Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found with 890 fentanyl pills after Arkansas state troopers pulled him over. He admitted that the pills were his, that he had traveled to Arkansas from Texas to sell them, and that he had successfully done so before. He later pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the court impermissibly varied upward based on a policy disagreement with the guidelines’ treatment of fentanyl.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a district court may vary from the guidelines based on its own policy disagreements with those guidelines. A variance need not be based on the court’s “individualized determination that [the guidelines] yield an excessive sentence in a particular case.” Moreover, the court tied its general policy disagreement to the specific aggravating circumstances of Defendant’s case: the quantity of fentanyl involved, the concealment of the pills as oxycodone, and the past drug sales for which Cortez was not charged. The court carefully weighed these against the mitigating factors and ultimately concluded that they warranted an above-guidelines sentence. The court found no abuse of discretion in that determination. View "United States v. Cesar Cortez" on Justia Law

A jury in a Missouri state court found Petitioner guilty of statutory sodomy in the first degree, which a person commits if he "has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years old." Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, rejecting the argument that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was less than fourteen years old. When Petitioner turned to the federal courts for relief, a magistrate judge1 denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable, though it did grant Petitioner a certificate of appealability. He now challenges the magistrate judge's determination.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the magistrate judge that the Missouri Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable. Though a reasonable juror might harbor some possible doubt that the victim was fourteen or older, the court wrote it is dubious that every rational juror would be compelled to harbor a reasonable doubt or would necessarily not "reach a subjective state of near certitude" that Petitioner was guilty. But a more critical point is that, under AEDPA, the court does not think that the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable or "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement." View "Dale Bookwalter v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action after her son was shot and killed by a City of Minneapolis Police Officer. The district court found Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity as to his initial use of deadly force but not the continued use of force after Jordan dropped his knife and had fallen to the ground. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant asserted he is entitled to qualified immunity as to the entire encounter, which lasted a total of about two seconds.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity. The court explained that its review of the videos of the incident establishes that Defendant never paused during the shooting, which lasted less than two seconds, and he continued shooting for only approximately one second after Plaintiff’s son fell to the ground, dropping the knife. Given the swift and continuous progression of the incident and Defendant’s limited time to observe and process the circumstances, a jury could not find Defendant had sufficient time to reassess the threat presented before he stopped firing. Further, the court explained that even if Plaintiff’s son’s emotional condition perhaps mitigated the threat he posed to the responding officers, a question we need not reach, this detail does not sufficiently distinguish this case from Cook such that Defendant would have had “fair warning” that his conduct violated a constitutional right. View "Florine Ching v. Ofc. Neal Walsh" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury on multiple counts of possessing methamphetamine and firearms. Juneau appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence seized during searches of two residences in Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids, Minnesota.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the firearms were found in the garage near Defendant’s motorcycle, and, as the warrant explained, Defendant’s truck had been observed at the Coon Rapids residence. Thus, the officers had probable cause to believe the firearms belonged to Defendant. Because the firearms fit comfortably within the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. John Juneau" on Justia Law

On April 18, 2018, a jury convicted Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1153 and 2241(c). The court imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment of 30 years on each count. Defendant appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court on two issues and remanded for in-camera review on a single issue—that is, whether the refusal to allow defense counsel access to the victim’s mental health records was harmless in light of the victim’s testimony at trial that she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) after the alleged sexual assault by Defendant. The district court reviewed the records and concluded that not ordering the disclosure of the victim’s mental health records was harmless, finding she received a PTSD diagnosis for the first time after Defendant sexually assaulted her, and her trial testimony was truthful.   The Eighth Circuit, upon de novo review of the claimed constitutional violation, reversed, vacated the convictions, and remanded for a new trial. The court concluded that the district court’s refusal to require the production of K.P.’s mental health records and its limitations on cross-examination after the government opened the door about K.P.’s mental health diagnoses was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Ira Alan Arias" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged was assaulted by his daughter’s ex-boyfriend and the ex-boyfriend’s cousin outside his house in Camden County, Missouri, in December 2011. He reported the assault to the Camden County Sheriff’s Department the following May. After no charges were brought, Plaintiff filed a civil suit against the alleged assailants. While pursuing his civil suit, Plaintiff claimed he discovered that the sheriff’s department refused to investigate the assault because the assailants were related to the county’s clerk of court. This refusal meant that Plaintiff could obtain very little evidence of the assault. Plaintiff then filed an action against officials in the sheriff’s department for claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Missouri Constitution. He claimed that Defendants’ inadequate investigation deprived him of his equal protection and due process rights. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing. They also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants and denied their motion to dismiss as moot. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s federal claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss these claims for lack of standing. The court affirmed to Plaintiff’s state law claims.  The court explained that it has not yet addressed whether a crime victim has standing to sue a government official for an inadequate investigation. However, the court has held that a crime victim cannot sue a government official for failing to prosecute his assailant. View "Jeffery Pratt v. Tony Helms" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as personal representative of her brother, who was in pretrial custody at Phelps County Jail for about six months, filed a lawsuit for damages from inadequate medical care during her brother’s pretrial detention. The district court awarded the individual defendants and Phelps County summary judgment. Plaintiff argued the district court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on her claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. “   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded there is not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent. A correctional officer’s deference to a medical professional regarding a pretrial detainee’s medical care, standing alone, does not create a genuine issue of material fact on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Plaintiff, however, points to nothing in the record showing Defendants deliberately disregarded her brother’s condition while he was in the holdover cell during the final weeks of his pretrial detention. Instead, Plaintiff points to evidence that Phelps County employees were generally aware that her brother was suffering. This evidence, however, does nothing to address the focus of the court’s inquiry: whether Defendants deliberately disregarded Plaintiff’s brother’s serious medical need. Ultimately, the court concluded there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Lady Maakia Charlene Smith v. Richard Lisenbe" on Justia Law

The United States indicted Defendant for illegal exportation of firearm parts from the United States to Mexico. Mexican authorities apprehended Defendant while he was living in Mexico. In conjunction with his arrest, Mexican authorities searched both his vehicle and his Mexican residence. They returned Defendant to the United States border, allowing him to cross the border into the United States, where he was arrested by United States authorities. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the searches. He also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged violation of his due process rights premised on his treatment by Mexican authorities. The district court denied both motions. The district court imposed an upward variance and sentenced him to 144 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression and dismissal motions, as well as the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the record reflects Defendant made his Miranda waiver “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Further, Defendant’s that the district court clearly erred in concluding he self-surrendered is merely an additional attempt to show a joint venture. In this case, the district court explained that it was going above the Guidelines range in order to serve as a deterrent to people going to Mexico to assist cartels. The resulting sentence, while significantly above the Guidelines range, was well below the statutory maximum of 240 months and based on applicable Section 3553(a) factors. Defendant has not shown the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Andrew Pierson" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 63-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon. The question for us is whether a prior conviction for “intentionally” causing “bodily injury,” Iowa Code Section 708.4(2), qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that committing willful injury in Iowa requires an unjustified “act” that is “intended to cause serious injury.” The fact that the statute requires an intent to cause harm to another person necessarily means that anyone who violates it has used “physical force against the person of another.” View "United States v. Christopher Cungtion, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant faced 13 federal charges. Included among them are three counts of arson: “maliciously damaging or destroying]” by “fire or an explosive,” a “vehicle . . . owned or possessed by . . . an institution or organization receiving” federal funding. The arson charges are also the driving force behind three counts of possessing a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.” Under the government’s theory, the Molotov cocktails were destructive devices, and the three counts of arson were crimes of violence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing three destructive device counts against Defendant. The court held that arson is not a “crime of violence.” The court explained that the differences between recklessness, malice, and knowledge come down to a sliding scale of probabilities. From “substantial and unjustified” (recklessness), to a “likelihood” (malice), to “practical certainty” (knowledge), each requires more risk and culpability than the last. In many cases, there may be “little difference” between these mental states. But little does not mean none. The court explained that consciously creating a “likelihood” of harm to property does not satisfy the force clause, despite the high risk involved. In short, the arson counts cannot support the charges for using a “destructive device” in connection with a “crime of violence.” View "United States v. Mujera Lung'aho" on Justia Law