Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After arresting prostitutes, officers noticed markings on one woman (victim). She identified Roy as her pimp and boyfriend. Roy had posted ads for the victim on Backpage.com. She was required to give Roy the money she earned. Roy hit and threatened her. The victim received disability benefits because she had difficulty reading, writing, and understanding complex concepts. In his trial for violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1), Roy sought to introduce a videotape of the victim performing oral sex on him, claiming that it showed that the victim was not forced into engaging in prostitution. The district court allowed Roy to cross-examine the victim about the video, but ruled that showing it was too prejudicial. The court did not allow testimony that the victim had engaged in prostitution before meeting Roy. The government provided disclosure about prosecution witnesses, but did not know that, years earlier, the victim made a statement in an Arkansas murder investigation, identifying the shooter. She later testified that she did not see the shooter and had told the police what her friend said to say. Roy moved for a new trial, claiming that the court erred in excluding the video and the victim’s sexual history, and asserting a Brady violation for failure to disclose the prior false statement. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. View "United States v. Roy" on Justia Law

Young approached an Iowa UPS truck to give the driver a package, anxiously offering to pay with cash. The driver directed Young to a dropoff location. Returning to that location, he saw a package from Young’s address. Because of Young’s behavior, the package’s shape, and the need for transport by plane, the driver contacted a supervisor, who opened the package and found cash wrapped in foil. UPS consulted local officer Weber, then sent the package to its intended recipient, Gonzalez, in Yuma, Arizona. Weber contacted Yuma police, who saw Gonzalez retrieve the package. Two days later UPS had a package from Gonzalez addressed to Young. A drug-detection dog handler had UPS place Gonzalez’s package with three similar packages without telling him or Weber which one came from Gonzalez. The dog nudged the third package and scratched at the fourth. On second and third passes, the dog showed no interest in the third package but scratched at the fourth. Weber learned that this package came from Gonzalez, took possession, and obtained a search warrant the same day. The package contained methamphetamine. Yuma police obtained warrants, arrested Gonzalez, and searched his home, finding marijuana, a rifle, and ammunition. Gonzalez was Young’s nephew. Indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 846, Gonzalez unsuccessfully moved to suppress. Gonzalez conditionally pleaded guilty; the court sentenced Gonzalez to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion and the sentence. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit consolidated appeals from district court decisions granting defendants summary judgment in cases under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against law enforcement officials and municipalities. The claims related to the seizure of firearms, which were kept by the police for up to two years, and the arrests and prosecutions of plaintiffs, as to whom charges were ultimately dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that there was a reasonable basis for retention of the firearms in both cases and that officers were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in connection with the arrests and searches. View "Rodgers v. Knight" on Justia Law

Polk County, Arkansas, Sheriff’s Officers were attempting to locate a rural address during unrelated investigation and decided to contact neighbors for assistance. The officers but did not enter property later identified as Bearden’s because of a closed driveway gate. They drove down another driveway through a wooded area. Speaking to the owner, White, they noticed a shop building and smelled a strong odor of green marijuana. Leaving, the officers noticed surveillance cameras. They returned to White’s property later that day to investigate the “overwhelming” smell. They encountered Bearden on the property. A search of Bearden’s property revealed over 800 marijuana plants in the shed. On White’s property, the officers found hundreds of marijuana plants in the shop building. The trial court suppressed statements Bearden made before he was Mirandized but found that White’s driveway gate was open both times the officers arrived. Bearden entered a conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to manufacture 1,000 or more marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Eighth Circuit upheld denial of the motion to suppress and Bearden’s sentence of 180 months, rejecting arguments that burglary and escape should not count as “crimes of violence.” View "United States v. Bearden" on Justia Law

In 2007, while on probation for 2005 theft offenses, Clark illegally used a credit account. North Dakota revoked Clark's probation, and he received a sentence of five years for the 2005 offenses. Clark entered into a plea agreement on the new offense, to avoid being sentenced as a habitual offender. He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, consecutive to his other sentence. Clark signed a judgment for the 2007 offense, stating that he entered a plea of guilty, but never actually entered a plea of guilty. Clark unsuccessfully appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court arguing that he was sentenced without actually entering a plea in the trial court. A federal court granted habeas relief. Clark was then convicted on the 2007 charge. With an enhancement for being a habitual offender, he was sentenced to eight years (consecutive to his other sentence). The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected Clark's appeal. In federal habeas proceedings, the court dismissed claims that had been raised only in Clark's pro se state court brief as procedurally defaulted. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. A federal habeas court cannot reach an otherwise unpreserved and procedurally defaulted claim merely because a reviewing state court analyzed that claim for plain error. View "Clark v. Bertsch" on Justia Law

Protestors, including those concerned with sexual abuse by clergy and those advocating the Catholic ordination of women and acceptance of gay, lesbian, and transgender people, raised a facial First Amendment challenge to Missouri's 2012 House of Worship Protection Act" Mo. Rev. Stat. 574.035, which prohibits intentionally disturbing a "house of worship by using profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior . . . either within the house of worship or so near it as to disturb the order and solemnity of the worship services." The district court upheld the Act. The Eighth Circuit reversed, noting that there was no evidence of actual disturbances to houses of worship or that protesters interfered with churchgoers' entry or exit. The Act draws content based distinctions on the type of expression permitted near a house of worship, forbidding profane discourse and rude or indecent behavior which would disturb the order and solemnity of worship services and runs "a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." It impermissibly requires enforcement authorities to look to the content of the message and cannot survive strict scrutiny since its content-based distinctions are not necessary to achieve an asserted interest in protecting the free exercise of religion. View "Survivors Network v. Joyce" on Justia Law

Brothers Jose and Ismael were indicted for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846; possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. 2; and possessing heroin with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. 2. Jose pled guilty to count one, and the district court1 sentenced him to 175 months imprisonment. Ismael proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him of all three counts. The district court sentenced Ismael to concurrent sentences of 188 months imprisonment on each count. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Jose’s sentence, and Ismael’s conviction and sentence. The court upheld denial of a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search of Jose’s truck, rejecting an argument that officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a stop because the informant had no prior track record at the department and the officers failed to independently corroborate the information he provided. The court also upheld a deliberate ignorance jury instruction; the government adduced sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find Ismael intentionally conspired to distribute illegal drugs. View "United States v. Corrales-Portillo" on Justia Law

Previously, Missouri’s lethal-injection protocol involved Sodium thiopental to anesthetize the prisoner and render him unconscious, pancuronium bromide to paralyze him and stop his breathing, and potassium chloride to stop the prisoner’s heart. In 2012, after sodium thiopental became unavailable, the state revised its protocol to use a single drug—propofol—as the lethal agent. While a challenge was pending, the state revised its protocol to use pentobarbital as the lethal agent. An amended complaint alleged that use of compounded pentobarbital constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, that the defendants are deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ medical need for their executions not to inflict gratuitous pain, that use of compounded pentobarbital creates a significant risk of increased punishment over previous methods and amounts to ex post facto punishment, that the defendants deprived them of due process by not providing notice of the lethal injection methods, that the defendants deprived them of equal protection by deviating from execution protocol in certain instances, that the defendants violated their First Amendment rights by refusing to disclose the identities of the pharmacy that compounds the pentobarbital and its suppliers, and that the defendants violated federal laws by soliciting and using the compounded pentobarbital in executions. The court dismissed all claims except for that alleging “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment and its state equivalent. The prisoners’ concession that “other methods of lethal injection . . . would be constitutional” did not suffice to state a claim. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Zink v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

Bucklew was convicted in state court of murder, kidnapping, and rape and sentenced to death. After Missouri courts denied post-conviction relief, the Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of Bucklew’s petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of Missouri set Bucklew’s execution date as May 21, 2014. Bucklew was a plaintiff in a pending 42 U.S.C. 1983 action (Zink) that challenged Missouri’s method of execution. The district court tentatively dismissed that action on May 2. Bucklew filed another Section 1983 action on May 9, asserting that the method of lethal injection would violate his Eighth Amendment rights because of the unique risk that his serious medical condition (cavernous hemangioma) will result in excruciating pain. On May 16, the district court finally dismissed the Zink complaint. On May 19, the court denied a stay of execution and dismissed Bucklew’s Eighth Amendment claim. On May 21, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending appeal. The Eighth Circuit then reversed the dismissal: it was not “patently obvious” that Bucklew could not prevail. His as-applied challenge is distinguishable from Zink’s facial challenge. Bucklew’s allegations of a substantial risk of serious and imminent harm were far more specific than those allegations. There was also support for Bucklew’s allegations that the state unreasonably refused to change its regular method of execution to a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative that -would “significantly reduce” the substantial risk of pain. View "Bucklew v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

For more than 30 years, Wagner worked at the Merrick County sheriff’s office, as chief dispatcher and office manager. Campbell was appointed as sheriff in 2011 and told Wagner he wanted her to train another employee to perform her duties in her absence.” Campbell later expressed concerns that the training was taking too long and informed Wagner that he had received a complaint from a judge about delays in depositing bond money with the court. Campbell wanted to change policy to have bond money taken directly to court, rather than deposited in the sheriff’s office account. Wagner disagreed. Campbell gave Wagner a reprimand, stating that she failed to follow directives. Wagner refused to sign the reprimand, claiming it contained false information, told Campbell she was leaving, and walked home. Wagner never returned to work; she filed a grievance, which the Board of Supervisors denied. Wagner sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Neb. Rev. Stat. 20-148, alleging she suffered an adverse employment action in retaliation for protected speech on a matter of public concern. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Campbell. When a reprimand does not affect the terms and conditions of employment, a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Wagner v. Campbell" on Justia Law