10 et seq., and breached its contract with the class members. Plaintiffs alleged that Charter had provided the class members with Internet modems that were incapable of operating at the speed that Charter had promised. Charter removed to federal court. The court concluded that Charter met its burden of showing that the amount in controversy exceeded the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005's (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), $5 million jurisdictional threshold. The court also concluded that, under Missouri law, plaintiffs failed to allege facts to support pecuniary loss. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Grawitch, et al. v. Charter Communication" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, consumers, filed suit in Minnesota state court against ConAgra, claiming that some Hebrew National beef products were not, as the label reads, "100% kosher." ConAgra removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1453. The district court decided that the First Amendment prohibited the courts from adjudicating plaintiffs' legal claims and dismissed the appeal. The court concluded that plaintiffs alleged economic harm - even if only a few pennies each - was a concrete, non-speculative injury. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' allegations failed to show that any of the particular packages of Hebrew National beef they personally purchased contained non-kosher beef. Without any particularized reason to think that plaintiffs' own packages of Hebrew National beef actually exhibited the alleged non-kosher defect, plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to sue ConAgra and CAFA did not extend federal jurisdiction to this case. The court vacated the district court's judgment, reversed the district court's dismissal with prejudice, and remanded with instructions to return this case to the state court for lack of federal jurisdiction. View "Wallace, et al. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Arkansas Circuit Clerk, filed suit against Lenders, alleging that they used the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) to avoid paying recording fees on mortgage assignments and deprived Arkansas counties of revenue. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's exercise of jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). The court concluded that the district court properly found that plaintiff alleged a class action under CAFA and that the class for the illegal-exaction claim included all Arkansas taxpayers, and thus, properly exercised jurisdiction under CAFA; the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss or remand the state-law claims after dismissing the illegal-exaction class action claim; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abstain under Burford abstention; and the dismissal of the state law claims was appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Brown v. Mortgage Electronic, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when groups of plaintiffs filed product liability actions against four manufacturers of transvaginal mesh devices, including Boston Scientific. Three groups filed similar motions proposing that the state court assign each group to a single Judge for purposes of discovery and trial. Two district judges granted plaintiffs' motions and remanded to state court on the ground that no case included more than 100 plaintiffs and plaintiffs had not proposed to the state court that the actions be tried jointly. The court granted Boston Scientific leave to appeal and vacated the order remanding to state court where the three groups of plaintiffs have already proposed to try their cases jointly within the meaning of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), because plaintiffs' counsel urged the state court to assign the claims of more than 100 plaintiffs to a single judge. View "Atwell, et al. v. Boston Scientific Corp." on Justia Law

This case concerned the 2011 NFL lockout. Active NFL players filed a class action suit (Brady suit) against the NFL, alleging violations of the federal antitrust laws and other claims. Retired NFL players also filed suit against the NFL and its teams, alleging antitrust violations (Eller I suit). After both actions were consolidated, the Brady suit was settled, the players re-designated the NFLPA as their collective bargaining agent, the NFL and NFLPA signed a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating the settlement terms, the Brady plaintiffs dismissed their action, the lockout ended, and the 2011 NFL season commenced. Carl Eller and other retired NFL players (plaintiffs) then filed this class action (Eller II) against the NFLPA and others. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed, alleging claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage under Minnesota law. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of a prospective separate contractual relation with the NFL that would provide more than the increased benefits provided in the 2011 CBA. Even if plaintiffs alleged a reasonable expectation of prospective contractual relations or economic advantage with the NFL, plaintiffs failed to allege facts proving that defendants improperly or wrongfully interfered with these advantageous prospects. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Eller, et al. v. NFL Players Assoc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against CMH Homes, Vanderbilt and others in state court. The companies subsequently filed a petition in the district court alleging that plaintiffs' claims were subject to mandatory arbitration. The district court dismissed the petition. The companies argued that the district court erred by concluding that it lacked diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court correctly reasoned that Vaden undermined Advance America and required the court's departure from that precedent. Following the Vaden approach, the district court properly looked through the arbitration petition to the state court complaint to determine the amount in controversy. Nonetheless, the court remanded for the district court to calculate an amount in controversy and to determine on that basis whether it had jurisdiction over the putative class action under 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). View "CMH Homes, Inc., et al. v. Goodner, et al." on Justia Law