Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant is one of four former Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers involved in the death of George Floyd. Defendant was convicted of two counts of deprivation of rights under color of law resulting in bodily injury and death. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motions for acquittal and a mistrial. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant specifically argued that no reasonable jury could have found that he had the requisite mens rea to commit the crimes. The court wrote that to prove Defendant acted willfully, the Government produced evidence that Defendant knew from his training that (1) Chauvin’s use of force on Floyd was unreasonable and (2) he had a duty to intervene in another officer’s use of unreasonable force. The court concluded that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there was sufficient evidence that Defendant acted willfully on this charge.   In regards to Defendant’s second charge: his deliberate indifference to Floyd’s serious medical needs, the court held that it agreed with the district court that the evidence on this count is “not overwhelming,” but nonetheless, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted willfully. Ultimately, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendant acted willfully on both Section 242 counts and that any prosecutorial conduct did not deprive Defendant of his right to a fair trial. View "United States v. Tou Thao" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty on three counts: (1) Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, (2) Committing a Felony Sex Offense Against a Minor While Required to Register as a Sex Offender, and (3) Tampering with a Witness. After the verdict, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court denied the motion and subsequently sentenced Defendant to life plus 120 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to convict on the aggravated sexual abuse and witness tampering charges. Defendant also challenged his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that here, the evidence at trial presented “two conflicting hypotheses” about Defendant’s motivation in making these phone calls. The jury found more credible the government’s explanation. And while there was no direct evidence that Defendant attempted to corruptly persuade his mother, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that he did. Given that all reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of upholding the verdict, this court will not disturb the jury’s decision on this count. View "United States v. Kimo Little Bird, Sr." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of assaulting a person assisting a federal officer, and a second jury convicted Defendant of drug offenses. On appeal, Defendant raised several challenges to his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant complains that the district judge was unaware that the clerk collected data on the race of potential jurors. But whether or not the district judge was familiar with the information gathered by the clerk, the relevant reports were available to Defendant on request. Defendant could have inquired about information on the racial composition of jury pools before the pre-trial motion deadlines. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motions as untimely. Moreover, evidence of drug activity by a conspirator during the conspiracy is relevant evidence of the existence of the conspiracy. The evidence here was prejudicial in the sense that it tended to prove the existence of the conspiracy, but it was not unfairly prejudicial because it was directly relevant to the charged offense. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. View "United States v. Marcus Burrage" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of a conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d), based on his involvement with the Crips street gang. The Eighth Circuit court affirmed Defendant’s conviction but remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court imposed a sentence of 71 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed the sentence. The principal dispute on appeal concerns whether the district court erred by failing to account for a term of imprisonment that Defendant served in Nebraska for state drug offenses that were committed in the course of the RICO conspiracy.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the court originally sentenced Defendant to 84 months’ imprisonment but effectively gave Defendant“credit” for the eleven-month period from July 2018 through May 2019, when he was serving federal and state sentences concurrently. The incremental punishment for the federal offense originally was 73 months imprisonment. On remand, the state sentence had been discharged, and the court imposed only 71 months imprisonment for the federal offense. Defendant thus received a lesser net punishment after the remand, and he did not lose any “credit” for time served in state custody. View "United States v. Jerell Haynie" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce, conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce, and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in murder. Basically, the Government’s theory was that a drug dealer was robbed and killed, and his body was tossed into a burn pit behind Defendant’s house. The district court denied Defendant’s motions for acquittal and a new trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that sufficient evidence supported the findings that the robbery involved methamphetamine and drug proceeds. The evidence at trial showed that the victim was a drug dealer who sold methamphetamine and had no source of legitimate income. The court explained that while Defendant highlights some facts, he suggests pointing the opposite way; the court wrote it was not convinced. The district court didn’t err in denying acquittal. Further, Defendant’s concerns speak to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The evidence was admissible because it advanced the Government’s theory of the case—that the victim was killed during a robbery, and his body was destroyed in a backyard burn pit. It also wasn’t unfairly prejudicial, considering the evidence suggesting that the victim was murdered. View "United States v. Matthew Robbins" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court ultimately sentenced Defendant to 87 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s calculation of the advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”). Specifically, Defendant argued the district court erroneously decided Defendant’s past conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking in violation of 720 Illinois Compiled Statutes Section 5/18-4(a)(3) was a crime of violence. Thus it should not enhance his offense level under Section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the issue is whether, under the pre-2012 version of the Illinois statute, Defendant could have been convicted for reckless vehicular hijacking. The court concluded that the answer was no. The court wrote that there is neither a precedential case nor a realistic situation in which vehicular hijacking would not be considered a crime of violence as it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Therefore, the court held Defendant’s vehicular hijacking conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the force clause. View "United States v. Ricky Pulley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a prohibited person. He argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that there was no error in admitting the evidence. The court explained that officers may seize an effect without a warrant under the “plain view doctrine” if they are lawfully present in a place to view the object, the incriminating character of the object is immediately apparent, and the officers have a lawful right of access to the object. Here, once the officers were lawfully present in Defendant’s house based on his stepfather’s apparent authority to consent, the officers permissibly seized the Molotov cocktails as objects in plain view in the bathroom and kitchen.   Defendant suggests that even if the police officers were lawfully present in his home and the incriminating character of the explosive devices was immediately apparent, the officers were required to obtain a warrant before making a seizure. But “where the elements of the plain view doctrine are met, the fact that the officers could have left and obtained a warrant does not invalidate the justification for seizing the property.” Accordingly, the district court did not err when it concluded that the officers lawfully seized the items from Defendant’s bathroom and kitchen. View "United States v. Melchizedek Hayes" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and (b)(1), after law enforcement found more than 1,500 grams of methamphetamine concealed in a vest on his person. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his detention and frisk were not supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion. Defendant entered a conditional plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal, Defendant conceded that his first two encounters with the Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force Officer (TFO) were consensual and that his third encounter involving both TFOs began consensually. He argued only that his detention and subsequent frisk during this third encounter were neither consensual nor supported by reasonable suspicion, and, thus, the evidence obtained thereafter must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that initially, it is questionable whether the TFOs would have even been justified in conducting a pat down, as the facts do not lend much credence to the claim that Jimenez may have been “armed and presently dangerous.” The court explained that even if it were to assume that the TFOs would have been justified in conducting a pat down of Defendant based on his efforts to keep his blanket on his person and his potential involvement in drug trafficking, the TFOs far exceeded the scope of these permissible bounds when they immediately leaped to the substantially more intrusive action of forcibly removing his blanket. View "United States v. Sergio Jimenez" on Justia Law

An officer deployed pepper spray on Plaintiff and others during a protest in downtown St. Louis. Plaintiff sued various parties (collectively, “City Officials”), alleging various federal and Missouri law claims, including First Amendment retaliation. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the City Officials on some of the claims. As relevant to this interlocutory appeal, however, the district court concluded that neither the City nor one officer was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim and therefore denied the motion in part. The district court also reserved a ruling on the City Officials’ motion for summary judgment on two state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded for the district court to resolve the motion on the state law claims. The court explained that based on Plaintiff’s interaction with the officer and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, “a jury could find that the officer acted with the prohibited . . . malice” if he deployed the pepper spray with the ulterior motive of retaliation. Or a jury may determine that the officer’s actions upheld his duty, but the court explained that it has no basis to decide that factual question on an interlocutory appeal. However, the court remanded with instructions for the district court to reach the merits of the sovereign immunity issue as to the state law claims. View "Amir Brandy v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed rom the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of TrialCard, Inc. (“TrialCard”) on employment claims she brought under Mo. Stat. Section 213.055.1 (“MHRA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (“Section 1981”), and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence is likewise insufficient to establish TrialCard’s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. This Court has noted that “me too” evidence of other discrimination victims can be relevant because “an employer’s past discriminatory policy and practice may well illustrate that the employer’s asserted reasons for disparate treatment are a pretext for intentional discrimination. Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence, however, is insufficient because she has not shown that these individuals received the same discipline under the same circumstances from the same person. Further, the court explained that Cigna repeatedly reached out to Plaintiff and her therapist about obtaining medical certification. Because Plaintiff failed to present evidence to support her FMLA claim, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of TrialCard. View "Lakeitha Boston v. TrialCard, Inc." on Justia Law