Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the Fire District suspended Anzaldua, a paramedic and firefighter, for failing to respond to a directive issued by Chief Farwell, Anzaldua emailed a newspaper reporter expressing concerns about the District and about Farwell. The email “shocked” and “angered” his co-workers. Battalion chiefs noted it “fostered division between Anzaldua and his co-workers," and between firefighters and Farwell. The District terminated Anzaldua, who sued, alleging that the District and the individuals involved in his termination violated his First Amendment rights by retaliation and that Farwell and Anzaldua’s ex-girlfriend violated federal and state computer privacy laws by accessing his email account and obtaining his emails. The district court allowed some First Amendment claims to proceed but dismissed all other claims and denied leave to amend the computer privacy law claims. The court granted defendants summary judgment on Anzaldua’s First Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Anzaldua’s First Amendment claims and denial of leave to amend federal computer privacy law claims, but reversed denial of leave to amend state computer privacy law claims. View "Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire" on Justia Law

In 1992, Gabaree began living with a woman who had two daughters; the two later had two children together. In 1996, three children told a social services employee that Gabaree was abusing them. A physician found marks that had been inflicted intentionally. The girls, ages five and six, made inconsistent statements concerning sexual abuse; no physical evidence was found. Gabaree was convicted of statutory sodomy, first-degree child molestation, and child abuse. A court granted post-conviction relief because Gabaree’s attorney had failed to impeach the girls. At a 2003 retrial, one girl testified that Gabaree had sex with her and that she saw Gabaree having sex with her sister, who testified that Gabaree had “touched her ‘private part’ with his hands.” The court admitted the statement of an unavailable witness that the girls had previously recanted their allegations. A doctor’s testimony about Gabaree’s “propensity” was not challenged. Gabaree again was convicted of all counts. The state court denied Gabaree’s post-conviction petition, concluding that counsel’s stated possible reasons for not objecting to the doctors’ testimony were not necessarily unreasonable. Gabaree sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted Gabaree’s petition with respect to his convictions for sodomy and child molestation and denied his petition with respect to child abuse. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. By not challenging the testimony of the doctor concerning sexual abuse, counsel failed to make the adversarial testing process work. View "Gabaree v. Steele" on Justia Law

The victim was diagnosed with a skull fracture and a subdural hematoma, a type of traumatic brain injury after being found unconscious at a drinking party at which William Clifford, King Martinez, and four others were present. Clifford was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3), (6), 1153, and 2. In addition to the victim’s testimony, the district court admitted an out-of-court statement by the victim's three-year-old son that "Will and King hurt mama." Clifford objected to this evidence based on the Confrontation Clause. A jury convicted Clifford of simple assault and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The record showed an informal, spontaneous conversation between a very young child and a private individual to determine how the victim had just been injured, not a statement intended as testimony. The statement was also properly admitted under the hearsay exception for an excited utterance. View "United States v. Clifford" on Justia Law

Eva Robinson and her son Matthew were walking their dog. Dover Deputy Payton observed "suspicious people walking." He stopped them. The dog ran away; Matthew chased it. After Matthew returned with the dog, Payton placed them inside his patrol car. Pope County Deputy Stevens and Arkansas State Trooper Condley arrived. Stevens asked Matthew to exit the patrol car. Matthew did not exit. Stevens tased Matthew. According to the Robinsons, Matthew, who is very large, was tased while struggling to get out. Condley asserts Matthew refused to exit after multiple requests. The parties disagree about whether warning was given. Condley removed Eva from the vehicle, and handcuffed her. Payton pulled Matthew from the car and stunned him, then took Matthew to the ground and stunned him again. Photos show at least 15 taser marks. Searching Matthew, the officers found cigarette lighters and an air chuck. Eva thought the officers were shooting a handgun. She urinated on herself and screamed. Wanting to cover Matthew, she broke free a. Condley grabbed her and slammed her onto the hood of the patrol car. Eva was charged with disorderly conduct, refusal to submit to arrest, and criminal mischief. Matthew was charged with refusal to submit to arrest. The Robinsons sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Condley's motion for qualified immunity on the claim that Condley failed to intervene during the other officers' use of excessive force. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Condley's duty to intervene in these circumstances was not clearly established, View "Robinson v.Condley" on Justia Law

Because of an unpaid drug debt, Velez attacked the victim in a prolonged beating with a metal pole causing numerous broken bones and other serious injuries. Velez pleaded guilty to two counts of "willful injury causing serious injury" under Iowa law. The plea agreement provided that the state would recommend consecutive sentences for the counts, both based upon the July 5, 2010, incident. The state court sentenced Velez to consecutive 10-year sentences. On appeal, Velez asserted there was an inadequate factual basis for his plea, that counsel was ineffective, and that the sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the plea colloquy only established a factual basis for the proposition that Velez had caused multiple serious injuries, not that there were at least two discrete incidents. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, finding that the record as a whole contained a sufficient factual basis to support a finding of two separate assaults. The federal district court denied habeas relief, finding that the state court's adjudication of the federal issue was not an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence and that Velez's convictions were not based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. The Eighth circuit affirmed. View "Velez v. Clarinda Corr. Facility" on Justia Law

Franklin claimed that Young, an assistant caseworker at the facility where Franklin was incarcerated, violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from sexual assault by another inmate by being deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that he would be sexually assaulted by inmate Mosley. The district court denied Young’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, holding that factual disputes prevented the court from determining whether Young violated Franklin’s rights. The Eighth Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal. A district court's summary judgment order denying qualified immunity may not be appealed “insofar as [it] determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Essentially, Young argued that the district court erred in finding a genuine dispute of material fact over whether he violated Franklin’s Eighth Amendment rights. By challenging the district court's finding on sufficiency of the evidence, Young was asking the court to engage in “the time-consuming task of reviewing a factual controversy about intent.” View "Franklin v. Young" on Justia Law

Ransom was driving home to Kansas City. His van began backfiring. He pulled over. Someone called 911 and reported that shots had been fired from or near a white van, though the caller did not report seeing flashes. Officers Phillips and Conaway arrived and pulled behind Ransom’s van, which had on its hazard lights. The van backfired; its driver’s-side door opened. Phillips yelled, “Get back in.” Ransom apparently did not hear and stepped out. The officers fired eight shots. Ransom did not notice that they had fired at him. The officers reported “shots fired.” Ransom stated “My van is backfiring.” Phillips stated, ““No, it’s not. Our window’s shot out” and ordered Ransom to walk toward the squad car. Ransom complied. The Officers requested back-up, thinking another person might be shooting from a ditch. Ransom was taken to police headquarters. When his interview ended, he accepted a ride. Officers pulled behind the van, began to exit, and heard a loud backfire that they thought was a gunshot. The officers believed that they were being “ambushed.” When Ransom did not follow a command to get back in his car, Phillips believed that Ransom was attempting suicide by cop and feared for his safety and for bystanders. The officers thought they heard more shots and fired at Ransom. An investigation determined Ransom’s van was backfiring; there was no suspect nearby. Ransom was again questioned. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court concluded that there were disputed issues and denied the officers’ motion for qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit directed judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the officers’ conduct reasonable. View "Ransom v. Grisafe" on Justia Law

Snyder was on parole after serving sentences for possession of a controlled substance and automobile theft. The Missouri Board of Probation and Parole determined that Snyder had absconded and issued a warrant for his arrest. Julian, an employee of the Board’s Fugitive Apprehension Unit, received a telephone call informing him that Snyder was at an apartment in Cape Girardeau. Julian drove to the address and positioned his car in a well-lighted parking lot in front of the apartment. Julian saw Snyder, got out of his car, and informed Snyder that he was a parole officer with a warrant for Snyder’s arrest. Snyder placed his hands on the back of Julian’s car. Julian approached, stood to Snyder’s left, and placed his left hand on Snyder’s left shoulder. Snyder then turned to his right and began to run. After Snyder took two steps, Julian fired one shot, killing him. In a suit by Snyder’s estate, the jury rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but awarded $1 million for wrongful death. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that there was sufficient evidence to defeat Julian’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and that the damages award did not require a new trial. View "Estate of Snyder v. Julian" on Justia Law

Des Moines Officers Chiodo, Fong, and Wilshusen were patrolling in a marked squad car. A week earlier, a shooting had occurred nearby; the area had been the site of murders and narcotics and gang-related activity. Around 1:00 a.m., the officers saw people loitering near a commercial building. The businesses were closed. One business owner had filed a letter, requesting police assistance in enforcing a sign prohibiting trespassing. The officers decided to approach, ask for identification, and advise them that they were trespassing. As they drove into the parking lot, they recognized Brown, a suspect in three murders and several narcotics investigations and the subject of a bulletin warning officers to use caution because he is believed to be armed and dangerous. Sighting the squad car, the group walked around the building. The officers observed one of the men, later identified as Trogdon, place something on the ground. The officers followed, then exited the squad car. Chiodo approached Trogdon, ordered him to stop, and asked if he had any identification. Trogdon responded that he did not. Chiodo informed Trogdon that he was going to perform a pat-down and grabbed Trogdon’s arm. Trogdon attempted to flee. With assistance, Chiodo took Trogdon to the ground and handcuffed him. Trogdon announced that he had a firearm. Officers located a handgun in his waistband. The district court denied his motion to suppress. Trogdon entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm as a felon. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the police lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and frisk. View "United States v. Trogdon" on Justia Law

Officer Bovy was stopped at a red light and saw Gaffney’s vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. As the light changed to green, the vehicle, without slowing, moved through the intersection. Bovy made a u-turn to follow it. Gaffney braked hard and made a right turn. Bovy turned on his lights. The vehicle stopped. Bovy said he estimated Gaffney was driving 50 to 55 mph in a 35 mph zone. While Gaffney was looking for an insurance card, dispatch told Bovy that Gaffney had a narcotics history. Bovy noticed Gaffney appeared nervous with beads of sweat, shaking, and heavy breathing. Gaffney stated that he had no drugs or weapons, but declined permission to search his vehicle. Bovy ordered him to exit the vehicle to prepare for a dog sniff (the dog was in his car). Conducting a pat-down search, Bovy detected a long round object with a bulb on the end--a meth pipe. Bovy had the vehicle towed. An inventory search disclosed four pounds of ice meth. At a suppression hearing, Bovy testified he received training in identifying speed 11 years earlier; his estimate of 50-55 mph was based on his general experience. Gaffney presented evidence that his vehicle traveled about 473 feet in nine seconds, an average speed of 35.8 miles per hour. The court denied the motion. The Eight Circuit affirmed. Based on the totality of the facts, corroborated by Gaffney’s admission and the investigator’s measurement, Bovy’s belief that Gaffney was speeding was objectively reasonable. View "United States v. Gaffney" on Justia Law