Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 2013 General Public School Choice Act, Ark. Code 6–18–1901 provided that "[a] school district annually may declare an exemption under this section if the school district is subject to the desegregation order or mandate of a federal court or agency remedying the effects of past racial segregation." Plaintiffs have minor children who reside within the Blytheville School District and applied to transfer their children to neighboring school districts. The Blytheville District subsequently adopted a resolution to exempt the District from the Act. Plaintiffs sued, alleging that the District violated their due process and equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for violations of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the District violated due process by abusing its power under state law and failing to provide pre-deprivation process, and violated equal protection by using race as the reason for its exemption and nullifying the 2013 Act within its borders on the pretense that it was subject to a desegregation order. The District at least had a rational basis for believing that it "is subject to the . . . mandate of a federal court or agency." View "Adkisson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5" on Justia Law

Agent O’Neil interviewed V.R.B., who told him that in 2008, when she was about eight years old, she awakened when someone lay down in her bed and touched her vaginal area through her clothes. V.R.B. pretended to remain asleep, but got up after the person left and saw her mother's friend Thunderhawk in her living room. Agents went to Thunderhawk’s home and talked to him in their car, stating that he could end the interview at any time, he was not under arrest, and he would not be arrested at the end of the interview regardless of what he said. He admitted to the incident involving V.R.B., saying he had been drinking heavily. In a taped statement, O’Neil reviewed the interview and gave Thunderhawk an opportunity to correct mistakes. O’Neil later drove Thunderhawk to a polygraph test, stating that the test was voluntary, he could stop at any time, and O’Neil would drive him home. Thunderhawk signed written Miranda warnings and was again advised that the polygraph was voluntary and he could stop at any time. Thunderhawk again admitted to the incident. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Thunderhawk’s conviction for abusive sexual contact of a child under 12 years of age, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(5), and sentence of 41 months in prison, upholding denial of a motion to suppress his allegedly involuntary confessions; instructions to the jurors to draw reasonable inferences from their experience and common sense; and denial of motions for mistrial based on improper closing arguments. View "United States v. Thunderhawk" on Justia Law

Waynesville Office Weir sought a warrant to search the Conants’ house, stating that a reliable confidential informant had given information that Methamphetamine was being distributed from and stored at the house. Weir explained that the CI faced criminal charges and hoped to receive favorable consideration for cooperation, but there was no agreement. The prosecutor signed the application and did not tell Weir to include any additional information. The judge granted a warrant. The Conants moved to suppress evidence from the search and requested a Franks hearing. At a hearing, Weir testified that: the CI got the information from a second person while they used drugs together, and was subject to criminal charges at the time. A magistrate found no Franks violation because the officer did not act intentionally or recklessly to mislead the judge, and recommended denial of the suppression motion based on a good-faith analysis. The district court denied the motions to suppress. The Conants conditionally pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that a Franks hearing was, in effect, conducted when the officers involved were questioned at the evidentiary hearing, and the district court treated the evidentiary hearing as a Franks hearing.” View "United States v. Conant" on Justia Law

Simmons and Gyurica were fishing on a bridge near Bowden’s property. Bowden shouted to the men to identify themselves; he fired a shotgun from his deck when they failed to respond. Bowden and Simmons then had a verbal altercation, with Bowden holding his shotgun. Each called the police. Deputy Martin first spoke with Simmons and Gyurica at the residence of Simmons’s grandmother, Voyles. They reported that Bowden shot at them. Bowden said that he shot away from the men. Martin relayed these circumstances to his supervisor, who ordered Martin to seize the shotgun and to draft a probable cause statement averring that there was probable cause that Bowden had unlawfully used a weapon. The parties dispute involvement by the circuit clerk, a friend of Voyles. Martin later admitted that he did not think that Bowden had violated Missouri law. The Jefferson County prosecutor obtained an arrest warrant. A Missouri court held a preliminary hearing and determined that there was probable cause. Bowden was acquitted. In Bowden’s suit alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, the court denied the defendants summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the facts, in the light most favorable to Bowden do not show violation of his constitutional rights. View "Bowden v. Martin" on Justia Law

Powell contends that his Christian beliefs compel him to publicly share his faith with others. Powell went to the Iowa State Fairgrounds and positioned himself on a sidewalk outside the paid admission area, close to a heavily-traveled intersection near the fair’s main gate. Uniformed Iowa State Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave the fairgrounds. The next day, Powell returned to the fairgrounds and stood in front of public restrooms outside the paid admission area. Fair Patrol Officers told him to leave. Powell brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 and sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted in part, prohibiting defendants from “arresting or threatening to arrest [Powell] solely for engaging in protected speech on the Fairgrounds in locations where [appellees] have already conceded that he is not impeding or would not be likely to impede the flow of traffic.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Powell’s motion based on his First Amendment claim and remanded the case for consideration of Powell’s request for preliminary injunctive relief based on his due process claim. View "Powell v. Noble" on Justia Law

Long, a member of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, operated the “OC Store,” a novelty store, on the reservation. The store had few exterior windows. BIA Officer Spargur encountered juveniles, carrying fireworks. One juvenile stated that he just bought them at the OC Store. Spargur went to the Store, was unsure whether it was closed, but concluded the store was open because of lights, music, unlocked doors, and the juveniles’ report that they had “just” purchased fireworks. Spargur entered through two unlocked doors, stopped at a third door, and “knock[ed] and announce[d] police.” Receiving no response, Spargur opened the main door, and, seeing Long’s son, entered the store. Another of Long’s sons acknowledged the juveniles had been in the store. Spargur noticed a small package on one of the concession tables that, based on his experience and training, he “recognized . . . as a package normally holding synthetic marijuana.” Once Long emerged, Spargur reminded him not to sell fireworks after Independence Day, left the store, and prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. A judge, 60 miles away, approved the warrant by telephone. Spargur and others searched the store, seizing 80 grams of synthetic marijuana. Long conditionally pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, finding that the officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

A shed on the Brandweins’ leased property caught fire. Neighbors called for assistance and knocked on the door of the residence, but received no response. Concerned that a truck parked near the shed would catch fire, a neighbor moved it, using keys he found in its ignition. The neighbor noticed a loaded rifle on the ground nearby. Officers arrived. Informed that all of the Brandweins’ vehicles were present, officers knocked loudly several times, and became concerned that there may be injured persons inside the home. They used keys from the truck to enter the house, where they saw drug paraphernalia and firearms in plain view. Officers continued to announce their presence. Brandwein emerged from the bedroom, fully dressed, sweating profusely, and apparently disoriented. Brandwein’s wife returned. An officer noticed large glass jars containing what he believed to be methamphetamine, informed the wife that he was going to secure the residence and apply for a search warrant. The district court found that she consented to a search, but returned to the kitchen, and cleaned the jars. Brandwein, charged with the unlawful possession of six firearms as a previously convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(a)(2), and attempted manufacturing of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C),; 846, unsuccessfully moved to suppress all evidence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial and his firearms conviction. He was acquitted on the drug charge. View "United States v. Brandwein" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are same-sex couples seeking to marry in Arkansas, South Dakota, or Nebraska or to have their marriage in another state recognized in those states. They also sought state benefits incident to marriage. The district court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment, finding that state laws denying them the right to marry violate the U.S. Constitution’s guarantees of due process and equal protection. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, (2015), abrogating Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning (2006). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The challenged laws are unconstitutional. As Obergefell concluded: [T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. View "Waters v. Ricketts" on Justia Law

King pled guilty in Arkansas state court to 1,577 counts of forgery and theft of property for embezzling more than $700,000 from the school district where she worked. The court sentenced King to 80 years imprisonment, within the guidelines range. King had no criminal history and claims she accepted the plea because of threats that her husband and son would also be charged. Five months later, the court reduced King’s sentence to 20 years imprisonment, under Arkansas Code 16-90-111, which allows a trial court to “correct an illegal sentence at any time” or to “correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within . . . ninety (90) days after the sentence is imposed.” The state appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which reinstated King’s 80-year sentence, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the reduction because the 90-day period for doing so had expired. King sought federal habeas relief. Although the district court was clearly sympathetic, it found no grounds for habeas relief. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that King is not entitled to habeas relief based on her disagreement with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Arkansas law. View "King v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Brown pled guilty as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 180 months’ imprisonment, finding that Brown had three predicate convictions, including possession of a short-barreled shotgun. In 2013 the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the shotgun conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA’s “residual clause,” which provides that crime is a violent felony if it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of its 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which struck down the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law