Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Danial received a 120-day "shock" sentence for possessing marijuana. At the Missouri Western Correction Center, Danial was placed in the prison's "hospital" ward, where he beat on the walls. Following a request from mental health personnel, Danial was moved to a padded cell. He remained in a manic state, under the highest level of observation, requiring in-person checks for an affirmative response four times an hour. One night, staff merely viewed Danial through a monitor. Around 11:26 p.m., Danial fell and hit his head against a wall, slid down, and remained sitting until he fell backward again, hitting his head on the door jamb. Danial stated that he injured his head and needed medical attention. Staff did not open the cell door. They obtained no responses from Danial during the rest of the shift. Around 9:00 a.m., staff tried to wake him, even splashing water on Danial's face through a door opening. Danial responded by moving his eyes "slightly" and groaning. Danial had been in the same position, unresponsive for hours, but staff still did not open the door. When staff finally entered Danial's cell, his temperature was below 90 degrees, his pulse was between 30 and 34 beats per minute, and his eyes were fixed and dilated. He died in a hospital three days later, as a result of subdural hematoma caused by the falls in his cell. His parents sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on deliberate indifference claims, asserting qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a jury could find two defendants liable for deliberate indifference, but that the conduct of a third officer constituted, at most, negligence. View "Letterman v. Farnsworth" on Justia Law

Schoettle, an insulin-dependent diabetic, was driving when he became lightheaded. He parked on the shoulder, took glucose tablets, and fell asleep or became unconscious. Deputy Hudson approached, knocked on the window, and attempted to identify himself. Schoettle mumbled that he was recovering from low blood sugar. Believing Schoettle to be intoxicated, Hudson radioed for a DWI enforcement officer. Peifer arrived. Schoettle told him to “leave me the fuck alone.” Peifer twice requested that Schoettle exit his vehicle. Schoettle refused. The officers grabbed Schoettle’s legs and pulled him out, causing him to hit the ground. Schoettle attempted to return to the truck. The officers forced him to the ground. While they attempted to handcuff him, Schoettle stated he had a gun in his waistband. Peifer removed the gun and threw it. Schoettle became more agitated because the gun could have discharged, and asked the officers if they were stupid, continuing to struggle. The officers pepper-sprayed and struck Schoettle, trying to subdue him. An ambulance arrived. EMS personnel noted that Schoettle was “very uncooperative.” After treatment for a nosebleed and hypoglycemia, he became calm. Tests on his blood alcohol content were negative. He had a broken rib. Schoettle sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that even if the officers were aware that Schoettle was suffering a hypoglycemic episode, they were still confronted with a belligerent and impaired man who was refusing to comply with orders. View "Schoettle v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

While in prison, Brown incorporated “Softwear Group.” After his release, Brown obtained an investment from Armstrong, a prison friend, who was in the residential mortgage business. Brown earned $5,000 per month. When the company floundered, Brown purchased five homes in 2006. Brown inflated the purchase price on his loan applications, prepared by Armstrong. He represented that he would occupy each house and that he earned $15,000 per month. Brown received kickbacks totaling $224,500. Brown was charged with wire fraud and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. The prosecution presented testimony from Parton, the loan closer. On cross examination, defense counsel questioned Parton about statements she allegedly made to a private investigator, Reeder, by telephone. Brown called Reeder to testify about that interview. The court ruled that Parton’s testimony that she could not recall making certain statements was not inconsistent with her alleged statements as recounted by Reeder, so that Reeder’s testimony could not be used to impeach Parton, and instructed the jury to disregard Reeder’s testimony. Armstrong took a plea agreement and testified. Defense counsel asked Armstrong about his possible sentence, eliciting testimony that his “criminal history” was going to be “quite high.” The court sustained the government’s objection. The court sentenced Brown to 87 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the court violated his right of confrontation by limiting cross-examination of Armstrong and by excluding Reeder’s testimony regarding Parton’s interview. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

A masked man fired shots into a car, striking occupants. Witnesses saw a black Chrysler leave the area. Moments later, an officer saw a black Chrysler blocks from the crime scene, asked the driver, Phillip Roberts, to identify himself, took pictures of him, and allowed Roberts to leave. A week later, police received an anonymous tip concerning “Phillip,” called “Philco,” with a photograph of Phillip that matched a booking picture of Roberts. The gang unit indicated that Roberts was called Philco. A witness identified Roberts from a photo lineup. A notice to arrest Roberts issued. Officers recognized Roberts while driving and arrested him. Roberts was the sole occupant of the car, which was registered to Roberts. An inventory search uncovered marijuana and a handgun in the center console. Roberts, recorded by the police car’s system during the search, said, “[b]ack to the joint,” The gun had no fingerprints, but DNA from the gun was consistent with Roberts’s DNA. Roberts was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the handgun and marijuana and a statement he made after his arrest. Roberts was convicted and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the two vehicle stops. View "United States v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Officers obtained a warrant and searched an Arkansas home where an identifiable internet connection and computer had been used to receive child pornography, but did not find the computer. The home’s wireless network was unsecure and could be accessed from neighboring homes. During the search, officers observed Harper leaving a neighboring home in a truck bearing Oklahoma license plates. Officers knew the computer being sought had been used in the vicinity of Owassa, Oklahoma, to download child pornography. Officers ran the plates and discovered Harper had an outstanding warrant for contempt. Officers approached the home and talked to Harper's girlfriend, who stated she and Harper had recently moved to Arkansas from Owassa. Officers eventually located Harper, arrested him, searched his truck, and discovered a computer and a thumb drive in a backpack in a truck-bed toolbox. Later, at the police station, officers gave Harper a Miranda warning, and he signed a consent form to allow search of the computer and thumb drive. After officers discovered child pornography, Harper admitted he had downloaded the images. Harper moved to suppress the materials found in the truck. The parties dispute whether an officer asked for or obtained consent before searching the truck or toolbox. Harper entered a conditional plea agreement to Receipt of Images of Child Pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2); (b)(1). The Eighth Circuit upheld denial of the motion to suppress and his sentence of 121 months' imprisonment. View "United States v. Harper" on Justia Law

Trinity operates on its church premises a licensed preschool and daycare, the Learning Center, which has an open admissions policy. It teaches a Christian world view and incorporates daily religious instruction in its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants, a solid waste management program, providing funds for the purchase of recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. In 2012, Trinity applied for a grant, disclosing that the Learning Center was part of Trinity. DNR denied the application, stating that the Missouri Constitution specifically provides that “no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion.” Trinity’s application ranked fifth out of 44 applications and 14 projects were funded. Trinity sued, citing the Equal Protection Clause; its right to free exercise of religion; the Establishment Clause, and its right of free speech. The district court dismissed and declined to reconsider in light of evidence that the DNR had previously given Scrap Tire grants to 15 religious organizations, including churches. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, citing precedent that concluding that Missouri Constitution Article I, section 7 does not conflict with the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. View "Trinity Lutheran Church v. Pauley" on Justia Law

Sergeant Denver of the Benton County Sheriff’s Office arrested New in 2009 for possession of marijuana after two leaves were found during a consensual search of New’s car following a traffic stop. When the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory tested the leaves and reported they did not contain detectible amounts of Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the prosecutor dropped a criminal charge. New filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Denver, alleging he was arrested without probable cause. Denver moved for summary judgment on the merits and based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it could not make “a credibility determination crediting Mr. Denver’s assertions as true in the face of contrary evidence -- a negative lab result and the contrary averments of Mr. New.” The Eighth Circuit reversed: an objectively reasonable police officer with Denver’s training and experience could have reasonably believed that the leaves he found in New’s car were marijuana, giving Denver probable cause to arrest and have the leaves tested for THC. More than evidence of a mistake is required to deny a public official qualified immunity from section 1983 damage liability. View "New v. Denver" on Justia Law

Medina police officers arrested Greenman on three separate occasions for, among other things, operating his Segway while under the influence of alcohol (DWI) in violation of Minnesota Statutes Chapter 169A. Greenman filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the officers and city prosecutor violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, his due-process rights, and his First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. He further alleged that the city was liable for not properly training and supervising its police officers. He also filed several state-law claims. The district court dismissed all the federal claims, on the basis that the police officers and city prosecutor were entitled to qualified immunity, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Greenman’s state-law claims. The Eighth Circuit concluded that a request for declaratory relief is moot because there is no longer an actual case or controversy.. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has concluded that operating a Segway while intoxicated does not violate Minnesota’s DWI statute. Following that decision, the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office dismissed the pending DWI charges against Greenman. View "Greenman v. Jessen" on Justia Law

The Arkansas Human Heartbeat Act provided that a licensed physician “shall not perform an abortion on a pregnant woman before the person tests the pregnant woman to determine whether the fetus that a pregnant woman is carrying possesses a detectible heartbeat.” Ark. Code 20-16-1303(a) (f). A physician could not perform an abortion on a pregnant woman with the specific intent of causing or abetting the termination of the life of an unborn human individual whose heartbeat has been detected and was 12 weeks or greater gestation. The penalty for violation was revocation of the physician's medical license. The Act provided exceptions to protect the life of the mother, for a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest, or for a medical emergency and required informed disclosures about the existence of a heartbeat and the probability of bringing the unborn to term. Arkansas physicians, on behalf of themselves and their patients, challenged the constitutionality of the Act, seeking a permanent injunction. The district court granted a permanent injunction, prohibiting enforcement. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that viability of a fetus varies with individuals. View "Edwards v. Beck" on Justia Law

Manning, who had a 1997 Texas sexual assault conviction, was arrested in El Dorado, Arkansas, and charged with failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Manning entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss, raising “frequently-litigated” constitutional and statutory issues. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Manning’s argument that SORNA did not clarify whether its registration requirements apply to convictions prior to its enactment. The court rejected specific arguments that delegating to the Attorney General the legislative power to determine the individuals to whom SORNA applies violates the constitutional nondelgation doctrine that is “rooted in the principle of separation of powers” and that SORNA violates the Commerce Clause. View "United States v. Manning" on Justia Law