Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, Defendant learned that the detective who testified at his suppression hearing had been indicted for crimes related to an on-duty shooting. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea based on this discovery. Defendant argued that the Government’s failure to disclose the information about the detective at the suppression stage rendered his plea involuntary and, separately, constituted a fair and just reason for withdrawal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Supreme Court precedent forecloses Defendant’s involuntariness argument. Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Defendant lacked a fair and just reason for withdrawal. Further, the court explained that the information Defendant discovered about the detective would have, as the district court suggested, only marginally improved Defendant’s chances of winning his suppression motion. The material was only indirectly related to his case, amounting to weak propensity evidence that the detective, as in prior situations, violated Defendant’s  rights here. View "United States v. Juan Colbert" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arise from a multi-defendant criminal case involving the Lowriders street gang in Davenport, Iowa. All five Appellants pleaded guilty to a charge of racketeering conspiracy and other charges related to their activities with the Lowriders. The district court sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. The appeals concern only the sentences imposed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgments for four appellants and vacated the sentence of one appellant and remanded his case for resentencing. Regarding the vacated sentence, the court explained that the evidence is insufficient to support the district court’s finding that Appellant aided and abetted attempted first-degree murder. The court explained that he was a backseat passenger in the vehicle from which shots were fired. The government contends that Appellant aided and abetted attempted first-degree murder because he “got in a car with a gun and went looking for Latin Kings.” But a defendant’s presence at the scene of a crime or association with persons engaged in illegal activity is not sufficient to establish that he aided and abetted the crime. Rather, the defendant must affirmatively act in a manner “which at least encourages the perpetrator.” There is insufficient evidence here that Appellant’s act of riding in the back seat of a vehicle to the scene of the crime facilitated the offense. View "United States v. Austin Nichols" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction for receiving child pornography. Defendant asserts that the district court’s decision to stop him from asking about the employee’s prior sex-offense conviction deprived him of his right to present a complete defense.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments “guarantee criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” The court wrote that the district court, for its part, tried to strike a balance too. It recognized that Duggar should have an opportunity “to create reasonable doubt” by “calling” the former employee to testify and asking whether he was “present on the car lot” when the downloads occurred. But he could not impeach him with a prior sex crime or introduce “speculative” testimony. Here, the district court had “unquestionably constitutional” discretion to exclude the conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.   Further, Defendant wanted his incriminating statements during the search at the car dealership suppressed on the ground that the agents violated his right to counsel, which he tried to invoke by mentioning a lawyer and then attempting to call one. The court explained that viewed through Griffin’s lens, we conclude that a reasonable person in Defendant's position would not have thought “his freedom of movement” was “restricted.” View "United States v. Joshua Duggar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for deliberate indifference after she was assaulted by a fellow inmate and co-defendant. She appealed the district court’s dismissal of one prison staff member, the grant of summary judgment to other staff members, and the denial of her motion to alter or amend the judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under Nebraska law, Plaintiff had four years to sue after her cause of action accrued. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims started to accrue when she was assaulted in September 2016, the moment she could “sue and obtain relief.”. When Plaintiff sought to sue Defendant in December 2020, more than four years later, her claims were time-barred. The court explained that it is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, so the district court did not err. Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiff’s motion, considering she had notice of what she needed to do to comply with the local rules and neglected to do so. View "Christine Bordeaux v. Cheryl Bicknase" on Justia Law

Defendant is one of four former Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers involved in the death of George Floyd. Defendant was convicted of two counts of deprivation of rights under color of law resulting in bodily injury and death. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motions for acquittal and a mistrial. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant specifically argued that no reasonable jury could have found that he had the requisite mens rea to commit the crimes. The court wrote that to prove Defendant acted willfully, the Government produced evidence that Defendant knew from his training that (1) Chauvin’s use of force on Floyd was unreasonable and (2) he had a duty to intervene in another officer’s use of unreasonable force. The court concluded that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there was sufficient evidence that Defendant acted willfully on this charge.   In regards to Defendant’s second charge: his deliberate indifference to Floyd’s serious medical needs, the court held that it agreed with the district court that the evidence on this count is “not overwhelming,” but nonetheless, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant acted willfully. Ultimately, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendant acted willfully on both Section 242 counts and that any prosecutorial conduct did not deprive Defendant of his right to a fair trial. View "United States v. Tou Thao" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty on three counts: (1) Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, (2) Committing a Felony Sex Offense Against a Minor While Required to Register as a Sex Offender, and (3) Tampering with a Witness. After the verdict, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court denied the motion and subsequently sentenced Defendant to life plus 120 months in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to convict on the aggravated sexual abuse and witness tampering charges. Defendant also challenged his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that here, the evidence at trial presented “two conflicting hypotheses” about Defendant’s motivation in making these phone calls. The jury found more credible the government’s explanation. And while there was no direct evidence that Defendant attempted to corruptly persuade his mother, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that he did. Given that all reasonable inferences must be construed in favor of upholding the verdict, this court will not disturb the jury’s decision on this count. View "United States v. Kimo Little Bird, Sr." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of assaulting a person assisting a federal officer, and a second jury convicted Defendant of drug offenses. On appeal, Defendant raised several challenges to his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant complains that the district judge was unaware that the clerk collected data on the race of potential jurors. But whether or not the district judge was familiar with the information gathered by the clerk, the relevant reports were available to Defendant on request. Defendant could have inquired about information on the racial composition of jury pools before the pre-trial motion deadlines. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motions as untimely. Moreover, evidence of drug activity by a conspirator during the conspiracy is relevant evidence of the existence of the conspiracy. The evidence here was prejudicial in the sense that it tended to prove the existence of the conspiracy, but it was not unfairly prejudicial because it was directly relevant to the charged offense. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. View "United States v. Marcus Burrage" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of a conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d), based on his involvement with the Crips street gang. The Eighth Circuit court affirmed Defendant’s conviction but remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court imposed a sentence of 71 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed the sentence. The principal dispute on appeal concerns whether the district court erred by failing to account for a term of imprisonment that Defendant served in Nebraska for state drug offenses that were committed in the course of the RICO conspiracy.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the court originally sentenced Defendant to 84 months’ imprisonment but effectively gave Defendant“credit” for the eleven-month period from July 2018 through May 2019, when he was serving federal and state sentences concurrently. The incremental punishment for the federal offense originally was 73 months imprisonment. On remand, the state sentence had been discharged, and the court imposed only 71 months imprisonment for the federal offense. Defendant thus received a lesser net punishment after the remand, and he did not lose any “credit” for time served in state custody. View "United States v. Jerell Haynie" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce, conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce, and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in murder. Basically, the Government’s theory was that a drug dealer was robbed and killed, and his body was tossed into a burn pit behind Defendant’s house. The district court denied Defendant’s motions for acquittal and a new trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that sufficient evidence supported the findings that the robbery involved methamphetamine and drug proceeds. The evidence at trial showed that the victim was a drug dealer who sold methamphetamine and had no source of legitimate income. The court explained that while Defendant highlights some facts, he suggests pointing the opposite way; the court wrote it was not convinced. The district court didn’t err in denying acquittal. Further, Defendant’s concerns speak to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The evidence was admissible because it advanced the Government’s theory of the case—that the victim was killed during a robbery, and his body was destroyed in a backyard burn pit. It also wasn’t unfairly prejudicial, considering the evidence suggesting that the victim was murdered. View "United States v. Matthew Robbins" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court ultimately sentenced Defendant to 87 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s calculation of the advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”). Specifically, Defendant argued the district court erroneously decided Defendant’s past conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking in violation of 720 Illinois Compiled Statutes Section 5/18-4(a)(3) was a crime of violence. Thus it should not enhance his offense level under Section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the issue is whether, under the pre-2012 version of the Illinois statute, Defendant could have been convicted for reckless vehicular hijacking. The court concluded that the answer was no. The court wrote that there is neither a precedential case nor a realistic situation in which vehicular hijacking would not be considered a crime of violence as it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Therefore, the court held Defendant’s vehicular hijacking conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the force clause. View "United States v. Ricky Pulley" on Justia Law