Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Desloge has a population of 5,054; 97.4% are white. The Ku Klux Klan regularly distributes leaflets on streets and sidewalks, wearing robes and hoods. Imperial Wizard Ancona contacted city officials about plans to distribute leaflets in 2012 and learned that an ordinance prohibited "solicitation activities" on public streets. The district court issued an injunction, concluding that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. In 2013 Ancona and the Klan returned to distribute leaflets concerning gun rights. They stood along a sidewalk at a four way stop, holding up leaflets. If a vehicle’s occupant signaled for a leaflet, a Klan member would step into the street to supply one. A police officer told them about a 2013 traffic ordinance , which prohibited "stand[ing] in or enter[ing] upon a roadway for the purpose of soliciting rides, employment, business or charitable contributions from, or distribut[ing] anything to, the occupant of any vehicle." The Klan left. While litigation was pending, the city amended the ordinance, adding a preamble and defining terms to explain that it sought to address "public safety concerns," distracted drivers, and resulting collisions. "Roadway" was defined as the entire road, from one curb or pavement edge to another, including parking lanes. The district court granted an injunction, concluding that some provisions were not narrowly tailored. The Eighth Circuit reversed. There was no evidence that the ordinance was created to curtail the Klan's message or its speech in Desloge; it is not impermissibly underinclusive. View "Traditionalist Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Desloge" on Justia Law

After Hopkins was arrested for driving while impaired for the third time in 10 years, officers impounded her vehicle under Minnesota Statute 169A.631(e)(1), She received a notice of seizure and intent to forfeit her vehicle. Hopkins filed a challenge and requested immediate return of her vehicle. The court administrator did not schedule a hearing on the demand because that “judicial determination . . . must not precede adjudication in the criminal prosecution of the designated offense without the consent of the prosecuting authority.” Hopkins neither requested a decision on her demand prior to resolution of her underlying criminal case nor utilized procedures that allow an owner to give security or post bond in exchange for the vehicle. Hopkins voluntarily withdrew her demand. The resolution of her criminal case was delayed by continuances pending the outcome of litigation relating to the breathalyzer. Hopkins pled guilty, then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the vehicle forfeiture statute violated the federal and state constitutions by depriving Hopkins of procedural due process and by unreasonably seizing her vehicle. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Hopkins voluntarily ceased pursuing available state administrative remedies, so she waived her post-deprivation procedural due process claim. View "Hopkins v. City of Bloomington" on Justia Law

Riding home from a bar, Partlow talked about suicide. When they reached his apartment, Partlow jumped out of the running car, ran into his apartment, and locked the door. His aunt (Lisa) called 911. Officer Mann arrived and requested backup, stating that there was a weapon involved and that the subject had said, “You don’t want to see this.” Beedy, Stadler and Craig arrived, heard the door crash open, turned, and saw Partlow carrying a shotgun, with Lisa holding his other arm. They yelled, “Drop the gun.” Partlow seemed surprised by their presence. Lisa fell, freeing Partlow’s arm. Officers testified that Partlow chambered a round and aimed at them. They opened fire, hitting Partlow in the eye, forearm, hands, groin, hip, and shin. Beedy secured Partlow’s shotgun and discovered a live round in the chamber. Partlow was convicted of terrorizing, N.D. Code 12.1-17-04. Lisa testified that Partlow putting the gun down when the officers opened fire. Partlow sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed. It is possible that the officers were mistaken, but their mistake was objectively reasonable in light of known circumstances. View "Partlow v. Stadler" on Justia Law

While an inmate in Federal Correctional Institution - Forrest City, Spencer was assigned a cell for a medical assessment. Correctional Officer t Sheldon entered the cell to assist staff with checking Spencer's restraints. Spencer backed himself into a corner and was verbally abusive. Staff members told Spencer to sit on the bunk, but Spencer was uncooperative and aggressively resisted. While forcibly being placed on the bed, Spencer bit Sheldon's abdomen. Spencer was then placed in "four-point" restraints around 9:10 a.m. and was not removed from those restraints until 3:45 p.m. the following day. After a hearing, the Disciplinary Hearing Officer found that Spencer assaulted Sheldon and disciplined Spencer with losses of privileges. Spencer brought a petition for habeas corpus alleging a Fifth Amendment due process violation for being put in four-point restraints without being afforded a hearing. The district court dismissed without prejudice, finding that conditions-of-confinement claims cannot be raised in the context of habeas petitions. The Eighth Circuit remanded, stating that the court should liberally construe the pro se petition and decide the conditions-of-confinement claims under the principles of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. View "Spencer v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Reeves, an inmate housed in the isolation unit at Ouachita River Unit in Malvern, provided information to correctional officers about a prison nurse who was bringing contraband into the facility. While Lieutenant King and another officer made security rounds in the unit, Reeves attempted to initiate a conversation with them. King responded by commenting, “Go ahead and snitch to the major like you did to him on the nurse and he’ll get back with you later.” King made this comment in the presence of several inmates, and Reeves suffered emotional distress and fear of retaliation. The next day, Arkansas Department of Corrections transferred Reeves, who then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that King violated his Eighth Amendment rights by calling him a snitch. King sought summary judgment. The magistrate determined King was not entitled to qualified immunity because Eighth Circuit precedent provides a detention officer violates his duty to protect an inmate by labeling that inmate as a snitch. The district court adopted the recommendations and denied the motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable correctional officer in King’s position would have known that labeling Reeves a snitch would violate his constitutional right to protection. View "Reeves v. King" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Kelley on two counts of arson. Before trial, Kelley moved to have his court appointed attorney replaced. The magistrate judge denied Kelley’s motion. On the morning Kelley’s trial was to begin, Kelley moved for substitute counsel or, alternatively, to proceed pro se. The district court denied the motion. At trial, a jury found Kelley guilty on both counts. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of substitute counsel, based on its finding that the public defender was not doing anything other than acting in [Kelley’s] best interests and that Kelley’s specific complaints did not rise to the level of “[j]ustifiable dissatisfaction.” The court remanded for clarification as to Kelley’s request to proceed pro se. The court denied that request without any explicit discussion, perhaps due to the unusual circumstance of a courtroom observer shouting a question during ex parte proceedings, which resulted in a recess. It was not clear whether the district court found Kelley’s request to be unclear and equivocal, in the first instance; found the request untimely or obstructionist; or found Kelley could not produce a valid waiver of his right to counsel. View "United States v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Goodwin, scheduled to be executed on December 10, 2014 based on his conviction for first-degree murder, sought a certificate of appealability with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim of intellectual disability or, in the alternative, authorization to file a successive habeas application. Goodwin claims that he is intellectually disabled and that,in his case, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued a decision that was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Hall v. Florida. The Eighth Circuit denied relief, noting state court findings that “Goodwin has eight independent intelligence tests spread over twenty years that indicated that Goodwin is not retarded” and that Goodwin’s single IQ score within the five-point margin of error for the Wechsler scale of sub-average intellectual functioning was “inadequate to raise a triable issue of fact.” Jurists of reason would not find debatable the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that Goodwin’s claim is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1); Goodwin conceded that he raised the claim that he is mentally retarded and ineligible for execution in his initial habeas application. View "Goodwin v. Steele" on Justia Law

Williams was an Alexander police officer under chief Walters. There was animosity between them, stemming from Williams’s support of the mayor. Walters stated that he had Williams “in his cross hairs” and relieved Walters of duty. The city reinstated Walters. The city’s bookkeeper later discovered that Williams had cashed two payroll checks covering the same period without realizing that a check he found was the check that he had reported lost and had had replaced. The mayor found that it was unintentional error; the city council agreed. Williams returned the money. Williams borrowed police lights from a county deputy that were the deputy’s personal property and were marked with his name. Williams informed Walters that he had borrowed the lights. At Walters’s instruction, another officer retrieved the lights from Williams and installed them on Walters’s patrol car. A magistrate issued a warrant for Williams’s arrest, based on Walters’s affidavit, based on those incidents. Williams was arrested for theft and spent a day in jail. The prosecutor dismissed the charges. Williams sued Walters and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed claims against the city, but denied summary judgment and qualified immunity for Walters. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Williams v. Walters" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., against his employer after he retired. The court concluded that plaintiff's age-based hostile work environment claim failed because the supervisor's age-related comments were not so severe as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of his employment; without more than plaintiff's speculation, a reasonable juror could not find the supervisor's actions - although contemptible - amounted to harassment based on sex; plaintiff has not shown sufficient facts to infer a hostile work environment and he cannot prove constructive discharge; and plaintiff has not suffered an adverse employment action and cannot establish a claim for either disparate treatment or retaliation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. View "Rickard v. Swedish Match North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that his probation officer violated his First Amendment rights by requiring him to satisfy the terms of a court probation order directing him to complete a privately run substance abuse treatment program (ARCH). Plaintiff alleged that the program prohibited him from practicing his faith as a Jehovah's Witness. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that quasi judicial absolute immunity applied to the officer because he was carrying out a court order. View "Rose v. Flairty" on Justia Law