Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Leslie Torgerson filed a lawsuit in federal district court against Roberts County, South Dakota, and several individuals, including County Sheriff Tyler Appel, County Deputies Zachary Angerhofer and Wesley Bowsher, his adopted son Ross Torgerson, and his ex-wife Terri Torgerson. Torgerson alleged violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and civil conspiracy. He also asserted a Monell claim against the County, a state-law claim for common law battery against Ross, and a state-law intentional-infliction-of-emotional distress claim against Deputy Angerhofer, Deputy Bowsher, Ross, and Terri. These claims stemmed from a domestic dispute involving Torgerson, Ross, and Terri.The defendants moved for summary judgment on Torgerson’s claims. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. The court concluded that Torgerson failed to state a claim for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, as he did not plead that he possessed a constitutional interest that had been violated. The court also determined that Torgerson’s civil conspiracy claim failed due to the lack of a stated constitutional interest and insufficient facts showing a conspiracy. Consequently, Torgerson’s Monell claim against the County also failed. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, considering them to be purely state-related issues.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Torgerson did not suffer a deprivation of liberty as he was not charged or prosecuted for any crime, thus failing to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the civil conspiracy and Monell claims, as there was no underlying constitutional violation. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. View "Torgerson v. Roberts County of South Dakota" on Justia Law

Karla Smith and Holly Bladel sued Iowa state officials and the State of Iowa after Iowa opted out of federal unemployment programs established during the Covid-19 pandemic. These programs, created under the CARES Act, provided various unemployment benefits. Iowa initially participated in these programs but decided to end its participation in June 2021. Smith and Bladel claimed that this decision violated the U.S. Constitution, the Iowa Constitution, and Iowa state law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the case, ruling that the defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that the plaintiffs lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in the CARES Act benefits. Smith and Bladel appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Smith's official-capacity claims against Iowa and its officials, as the claims did not fall under the Ex parte Young exception for ongoing violations of federal law. The court also found that Smith lacked a protected property interest in the CARES Act benefits because Iowa had the discretion to opt out of the programs. Consequently, Smith's due process claim against the Governor and Director in their individual capacities failed. Additionally, the court ruled that Smith's state law claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and her request for declaratory relief was inappropriate as it sought to address past actions rather than future conduct. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed all of Smith's claims. View "Smith v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

In this case, Jae Michael Bernard was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Bernard had a prior conviction in 2002 for domestic abuse assault causing injury. In September 2021, investigators found firearms and ammunition at his residence. Bernard pleaded guilty in June 2022 but later moved to withdraw his plea and dismiss the indictment, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied Bernard's motion to dismiss the indictment. Bernard then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. The district court sentenced him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Bernard's appeal was based on a facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9). The court noted that a facial challenge requires showing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. The court held that § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation, which allows disarming individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others. The court found that the statute is constitutional in at least some of its applications, as it targets individuals convicted of crimes involving actual or attempted violence or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that § 922(g)(9) is not unconstitutional on its face. View "United States v. Bernard" on Justia Law

Anthony Unocic, while incarcerated in a Nebraska detention center, told two fellow inmates that he wanted to kill a federal agent named Tubbs who had investigated him. Unocic's threats were taken seriously by the inmates because he bragged about a previous violent standoff with police, demonstrated stabbing techniques, and mentioned using explosives. The inmates reported the threats to federal agents, leading to Unocic being charged with one count of threatening to assault a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) and (c)(1).Unocic pleaded not guilty, and the case went to trial in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. The district court instructed the jury on the elements required to convict Unocic, including that he either knew or intended that others would regard his communication as threatening violence, or recklessly disregarded a substantial risk that others could regard his communication as threatening violence. The jury found Unocic guilty, and he was sentenced to thirty-three months' imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Unocic argued that the district court erred by including the term "carelessly" in the definition of "recklessly disregards" in the jury instructions. He claimed this allowed the jury to convict him for speech protected by the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit reviewed for plain error and concluded that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions did not mislead the jury to convict Unocic based on an incorrect standard. The court found no obvious error and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Unocic" on Justia Law

Jacqusyn Grubb was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm as an unlawful user of a controlled substance under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Grubb moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated his Second Amendment rights, particularly as he was a user of marijuana, not a more dangerous controlled substance. The government contended that Grubb's challenge was premature due to undeveloped facts.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied Grubb's motion to dismiss, ruling that the statute was constitutional on its face but held Grubb's as-applied challenge pending trial. The court rejected Grubb's request for an evidentiary hearing, stating it would amount to unauthorized discovery. Grubb then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The district court later reconsidered and requested supplemental briefing but ultimately denied the motion to dismiss, concluding the statute was constitutional as applied to Grubb.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a trial on the merits was necessary to resolve Grubb's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. The court emphasized that there is no summary judgment procedure in federal criminal cases and that the government is not required to present all its evidence before trial. The court concluded that the district court should have deferred ruling on the as-applied challenge until trial. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Grubb to choose whether to adhere to his guilty plea or proceed to trial. View "United States v. Grubb" on Justia Law

Devin Ledbetter was seriously injured by Springfield, Missouri police officer Brandon Helmers. Ledbetter sued Helmers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Helmers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The incident occurred when Helmers and his partner responded to a 911 call about a man holding a woman captive in a tent. Ledbetter, who was in the tent, exited holding a knife. The accounts of what happened next differ, with Helmers claiming Ledbetter was non-compliant and threatening, while Ledbetter claimed he immediately dropped the knife and was compliant. Ledbetter sustained severe injuries, including a fractured hip, during the arrest.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Helmers's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, noting disputed facts about the threat Ledbetter posed and the amount of force used. The case proceeded to trial, but the jury could not reach a verdict on liability. However, they answered special interrogatories, finding Helmers reasonably believed Ledbetter posed an immediate threat but did not believe Ledbetter was resisting arrest. The district court then granted Helmers's motion for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity, concluding that Helmers did not use excessive force and that his conduct did not violate clearly established law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a reasonable jury could find Helmers used excessive force, given the evidence and the jury's special findings. However, the court also held that it was not clearly established that Helmers's use of force was excessive under the circumstances, as existing case law did not provide sufficient guidance for the specific situation Helmers faced. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting Helmers qualified immunity. View "Ledbetter v. Helmers" on Justia Law

Muhammad Masood, a licensed physician from Pakistan, came to the United States in 2018 on a non-immigrant visa to work as an unpaid medical researcher. In 2019, he became radicalized by Islamic extremist content and planned to join ISIS. In March 2020, he was arrested at the Minneapolis airport with plans to travel to ISIS-controlled territory. A search revealed military and medical supplies, computers, and digital storage devices containing extremist propaganda. Masood pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and sentenced Masood to 216 months imprisonment, varying downward from the statutory maximum of 240 months. Masood appealed, arguing procedural errors in applying the terrorism enhancement, considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and alleged violations of his due process rights and right to allocution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no procedural error in applying the terrorism enhancement, as the evidence supported that Masood's offense was intended to promote terrorism. The court also found that the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence. Additionally, the court determined there was no violation of Rule 32(i) or the Due Process Clause, as Masood and his counsel were given opportunities to argue and allocute before the final sentence was imposed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Masood" on Justia Law

Pollyann Sorcan, a member of the Rock Ridge School District board, was excluded from committee assignments and meetings by the board. The board alleged that Sorcan undermined the District’s mission and violated policies and data privacy laws. Sorcan filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the District and Bill Addy, the board chair, claiming retaliation for her protected speech under the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Sorcan’s case. The court concluded that Addy was entitled to legislative immunity and that Sorcan failed to state a claim against the District under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The court found that Sorcan did not identify a persistent pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Addy, sued in his official capacity, was not entitled to legislative immunity because such immunity does not extend to local officials in their official capacities. The court also found that the district court erred in requiring Sorcan to identify a persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct. Instead, a single decision by authorized decisionmakers can represent an official policy under Monell. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sorcan v. Rock Ridge School District" on Justia Law

Dontavius R. Sharkey was convicted by a jury of two counts of felon in possession of a firearm and two counts of a straw-purchasing conspiracy. The district court sentenced him to 360 months in prison. Sharkey appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the statutes under which he was convicted were unconstitutional and that the district court improperly used acquitted conduct to enhance his sentence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa found Sharkey's acquitted conduct proven by a preponderance of the evidence and used it to increase his Guidelines range. Sharkey's arguments against the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and the use of acquitted conduct were rejected based on existing precedent. The district court also applied enhancements for using a firearm in connection with another felony and for his role as an organizer in the criminal activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that Sharkey's constitutional challenges were foreclosed by precedent, specifically citing United States v. Jackson. The court also upheld the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing, referencing United States v. Watts and United States v. Bullock. Additionally, the court found no procedural error in the application of the Guidelines enhancements and determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an above-Guidelines sentence. The court concluded that the district court properly considered the relevant factors and did not give undue weight to any improper or irrelevant factors. View "United States v. Sharkey" on Justia Law

The Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) sought to mail its publications to inmates at the Baxter County Jail and Detention Center. HRDC's materials, which include books and magazines about prisoners' legal rights and criminal justice news, were rejected due to the jail's policy limiting non-legal mail to postcards. HRDC filed a lawsuit against Baxter County, claiming the policy violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas awarded partial summary judgment to HRDC on the due process claim, finding a technical violation of HRDC's right to notice. However, after a bench trial, the court held that the postcard-only policy did not violate HRDC's free speech rights. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the decision, requiring additional fact-finding on whether HRDC had alternative means to exercise its First Amendment rights.Upon remand, the district court found that the jail's policies effectively banned HRDC's publications and that allowing these publications would have a de minimis impact on jail operations. The court concluded that the policy was not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives and violated HRDC's rights. It awarded HRDC nominal damages, a permanent injunction against the postcard-only policy as applied to publisher mail, and attorney fees and costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the jail's postcard-only policy was not reasonably related to its penological goals and constituted an exaggerated response, effectively banning HRDC's publications. The court also upheld the award of attorney fees and costs to HRDC, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's decisions. View "Human Rights Defense Center v. Baxter County Arkansas" on Justia Law