Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants were each pepper-sprayed by Police Officer William Olsten while participating in a protest in downtown St. Louis. Each of them sued various officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation and excessive force claims, as well as various other federal and state law claims. In each case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city officials on all the federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed. The court explained that here, Appellants admit that “every other non-police officer in the vicinity was actively involved in a protest” and that the officer “moved his arm side to side and indiscriminately sprayed numerous protestors.” One cannot simultaneously single out Appellants and “indiscriminately” spray the crowd. And there is no evidence in the record that either Appellant had any interaction with the officer or that the officer was aware of their presence, or that either did anything to differentiate themselves from the other protestors in the crowd. While one Appellant argued she was filming the protest, there is no evidence that the officer observed her filming or deployed pepper spray in retaliation for her doing so. Regardless of whether the officer’s action was appropriate or reasonable under the circumstances, the lack of evidence causally connecting the officer’s adverse action of using pepper spray to Appellants’ protected expression is fatal to the retaliation claims. View "Rasheen Aldridge v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud; wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire fraud and money laundering; and money laundering and aiding and abetting money laundering.  On appeal, Defendants claimed the district court erred when it admitted a redacted plea agreement that Ridings signed but which did not ultimately result in a guilty plea. By the terms of the plea agreement, one Defendant waived his rights under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That Defendant also appealed his sentence, asserting that the district court imposed a sentence above the Sentencing Guidelines range based on his religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there was an overwhelming quantum of evidence received at trial that was consistent with Defendant’s statement, rendering admission of the factual statement, even if it was error, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the court explained that here, the district court specifically stated that its sentence was not based on Defendant’s faith, but rather, the district court considered that Defendant used faith to manipulate people who were susceptible to such manipulation and lull people into a false sense of security. The court explained that it has upheld sentences where the district court took into account a defendant’s abuse of a religious connection. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering Defendant’s abuse of others’ faith, nor is the sentence it imposed substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Phillip Ridings" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs individually and as next friends of their minor daughter, I.B., appealed the district court’s dismissal of disability discrimination and civil rights deprivation claims, and denial of their motion to reconsider dismissing with prejudice a state law negligence claim against the Bentonville, Arkansas School District (“the District”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Arkansas law provides a direct cause of action against the liability insurer of a school district that is “not subject to suit for tort.” Plaintiffs’ Complaint named “John Doe” as an additional defendant, alleged on information and belief that the District maintained liability insurance, identified the insurer as John Doe, and stated that “the joinder of [John Doe] will be made upon verification of its identity.” Eleven months later, the district court ordered Plaintiffs to show good cause for an extension of the deadline to add parties, if they opposed dismissal of the John Doe defendant without prejudice. When Plaintiffs did not respond, the district court dismissed John Doe without prejudice, leaving the District, with its statutory immunity, the only negligence defendant. Plaintiffs were not deprived of a remedy for the alleged negligence of District employees and agents. View "Rodney Baker v. Bentonville School District" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Defendant argued judgment of acquittal or a new trial and in calculating the drug quantity for purposes of sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the magistrate judge, after hearing testimony from the officer, concluded that his conduct in drafting the affidavit amounted to negligence. But to prevail here, Defendant “must show more than negligence or an innocent mistake.” And the court agreed with the district court that the officer did not act recklessly in his efforts to obtain a search warrant, despite the time pressure. The record does not indicate that the officer entertained serious doubts about or had obvious reasons to question the accuracy of his statements. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to suppression under Franks. Further, the court held that the information included in the warrant affidavit, the officers’ good-faith reliance on the search warrant for Defendant’s home, was objectively reasonable. Moreover, the court wrote that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial because there was no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the Gentry evidence been produced. Finally, the court saw no clear error in the district court’s drug quantity calculation. View "United States v. Melroy Johnson, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for committing mail and wire fraud against his spouse and National Life Insurance. He moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense, which the district court1 denied. Welker appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the indictment included allegations about Defendant’s intentional concealment of material information from and misrepresentations to R.W., supporting that he had the “intent to defraud” her. And it alleged that he used the mail and wire in furtherance of his scheme. These allegations were sufficient to apprise Defendant of the nature of the accusations against him and to enable the district court to determine that the facts stated were adequate in law to support a conviction. Further, the court wrote that Defendant provided no support for the proposition that an indictment must sufficiently allege a violation of state law to sufficiently state a federal mail or wire fraud offense. Ultimately, the court held that the indictment charging Defendant is not “so defective” that it fails to charge him for mail and wire fraud under federal law. View "United States v. Michael Welker" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. At sentencing, the district court determined a base offense level of 24 after concluding that Defendant had sustained two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The court sentenced Defendant to 96 months imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error when it calculated his base offense level and failed to follow the procedures of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3).
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence but remanded for correction of the court’s statement of reasons. The court explained that the district court was not required to resolve every disputed issue and to amend the presentence report accordingly. But Rule 32 does impose a duty either to resolve disputes or to determine that a ruling is unnecessary and then to append a copy of the court’s determinations to the report. Defendant requested, and the government does not resist, a remand for the district court to amend its statement of reasons to reflect that it did not resolve Defendant’s objection to the presentence report regarding gang affiliation. Accordingly, the court agreed that the remedy is warranted. View "United States v. Christopher Conrad" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims against various Arkansas Department of Corrections staff members for damages stemming from injuries that he received when he was beaten by another inmate. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants failed to protect him from the beating. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on summary judgment, finding that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies even though he remained hospitalized from his injuries until the time for filing expired. At issue is whether the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the district court’s rant of summary judgment was premature. The court explained that the district court legally erred in declining to decide whether administrative remedies were “unavailable” to Plaintiff. As the Supreme Court stressed in Ross, the PLRA “contains its own textual exception to mandatory exhaustion.” The court explained that under the PLRA, the exhaustion requirement hinges on the ‘availability’ of administrative remedies. The court reversed because the district court declined to decide whether the prison’s grievance procedure was unavailable to Plaintiff. View "John Smith v. Jeremy Andrews" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, for her son A.H., sued Defendant Officer under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging he used excessive force by not giving a warning while searching with a canine trained to “bite and hold.” Trimble moved for summary judgment. The district court denied qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no dispute that Defendant did not provide a warning when he deployed Ace or when Ace alerted to fresh human odor during the search. The parties dispute whether A.H. heard the warnings from the other officers. A.H., lying underneath a trailer, testified he did not hear any warnings. The court wrote that assuming the facts most favorably to A.H., he did not hear the other officers’ warnings and did not have the opportunity to surrender. Defendant had fair notice from the court’s precedent that the failure to give a warning and an opportunity to surrender violated clearly established law. View "TonyaMarie Adams v. Nathan Trimble" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by law enforcement while speeding in a construction zone. The driver admitted there was marijuana in the car. During the search, the driver tossed a bag to Defendant. The bag contained methamphetamine. Ultimately, the trooper seized both cell phones from the driver and Defendant.Although the phone found in the center console was a “burner” phone without any identifying subscriber information on it, it contained evidence tying Defendant to the phone, including: (1) messages identifying the sender as Defendant; (2) a photograph of Defendant's bank card; and (3) text messages between a sender using the phone and Defendant's sister. At trial, prosecutors planned to call the trooper to authenticate the phone. The district court allowed the trooper's testimony over objection.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that direct evidence that the phone belonged to Defendant is not required and circumstantial evidence may be relied on to support authenticity. View "United States v. Jerry Wise" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued police officers under Sec. 1983 after the officers made warrantless entry into their apartment. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. While warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, there is an exception when officers act with probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and an objectively reasonable basis to believe that exigent circumstances exist.Here, the officers were dispatched to the scene in response to a report of domestic violence. The report received by the officers explained that the 911 call came from a neighbor who thought “abuse” was occurring and heard a “verbal argument,” “someone being thrown around,” and “yelling and screaming” in the upstairs apartment. The neighbor stated that a woman, her boyfriend, and a child lived in the apartment. This created anm exigency, justifying warrantless entry. View "Benedda Cotten v. Ryan Miller" on Justia Law