Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs owned and operated a hotel that had a record of serious structural and safety problems, including a window and a stone falling from the building, and repeated failures to correct code violations. After a fire occurred without activation of the sprinkler system, a follow-up inspection revealed that several fire code violations remained unaddressed, along with new violations. Based on these findings, the city’s building administrator ordered the hotel to be closed immediately, citing imminent safety risks. The owners sought to appeal and demanded hearings, but the city cited the COVID-19 pandemic as a reason for delay and directed them to other appellate avenues. The closure order was lifted once the most urgent hazards were remedied, and the owners eventually fixed all violations.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment to the city and the building administrator, finding no violations of procedural due process or the Fifth Amendment, and that qualified immunity protected the administrator in his individual capacity. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the procedural due process provided for the closure, the application of qualified immunity, and asserting that the closure constituted a regulatory taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, even assuming a protected property interest existed, the risk of erroneous deprivation was low due to specific regulations and the availability of prompt post-deprivation remedies. The court also found that swift action in the face of public safety threats justified summary administrative action without additional pre-deprivation process. Regarding qualified immunity, the court determined that no clearly established law prohibited the administrator’s conduct. Finally, the court held that the temporary closure was a lawful exercise of police power and did not amount to a compensable regulatory taking. View "reVamped LLC v. City of Pipestone" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury charged the defendant with possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Task force officers at a bus station in Omaha, Nebraska identified the defendant’s suitcase as suspicious and removed it from the bus’s luggage compartment. After the defendant claimed and approached his bag, an officer questioned him about his travel plans and requested permission to search the suitcase, which the defendant consented to. The defendant then fled, prompting officers to detain him and search his belongings, ultimately discovering firearms and controlled substances.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his suitcase, backpack, and person, arguing that the officers’ actions constituted unlawful searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. A magistrate judge recommended denying the suppression motion, concluding that the suitcase was not seized, the initial encounter was consensual, the consent to search was valid, and reasonable suspicion supported the later detention. The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska adopted the recommendation and denied the motion to suppress. At trial, a jury acquitted the defendant of possession with intent to distribute but found him guilty of simple possession and the firearms offense. The district court imposed consecutive sentences totaling 144 months’ imprisonment and a $2,500 fine, the latter without findings about the defendant’s ability to pay.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion, holding there was no Fourth Amendment seizure of the suitcase, the initial encounter was consensual, the defendant’s consent to search was voluntary, and reasonable suspicion justified the post-flight detention. The court also affirmed the custodial sentence as substantively reasonable but vacated the fine, remanding for proper findings on the defendant’s ability to pay. View "United States v. Clay" on Justia Law

After Mikel Neil fled from a traffic stop initiated by two St. Louis County police officers, a high-speed chase ensued, reaching speeds over ninety miles per hour through a residential area. During the pursuit, one of the officers used a PIT maneuver, causing Neil’s vehicle to crash into a tree, resulting in his death. The officers left the scene without administering aid or calling for assistance and later falsely reported the crash as a single-car incident. Neil’s mother, Clara Cheeks, brought a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers had used excessive force.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed Cheeks’s excessive force claim, finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint did not sufficiently allege a constitutional violation. Over a year after the dismissal, and after the deadline for amending pleadings had passed, Cheeks sought leave to amend her complaint to revive the excessive force claim. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the proposed amendments would be futile. Cheeks then appealed the dismissal and the denial of leave to amend, after voluntarily dismissing her remaining claim for failure to provide medical aid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Eighth Circuit held that, under the circumstances described in the complaint, the use of a PIT maneuver during a dangerous high-speed chase did not constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, following precedents such as Scott v. Harris. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, because the proposed amendments would not cure the deficiencies in the excessive force claim. The court’s disposition was to affirm the dismissal and denial of leave to amend. View "Cheeks v. Belmar" on Justia Law

A member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate tribe was observed by a tribal police officer driving erratically within the city limits of Sisseton, nearly causing multiple collisions and fleeing from law enforcement. He was apprehended in a tribal housing unit. Subsequently, the tribal prosecutor charged him in tribal court with driving under the influence (DUI) and resisting arrest, while South Dakota state court charged him with resisting arrest, reckless driving, and assaulting a law enforcement officer. He later pled guilty in state court to assault and was sentenced to two years in prison. The tribal court then dismissed the DUI charge without prejudice.He filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota against various tribal officials, alleging that the DUI charge exceeded the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction and violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act. The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the complaint failed to raise a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal. The court concluded that, even assuming it had jurisdiction to consider the scope of the tribe’s criminal authority, the case had become moot because the tribal DUI charge was dismissed and could not be refiled due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court found that neither the voluntary cessation exception nor the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness applied. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and vacated its decision, declining to address the underlying questions of tribal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, or exhaustion of tribal remedies. View "LaBatte v. Gangle" on Justia Law

A police officer in Des Moines, Iowa attempted to stop a vehicle driven by Dylan Pettyjohn for lacking license plates or a temporary registration. Pettyjohn fled, leading the officer on a high-speed chase through a residential area before crashing. He then ran from the vehicle, discarding a loaded revolver and a fanny pack containing 54 fentanyl pills, $389 in small bills, marijuana, and about 85 grams of methamphetamine. A search of his vehicle yielded a digital scale with white residue, more marijuana, and shell casings. Pettyjohn was arrested, and a federal grand jury indicted him on multiple counts related to drug possession with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Pettyjohn’s motion to dismiss the felon in possession charge, rejecting his argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment. The court also allowed limited admission of his prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes, after an agreement between Pettyjohn and the government. At trial, Pettyjohn moved for acquittal based on insufficient evidence, but the district court found the evidence sufficient and denied the motions. The jury found Pettyjohn guilty on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings under Rules 404(b) and 609, and upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) based on circuit precedent. The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior conviction evidence, and § 922(g)(1) is constitutional. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pettyjohn" on Justia Law

An inmate at the McPherson Unit, a maximum-security prison in Arkansas, alleged that from 2010 to 2014, a chaplain at the facility sexually assaulted her weekly in his office. The chaplain, who was permitted by policy to be alone with female inmates, also assaulted at least two other inmates in a similar, regular manner. He resigned in 2014 and later pleaded guilty to third-degree sexual assault. The inmate brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several prison officials in their individual capacities, claiming they failed to protect her from the assaults and failed to supervise the chaplain adequately.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Chief Judge Kristine G. Baker presiding, denied in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants—three particular officials—were aware of the chaplain’s conduct and were deliberately indifferent to the risk he posed. The district court also found genuine disputes as to whether two of the officials had sufficient supervisory authority over the chaplain to be liable for failure to supervise and whether they took appropriate remedial action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. It held that, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the inmate, a reasonable jury could find the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm, violating clearly established Eighth Amendment rights. The appellate court also held that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the supervisory liability of two officials. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, allowing the inmate’s claims to proceed to trial. View "Arnett v. Norris" on Justia Law

Late on January 10, 2022, Kansas City police officers stopped a pickup truck with a broken headlight and expired license plate. The driver, Alonzo Miller, was not the vehicle’s owner and could not provide proof of insurance. The officers recognized the area Miller had driven from as one known for criminal activity. During the stop, Miller exhibited nervous behavior. A computer check revealed Miller was on probation and parole for a violent felony involving a firearm. The officers, noting a significant age difference between Miller and his passenger and the late hour, suspected possible illicit activity. After Miller mentioned “something under there” when asked about illegal items and consented to a vehicle search, the officers asked him to step out. Miller behaved unusually, triggering further suspicion. As an officer attempted a frisk, Miller resisted, and a firearm discharged from his coat pocket. Miller was arrested and later indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Miller’s motion to suppress evidence from the stop and search. The magistrate judge found the stop lawful, that Miller’s consent to search was voluntary, and that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and frisk Miller based on the totality of the circumstances—including Miller’s criminal history, behavior, and responses during the encounter. The district court adopted these findings. Miller then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of Miller’s suppression motion, applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error review to factual findings. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, request consent to search the vehicle, and frisk Miller. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

During a protest in Omaha, Nebraska, following the death of George Floyd, law enforcement declared the gathering an unlawful assembly and ordered the crowd to disperse. Adam Keup, who was present with his partner and friends to document the protest, was standing on a sidewalk near a Walgreens with a backpack containing camera equipment. Unaware of the dispersal order, Keup was shot in the eye with a pepper ball by Deputy Nicholas Palmer, resulting in permanent vision loss. After being shot, Keup was taken behind police lines for medical attention but was not arrested.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of Deputy Palmer, finding that he was entitled to qualified immunity on both the First and Fourth Amendment claims. The district court determined that Keup had not shown he was engaged in protected First Amendment activity that was the but-for cause of the force used against him, and that the use of the pepper ball and subsequent actions did not constitute a clearly established Fourth Amendment seizure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that Keup failed to establish a causal connection between any protected First Amendment activity and Deputy Palmer’s actions, as there was no evidence Keup was singled out for his expression. Regarding the Fourth Amendment claim, the court concluded that the use of the pepper ball was intended to disperse, not to apprehend, and that taking Keup for medical care did not amount to an unreasonable seizure. Therefore, Deputy Palmer was entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Keup v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Drexel Starks was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and taken to the St. Louis County Justice Center, where he reported heroin withdrawal symptoms. Jail medical staff placed him on a withdrawal protocol, which included comfort medication and regular nurse assessments. Over the next day, nurses noted some improvement in his symptoms. However, there is no evidence of further assessments as required by protocol. On August 6, a correctional officer found Drexel on the floor with withdrawal symptoms; he was transferred to the infirmary and then to a hospital, where he died. The medical examiner attributed his death to withdrawal from heroin and cocaine, dehydration, and cardiac dysrhythmia.Margaret Starks, Drexel’s mother, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that jail nurses and a correctional officer were deliberately indifferent to Drexel’s serious medical needs, and that nurse supervisors and St. Louis County failed to train or supervise staff and maintained an unlawful policy of denying medical care. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that Margaret failed to establish a violation of Drexel’s constitutional rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eighth Circuit held that no reasonable jury could find Drexel had an objectively serious medical need that was obvious to a layperson or supported by medical evidence, nor that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference akin to criminal recklessness. The court also held that, absent an underlying constitutional violation, claims against the nurse supervisors and the County for failure to train or supervise, or for unlawful policy, could not succeed. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Starks v. St. Louis County" on Justia Law

A security services company and its sole shareholder, who is also its president and CEO, provided security services to two Iowa cities under separate contracts. After the shareholder published a letter criticizing media coverage of law enforcement responses to protests, a local newspaper published articles highlighting his critical comments about protestors and the Black Lives Matter movement. Subsequently, a city council member expressed concerns about the shareholder’s views, and the city council voted unanimously to terminate the company’s contract. The council member also pressured officials in the other city to end their contract with the company. Facing negative publicity, the company voluntarily terminated its second contract to avoid harm to a pending business transaction.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against the city, the council member, and other council members, alleging First Amendment retaliation, tortious interference with business contracts, and defamation. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). It found that the shareholder lacked standing to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim for injuries to the corporation, and that the corporation failed to state a retaliation claim because only the shareholder engaged in protected speech. The court dismissed the tortious interference claim for lack of sufficient factual allegations and because the contract was terminated voluntarily. The defamation claim was dismissed for failure to identify any actionable statements by the defendants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the shareholder’s First Amendment retaliation and defamation claims, but directed that these dismissals be without prejudice. The court reversed the dismissal of the corporation’s First Amendment retaliation and tortious interference claims, finding that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss, and remanded those claims for further proceedings. View "Conley v. City of West Des Moines" on Justia Law