Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Johnson shot his ex-girlfriend in the head, causing serious permanent injuries. A South Dakota jury convicted him of first-degree attempted murder and aggravated assault. The trial judge imposed consecutive sentences of 25 and 15 years for the two offenses. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota rejected Johnson’s claim that imposing consecutive sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault based on the same act violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. After exhausting state post-conviction remedies, Johnson sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the double jeopardy claim as no “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). View "Johnson v. Young" on Justia Law

Defendant and others were charged with conspiring to distribute and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a). He originally was appointed counsel, but later retained new counsel. Unsatisfied, defendant retained a third attorney, Rozan. Represented by Rozan, defendant pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and appellate levels. Defendant argued that Rozan did not disclose that in 2004 and 2005, Rozan was privately reprimanded by the State Bar of Texas; in 2007, he was publicly reprimanded; and in 2009, while representing defendant on appeal, he was suspended from practice in Texas for five years, effective January 1, 2010. The Texas Supreme Court ordered Rozan to provide written notice of his suspension to every client and to every court officer in every court in which Rozan practiced. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of relief. It was defendant’s responsibility to investigate the disciplinary past of his attorney; the required notification occurred after defendant’s sentencing, and defendant did not show how he was prejudiced by Rozan’s silence. View "Ghost Bear v. United States" on Justia Law

Responding to a report that a man wearing a Steelers jacket had stolen an iPad wrapped in bubble wrap from an electronics retailer, Officer Loftis pursued a car identified by customers. Loftis pulled the Cadillac over; the driver was wearing a Steelers jacket. Williams eventually obeyed an order to exit the car and locked the doors behind him. The car window was partially down. Loftis looked inside and noticed bubble wrap between the seats. Unlocking the car through the window, Loftis removed the bubble-wrapped item, which was the stolen iPad. Williams grabbed the iPad and resisted attempts to handcuff him. The store manager arrived and identified Williams. Loftis ordered Williams’s car to be towed, reasoning that he “didn’t want to leave a Cadillac on the side of the road.” Loftis did not want to release Williams to sign an “authorization not to tow.” Loftis later testified that he did order towing as a punitive action, nor was he expecting to find additional evidence. After ordering a tow, officers inventoried the vehicle, pursuant to policy. In the trunk, they discovered a stolen, loaded AK-47 rifle. Williams admitted, after receiving Miranda warnings, that he had stolen the firearm. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); possessing a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j); and stealing a firearm from a licensed dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(u), Williams unsuccessfully moved to suppress the rifle, entered a conditional guilty plea, and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Officers were informed that a “couple of black females” had stolen merchandise from Urban Outfitters, and that an employee from the nearby Heartbreaker store had called to report suspected shoplifters. The Heartbreaker manager said that an unidentified customer had pointed out African American females (Parker and her friends) inside the store that had run out of Victoria’s Secret. A Victoria’s Secret employee confirmed that a “group of black females” had “very recently” run out of the store, but could not confirm whether anything was stolen. The manager did not suspect the women of stealing from Heartbreaker. The officers noted no suspicious activity, but followed the group, pulled their squad car in front of Parker’s car and turned on the emergency lights. The women stated that they had not been to Victoria’s Secret. Parker consented to a search of her shopping bags; nothing appeared stolen. After running Parker’s license and speaking to her father on her cell phone, the officers told the women they could leave. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The Eight Circuit reversed. It was not clearly established that the officers, having corroborated the running incident, and knowing shoplifting recently occurred, could not reasonably suspect Parker of shoplifting. View "Parker v. Chard" on Justia Law

Brooks, a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, is incarcerated for Minnesota convictions of first-degree DWI and assaulting an officer. The Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) requires a chemical-dependency assessment. Brooks was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions. Brooks began treatment in 2011, but, in 2012, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996; and the Minnesota Constitution. He claimed that his required chemical-dependency program deprived him of his right to the free exercise of his religion. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all others. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, because, based on the complaint, the court and the defendants could not discern what beliefs he has or what faith he professes. View "Brooks v. Roy" on Justia Law

Police had DNA evidence suggesting Barefield unlawfully possessed a firearm and engaged in a gunfight. The Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives obtained a warrant. A confidential informant arranged a meeting in a parking lot, stating Barefield would arrive in a gold Oldsmobile with a dented door and would have a plastic water bottle containing drugs. At the appointed time, a gold-brown Buick with a dented door arrived and parked near the informant. The driver got out and conversed with the informant, then got into his car and left. Police conducted a traffic stop, having been told the driver would be an African-American male, likely armed, removed the driver (African-American male), placed him in handcuffs, patted him down, and placed him in a cruiser, noting a water bottle in the console which appeared to have a “leafy substance floating in it.” ATF agents arrived, found the bottle containing marijuana and fake cocaine, and a digital scale in the glove box. The driver claimed to have no identification but gave his brother’s name. At the police station a detective identified the driver as Patrick, who had an outstanding arrest warrant. The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, determining the officers were justified in stopping Patrick and searching the car. View "United States v. Patrick" on Justia Law

Hutterites disavow individual property ownership for a communal lifestyle. The Hutterian Church has three conferences. South Dakota’s Hutterville Colony belonged to the Schmiedeleut Conference. Hutterville’s nonprofit corporation operates a communal farm, conducts business, and owns all property. In 1983, when the Colony formed, Kleinsasser led Schmiedeleut Conference. Several ministers repudiated Kleinsasser’s leadership in 1992 and followed Wipf. Colonies following Wipf ratified a new constitution. Kleinsasser’s colonies did not. Each group claimed that it was the true Schmiedeleut. Waldner, Hutterville’s ecclesiastical leader, its corporation’s president, and a director, was loyal to Kleinsasser. The complaint alleges that through “sham” corporate meetings in 2008-2009, Wipf faction members were elected to replace Waldner faction officers and directors. Each faction conducted business in the name of the company. In 2009 a state trial court determined that Wipf faction members were the duly elected directors and officers. Waldner and Kleinsasser excommunicated Wipf faction members. State courts rejected a challenge to the excommunication, reasoning that control of the corporation could not be determined without addressing religious questions. In a second state action, the supreme court reversed appointment of a receiver, concluding that even corporate dissolution is beyond secular jurisdiction. As the factions were contesting the receiver’s accounting, the Waldners filed suit under RICO, as individuals and in their “official” capacities as purported directors and officers, claiming that attorneys worked with the Wipf faction to “wrest control” of Hutterville, and that the receiver was part of the plan. The district court dismissed, reasoning that official capacity standing required knowing who truly controls Hutterville, which involves religious disputes; individual claims for property damages claims were dismissed based on the renunciation of individual property. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc. v. Sveen" on Justia Law

DEA officers believed Gunnell was selling methamphetamine and asked Springfield Sgt. Meyer to “develop probable cause” to stop Gunnell and search his person and his motorcycle. Meyer contacted K-9 Officer Tjelmeland and asked him to be available in the surveillance area with his drug dog, Raider. Gunnell was seen placing a blue bag in his motorcycle’s saddlebag. Meyer followed Gunnell for almost a mile. Meyer testified that Gunnell was traveling 41 or 42 miles per hour, at least 10 miles per hour over the speed limit. Meyer stopped Gunnell’s motorcycle and asked for identification. Other officers arrived. Gunnell did not have his driver’s license, so the officers took his information, ran his name through the system, and learned that Gunnell did not have a motorcycle designation and that there were no warrants for his arrest. Meyer asked for consent to search Gunnell’s person and motorcycle. Gunnell declined. Meyer conducted a pat-down and placed Gunnell in handcuffs. Tjelmeland arrived with Raider, who alerted near the saddlebag. Tjelmeland and Meyer searched the motorcycle. The bag contained approximately one pound of methamphetamine, baggies, and digital scales. The court denied Gunnell’s motion to suppress. He was sentenced to 240 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Gunnell" on Justia Law

During a fight in 2007, Delonais stabbed Addai's friend. Addai stabbed Delonais, who died as a result of his injuries. Addai was convicted of class AA felony murder, ND Code 12.1-16-01(1)(a). At trial, Addai's attorney called as a witness the attorney of another individual who had been involved in the stabbing investigation, to testify regarding alleged tampering with evidence and obstruction of the Delonais murder investigation. Before testifying, Lange explained that he was uncomfortable testifying because there could be topics that were protected by attorney-client privilege or not public knowledge. Asked to testify about his client's criminal file, he objected and advised the court that the file was sealed. The trial court closed the courtroom. Addai's counsel stated he did not "have a problem with this" and the court allowed Addai's attorney to question the witness further regarding the restricted information. After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Addai sought habeas relief, arguing that courtroom closure during his state court trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel consented to the closure. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court properly denied Addai's petition. View "Addai v. Schmalenberger" on Justia Law

Colbert alleges that in traffic court deputy Chapman beckoned him to a group of officers and loudly said, “Don’t be eyeballing my officers”; when Colbert said he was not, an officer grabbed Colbert and said “shut up”; when Colbert told that officer to let go, officers handcuffed him, threw him against a wall (causing his nose to bleed), threw him to the floor, tased him twice, “hog tied” him, and dragged him out. A state court found Colbert guilty of disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to arrest. Colbert sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unreasonable seizure and excessive force. The district court dismissed. Colbert appealed dismissal of his excessive-force claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed. When a state prisoner seeks damages under section 1983, the court must consider whether judgment for the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. If the court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should proceed. A finding of excessive force would not necessarily invalidate Colbert’s convictions. View "Colbert v. Chapman" on Justia Law