Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Beckmann, convicted for possession of child pornography in 2001, was visited for a routine compliance check. Beckmann consented to a search of a laptop, visible on a table. While Deputy Barbato searched the laptop, Beckmann showed Deputy Thebeau the rest of the residence. Thebeau alerted Barbato that there was another computer upstairs. While Thebeau used a washroom, Barbato looked into the office where Beckmann went. He saw a computer desk with a monitor, with Beckmann underneath working with cords. Beckmann seemed startled at seeing Barbato and consented to have Barbato look at the computer. Barbato saw a computer tower and two external hard drives underneath the desk. Barbato plugged the power cord to the external drive back into the wall and searched the computer, including the external drives. He did not get specific consent to search the external drives or to plug the external drive back into the wall; he considered them part of the “computer” because they were plugged into the computer. Barbato discovered file names suggesting child pornography. Beckmann pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment plus a lifetime of supervised release, and ordered to pay $9,000 of restitution. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding denials of motions to suppress evidence View "United States v. Beckmann" on Justia Law

Billiot was convicted in Louisiana state court on three counts of aggravated incest in 1996, and on one count of aggravated incest in 1997. He was released from state custody in 2000. At the time of Billiot’s convictions, Louisiana law required convicted sex offenders to register for 10 years after release from imprisonment. La. Stat. 15:544. Amendments to Louisiana law now impose lifetime registration and notification requirements on certain offenders. Billiot initially complied with the registration law, but in 2012, he moved to Arkansas. Billiot admits he knew he had a duty to register, but he failed to do so after moving. Billiot pled guilty to violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250, but asserted that in 2000, Louisiana officials told him he had to register for 10 years. Only later did an employee of the Louisiana sex offender registry tell him that he must register for life. The district court held that “extension of Billiot’s registration obligation … while he was subject to the original obligation,” did not present a “federal constitutional problem.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an Ex Post Facto Clause argument and a challenge to a special condition of supervised release, requiring sex-offender treatment. View "United States v. Billiot" on Justia Law

Ziesmer was driving when Travis threw a cigarette out the window. It flew back in and landed on the back floor. Ziesmer pulled over to retrieve the cigarette. Trooper Hagen approached. Hagen claims and Travis denies that Travis “bent over as if” reaching for something. Hagen claims he saw a hammer. Ziesmer claims the hammer was under the seat, not visible. Hagen reported smelling marijuana. The occupants disagree. Hagen ran their names. No relevant information appeared. Hagen subsequently searched all three occupants and the car. The occupants claim that Hagen began screaming, pulled Ziesmer out of the car, and injured him. Ziesmer claims that he attempted to call 911, but Hagen “hung up my phone and threw it.” St. Paul Police have a record of the call. Hagen denied injuring Ziesmer and claimed that, searching Ziesmer, he found a small amount of marijuana. Ziesmer was cited for possession and released. Charges were later dropped. At home, he took pictures of his bruised face. Five days later, Ziesmer went had x-rays of his spine, head, and neck. Three months later he underwent an MRI and was diagnosed with “minimal disc bulging” and neck and upper-back pain. Almost three years later, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Hagen, finding material issues of unreasonable seizure and that injuries like those claimed are “within the range of common experience,” so the lack of a medical expert was not fatal to Zeismer’s claim. View "Ziesmer v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Grider and his family were at a Taco Bell. An argument occurred between Grider and another patron. Police were called. The Griders crossed the street to eat in their vehicle. Officer Bowling, the first to arrive, approached Grider, who was wearing a knife on his hip, and asked Grider to exit his vehicle. Grider declined. Bowling forcibly removed Grider, placed Grider on the ground with his knee on Grider's back, and handcuffed Grider. Officer Reece arrived, ran toward the two and kicked Grider in the head. Bowling and Reece did not communicate before the kick; Bowling did not act to prevent the kick. Grider had open whiskey in his vehicle, which the officers poured out. Grider suffered contusions and abrasions on his face; the kick caused neck pain and restriction of movement that persisted at least two years. Mrs. Grider suffered emotional distress and problems with her pregnancy. The Griders filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court found that Bowling was not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Grider had no evidence that Bowling was aware of the kick before it occurred or had the opportunity "to take action to deescalate." Bowling cannot be liable for nonfeasance under these circumstances. View "Grider v. Bowling" on Justia Law

Minneapolis Officers Martin and Englund were patrolling an area that had high levels of narcotics transactions. They saw a car stopped in the middle of the road with Hurd standing next to the driver’s window. Based on the high-crime location, the darkness, the cold temperature, and the absence of buildings on the block, Martin suspected a narcotics transaction. Martin stopped the squad car behind the other car. Hurd approached the squad car with his hands in his jacket pockets. The officers exited their vehicle and ordered Hurd to remove his hands from his pockets. Hurd initially complied, but then put them back in his pocket and continued to approach the officers. The officers grabbed Hurd and placed him over the hood of the squad car. Hurd still refused to take his hands out of his pockets. Martin reached into the pocket and felt the butt of a handgun. The officers removed a loaded, cocked .45-calibur pistol. Hurd was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers had no reason to conduct a Terry stop. The district court denied the motion, noting that a protective frisk for officer safety purposes was appropriate under the circumstances. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Hurd" on Justia Law

A Missouri deputy responded to a report of a stolen firearm. Arriving at the Elledge home he discovered that Jackson was reporting the stolen firearm. A Highway Patrol Trooper arrived. Jackson stated that he had purchased a rifle from Elledge and that Jackson’s nephew, Bobby, had stolen the rifle. Outside, the trooper informed the deputy that Jackson was a convicted felon with numerous armed criminal actions in his history. The officers contacted Bobby, who stated that he was in a dispute with Jackson and feared for his life. He stated Jackson had threatened to shoot him and that he had told Elledge this story and asked if he could take the gun to keep the gun away from Jackson. Elledge had agreed. Bobby informed the officers there was a firearm in Jackson’s home. Jackson denied having firearms in his home. Executing a warrant, officers discovered a firearm and ammunition in the Jackson home. Jackson was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in finding that the warrant application failed to supply probable cause, but the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In 2001, Phillips pled guilty to statutory rape. In 2012, he failed to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. In 2014, two months into his release, the Probation Office moved to revoke supervision. Phillips admitted violating release conditions, including unsupervised contact with minors. The court sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment and supervision for life. As a special release condition, Phillips cannot “possess or use . . . a computer . . . gaming equipment, cellular devices, or any other device with access to any ‘on line computer services,’ or subscribe to or use any Internet service . . . without the written approval of the probation office.” The Eight Circuit affirmed the lifetime supervision, vacated the special condition, and remanded. Phillips made no legal argument rebutting the presumptive reasonableness of lifetime supervision. Because the possibility of possessing child pornography may not necessarily justify a broad ban on Internet access, Phillips only possessed adult pornography. On remand, lesser restrictions on Phillips’s Internet access may be consistent with 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Matthews’s girlfriend, the mother of his child, reported theft of a firearm. She identified Matthews as a suspect and suggested that Matthews was trafficking heroin. Matthews lived in an apartment in a secure building, to which the owner had granted police access by a key in a lockbox. Their apartment was one of 40-50 opening onto a common hallway. Police went, with a trained dog, to conduct a drug sniff in that hallway outside Matthews’s apartment. The dog alerted to drugs. The next month police returned with the same dog and conducted another drug sniff outside Matthews’s apartment. The dog again alerted, but did not alert when police led it to other apartment doors. A state judge issued a warrant. Executing the warrant, police recovered drug paraphernalia, a digital scale, trace amounts of heroin, and the gun Hines had reported stolen. Matthews’s motion to suppress the evidence was denied. He was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(a).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction and 96-month sentence. In conducting the 2013 drug dog sniffs, police reasonably relied on precedent that a sniff of the apartment door frame from a common hallway does not constitute a search. The court properly rejected Matthews’s claims regarding his intent to return the gun and applied a stolen-firearm enhancement View "United States v. Mathews" on Justia Law

Johnson was a guard at the South Dakota State Penitentiary. Inmates Berget and Robert attempted to escape and intentionally murdered Johnson. Berget entered the penitentiary at age 15 after escaping repeatedly from State Training School. Berget amassed convictions for grand theft, burglary, escape, and attempt to escape. He spent most of his life in prison. His last escape attempt occurred in 1987. He did not have a history of institutional violence. Berget was transferred to segregation at times; Johnson’s estate alleges at least some transfers back to general population were negotiated to end hunger strikes. Robert had no criminal history when he arrived at the penitentiary in 2006 to serve an 80-year sentence for kidnapping. In 2007 Robert was discovered preparing for an escape attempt; he threatened a correctional officer. The estate alleges that Robert’s transfer from maximum security was to end his hunger strike. There was some forewarning of the escape attempt. The district court rejected the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Although the paperwork was not always completed for the discretionary housing decisions, it was within the warden’s power to move the inmates; the Department’s policies on warden discretion do not shock the conscience and the warden did not act with deliberate indifference. View "Estate of Johnson v. Weber" on Justia Law

Turner, a Missouri inmate, suffered from a neurological disorder but was able to ambulate, stand, and sit by using leg braces and crutches. Although Turner received medical care several times, no physician ordered a wheelchair or transport by wheelchair-accessible van. The facility had a wheelchair-accessible van with a "lift," but restricted its use to wheelchair users. Signage on the van advised that only wheelchairs were allowed on the lift and that standing on it was forbidden to avoid falls. For transport to a medical appointment, Turner arrived with neither a wheelchair nor a physician's order to use a wheelchair-accessible van. Turner alleges that he had to enter the van by crawling; that urine and vomit were on its floor, so that he was unable to eat while traveling; and that, during his return trip the driver stopped near a bridge and stated that the guards could drown Turner and claim that Turner tried to escape., Turner filed an Inmate Resolution Request; according to Turner, prison staff "ransacked" his cell and were verbally abusive in retaliation and that when he was moved to another prison, he was transported in a non-wheelchair-accessible van for part of the trip. The Eighth Circuit affirmed rejection of Turner’s claims of violations the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; the Americans with Disabilities Act,, 42 U.S.C. 12131; and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. View "Turner v. Mull" on Justia Law