Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brown pled guilty as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 180 months’ imprisonment, finding that Brown had three predicate convictions, including possession of a short-barreled shotgun. In 2013 the Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the shotgun conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA’s “residual clause,” which provides that crime is a violent felony if it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of its 2015 decision, Johnson v. United States, which struck down the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

St. Louis Metropolitan Police Officer Hendricks was driving when her patrol car’s license plate recognition system alerted, indicating that a man named Hicks was associated with a nearby car, was wanted for first-degree domestic assault, and could be armed and dangerous. The alert did not explain how or when Hicks was associated with the car. After pulling the car over, Hendricks asked the driver for his license, which identified him as Hicks. A second officer, Christensen, arrived, and asked the passenger, Williams, to step out and present identification. According to Christensen, Williams patted his waistband twice while getting out of the car, with his hands shaking uncontrollably as he retrieved his identification. Christensen handcuffed Williams, conducted a pat-down search, felt what he recognized to be a firearm, removed a handgun from Williams’s waistband, then found a bag containing “a dark rock-like substance” in Williams’s pocket--later identified as heroin. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Williams’ conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922, upholding denial of a motion to suppress and of motions in limine that sought to exclude his 2002 conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon and a 1995 conviction for unlawful possession of a concealable firearm and unlawful use of a firearm. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

St. Louis Metropolitan Police Officer Hendricks was driving when her patrol car’s license plate recognition system alerted, indicating that a man named Hicks was associated with a nearby car, was wanted for first-degree domestic assault, and could be armed and dangerous. The alert did not explain how or when Hicks was associated with the car. After pulling the car over, Hendricks asked the driver for his license, which identified him as Hicks. A second officer, Christensen, arrived, and asked the passenger, Williams, to step out and present identification. According to Christensen, Williams patted his waistband twice while getting out of the car, with his hands shaking uncontrollably as he retrieved his identification. Christensen handcuffed Williams, conducted a pat-down search, felt what he recognized to be a firearm, removed a handgun from Williams’s waistband, then found a bag containing “a dark rock-like substance” in Williams’s pocket--later identified as heroin. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Williams’ conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922, upholding denial of a motion to suppress and of motions in limine that sought to exclude his 2002 conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon and a 1995 conviction for unlawful possession of a concealable firearm and unlawful use of a firearm. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Officers Lesher and McCrillis were working off-duty, patrolling a Little Rock apartment complex. They noticed that Ellison’s apartment door was open. From outside, they could see 67-year-old Ellison sitting on his couch, leaning on his cane. After Lesher and McCrillis started a conversation, Ellison responded that he did not want help or attention. McCrillis thought Ellison was being mouthy and wanted to keep him from shutting the door. The women stepped inside. Ellison got up and approached. A physical altercation ensued. The officers repeatedly struck Ellison and knocked off his glasses. Ellison repeatedly told them to get out of his apartment. McCrillis requested back-up, which arrived after the physical altercation was over. Lesher was still inside the apartment. Officer Lucio reached inside to pull Lesher out. The officers instructed Ellison to lie down. He refused. Lesher told McCrillis that Ellison was getting his cane, and that she was going to shoot Ellison. She fired two shots into the apartment, killing Ellison. In the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Eighth Circuit held that neither officer was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim of illegal entry; that Lesher was not entitled to qualified immunity on a claim of lethal excessive force; but both are entitled to qualified immunity on a claim concerning use of nonlethal force. View "Ellison v. Lesher" on Justia Law

Duit, an Oklahoma highway contractor, contracted with the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD) to reconstruct I-30 between Little Rock and Benton. Duit encountered soil conditions that, it alleges, differed materially from information provided by the ASHTD during bidding. Duit’s claims for compensation were denied by the ASHTD, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, and the General Assembly. Duit sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the “in re Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Duit alleged violations of the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 101, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses and sought to “enjoin Defendants from accepting federal aid … until . . . they fully comply with the federally mandated differing site clause.” The court dismissed the FAHA claim because that statute is enforced exclusively by an executive agency, dismissed the due process claim because Duit’s interest in future highway contracts is not a protected property interest and because the state appeals process for claim denials satisfies procedural due process requirements. The court declined to dismiss the equal protection claim, concluding Duit sufficiently alleged that the Commission treated out-of-state-contractor Duit differently from similarly situated in-state contractors without a rational reason. The Eighth Circuit held that Duit lacks standing to bring its equal protection claim and that the court erred in not dismissing that claim. View "Duit Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Castleman was charged with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, maintaining drug premises, and conspiracy to possess chemicals and equipment used to make methamphetamine. Some evidence came from a traffic stop in Walnut Ridge, Arkansas and a later search of open fields on Castleman's property. The court denied motions to suppress the evidence. At trial the government also introduced evidence that he had murdered a coconspirator to prevent him from testifying. This testimony was offered over Castleman's objection as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. At sentencing the court found that Castleman had murdered the coconspirator, applied the higher base offense level for first degree murder under U.S.S.G. 2A1.1; 2D1.1(d)(1), and sentenced him to 40 years imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Castleman did not show that any expectation of privacy he had in trash bags, which were visible in the open field, was objectively reasonable. Castleman admitted that the evidence as a whole was legally sufficient to support the convictions, and the jury was properly instructed regarding the value of the consciousness of guilt evidence. It was within the court's discretion to determine that the probative value of the contested evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. View "United States v. Castleman" on Justia Law

Trooper Taylor observed a car on I-80 with very dark-tinted windows, traveling at a high speed. He initiated a traffic stop. The driver, Gomez, provided a valid driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. After testing and discovering the window tint level violated Iowa law, Taylor began to issue warnings for the tint and speeding violations at 9:01. When questioned, the men did not accurately identify each other, the owner of the car, or the purpose of their trip. They appeared "extremely nervous." Taylor ran checks on all three men. Dispatch responded that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for passenger Anguiano and that he was "armed and dangerous." At 9:29, another trooper arrived. Anguiano was arrested. At 9:41, Taylor issued written warnings and returned Gomez’s documents, stating that the traffic stop was done, but asked for consent to search the vehicle. Gomez gave written consent. At 9:50 the troopers began to search. They found a bag containing a stolen rifle and ammunition; a meth pipe; and open beer; removing the panel in the center console, they found two pounds of methamphetamine. The men were charged with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, rejecting arguments that the stop was unreasonably prolonged and the search went beyond the scope of consent. View "United States v. Anguiano" on Justia Law

Pierre and three co-defendants were charged, in the Minnesota district court, with conspiracy to defraud the government, 18 U.S.C. 286, by submitting 1066 false tax returns and claiming undeserved tax refunds of about $6.9 million. They used social security numbers belonging to Florida prisoners on returns and, allegedly, incorporated fictitious businesses in Minnesota, opened bank accounts on behalf of those businesses, and collected tax refunds in those accounts. The indictment also charged Pierre with money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. Before the Minnesota indictment was returned, Pierre and two co-defendants were indicted in Florida. Pierre’s Florida codefendants were not mentioned in the Minnesota indictment. The Florida indictment charged conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 286, conspiracy to use unauthorized access devices (section 1029(b)(2)), use of unauthorized access devices (section 1029(a)(2)), and aggravated identity theft (section 1028A(a)(1)). The indictment also charged Pierre with possession of 15 or more unauthorized access devices (i.e., debit cards and social security numbers), 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3). A jury convicted Pierre on all counts charged in Florida. Pierre unsuccessfully moved three times to dismiss his Minnesota indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the prior conviction did not encompass either the same conspiracy or the money laundering offense charged in Minnesota. View "United States v. Pierre" on Justia Law

Solomon was convicted of violating supervised release and was allowed to voluntarily surrender himself. Solomon absconded after writing a letter, stating his hope that Hendren, then Chief Judge of the Western District of Arkansas, "dies of a slow and painful disease." He sent the letter to Hendren's chambers and a newspaper, which published it. Solomon was apprehended. U.S. Marshal Jones, accompanied by a guard, drove him to Arkansas. According to Solomon's pro se complaint they, "said [he]'d 'pay for writing that type of letter.'" Solomon was transferred to the Benton County Criminal Detention Center (BCCDC). Solomon claimed, while driving him to the BCCDC, the Marshals said that BCCDC "was like going to hell … for their abusive handling practices" and that "they were going to make sure [he] was punished for that letter." Later, Solomon alleged that he was hit by Marshal Cory Thomas; that he "was handcuffed in the middle of the night . . . and a dark cloth was slipped over [his] head and he was . . . carried . . . into another room and given a 'blanket-party' by the deputies." Solomon filed a pro se “Bivens” action. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, finding that Jones and Thomas were not entitled to qualified immunity against Solomon's excessive force claim View "Solomon v. Deputy U.S. Marshal Thomas" on Justia Law

A Kansas City police officer stopped Harris for speeding. Before the stop, the officer saw him reaching below the driver’s seat and center console. Approaching the car, the officer smelled marijuana, but could not determine the source. The officer ordered Harris out of the car and soon found marijuana in Harris’s wallet. Harris was driving with a revoked license, so the officer arrested him. Because the car was parked on the left shoulder of a highway, the officer called for a tow truck. He inventoried the car, discovering a loaded 9mm semi-automatic handgun under the driver’s seat. Harris admitted he was a convicted felon, knew the gun was in the car, and had handled it before. Harris plead guilty to possessing a firearm, having been convicted of three previous violent felonies, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of his motion to suppress. Harris’s car was towed pursuant to police policy. Police are not precluded from conducting inventory searches when they lawfully impound the vehicle of an individual that they also happen to suspect is involved in illegal activity, and, when police are conducting inventory searches according to standardized policies they may “keep their eyes open.” View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law